Sánchez appears at 9:00 in Moncloa and all eyes point to a possible electoral advance.

The president will make an institutional statement after the rejection of the housing decrees and two days after opening a reflection on the future of the legislature.

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Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

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Media a 19 de noviembre de 2026 · 19 institutos

  • PP31,0 %
  • PSOE27,7 %
  • Vox19,0 %
  • Frente Amplio6,2 %
  • ERC2,6 %
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Media del último estudio de cada instituto en 30 días y su evolución semanal desde el 23J. Partidos con al menos un 2 %.

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Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

Pedro Sánchez will make an institutional statement this Monday at 9:00 a.m. from the La Moncloa Complex, in an appearance called after the Congress rejected the two housing decrees and after a weekend in which the president has held contacts to decide the future of the legislature.

The statement comes after government sources indicated that Sánchez was evaluating all options, including an advance of the general elections. The president has dedicated the weekend to analyzing with government members and PSOE leaders the consequences of the parliamentary defeat.

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What is the parliamentary procedure for the dissolution of the Cortes and the calling of general elections in Spain?

The dissolution of the Cortes Generales and the calling of general elections in Spain is a procedure mainly regulated by the Constitution (arts. 68, 69, 78, 99, 115, and 116 CE) and by the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG). It combines decisions by the Prime Minister and the King, strict material and temporal limits, and a fixed electoral calendar.

1. Who can dissolve and how it is initiated

The political initiative corresponds to the Prime Minister. According to article 115 CE:

  • The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, proposes the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or both Chambers.
  • That proposal is submitted to the King, who formally issues the Royal Decree of dissolution and call for elections, which must always be countersigned by the Prime Minister.
  • There is no prior vote by the Congress nor decisive intervention by the Chamber: it is a governmental power, not parliamentary, except in the case of automatic dissolution due to investiture failure.

Along with the dissolution, the royal decree already sets the call for general elections, in accordance with the deadlines of the LOREG.

2. Automatic dissolution due to investiture failure

Besides the “discretionary” dissolution at the Prime Minister's initiative, the Constitution provides for an automatic dissolution (art. 99 CE):

  • If two months pass from the first investiture vote without any candidate having obtained the confidence of the Congress.
  • In that case, the King dissolves both Chambers and calls new general elections, without the Government being able to opt to maintain the legislature.

Here the Congress is indeed relevant de facto, because the counting of the deadline and the failure of the votes are the premise that triggers the dissolution.

3. Material and temporal limits (art. 115 CE)

The Prime Minister cannot propose dissolution at any time. The Constitution establishes several prohibitions:

  • First year of the legislature: a new dissolution cannot be agreed upon before one year has passed since the previous one.
  • Motion of censure in process: dissolution is not allowed while a motion of censure against the Government is registered and pending; this protects this control mechanism of the Congress.
  • States of exception and siege: the Congress cannot be dissolved while a state of exception or siege is declared and in force (art. 116 CE).

Dissolution can be agreed upon in any session period (ordinary or extraordinary), provided these prohibitions are respected.

4. Electoral deadlines and constitution of the new Cortes

The LOREG sets a fixed calendar:

  • The royal decree of dissolution and call determines the date of the vote.
  • Between the call and election day, 54 days must elapse, a period that includes the electoral campaign and prior procedures.
  • Once the elections have been held and the results proclaimed, the new Chambers are constituted in the constitutive session, within the deadlines set by the Constitution and the LOREG (the Constitution provides, for the Congress, a maximum period of a few days from the election).

The previous legislature is formally considered ended with the dissolution; the new Cortes inaugurate their own legislature from their constitutive session.

5. Situation during dissolution: Permanent Deputation and caretaker Government

Once the Chambers are dissolved or their mandate has expired, Parliament enters a transitional phase:

  • Ordinary plenary sessions and committees cease to exist, but, according to art. 78 CE, the Permanent Deputation of the Congress and the Senate maintains certain functions until the constitution of the new Cortes.
  • In particular, it assumes powers related to:
    • The validation or repeal of royal decree-laws, within 30 days following their promulgation (art. 86 CE).
    • The authorization and extension of states of alarm, exception, and siege, if they occur with the Chambers dissolved (art. 116 CE).
  • It cannot legislate nor participate in investitures nor exercise ordinary political control (questions, interpellations, motions), beyond these exceptional functions.

Meanwhile, the Executive becomes a caretaker Government until the new one takes office. Its actions are limited to the ordinary dispatch of public affairs and essential management, without setting new political orientations, except in urgent and extraordinary situations that may justify, for example, the approval of royal decree-laws later validated by the Permanent Deputation or the new Cortes.

Overall, the constitutional design combines broad discretion of the Prime Minister to propose dissolution with temporal and material checks, and ensures the continuity of the State through the Permanent Deputation and the caretaker Government regime until the new Chambers are constituted.

What powers does the Permanent Deputation of the Congress have according to the Spanish Constitution?

The Permanent Deputation of the Congress of Deputies is a body provided for in the Spanish Constitution to guarantee the continuity of certain parliamentary functions when the Plenary cannot meet (mainly during periods between sessions and especially when the Congress is dissolved or its mandate has expired). Its basic powers are set out in article 78 of the Constitution, complemented by other provisions (such as articles 73, 86, and 116) and by the Rules of the Congress.

1. General constitutional framework

Article 78 of the Constitution establishes that each Chamber (Congress and Senate) must have a Permanent Deputation, composed of a small number of members who proportionally represent the parliamentary groups. In the case of the Congress, this Deputation:

  • Remains in office when the Plenary is not convened.
  • Assumes certain powers when the Congress has been dissolved or its mandate has expired.
  • After elections, reports to the Plenary on the matters it has dealt with and the decisions it has made.

Its purpose is to avoid “power vacuums” in parliamentary moments when the Chamber is not fully operational.

2. Powers over Royal Decree-Laws (art. 78.2.a CE and art. 86 CE)

One of the central functions of the Permanent Deputation of the Congress is its relation to royal decree-laws, regulated in article 86 of the Constitution. These are norms with the force of law issued by the Government in cases of extraordinary and urgent necessity, which must be submitted to the Congress for validation or repeal within a short period.

According to article 78.2.a CE, it corresponds to the Permanent Deputation to:

  • Consider the royal decree-laws issued by the Government when the Congress is dissolved or its mandate has expired, or when the Plenary cannot meet normally.
  • In practice, this implies:
    • Calling the session (of the Deputation itself or the Plenary, if appropriate) to debate and vote on the validation or repeal of each decree-law.
    • Ensuring that parliamentary control over the use of decree-laws is not suspended by the dissolution of the Chamber.

Thus, even if the Plenary cannot act, the Government remains subject to immediate control regarding urgent norms.

3. Powers in states of alarm, exception, and siege (art. 78.2.b CE and art. 116 CE)

Another key power derives from article 116 CE, which regulates states of alarm, exception, and siege. In crisis situations, the Constitution grants the Congress authorization and control functions over these declarations.

Article 78.2.b provides that the Permanent Deputation of the Congress:

  • Assumes the powers corresponding to the Congress according to paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 116 CE, when the Chamber is dissolved or cannot meet:
    • Authorize extensions of the state of alarm.
    • Authorize the declaration and extension of the state of exception.
    • Authorize the declaration of the state of siege and oversee its development.

This ensures that, even in exceptional scenarios with the Congress dissolved, effective parliamentary control over the Executive's use of extraordinary powers continues.

4. Calling extraordinary sessions (art. 73.2 CE)

The Constitution also links the Permanent Deputation to the calling of extraordinary sessions. Article 73.2 CE establishes that the Chambers may be convened in extraordinary session:

  • At the Government's request.
  • At the Permanent Deputation's request.
  • At the request of the absolute majority of the Chamber members.

Consequently, the Permanent Deputation of the Congress has the power to request the calling of extraordinary sessions when it deems necessary, for example, in the face of a political or social situation requiring urgent intervention by the Chamber.

5. Other powers and limits

Besides these functions expressly mentioned in the Constitution, article 78.2.c CE refers to “those attributed by the Constitution or the Chambers' Rules.” From this derive other powers, mainly organizational and control-related, established by the Rules of the Congress, such as:

  • Safeguarding the powers of the Chamber when it is dissolved or its mandate has expired.
  • Assuming certain control functions over the Government (for example, requests for information or agreements to call hearings), under the terms provided by the Rules.
  • Reporting to the Plenary, once the new Congress is constituted, on the matters it has dealt with and decisions made during the Plenary's inactivity period.

At the same time, the Permanent Deputation has clear limits: it does not replace the Congress in its ordinary legislative capacity nor in the full processing of laws; it essentially acts as a body of continuity and guarantee, focused on decree-laws, exceptional states, extraordinary calls, and preservation of the Chamber's powers while it cannot exercise them itself.

How is the Permanent Deputation of the Congress composed and how are its members elected? What differences are there between the powers of the Permanent Deputation of the Congress and that of the Senate? Could you explain with recent examples how the Permanent Deputation has acted regarding decree-laws or states of alarm?

What requirements must Sumar, Más Madrid, IU, and Comuns meet to officially register their coalition before the Electoral Board?

For Sumar, Más Madrid, Izquierda Unida, and the Comuns to officially register an electoral coalition before the competent Electoral Board in general elections, there is no “ad hoc” regime for them: the general coalition regime of the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) applies. This regime sets material requirements (internal agreements and content of the pact) and formal requirements (deadlines, documentation, and authorized bodies to sign and submit the coalition).

1. Internal agreement of the parties forming the coalition

Each party to be part of the coalition must adopt, according to its internal statutes, a specific agreement authorizing participation in that electoral coalition. In practice, this implies:

  • That the competent body according to the statutes (leadership, executive, political council, etc.) approves the integration into the coalition and the text of the pact.
  • That it expressly authorizes who will sign the coalition agreement on behalf of each party (usually the person holding the legal representation of the formation or who is empowered for that purpose).
  • That this agreement is formalized in writing, so it can be submitted to the Electoral Board if required to verify valid representation.

2. Legal deadline to communicate the coalition

LOREG requires that parties intending to run in coalition in general elections communicate in writing to the competent Electoral Board within the deadline set from the call of the elections. This deadline is very short and runs from the publication of the royal decree of the call in the corresponding official bulletin.

If the coalition is not communicated within the legal deadline:

  • It is not officially recognized as an electoral coalition for the purpose of submitting candidacies.
  • The parties would have to present separate lists, with consequences in denomination, financing, and electoral spaces.

3. Minimum content of the coalition agreement

In that communication to the Electoral Board, a sufficiently detailed coalition agreement must be included or reflected. For electoral purposes, the following are especially relevant:

  • Name and acronyms under which the coalition will appear on the ballots, and, if applicable, symbol or logo. Confusion with other existing parties or coalitions must be avoided.
  • Territorial scope of the coalition (for example, whether it runs in all constituencies or only some) and, if applicable, the internal distribution of candidacies by provinces.
  • Criteria for the distribution of electoral subsidies among the member formations (both those linked to seats and those associated with votes and mailing). The Board does not enter into political detail, but the agreement must allow identifying who holds the economic rights vis-à-vis the Administration.
  • Distribution of electoral propaganda spaces (mainly in public media), in accordance with general rules on time calculation and representation.
  • Designation of general representatives and electoral administrators of the coalition, who will act before the Electoral Board and the electoral administration in economic matters.

4. Who signs and what documentation is submitted

The communication of the coalition before the Electoral Board must be signed by the persons legally authorized to represent each party. Usually:

  • This is the person registered as the legal representative or president of the party in the Ministry of the Interior's party registry, or someone with a notarial power of attorney or internal empowerment sufficient for this purpose.
  • The Electoral Board may require proof of that representation (for example, with certification from the party registry or a copy of the power of attorney).

Along with the communication and the coalition agreement, it is usually submitted:

  • Complete identification of each party (name, acronyms, and registry data).
  • Contact details of the representatives and electoral administrators.
  • If applicable, the internal resolution of the competent body that approved joining the coalition.

5. Effects of registering the coalition

Once communicated and accepted within the deadline, the coalition acquires effects at several levels:

  • It may present joint candidacies in the indicated constituencies, under the agreed name and acronyms.
  • Its electoral results (votes and seats) will be counted as a unit for the purposes of assigning subsidies and propaganda times.
  • That joint result will also be the reference point for the possible formation of a parliamentary group in the new legislature, under the general rules applicable to any other political force.

In summary, Sumar, Más Madrid, IU, and Comuns must first reach a politically valid pact according to their statutes and then submit it to the Electoral Board within the legal deadline, with the name, representatives, administrators, and basic rules for the distribution of economic rights and media spaces well defined. Without these material and formal requirements, the coalition would not be validly registered.

Can you detail exactly what LOREG says about the deadline and content of the communication of an electoral coalition? What practical differences are there between running as a formal coalition or through lists of a single party with independents from the rest? How does the design of the coalition influence the possibility of forming its own parliamentary group after the elections?

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What reason has led Pedro Sánchez to bring forward the general elections?

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Which body assumes the functions of the Congress after the dissolution of the Cortes during the electoral period?

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