Sánchez's appearance on June 24 before a Congress demanding explanations: what PP, Vox, and their investiture partners expect

Motion of no confidence and vote of confidence after a Prime Minister's appearance: steps and requirements

The appearance of the Prime Minister in Congress, by itself, does not automatically trigger either a motion of no confidence or a vote of confidence: it is only political context. The motion of no confidence can only be promoted by the opposition (at least one-tenth of the deputies) and the vote of confidence can only be proposed by the Prime Minister himself. Both procedures are regulated in the Constitution (arts. 113 and 114 CE for the motion of no confidence; art. 112 and 114 CE for the confidence vote) and in the Congress Rules of Procedure (arts. 175 to 179 RCD), with absolute majorities and very different effects in case of approval or rejection. The steps for each mechanism are detailed below.

a) Motion of no confidence: requirements and processing

1. Relation to the Prime Minister's appearance

The appearance is not a legal requirement for a motion of no confidence. It can be presented at any time when Congress is in session, regardless of whether there has been a prior debate with the Prime Minister or not. Political practice, however, shows that many motions are announced or justified after especially tense debates or visible political crises in the chamber.

2. Who can present it and how it is initiated

According to article 113 of the Constitution and the Congress Rules of Procedure:

Legitimacy: at least one-tenth of the deputies, that is, a minimum of 35 of the 350 members of Congress. Usually it is a majority parliamentary group of the opposition or an alliance of several groups.
Mandatory content: it must be a "constructive" motion of no confidence, that is, include an alternative candidate for the presidency of the Government. A "blank" motion cannot be presented just to censure without proposing a substitute.
Formal presentation: it is registered in writing with the Congress Board, signed by the proposing deputies and indicating the candidate for president.

3. Admission, deadlines and debates

Once registered:

Admission for processing: the Board verifies that the requirements are met (number of signatures and designation of candidate). If met, it admits it and communicates it to the Government and the groups.
Minimum period: the Constitution establishes a "cooling" period before the vote, usually 5 days from the presentation (art. 113 CE and regulatory development). Within the first two days, an alternative motion of no confidence with another candidate may be presented, if it also gathers 35 signatures.
Debate: a special plenary session is held. Normally, a representative of the proposers, the alternative candidate, the spokespersons of the groups intervene, and the Prime Minister himself may intervene.

4. Voting, majorities and effects

Required majority: absolute majority of Congress (176 deputies or more) in favor of the motion.
If approved: according to article 114.2 CE, the Government must resign and the candidate included in the motion is automatically invested as Prime Minister, without the need for a new investiture debate.
If rejected: the Prime Minister and the Government remain in office. The signatories of the rejected motion cannot present another one within the same session period (art. 113.3 CE).

b) Vote of confidence: requirements and processing

1. Relation to the Prime Minister's appearance

The vote of confidence is directly linked to the Prime Minister, but not to his specific appearance. After intervening in a plenary session (for example, on the state of the nation, a political crisis, or a major legislative package), the Prime Minister may politically decide to submit to a vote of confidence, but legally he is not obliged by the appearance to do so. It is an exclusive faculty of the Prime Minister, provided for in article 112 of the Constitution.

2. Who can propose it and on what

Only the Prime Minister can propose a vote of confidence, never the opposition or the Board. It must be linked to a political program or a general policy statement, or to a relevant set of legislative measures. It is presented in writing to the Congress Board, which admits it for processing and refers it to the Plenary.

3. Debate and voting

Debate: the Prime Minister presents the program or political orientation on which he requests confidence. Parliamentary groups intervene in a format similar to an investiture debate, with reply turns.
Required majority: simple majority of votes cast (more yes than no), according to article 114.1 CE. Absolute majority is not required, unlike the motion of no confidence.

4. Effects of approval or rejection

If confidence is obtained: the Government is politically strengthened and continues in full functions. There are no additional automatic effects, although politically it may unblock legislative projects or consolidate support.
If confidence is not obtained: article 114.1 CE establishes that the Prime Minister must present his resignation to the King. From that moment a new phase opens: either an investiture process of another candidate begins, or a dissolution of the Cortes and call for elections occurs if a new majority is not achieved within the established deadlines (art. 99 CE and 115 CE).

Conclusion: real role of the appearance

In summary, the Prime Minister's appearance before Congress acts as a political trigger but not as a legal requirement for either mechanism. The motion of no confidence depends on the opposition's initiative and requires an absolute majority to replace the Government, while the vote of confidence is an instrument of the Prime Minister himself, with a simple majority, whose rejection forces his resignation. Both procedures are strictly regulated in the Constitution and the Congress Rules of Procedure, and are not automatically activated after any specific debate or appearance.

Brief answer

The Prime Minister has the key power to propose to the King the dissolution of the Cortes Generales and the calling of general elections, in accordance with article 115 of the Spanish Constitution (CE). This power is politically discretionary but subject to formal and temporal limits (it cannot be exercised during a state of exception or siege nor when a motion of no confidence is pending). The formal decision of calling elections is made by the King by decree, which must necessarily be countersigned by the Prime Minister. Additionally, the Prime Minister cannot dissolve the Chambers during the first year of the legislature nor when a dissolution for the same reason has already occurred in that period.

Basic constitutional framework

The Prime Minister's power is mainly articulated through:

1. Article 115 CE: regulates the dissolution of the Cortes Generales and the calling of elections. It establishes that the Prime Minister, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, may propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales and the consequent calling of elections. The decision is formalized by the King by decree, which must be countersigned by the Prime Minister.

2. Article 64 CE: requires the countersignature of the Prime Minister for the King's act (the decree of dissolution and calling) to be valid and effective. In practice, this means that the real political power lies with the Prime Minister: the King acts without discretionary margin at this point.

3. Article 99 CE: in case of a deadlock in the investiture, the Constitution provides for an automatic dissolution of the Cortes if two months pass from the first vote without a Prime Minister being elected. Although this is no longer a discretionary initiative of the Prime Minister, the decree of dissolution and calling is also issued by the King with countersignature, traditionally by the acting Prime Minister or, failing that, by the President of Congress. In any case, the presidential decision margin is very limited, as the constitutional mandate is automatic.

Scope of the Prime Minister's discretionary power

Under ordinary conditions, the initiative to anticipate elections is one of the Prime Minister's main political weapons. His powers include:

a) Deciding the political moment of early dissolution. The Prime Minister can choose to complete the legislature or bring forward elections for reasons such as lack of parliamentary support, need for citizen "endorsement" of a political agenda, or management of a crisis situation. He does not need to legally justify the decision: it is an eminently political power.

b) Choosing which Chamber to dissolve. Although it is usual to dissolve both Congress and Senate together, the Constitution allows the separate dissolution of one or the other Chamber. In the Spanish system, however, for reasons of stability and political practice, the joint dissolution of the Cortes Generales is almost always chosen.

c) Setting, within legal margins, the election date. The Constitution and the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) establish deadlines between dissolution and the holding of elections (generally 54 days). Within that framework, the Government — under the Prime Minister's leadership — specifies the exact date in the decree, which has a clear strategic component.

Constitutional limits and restrictions

The CE imposes several limitations on this power:

1. Temporal limits (art. 115.2 CE). A new dissolution cannot occur before one year has passed since the previous one, except for the specific case of automatic dissolution due to investiture deadlock (art. 99.5 CE). Nor can dissolution be made during the first year of the legislature for the same purpose, which aims to prevent abusive or constant tactical use of dissolution.

2. Exceptional states (art. 116 CE). During the state of exception or siege, the dissolution of the Chambers cannot be proposed. This reinforces institutional and parliamentary continuity in situations of serious constitutional crisis.

3. Motion of no confidence (art. 115.2 CE). If a motion of no confidence is pending, the Prime Minister cannot propose dissolution. This prevents neutralizing the maximum parliamentary control that a motion of no confidence represents with an immediate early election.

4. Caretaker government. Although the Constitution does not explicitly detail this, doctrine derived from the constitutional text and institutional practice understand that a caretaker government should not make decisions of strong political content such as discretionary dissolution; in practice, when dissolutions occur in this context, they are usually imposed by the automatic mechanism of article 99 CE.

Nature and scope of the Prime Minister's power

The Prime Minister's power to promote general elections is:

Politically central: it conditions the effective duration of the legislature and the balance of forces in the Cortes, becoming a key instrument of negotiation with the opposition and investiture partners.

Legally regulated: although the political opportunity is free, the procedure (deliberation of the Council of Ministers, proposal to the King, decree and electoral deadlines) and the temporal and material limits are set by the CE and the LOREG.

Formally shared with the King, but decisive in the hands of the Prime Minister: the King signs and proclaims, but the effective content of the decision (to dissolve or not, when and what to dissolve) rests on the political will of the countersigning Prime Minister.

Brief answer

In the available parliamentary information, only a limited set of bills explicitly linked to democratic regeneration, institutional transparency, public integrity, or the fight against corruption have been identified, presented by several opposition groups. For the Popular Party (PP), 3 legislative initiatives have been located concerning the independence of the CIS, reform of the Congress Rules of Procedure, and transparency of the Council of State. For Vox, 2 organic law bills reforming the electoral regime aimed at strengthening the integrity of the electoral process appear. For Sumar, 1 bill creating an Anti-Corruption Office is recorded, and for other opposition groups (such as the PNV) at least proposals to reform control over the CNI that impact transparency and parliamentary oversight have been identified. However, the data are not exhaustive nor include all types of initiatives (questions, non-legislative motions, motions, etc.), so the figures should be understood as a partial sample and not as a definitive total count.

1. Scope and limits of the count

The search was based solely on the available parliamentary information block, without additional access to other complete repositories. For this reason:

a) Only bills or regulatory reforms with the rank and processing of law have been counted, not questions, interpellations, non-legislative motions, motions, or requests for appearances.
b) The criterion was thematic: only initiatives clearly related to democratic regeneration, transparency, public integrity, anti-corruption institutional reform, control and accountability, and the fight against corruption were included.
c) Several initiatives may simultaneously cover several of these axes (for example, transparency and accountability), but each is counted only once per party.
d) There is no exhaustive tracking of the entire XV Legislature, only a representative sample. Therefore, the figures offered are minimums and do not exhaust necessarily all real parliamentary production on the subject.

2. Initiatives of the Popular Party (PP)

In the case of the Popular Group, at least 3 bills directly framed in the field of democratic regeneration and institutional transparency have been located:

1) Independence of the CIS. The “Bill to amend Law 39/1995, of December 19, on the Organization of the Sociological Research Center, to strengthen its independence”, presented on 10/31/2024 in Congress and currently in an extended amendment period until 06/24/2026, aims to guarantee the neutrality of the CIS and strengthen control and transparency mechanisms of its studies, especially during electoral periods. It can be consulted in Congress: View initiative.

2) Debate on the State of the Nation. The “Bill to reform the Rules of Procedure of the Congress of Deputies regarding the regulation of the general policy debate on the State of the Nation”, dated 11/15/2024, also in amendment period until 06/24/2026, seeks to institutionalize an annual general policy debate, strengthening government accountability before the Chamber. It is available at: View initiative.

3) Transparency of the Council of State. The “Organic Law Bill amending Organic Law 3/1980, of April 22, regulating the Council of State, to strengthen transparency of its functions”, registered on 05/05/2025 and admitted for processing, introduces active publication obligations of opinions and reports, improving citizen control over this advisory body. It can be consulted at: View initiative.

Overall, the PP has articulated in this legislature a block of at least 3 legislative initiatives focused on institutional transparency and accountability mechanisms.

3. Initiatives of Vox

In the Vox group, 2 organic law bills aimed at strengthening the integrity of the electoral system have been identified:

1) Ineligibility of fugitives. The “Organic Law Bill amending Organic Law 5/1985, of June 19, on the General Electoral Regime, to include fugitives from justice as ineligible” (03/15/2024), admitted and pending consideration, expands causes of ineligibility to prevent access to public office of persons with arrest warrants or serious accusations. Text at: View initiative.

2) Prevention of electoral fraud. The “Organic Law Bill amending Organic Law 5/1985, of June 19, on the General Electoral Regime, to strengthen prevention of electoral fraud” (03/22/2024), also admitted, introduces separation of the counting of postal and in-person votes to increase traceability of the count. It can be consulted at: View initiative.

These 2 initiatives clearly fall within the scope of guaranteeing the integrity and security of the electoral process, a key component of democratic regeneration.

4. Initiatives of Sumar

For the Plurinational Sumar Group, at least 1 bill directly linked to the fight against corruption has been located:

The “Bill to create the Anti-Corruption Office”, presented on 04/12/2024 in Congress and finally rejected in a vote on 09/16/2025, proposed an autonomous body responsible for prevention, detection, and investigation of corruption, with coordination functions with civil society and aligned with international standards. The rejected text can be seen in the Bulletin: View initiative (rejected text).

This initiative constitutes the main legislative contribution identified from Sumar to the state architecture of corruption prevention and public integrity in the legislature.

5. Other opposition groups

Although the question focuses on the "main" opposition parties, in the field of transparency and institutional control other initiatives also stand out, for example from the Basque Group (EAJ-PNV), with a bill to amend Law 11/2002 regulating the National Intelligence Center and Organic Law 2/2002 on prior judicial control of the CNI, aimed at strengthening control and transparency mechanisms over intelligence services. The text is in the Congress database.

6. Quantitative conclusion and caveats

With the available information, it can be stated that, in the current legislature, the main opposition groups have presented at least the following legal-rank parliamentary initiatives on democratic regeneration and the fight against corruption:

PP: 3 bills / regulatory reforms.
Vox: 2 organic law bills on electoral reform.
Sumar: 1 bill creating an Anti-Corruption Office.
Other opposition groups (e.g., PNV): at least 1 relevant bill on control and transparency of the CNI.

Since questions, non-legislative motions, motions, or other control initiatives have not been included, nor has an exhaustive tracking of the entire XV Legislature been done, these figures should be interpreted as a documented minimum, not as a complete inventory of all opposition activity in democratic regeneration and the fight against corruption.