Europe gives a last chance to dialogue with China while sharpening its trade weapons

European leaders commission the European Commission to develop a new strategy to correct trade imbalances with Beijing, betting on strengthening political and economic dialogue without giving up on developing new trade defense tools if negotiations do not yield results.

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European leaders transformed the European Council chamber in Brussels on Thursday night into a kind of collective therapeutic consultation. The objective was to find a common diagnosis to learn to live with one of the most complex, necessary, and contradictory relationships in contemporary international economic policy. "There is an unsustainable situation of imbalance," various European officials repeated during the debates. "It costs us a billion euros a day," graphically summarized one of the leaders in favor of hardening the community's position. Hovering over the entire working dinner, although barely appearing in official documents, was a word that no one needed to utter too much: China.

From this first session of a genuine economic "shock therapy," the European Commission emerges with a new political mandate. This was precisely one of the objectives pursued by the Community Executive at this summit. The Twenty-Seven urged Brussels to develop a strategy to correct the growing disproportion in the trade balance with Beijing and to respond to imbalances that, as practically all European capitals now recognize, have reached a structural dimension.

On paper, the task consists of reinforcing existing mechanisms to protect European industry and ensure more balanced competition. However, community sources acknowledge that the debate also opens the door to exploring "eventually" new tools and "levers" of action. Of course, the same sources insist that any response must remain within the framework of international rules. "Europe should not move away from the World Trade Organization," they summarize.

Brussels prepares new instruments

According to sources familiar with one of the most complex negotiations of the entire summit, the discussion was not limited solely to reinforcing currently available trade instruments. Leaders would also have begun to explore the possibility of developing a novel response element that could see the light of day before the end of the year.

“There are areas in which Brussels is already working actively, such as market diversification or more effective use of safeguard clauses for entire sectors,” acknowledges a European diplomatic source. However, there is a feeling that current tools may prove insufficient given the magnitude of the challenge posed by the Chinese economy.

The perception that has spread in community offices is that the Union must move towards a strategy of risk reduction (de-risking) rather than complete decoupling from the Asian economy, a possibility that many consider simply unfeasible under current conditions.

In this context, some member states defended a more pragmatic approach during the dinner. Spain stood out among them. According to government sources, Pedro Sánchez conveyed to the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, that a firm but open negotiation with China would likely yield better results than a trade escalation with unpredictable consequences.

The Spanish president himself had already advanced this position upon arriving at the Europa building. “We need friends,” he stated to the media, in a declaration that summarized the philosophy Moncloa intends to bring to the debate.

European Division on China

The differences between member states were evident from the start of the day. Although there is a growing consensus on the need to correct trade imbalances, not everyone shares the same diagnosis or the same remedies.

Sources close to Sánchez maintain that Europe must avoid falling into a logic of permanent confrontation with Beijing. From Madrid, it is considered that a trade war would have a particularly high cost for European economies and that economic diplomacy continues to offer room for obtaining results.

Until now, contacts had already occurred between both parties, but within different European diplomatic teams, there is a feeling that these efforts have not generated significant progress. “There is room for improvement,” say sources from La Moncloa. Precisely for this reason, during the dinner, the possibility of creating a new platform or forum for structured dialogue with China that incorporates concrete objectives, defined timelines, and monitoring mechanisms would have been explored.

From the environment of the Spanish president, they also consider that part of the European strategy has been excessively focused on tariffs. "The European commercial offensive has been based a lot on tariffs and less on quotas," explain sources knowledgeable about the Spanish position.

"We are not opposed to the instruments themselves. What we want is for it to be clearly explained why each one of them is adopted. Anti-China rhetoric is not convenient," maintains a source present at the conversations.

From Spanish pragmatism to Nordic firmness

The Spanish vision was not shared by all participants. One of the most prudent leaders was the Dutch Prime Minister, Rob Jetten, who publicly admitted his doubts about the possibility of reaching a common position among the Twenty-Seven. "I am not sure we can reach an agreement, but it is very good to have a very open conversation," he said before the start of the meetings.

The Austrian Chancellor, Christian Stocker, was more forceful. The conservative leader once again defined China as a "systemic rival" and called for a more coordinated European strategy to respond to Beijing's growing economic, industrial, and technological influence. Even firmer was the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen. The social democratic leader argued that Europe must abandon certain strategic complexes and respond more forcefully to Chinese competition in sectors considered sensitive for the European economy.

"We must dare to counterattack and that also applies to China," she stated, reflecting a vision much closer to the theses of those who advocate for a more aggressive trade policy. Luxembourg positioned itself between the two blocs. Its Prime Minister, Luc Frieden, acknowledged that the economic challenge posed by China is growing, but warned against any temptation to break off relations. "I am very much in favor of us engaging in dialogue with them and telling them that, of course, we are interested in trade relations, but that they must be fair," he explained.

The different interventions highlighted a reality that Brussels knows well: the difficulty of building a unified position when the levels of economic dependence on China are very different among the member states and when national strategic priorities do not always coincide.

Putting the house in order

In reality, as several European officials explain, the discussion goes far beyond China. The underlying debate revolves around Europe's ability to maintain its industrial competitiveness in an international context increasingly marked by geoeconomic rivalry. "It's about putting our house in order so that the European market remains competitive and attractive to third countries," summarizes a senior EU official.

Therefore, in addition to trade measures, the conversation included issues related to industrial policy, technological innovation, critical supply chains, and the strategic autonomy of the European Union. It is no coincidence that the European Commissioner for Trade, Maroš Šefčovič, recently defended before the European Parliament the need to strengthen the effectiveness of trade defense instruments while deepening the economic diversification strategy through the EU's extensive network of trade agreements.

The Commission considers both dimensions to be complementary: better protecting the internal market against unfair practices and, simultaneously, opening up new trade opportunities with alternative partners.

A debate that barely appears in the conclusions

Despite the intensity of the discussions and the strategic importance of the issue, the official conclusions of the European Council barely reflect a minimal part of what was debated during the night. The only reference included in the document approved by the leaders states that "the European Council held a strategic debate on the issue of global macroeconomic imbalances."

A deliberately ambiguous formulation that hides behind technical language one of the most relevant debates for the economic future of the European Union.

Because behind the expression "global macroeconomic imbalances" lies an increasingly shared concern in European capitals: how to manage an economic relationship with China that remains essential for European growth, but which at the same time generates dependencies, vulnerabilities, and tensions that are increasingly difficult to ignore. The therapy has begun. The diagnosis seems shared by most leaders. What still divides Europe is the treatment.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What are the next legislative steps the European Commission must follow after receiving the mandate from the Twenty-Seven to develop a new trade strategy regarding China?

After a political mandate from the Twenty-Seven to develop a new trade strategy regarding China, the European Commission does not directly proceed to "make laws," but first prepares a strategic Communication and, only if necessary, accompanies it with legislative proposals. The immediate steps are: internally scheduling the initiative, launching a roadmap and public consultations and with Member States, and, if applicable, preparing an impact assessment. Afterwards, the College of Commissioners adopts the strategy as a Communication and sends any regulatory proposals to the European Parliament and the Council, which would initiate the ordinary legislative procedure. All this takes place in a context of "de-risking" and reducing dependencies on China within the 2024‑2029 institutional cycle.

1. Type of act prepared by the Commission and legal fit

The "mandate" of the Twenty-Seven is usually formulated in conclusions of the European Council or the Council, which set a political priority but do not replace the Commission's legislative initiative, as explained in institutional fact sheets about the Commission's role in the EU (Hablamos de Europa, Ministry of Finance). The typical response of the Commission is:

– To prepare a Communication (non-legislative act) that articulates the new trade strategy regarding China (objectives, principles, instruments).
– To determine if it is necessary to accompany it with regulatory proposals (regulations, directives, or modifications of existing trade instruments).
– If applicable, also to foresee delegated or implementing acts supported by already existing legislation.

2. Internal steps in the Commission: from political signal to adopted package

According to the practice described in documents about the EU decision-making process (Open Europe, Hablamos de Europa), the internal phases are as follows:

a) Definition of the internal mandate
After the Council conclusions, the College of Commissioners and the cabinets define the scope of the strategy: balance between access to the Chinese market, defense against unfair practices, investment control, economic security, and reduction of dependencies. The initiative is included in the Commission Work Programme and DG TRADE is designated as the lead service, in coordination with other DGs (competition, industry, energy, digital, external relations).

b) Roadmap and initial consultations
In line with the "Better Regulation" policy described by the Commission (better regulation portal), a roadmap or "Inception Impact Assessment" is published when possible legislative measures are foreseen. This document sets out the problem (for example, critical dependencies on China), objectives, and preliminary options, and is subject to public comments for several weeks.

In parallel, the Commission opens a structured dialogue with Member States in the Trade Policy Committee and other Council groups to probe red lines and priorities (for example, sectors where some countries are more reluctant to harden the stance towards China).

c) Consultations with stakeholders and impact assessment
Next, an online public consultation ("Have Your Say") of 8‑12 weeks is usually launched, aimed at companies, unions, NGOs, and experts, on market access to China, subsidies, supply chain risks, or possible new instruments. Parallel meetings are held with key sectors (automotive, renewables, critical raw materials, technology).

If regulatory proposals are foreseen, the Commission prepares a full impact assessment, analyzing the economic, social, and environmental effects of different options and which must pass the control of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (described in the Commission's better regulation documentation).

d) Inter-service coordination and adoption
Based on this work, an inter-service steering group is formed to review drafts of the Communication and any proposals for regulations or directives. After a formal inter-service consultation, the package is submitted to the College of Commissioners, which decides on its adoption: the Communication sets the strategy towards China and any legislative proposals are adopted and sent to Parliament and Council.

3. Relationship with the European Parliament and the Council

The strategic Communication on China is not processed as law, but it is presented and debated in the European Parliament (especially in the INTA committee) and in the Council (Trade formation). The Parliament can approve a own-initiative report or resolution setting its political position, while the Council can respond with new conclusions that support, qualify, or reinforce the strategy (see general explanation of the European Council's role at La Moncloa).

If the strategy includes legislative proposals (for example, a new trade defense regulation or investment control linked to China), these follow the ordinary legislative procedure, described by various guides on the EU decision system (Open Europe): first reading in Parliament and Council, possible trilogues, and final adoption by both institutions before publication in the Official Journal of the EU.

4. Political context and indicative timeline

Analyses of the new 2024‑2029 institutional cycle emphasize that the Commission has placed open strategic autonomy, industrial competitiveness, and economic security at the center of its agenda (Real Instituto Elcano). The relationship with China fits within this "de-risking" logic: not a total decoupling, but risk management in critical sectors and more active use of trade instruments.

In terms of time, from the political mandate of the Twenty-Seven to the adoption of the Communication usually takes about 9 to 12 months, including roadmap, consultations, and inter-service coordination. If the strategy includes draft regulations or directives, their processing in Parliament and Council can extend between one and two years, depending on the degree of political consensus and the sensitivity of the proposed measures.

What specific trade instruments could the Commission propose in that strategy to reduce dependencies on China? How could Spain position itself in the Council and the European Parliament regarding a tougher trade strategy towards China? What impact would a new EU trade strategy towards China have on specific sectors of the Spanish economy (automotive, renewables, agri-food)?

What are the main competences and functions of the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, according to European Union law?

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, plays a role defined mainly by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Her core competences are to direct the political and administrative action of the Commission, set its priorities, organize and coordinate the College of Commissioners, and represent the Commission externally and in the legislative process. Additionally, she proposes the composition of the College to the European Council, can demand the resignation of individual commissioners, and answers to the European Parliament, which can force collective resignation through a motion of censure. Overall, her position makes the Commission Presidency a center of political drive and institutional coordination within the EU system.

Legal basis of her competences

The functions of the Commission Presidency derive mainly from Article 17 of the TEU, complemented by provisions of the TFEU on the legislative procedure and interinstitutional relations. Article 17 TEU defines the Commission as the institution that "shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end", and specifies that it is the President who organizes and directs that work. It also regulates her appointment (proposed by the European Council and elected by the European Parliament) and the President's power to determine the distribution of portfolios and the internal structure of the Commission during her mandate.

Political leadership and priority setting

One of Ursula von der Leyen's essential functions is to define the major political orientations of the Commission. This is embodied in a political program for the mandate (such as the European Green Deal, the digital agenda, or the response to the energy crisis) and in the annual priorities set out in the Commission Work Programme. Although the formal legislative initiative belongs to the Commission as a whole, in practice the President guides which strategic proposals are prepared, when they are presented, and with what level of ambition, ensuring coherence among the different portfolios.

This driving capacity includes horizontal coordination of the executive vice-presidents and commissioners responsible for key areas (climate, economy, digitalization, etc.). The President can establish inter-service working groups, commission new initiatives, or request the revision or withdrawal of proposals if they deviate from the set priorities. In this way, she exercises an internal "head of government" function within the Commission.

Organization of the College and authority over commissioners

Article 17.6 TEU expressly grants the President the competence to decide the internal organization of the Commission. This includes the distribution of portfolios among commissioners, the appointment of vice-presidents, possible reassignment of competences during the mandate, and the definition of the political structure (for example, the existence of executive vice-presidencies or commissioners without classic portfolios but with horizontal responsibilities).

Additionally, the President has the power to request the resignation of an individual commissioner when deemed necessary, for political or integrity reasons. This prerogative strengthens internal discipline of the College and the political responsibility of each member vis-à-vis the general line decided by the Presidency. At the same time, the Commission acts collegially, so the President must build internal majorities and consensus for the adoption of acts and proposals.

Role in legislative and executive functions

At the legislative level, the Commission holds an almost monopoly on normative initiative at the EU level in most areas, and the President politically directs the use of that initiative. Von der Leyen oversees the preparation of proposals for regulations, directives, and decisions, as well as strategic plans (for example, industrial or climate strategies), and decides on their timetable for presentation to the European Parliament and the Council. She also intervenes in defining the Commission's position in interinstitutional negotiations (the so-called trilogues).

Regarding execution, the Commission is responsible for applying Union law and the European budget. The President sets the line of action in infringement procedures against Member States that violate EU law and in the application of major financial instruments (such as recovery funds). Although formal responsibility lies with the College, the Presidency guides decisions on when to open cases, how strict to be in compliance, and how to use financial tools as policy leverage.

External representation and interinstitutional relations

Another key competence is representing the Commission in external relations and before other EU institutions. The President regularly participates in European Council meetings, presents the Commission's priorities and positions, and contributes to drafting conclusions of heads of state and government. She also represents the Commission in the most relevant plenary debates of the European Parliament (for example, on the state of the Union or political and economic crises).

On the international front, the Commission, under her presidency, negotiates numerous trade and cooperation agreements, and directs foreign policies with regulatory or financial components (such as economic sanctions or aid programs). Although formal representation of the EU in foreign policy also corresponds to the High Representative and the Council, the Commission President is one of the main visible faces of the Union at international summits of the G7, G20, UN, and climate forums, defending the general interest of the EU and the coherence of its internal and external policies.

Political responsibility and democratic control

Finally, the President is subject to political control by the European Parliament. She was elected by a majority of the Parliament and must report periodically through debates, hearings, and answers to MEPs' questions. In case of serious conflict, the Parliament can approve a motion of censure that would force the collective resignation of the Commission, including its President. This dependence reinforces the democratic dimension of the Presidency and obliges Von der Leyen to maintain a constant relationship of negotiation and dialogue with political groups.

What results did the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) obtain in the last European elections and how many MEPs does it currently have?

In the last European Parliament elections held in Spain in 2024, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) obtained 30.18% of the votes nationwide and secured 20 seats. This represented a slight decline compared to the 2019 European elections, when it reached 33.18% and 21 seats, thus losing 1 MEP and about 3 percentage points of support. With the 2024 result, the PSOE currently has 20 MEPs integrated into the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament. As far as the consulted information goes, no relevant subsequent changes have altered this figure after the official count.

PSOE results in the 2024 European elections

According to aggregated European and Spanish results data, in the 2024‑2029 European Parliament elections the PSOE obtained 30.18% of the votes cast in Spain. This percentage allowed it to remain one of the main national forces in these elections, consolidating a relevant representation in the European Parliament.

In terms of seats, that 30.18% translated into 20 Spanish socialist representatives in the European Parliament. This distribution is reflected in the national results published at the EU level for Spain, detailing the number of MEPs assigned to each state candidacy after the definitive 2024 count (results.elections.europa.eu, results.elections.europa.eu – Spain 2024‑2029).

These data are consistent with statistical summaries from Spanish media and electoral databases, which record the vote percentage and number of seats obtained by each party in the most recent European elections (EPData – European Parliament elections, RTVE – European elections, Ministry of the Interior – electoral results).

Comparison with the 2019 European elections

In the previous European elections, held in 2019, the PSOE had a somewhat better result: around 33.18% of the votes and 21 seats. The comparison between 2019 and 2024 thus shows:

  • A drop of about 3 percentage points (from 33.18% to 30.18%).
  • The loss of 1 MEP (from 21 to 20 seats).

Politically, this implies that although the PSOE maintains a very significant presence in the European Parliament, its relative weight within the Spanish delegation has slightly decreased compared to the previous cycle. However, it remains one of the main contributors of seats to the S&D group (Socialists & Democrats), which groups the social-democratic and socialist forces of the EU (El País – European elections specials).

Current number of Spanish socialist MEPs

After the definitive closure of the count and the official proclamation of elected candidates in Spain, the PSOE delegation in the European Parliament for the 2024‑2029 period was set at 20 MEPs. This figure corresponds to the official seat distribution of the Spanish State and is the one managed by the EU itself on its results portals (national results Spain 2024‑2029).

The official documentation published in Spain, such as that related to the proclamation of candidacies and elected candidates in the Official State Gazette, confirms the seat allocation to each list after the 2024 European elections (BOE – European electoral documentation 2024).

Regarding possible resignations, incompatibilities, or substitutions after the election, the consulted information does not show any change that alters the total of 20 PSOE MEPs after the 2024 European elections. That is, the number of Spanish socialist representatives in the European Parliament remains at those 20 seats assigned after the final count.

PSOE's position in the European Parliament

PSOE MEPs are integrated into the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, the second largest political bloc in the European Parliament. This membership is relevant to understanding their capacity to influence the negotiation of directives, regulations, and European resolutions, especially in areas such as social policy, just ecological transition, labor rights, and progressive economic agenda.

From the perspective of Spanish politics, these 20 seats reinforce the PSOE's role as the main left-wing force at the state level in the European framework, although with a slight setback compared to 2019 in votes and representation.

What is the nominal list of the 20 PSOE MEPs elected in the 2024 European elections and what positions do they hold in the European Parliament? In which autonomous communities did the PSOE obtain its best and worst results in the 2024 European elections? How do the PSOE's results in the 2024 European elections compare with those obtained in the last general elections in Spain?

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