Abelardo de la Espriella, the "Tiger" of the populist right who is shooting up in Colombia's presidential polls

At this moment, there is no new “electoral law” or specific reform on the presidential runoff in the Colombian Congress that is in an advanced stage of processing. The regulation of the runoff remains the same: it is in the 1991 Constitution (art. 190) and is applied ordinarily in presidential elections, including the 2026 contest. In recent years, there have been political reform projects that indirectly mentioned the runoff, but none have completed the eight debates required to amend the Constitution. Therefore, there is currently no concrete initiative on the runoff close to being approved nor a new text about to come into effect.

Current framework of the presidential runoff

The runoff in Colombia is defined in the Constitution, not in a simple ordinary law. The current scheme is:

In the first round, the candidate who obtains more than half of the valid votes is elected. If no candidate reaches that absolute majority, a second round (runoff) is held between the two most voted formulas, and the one who obtains a simple majority wins. This design has been applied without substantial changes in recent presidential cycles and also governs the 2026 elections, as described, for example, in the analyses of that year's election collected in this general summary.

The runoff calendar (usually three weeks after the first round) and operational aspects are articulated through norms such as Law 996 of 2005 (Guarantees Law) and ordinary electoral legislation, but no reviewed source indicates a recent reform that has altered the basic logic of the runoff.

Current electoral context (2026 elections)

The best evidence that the regulation has not changed is how the 2026 presidential process is developing. The first round was held on May 31, and since no candidate reached more than 50% of the votes, a runoff has been called for June 21, 2026, between Iván Cepeda and Abelardo de la Espriella. This two-round scheme is described, among others, in the international monitoring of the election, such as the European mission report collected by the European External Action Service (Colombia goes to runoff after a “transparent and credible” electoral process).

Recent journalistic chronicles focus on political polarization, process logistics, and participation, but do not mention that there is a new electoral law already approved or in final processing specifically about the runoff. For example, real-time coverage of the 2026 runoff campaign, such as this coverage, take the current framework for granted without alluding to an ongoing regulatory change.

Recent political reforms and their scope

Reviewed sources indicate that there have been “political reform” or “electoral reform” projects that, within broader packages, indirectly touched on the runoff. These projects discussed:

Adjusting deadlines between the first and second rounds; reviewing some participation or calendar requirements; and, in more theoretical debates, exploring alternative presidential election rules. However, all these attempts required a legislative act to amend the Constitution. None have completed the eight required debates, and several have been archived due to expiration of terms or lack of majorities, so the part related to the runoff never came into effect.

No monographic project, that is, exclusively dedicated to changing the presidential runoff, has been identified as being in report for the last debate or in conciliation and sanction phase. The discussion about the runoff appears more as a topic within broad political conversations about the party system, closed lists, or financing, but without crystallizing into a concrete reform already approved.

Current status in Congress and outlook

With the information available in open sources (Congress Gazette, institutional communications, and specialized Colombian press), it can be summarized as follows:

There is no legislative act in seventh or eighth debate whose central object is to reform the presidential runoff. The political reform packages that included mentions of the runoff are archived or, in practice, without recent processing. No specific text on the runoff is about to be approved or sanctioned.

Consequently, in the short term, the runoff system will continue to function as it has until now. Any eventual change would require filing a new legislative act, passing eight debates in two periods, and also setting rules for entry into force; given the timing, it is unlikely that such reform could be applied immediately to an electoral cycle already underway.

If you need an exact technical follow-up (project number, committee, formal status), the way is to consult the Colombian Congress information system, but with what is available it can be stated that today there is no “new Colombian electoral law” on the runoff that is in a decisive approval phase.

The President of the Republic of Colombia, according to the current 1991 Political Constitution, is simultaneously Head of State, Head of Government, and supreme administrative authority. His powers are concentrated in article 189, complemented by other provisions such as articles 115, 150, and 218. Together, these norms grant him political and administrative direction of the State, conduct of international relations, command of the Public Force, and a role of reinforced collaboration with Congress. All this is exercised under the principle of subjection to the Constitution, the law, and controls of the other public powers.

1. General framework and constitutional basis

The 1991 Constitution defines that the President is the single-person body that heads the national executive power. As stated in the Charter itself, his powers are exhaustively enumerated, mainly in article 189, which must be interpreted systematically with the rest of the constitutional text. Additionally, article 115 presents him as Head of State, Head of Government, and supreme administrative authority, which explains the breadth of his political, administrative, and representative functions.

2. Political and administrative powers (art. 189)

The core of his ordinary powers refers to the direction of the Government and administration:

By virtue of article 189, the President can freely appoint and remove ministers and directors of administrative departments, as well as other high officials when the Constitution or law does not provide another appointment system. He also generally directs domestic policy, exercising the administrative function as the highest authority responsible for the execution of laws and the proper functioning of the State. This leadership entails the capacity to organize the central administration, within legal limits, and to enter into contracts corresponding to the Executive, under the rules of state contracting.

3. Relationship with Congress and normative function

The President is not an ordinary legislator but has a function of collaboration and participation in legislative activity. According to article 189, he is responsible for:

First, sanctioning and promulgating laws, obeying them, and ensuring their strict compliance. Additionally, he exercises regulatory power, that is, he can issue decrees, resolutions, and orders to ensure the execution of laws, without exceeding their content. The President also presents bills to Congress (government legislative initiative) and calls Congress to extraordinary sessions when he deems it necessary to address specific matters. All this is framed within the general legislative competencies that, according to article 150, mainly correspond to Congress, reserving the President an executive and regulatory role.

4. Powers in foreign relations and defense

Another essential dimension of his powers refers to foreign policy and the security and defense of the State. The President directs Colombia's foreign policy, appoints diplomatic and consular agents, and concludes international treaties, which must later be approved by Congress for their definitive entry into force. In the defense field, the Constitution establishes that the President is the supreme commander of the Military Forces and the Police (article 218 and related), with the responsibility to guarantee national defense and maintain public order throughout the territory. These powers include directing war operations when circumstances require and using the Public Force to preserve internal security.

5. Other relevant faculties

Article 189 also includes various functions of inspection and oversight over key sectors: the President exercises inspection and oversight of education and public services, as well as certain economic activities (such as financial, stock market, and insurance), always under the frameworks established by law. He is also responsible, under the terms provided by the Constitution, for exercising the right of grace (pardons and commutations), with the exceptions and limits set by the legal system, and managing the central administration, ensuring the execution of government plans and programs.

6. Systematic synthesis of his constitutional role

In summary, the presidential powers can be grouped into several blocks: as Head of State, he represents national unity and the country abroad; as Head of Government, he directs internal policy, appoints the cabinet, and guides government action; as supreme administrative authority, he regulates and executes laws, organizes administration, and enters into State contracts; and as Supreme Commander, he leads defense and public order. All these functions are exercised within the constitutional framework, under political control of Congress and judicial control, which balances the broad concentration of powers in the presidential figure.

Abelardo de la Espriella arrives at his presidential candidacy without having held public offices or elected seats, but with a long career as a high-profile criminal lawyer, businessman, and media figure associated with the Colombian right. His career has mainly developed in private litigation, building his law firm, and creating movements and foundations with a strong ideological charge. Before jumping into the presidential contest, he had already established himself as a controversial reference in debates on security, order, and a tough stance, and as a defender of controversial clients, including paramilitaries and figures close to Uribismo. That combination of media visibility, political networks, and conservative discourse explains how he could present himself as an “outsider” despite his prolonged influence in public life.

Education and early professional steps

Sources agree that De la Espriella is a Colombian lawyer who trained at the Sergio Arboleda University, specializing in criminal and administrative matters, although his exact degrees are not always exhaustively detailed.[2] Born in Bogotá in 1978 and raised in Montería, he began practicing in the late 1990s in labor and minor civil matters before fully focusing on criminal law. Around 2002, he founded his own firm, De La Espriella Lawyers (also referred to as De La Espriella Lawyers Enterprise), which over time specialized in high-profile criminal cases and representing politicians, businessmen, and celebrities.[3]

High-profile criminal lawyer

The core of his trajectory before the candidacy is criminal defense in cases of great public impact. Various journalistic profiles, such as that of El País, highlight his involvement in processes linked to the armed conflict and parapolitics, including the defense of paramilitaries and congressmen implicated in alliances with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.[3] He is also credited with defending David Murcia Guzmán in the DMG pyramid case, as well as participating in high social impact cases, such as the femicide of Rosa Elvira Cely or the acid attack against Natalia Ponce de León, where he acted representing the victims.[5]

In the most recent stage before his presidential aspiration, his name is also associated with the legal defense of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, which reinforced his profile as a trusted lawyer of Uribista sectors.[3] At the same time, reports indicate that his firm experienced strong economic growth from these high-profile assignments, consolidating him as a legal sector businessman.

Business activity and media role

Beyond the firm, De la Espriella has presented himself as a businessman with investments in sectors such as livestock and real estate, building a narrative of “economic success without depending on the State,” as highlighted by the profile from El Demócrata.[Demócrata] His public projection was reinforced thanks to a constant presence in media and social networks, where he cultivated a charismatic, controversial image marked by a confrontational and conservative style.[5][7] Although he is not identified as a regular columnist in major print media, his frequent participation in television debates and digital platforms helped establish his figure as a reference of the hard right.

Political links, foundations, and movements

Politically, his trajectory before the candidacy does not include elected positions but rather informal yet intense militancy. Various investigations point out that, in the mid-2000s, he acted as legal representative or promoter of the Iniciativas por la Paz (FIPAZ) foundation, indicated by some sources as an instrument of influence of paramilitary leaders in the university and political sphere, in the context of the Ralito Agreement dialogues and the demobilization of the AUC.[5] These connections, along with his defense of congressmen prosecuted for parapolitics, fueled the perception of closeness to paramilitary networks.

Likewise, he is placed as part of the civilian environment that accompanied negotiation processes between Álvaro Uribe's government and armed groups, fitting a trajectory linked to security and order agendas. Organically, before jumping to the presidency, he was already founder and leader of the Defensores de la Patria movement, with a right-wing populist discourse and strong emphasis on nationalism and the fight against the left.[2]

Ideological positioning and absence of public office

De la Espriella has systematically built a conservative ideological profile, with very critical positions towards the left and an emphasis on “tough hand” in security and public order.[1] According to various profiles, his historical closeness to Uribismo is reflected both in personal relationships (his family recognizes friendship with Álvaro Uribe since the 1990s) and in his role as lawyer and media defender of that sector.[3]

However, until launching his presidential candidacy, there is no record that he had held formal public offices (mayorships, governorships, legislative seats, or ministries). His political weight therefore comes from indirect influence: elite criminal law practice, creation of affiliated organizations, and a constant presence in public conversation. That combination allows him to present himself as “outside” institutional politics, despite his trajectory having placed him for years at the heart of Colombian political disputes.