OpenAI opens GPT-5.6 Sol to the public after passing the Trump Administration review

In the United States, there is still no federal legal framework that generally imposes a mandatory prior review of artificial intelligence models, but there are several political and legal foundations to build one. The "strong" path would involve an ordinary law passed by Congress that imposes ex ante evaluations and delegates its execution to agencies such as the FTC, while the White House has so far opted for executive orders and voluntary review mechanisms for so-called frontier models. At the same time, several states are legislating on their own, and the Trump Administration is trying to limit that margin with executive orders of federal preeminence. Any mandatory prior review framework would have to fit these three layers: federal law, agency powers, and relationship with state regulations.

1. Main route: a federal law passed by Congress

The strongest option would be a federal ordinary law that expressly established the obligation to subject certain AI models to prior review before their public deployment. Recent legal debate has raised proposals of this type, which require ex ante impact assessments and independent audits of algorithms before commercialization, entrusting execution to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as the enforcement authority, as analyzed in a Cuatrecasas report on the federal AI regulation proposal in the U.S. available at this link.

According to this type of proposal:

• Developers and providers would have to carry out a prior risk assessment before licensing or offering the model.
• If there is a reasonable plausibility of harm, an independent audit of the system would be required before deployment.
• The party responsible for the use of the model should prepare periodic reports on impact and risk mitigation.
• The law would empower the FTC and state attorneys general to bring civil actions and sanction non-compliance.

In practice, this would imply the ordinary U.S. legislative procedure: text presented in one chamber, committee processing, voting in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and finally presidential signature. Democratic articles on government reopening after budget shutdowns show how both chambers and the Presidency intervene successively in the approval of federal funding laws, which Trump then ratifies, as recalled in this report.

2. Executive route: White House orders and agency powers

While there is no comprehensive law, the White House is using the executive route and the sectoral powers of various agencies:

• Executive orders: Democrata details that Donald Trump has signed an order creating a voluntary review framework for the most powerful AI models, commissioning the Treasury, NSA, CISA, and NIST to design within 60 days a classified procedure to assess the cyber capabilities of so-called "frontier models," but for now discarding mandatory prior authorization licenses (Trump redefines his AI strategy).
• Informal prior review: according to the newspaper Democrata, the Administration has initiated contacts with OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic to explore "pre-launch controls" of advanced models, although without binding normative basis or defined schedule, keeping the initiative in study phase (U.S. proposes reviewing AI before launching new models).
• NIST: recent presidential orders entrust it with designing technical criteria to identify frontier models and cybersecurity capability evaluation procedures, in coordination with other agencies, within this still voluntary framework.
• FDA: in the health field, the FDA has published together with the EMA a decalogue of principles for the ethical use of AI in drug development, which includes the requirement that the degree of validation and supervision be proportional to risk, with traceability and complete documentation of data and decisions, as covered by Democrata in this article. These are regulatory practice guidelines, not a horizontal regime of prior review for all models.

In parallel, other authorities such as the FTC use their general mandate on unfair or deceptive practices to pursue problematic uses of AI, as systematized in public policy analyses on the U.S. regulatory mosaic, such as Neuraltrust's 2026 guide available at [link].

3. Relationship with state AI laws

In the absence of a broad federal rule, several states have begun legislating on their own. Democrata points out that "numerous states are already advancing with their own artificial intelligence regulations," while Pimco warns of the risk of a "hasty" response driven by the political climate (Pimco analysis).

At the same time, the White House is trying to cut back that margin. A Trump executive order seeks to curb state laws that, in the federal government's view, impose "excessive" restrictions on AI, explicitly citing the case of Colorado and initiatives in California, Utah, or Texas. The text advocates coordinating with Congress to establish "a minimally burdensome national standard, not 50 discordant state standards," making clear the preference for a single federal regulation that limits each state's regulatory scope, as Democrata reports in this piece.

If Congress were to pass a law imposing mandatory prior review, it could also include preemption clauses to displace some of the stricter or incompatible state rules. However, organizations like the Brennan Center have warned of the risk that Congress might prohibit states from regulating key AI areas, reducing citizen protection; this debate can be seen at [link].

4. Real starting point

In sum, today the U.S. combines targeted controls based on national security (vetoes on specific Anthropic or OpenAI models described by Democrata) with an embryo of voluntary prior review for frontier models and law proposals that have not yet completed their processing. To reach a mandatory and stable ex ante review legal framework, it would be essential for Congress to pass a law that clearly defines which models must be reviewed, what technical standards apply, and which agencies, especially the FTC and sectoral bodies like the FDA or NIST, are responsible for executing and enforcing those obligations.

The United States Secretary of Commerce does not "regulate" emerging technologies alone, but does concentrate several key powers for their oversight: controls much of the sensitive exports, coordinates industrial and innovation policy, participates in economic security (such as foreign investment control), and leads technical bodies that set standards. Oversight is mainly exercised through export controls, public aid, establishment of technical standards, and participation in interagency national security bodies. Below I detail the main areas, with the caveat that my specialty is the Spanish political-regulatory context, so this is a general summary of the U.S. system.

1. Export controls and sensitive technologies

The most direct competence of the Secretary of Commerce in emerging technologies goes through the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), an agency of the Department of Commerce responsible for:

• Classifying technologies and products under the Commerce Control List, including categories for artificial intelligence, high-performance computing, advanced sensors, robotics, biotechnology, etc.
• Granting or denying export licenses when a good or technology may have military, surveillance, or proliferation uses (which includes many dual-use emerging technologies).
• Managing restricted entity lists (for example, the "Entity List"), where foreign companies or institutions with which trade of certain components or software is heavily limited are included.
• Developing criteria for “emerging and foundational technologies”, in coordination with Congress and other agencies, to decide which technologies are subject to greater controls.

The Secretary of Commerce politically supervises the BIS: sets priorities, approves general lines of action, and answers to the White House and Congress for export control decisions affecting sectors such as advanced chips, quantum computing, or frontier AI.

2. Industrial policy, aid, and subsidies

The Department of Commerce is also a central piece in U.S. industrial and innovation policy, with direct impact on emerging technologies:

• Manages programs of grants and incentives to strategic sectors (for example, semiconductors or advanced communications technologies).
• Defines eligibility criteria that condition factory location, technology transfer, and certain security or government collaboration obligations.
• Uses these programs to reduce strategic dependencies on other countries in critical supply chains (chips, advanced materials, components for 5G, etc.).

In this sense, the Secretary of Commerce acts as the architect of the industrial strategy in cutting-edge technologies, with relevant power to guide private investments and shape national technological ecosystems against international competition.

3. Technical standards and federal laboratories

Another oversight route goes through technical bodies dependent on the Department of Commerce, especially the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):

• NIST develops standards and technical guidelines in areas such as cybersecurity, cryptography, trustworthy artificial intelligence, quantum communications, or advanced metrology.
• These standards, although often voluntary, become de facto references for industry and other federal agencies.
• The Secretary of Commerce guides research and standardization priorities, aligning them with competitiveness and national security objectives.

Additionally, the Department of Commerce houses other relevant bodies, such as the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), which advises on radio spectrum, internet, and telecommunications policies, all critical areas for emerging technologies like 5G/6G or massive IoT.

4. Economic security and foreign investment control

Although it does not exclusively control national security, the Secretary of Commerce participates in several economic security mechanisms linked to emerging technologies:

• Is part of or collaborates with interagency committees such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which reviews foreign investments in sensitive tech companies.
• Provides analysis on economic and technological impact of operations that may transfer critical capabilities to actors considered risky.
• Coordinates with the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security to align export policies, standards, and public aid with the overall security strategy.

5. Economic diplomacy and international forums

Finally, the Secretary of Commerce plays a very relevant role in economic diplomacy:

• Negotiates or participates in bilateral and multilateral agreements and dialogues on digital trade, data flows, AI norms, cybersecurity, or semiconductor value chains.
• Promotes international adoption of standards and regulatory approaches aligned with U.S. technological interests.
• Coordinates with partners and allies to harmonize export controls and prevent "leakage" of emerging technologies through third countries.

Overall, the Secretary of Commerce's powers in emerging technologies focus on these axes: export control, industrial policy guidance, standards definition, participation in economic security, and technological diplomacy. It is not a sole regulator, but a central figure in the governance architecture of advanced technology in the United States.

In the United States, there is no single stable framework regulating the federal government's entry into the capital of private technology companies. Rather, it is an exception used in very specific contexts (financial crises, defense and national security, strategic programs), and always supported by a specific law authorizing the operation. Therefore, the "requirements" are not a uniform checklist, but a recurring pattern of legal, financial, and public interest conditions that repeat in different programs.

1. Specific legal basis and budget authorization

The most important requirement is the existence of a federal law explicitly authorizing the acquisition of shares or the granting of instruments convertible into capital. Historical examples include:

• Financial rescue programs (such as TARP in 2008), which allowed the Treasury Department to acquire shares and preferred stock of banks or large strategic companies.
• Recent sectoral laws (for example, rules on semiconductors, energy transition, or defense) that may provide loans, guarantees, or investments linked to critical technologies.

Additionally, Congress must have approved the necessary budget appropriations. Without that dual authorization (legal and budgetary), direct participation in capital is usually not possible.

2. Justification of public interest and often national security

When it comes to technology companies, federal intervention is usually supported by a qualified public interest justification:

• National security and defense: dual-use technologies, cybersecurity, military artificial intelligence, secure communications, advanced semiconductors, etc.
• Resilience of critical supply chains: for example, essential electronic components, space technology, digital infrastructures.
• Financial or systemic stability: if the company is so large or interconnected that its bankruptcy would have systemic effects.

In practice, agencies must be able to demonstrate that ordinary instruments (grants, public contracts, loans) are insufficient and that equity entry responds to a strategic need: securing control of a technology, avoiding a destabilizing bankruptcy, or preventing a hostile foreign actor from acquiring the company.

3. Minimum solvency, viability, and audit

Another typical block of requirements is economic solvency and viability. Even when acting in financial stress situations, the company usually has to:

• Present audited financial statements and accounting transparency.
• Provide a credible business and restructuring plan showing how it will return to viability.
• Accept limits on dividends, share buybacks, and senior management compensation while the State remains in the capital, especially in rescue programs.

In the technological field, technical execution capacity and the existence of protected intellectual property, patents, and qualified teams are also valued, because the goal is to preserve capabilities, not just rescue balance sheets.

4. Corporate governance and control conditions

In exchange for entering the shareholding, the federal government usually imposes governance conditions:

• Appointment of observers or directors on the board of directors (with voice and sometimes vote).
• Special rights over certain strategic decisions: sale of critical assets, patent transfer, relocation of R&D centers, etc.
• Commitments to localization of certain activities (labs, factories, data centers) on U.S. territory.

The intensity of this control depends on the sensitivity of the technology and the instrument used (common shares, preferred shares, convertible debt, etc.). Generally, the image is maintained that the company remains under private management, limiting direct political interference.

5. Regulatory compliance and security controls

Another group of usual requirements is linked to compliance with specific regulations:

• Comply with export controls and sensitive technology lists.
• Ensure cybersecurity and data protection measures according to federal standards, especially if the company handles classified information or defense contracts.
• Respect limits on foreign ownership or influence from certain countries, supervised by bodies like CFIUS, although CFIUS usually reviews investments, not makes them.

6. Exit strategy and temporary nature

Finally, almost all public participation schemes in private companies in the U.S. require a clear exit strategy. The government is conceived as a temporary investor:

• Participation is usually time-limited, conditioned on the company's recovery or achievement of technological milestones.
• Repurchase of the stake by the company itself or sale on the market is foreseen when reasonable conditions exist.

As a specialist assistant in the Spanish context, this explanation about the United States is necessarily general and based on usual guidelines; in each specific case, the specific federal law and the program through which the capital entry is articulated would have to be analyzed.