The Iranian government assures that both parties have agreed on the coordinates of the new maritime corridor, although it conditions the normalization of traffic on the end of the U.S. naval blockade.
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Iran and Oman have reached an agreement on the geographical features of a new shipping route in the Strait of Hormuz, although Tehran has made it clear that this understanding will not mean, for now, the reopening of the strategic maritime passage.
The Iranian government maintains that security in the area is still conditioned by the U.S. naval blockade and by the tension arising from the conflict with Israel and the United States.
At this time, there is no record that Spain has any specific international agreement or treaty on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz (such as a convention, bilateral memorandum, or multilateral treaty) under processing before the General Courts that requires parliamentary authorization and publication in the BOE. Spanish action is mainly articulated through general frameworks (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Global Oceans Treaty) and through political initiatives and declarations in multilateral forums (NATO, EU, and the “International Initiative for Freedom of Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz”). Operational decisions on naval presence or future participation in a defensive mission in Hormuz remain, for now, at the political-diplomatic level, not in the form of a new formal treaty. The substantive regulation of navigation is being strengthened mainly at the European level against Iran's actions, without currently generating a “Hormuz agreement” signed by Spain.
The recent crisis in Hormuz has been mainly channeled through a memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, which has opened the ceasefire, the reopening of the strait, and a 60-day roadmap towards a broader agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, according to various analysis pieces from Demócrata (preliminary memorandum, leaked draft, temporary suppression of fees, lifting of the US blockade, Iran-Oman group to manage navigation). Spain is not a party to that memorandum nor to the Iran-Oman bilateral understandings.
Within the European Union, the Council has expanded the legal sanctions framework to directly target Iranian persons and entities whose actions “impede lawful transit and freedom of navigation” in the region, particularly in Hormuz, thus reinforcing the legal protection of the free passage of ships (Council note on the legal framework and decision to include new persons and entities). Here too, no “navigation treaty in Hormuz” is created: these are sanctions and restrictive measures adopted by the EU.
From the Spanish perspective, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has focused its action on the political level:
In parallel, according to the newspaper Demócrata, Spain has joined a European declaration supporting the possible creation of a “strictly defensive and independent mission” to safeguard commercial navigation and carry out mine clearance operations in Hormuz, always “in accordance with our respective constitutional requirements” and, in Spain's case, under the UN umbrella (Spain joins the European declaration). That declaration is political: it has not yet translated into an international agreement that must pass through the Courts.
With the available information, there is no record of any specific international agreement on navigation in Hormuz submitted by the Government to the General Courts for authorization, nor any ratification instrument published in the BOE exclusively referring to the strait. There are:
In summary, the “processing” of previous agreements on navigation in Hormuz currently proceeds, for Spain, mainly through political-diplomatic and EU law channels, without reaching the classic stage of an international treaty on Hormuz submitted, authorized, and ratified within the Spanish constitutional system. Any relevant change will likely involve: (1) a possible defensive mission formalized after the ceasefire, and (2) new EU decisions to strengthen freedom of navigation, rather than a specific bilateral agreement Spain–Iran or Spain–Rim States.
In this case, I cannot offer you a substantive and specific answer about the competencies of the spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor about the precise scope of their public statements. My design and the scope of information I work with are focused on Spanish politics (national and, partly, European linked to Spain), so I do not have my own documentary bases nor traces of research on the organizational structure or official communication protocols of Iranian diplomacy. To avoid misleading, I must not extrapolate or assume functions or scopes that are not documented in the sources I have access to.
I specialize in analyzing and explaining issues mainly related to:
Outside that perimeter—and especially regarding the internal structure of third-country governments, such as Iran, or the details of their positions and spokespersons—I do not have structured, updated, and verifiable information to provide a rigorous answer.
To answer precisely your question about the spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at least the following would be necessary:
Since I do not have those sources nor a specific database on the Iranian administration, any attempt to describe their competencies or the scope of their statements would have a speculative component that would violate the fundamental criterion of not inventing or completing with conjectures.
Although this specific question is outside my specialized scope, I can help you with very close content questions but focused on Spain, for example:
If you reformulate your question towards any of these axes—for example, comparing the figure of a Foreign Affairs spokesperson in abstract with the role of the Spanish minister, or asking how Spain officially channels its position on Iran—I can offer you a much more complete answer, supported by procedures and structures that are documented within the scope I work in.
The closure or reopening of strategic maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz is strongly conditioned by the International Law of the Sea: the general rule is freedom of navigation and the right of passage (innocent and transit passage) through straits used for international navigation, as established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Recent news about Hormuz shows that the UN, the EU, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) consider illegal both the closure of the strait and the imposition of unilateral tolls or naval blockades that prevent lawful transit. The reopening of such a route, therefore, is not a discretionary concession of the coastal States but the return to a regime of free passage required by the international legal framework.
UNCLOS, to which the EU and the UN expressly refer, recognizes that through straits used for international navigation there exists a right of transit passage and innocent passage that cannot be arbitrarily suspended. The EU Council emphasizes that Iran's actions in Hormuz “violate the rights established both of transit and innocent passage through international straits” in its sanction decisions of May and June 2026 (EU Council note, freedom of navigation in Hormuz).
Similarly, the IMO has approved resolutions emphasizing that “the right of passage through straits used for international navigation must not be threatened, impeded, denied, obstructed, impaired, or suspended,” and that Hormuz must be considered a “toll-free” corridor subject to non-discriminatory navigation rules, as reported by the newspaper Demócrata in a report on the IMO and in another on the safe corridor.
The UN and IMO have explicitly rejected that a single State can close Hormuz or impose transit fees unilaterally. The IMO Secretary-General, Arsenio Domínguez, cited by Demócrata, recalls that “there is no international agreement allowing the introduction of tolls on this route” and that the strait “cannot be closed by one country,” insisting that it is a route subject to freedom of navigation rules (UN and tolls in Hormuz, IMO position).
In fact, more than 90 countries have signed declarations rejecting “any illegal attempt to threaten or suspend navigation rights and freedoms, including through the imposition of transit fees,” considering it a violation of International Law reflected in UNCLOS, as reported by Demócrata in this information. The EU, for its part, insists that Iran's actions in Hormuz “are contrary to international law” and has created a specific sanctions framework against individuals and entities that threaten freedom of navigation (expanded legal framework, sanction lists).
Naval blockade measures are also subject to strict limits. Various Security Council resolutions—such as 2817, cited by the IMO—and EU declarations recall the need to guarantee maritime security and condemn “any act that threatens navigation or prevents ships from entering and leaving the Strait of Hormuz” (IMO summary, European Council references).
When a blockade is not authorized by the Security Council and affects third States' ships, numerous governments denounce it as a violation of International Law, sovereignty, and the UN Charter. This is seen both in Iran's protests against the US naval blockade in Hormuz and in other crises (Cuba, Venezuela, Red Sea), covered by Demócrata in several pieces on blockades and “state piracy” (Iranian protest, Venezuela's denunciation, GCC position).
The international framework recognizes that States can adopt maritime security measures (escorts, safe corridors, traffic separation schemes, inspections) as long as they do not empty the right of passage of content. The IMO reminds that such measures must comply with its conventions, such as SOLAS, and cannot become de facto blockades or disguised toll systems (IMO resolution, Spanish Ministry of Transport statement). The EU and other actors emphasize that cooperation in maritime security must serve to “guarantee the safe passage of all shipments through this route,” not to restrict it (EU position, EU-Korea statement, support from European powers).
In summary, International Law imposes three major limits: one cannot close an international strait, one cannot charge unilateral tolls, and naval blockades are only legitimate within UN-authorized frameworks and respecting the freedom of navigation of third parties. The reopening of routes like Hormuz is, legally, the restoration of those obligations, not a discretionary political concession.
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