Huawei presents the Mate 90 with HarmonyOS 7 and a new proprietary chip in the face of US restrictions.

U.S. restrictions on the export of advanced technology to China (cutting-edge semiconductors, chip manufacturing equipment, and certain AI capabilities) are not in an initial processing phase: since 2022 they have already constituted a mature, active, and constantly adjusted regime. As of October 1, 2026, the basic control framework of the Department of Commerce, through the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), remains operational and has been tightened and refined through successive waves, with some very selective case-by-case relaxations, but without a general repeal.

1. From the major packages of 2022‑2024 to a stable regime

According to official BIS notes and guides on China and U.S. export controls (Department of Commerce guide), the first major leap occurred in October 2022, with a package of measures designed to:

• Restrict the export, reexport, and internal transfers to China of advanced semiconductors for high-performance computing and AI.
• Limit Chinese access to advanced chip manufacturing equipment and certain process and metrology technologies.
• Introduce additional controls based on end use and end user related to supercomputing and military applications.

In October 2023, and again in April and December 2024, the BIS published new rules clarifying and expanding these controls on “advanced computing” and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, reinforcing the idea that Washington's strategic goal is to prevent China from producing or acquiring next-generation chips for military and AI uses (BIS note from December 2024).

2. Tightening in 2025: AI chips, foundries, and end use

At the beginning of 2025, the BIS again adjusted the rules to:

• Strengthen restrictions on advanced computing chips and the foundries that manufacture them.
• Impose greater due diligence requirements on U.S. companies exporting or reexporting these components to China and other sensitive destinations (BIS note on advanced computing and foundries).

Meanwhile, specialized press reported that the Department of Commerce was considering another tightening: a regulation that would require licenses for practically all exports of chips with integrated AI capabilities. The draft, according to Demócrata, would imply that manufacturers like Nvidia or AMD would have to request prior permission for each relevant operation and would allow Washington to decide in which countries large data centers are established and under what conditions (Demócrata news). This text is still described as a draft, not as a rule already in force.

Additionally, on May 13, 2025, the BIS published specific guidance on the so-called “General Prohibition 10” and a policy statement on training advanced AI models (GP10 guide, statement on model training). These clarifications make it clear that not only hardware is controlled: license obligations can also be triggered by end use, for example when AI model training is linked to China or Macau.

3. Situation in 2026: selective adjustments, not a fundamental shift

In 2026 the framework has not been dismantled; on the contrary, it has continued to be refined:

• In January 2026, the Department of Commerce revised the license review policy for certain advanced chips destined for China and Macau, such as Nvidia's H200 or equivalent AMD products, moving to a more case-by-case examination with security requirements and testing in the U.S. before authorizing limited exports (BIS statement on license review).
• According to Demócrata, former President Trump authorized Nvidia to sell its H200 chips to China in exchange for a 25% commission on sales, with the Department of Commerce finalizing details and intending to extend the same approach to AMD, Intel, and other major tech companies (news on Nvidia H200). This opening is partial and does not lift previous bans on more advanced chips like Blackwell, which remain out of reach for Chinese customers.
• At the same time, controls are actively enforced: the U.S. has dismantled smuggling networks of Nvidia GPUs to China and has brought criminal cases for violating export regulations (“Operation Gatekeeper”).

On a broader level, geopolitical analyses emphasize that these restrictions continue to condition Chinese industry’s access to key semiconductor manufacturing equipment and that companies like CXMT depend on domestic suppliers precisely because of the limitations imposed by the U.S. (analysis on CXMT).

4. Outlook: more iterations, not a “final big law”

Given the trajectory since 2022, what is foreseeable is not a single large package that “reorders” the entire system, but new iterations:

• Technical adjustments in chip performance thresholds and in the definition of covered manufacturing equipment.
• Expansions of entity lists and restrictions linked to sensitive end users.
• Possible approval (or abandonment) of the draft that would generalize licenses for AI chips, still under discussion today.

In summary, the status of processing can be described as an already consolidated and fully applicable control regime, subject to periodic reviews to close evasion routes or modulate specific cases, but with no signs of dismantling in the short term. The strategic direction remains the containment of China’s access to hardware and AI capabilities considered critical for U.S. national security.

Richard Yu, also known by his Chinese name Yu Chengdong, is one of Huawei's top executives and the highest-ranking figure linked to the company's consumer business. According to his updated corporate profile, he holds the positions of Executive Director of Huawei, Chairman of the Investment Review Board, and Chairman of the Board of the Consumer Business Group (Consumer BG), after having been for years the operational CEO of the Consumer BG and president of Huawei's intelligent automotive solutions unit.

As the top political and strategic leader of the Consumer Business Group, his core functions revolve around defining and overseeing the global strategy of Huawei's consumer business. This business broadly groups all lines of devices and services aimed at the end user: high-end and mid-range mobile phones and smartphones, tablets, laptops, smartwatches and fitness bands, headphones and other wearables, as well as the ecosystem of associated services, software, and experiences (interface, proprietary apps, consumer cloud services, etc.).

In this area, Richard Yu is not limited to a representative role. Historically, as CEO of the Consumer BG, his responsibility was to lead the performance and growth of the consumer business, that is:

• Set product priorities (segments, ranges, and device launch cycles such as the Mate or P series).
• Define the technology roadmap in hardware (own processors, cameras, connectivity) and user software.
• Oversee the commercial and positioning strategy against global competitors like Apple or Samsung, especially in the high-end smartphone market.
• Drive the international expansion of the consumer brand, with special focus on key markets such as China, Europe, and other strategic regions.

After the May 2024 restructuring, Huawei reorganized the governance of the Consumer BG: Yu left the operational CEO position to become chairman of the Consumer BG, while another executive, He Gang, assumed the role of executive CEO of the division. In practice, this means Yu focuses more on the strategic leadership and governance of the business (overall decision framework, major technological and commercial bets, results oversight) and less on day-to-day management, which falls to the new CEO.

His role as Chairman of the Investment Review Board reinforces this transversal role: this committee internalizes decisions on capital allocation and investments within the Huawei group. From this position, Yu influences which projects, technologies, and business lines receive priority resources, both in consumer and other areas, aligning investments with the strategy he himself drives in the Consumer BG.

In the field of automotive and intelligent mobility, various sources indicate that Yu was for a time chairman or top executive of the Intelligent Automotive Solution Business Unit (or equivalent Huawei “smart car” units). His role at that stage was linked to building Huawei as a provider of software, intelligent driving systems, electronics, and digital solutions for the connected car, rather than as a pure car manufacturer. Later information indicates that the updated corporate profile no longer presents him as active chairman of that unit, which is mentioned as a past responsibility or “former chairman,” although he is still considered a reference figure in that strategy.

Regarding software, his influence is articulated mainly through the connection between consumer devices, smart cars, and HarmonyOS / Hongmeng, Huawei's proprietary operating system and ecosystem. His role is not that of a technical software director, but of one who coordinates hardware, operating system, and user experience in an integrated product vision, where the phone, wearables, and car share platform and services.

In summary, Richard Yu's current competencies can be summarized as follows: he remains the highest-ranking executive associated with Huawei's consumer business, responsible for setting its strategic direction and overseeing execution through the Consumer BG CEO; he adds a key role in the investment review of the entire group; and maintains significant influence in the intelligent mobility strategy and HarmonyOS ecosystem, although the most recent official references no longer identify him as the acting chairman of the automotive unit.

I cannot provide you with a detailed and reliable answer about the specific technical and legal requirements to manufacture advanced semiconductors in China, because I specialize in Spanish policy and institutions and the regulatory and public ecosystem linked to Spain (including its European dimension). Chinese regulations on foreign investment, national security, technology controls, environmental licenses, or chip manufacturing standards fall outside my area of expertise and, therefore, I cannot rigorously break down the permits, agencies, specific technical standards, or applicable restrictions there.

To avoid giving you inaccurate or incomplete information in such a complex and changing field as advanced semiconductors in China, it is better to clearly explain what I can do for you and in what types of questions I can be truly useful. This way you can reformulate your query, if you wish, towards an angle connected with Spain or the European Union where I can provide valuable analysis.

What I can do: Spanish and European scope

I am designed to work on:

• Spanish legislation and its processing: laws, royal decree-laws, royal decrees, ministerial orders, public consultations, draft bills, as well as parliamentary initiatives in the Congress, Senate, and regional parliaments. I can help you understand their content, the procedures they follow, their current phase, and practical implications.
• Public policies and the tech industry in Spain: I can analyze how the semiconductor and digital technology industry is regulated and promoted in Spain (for example, the PERTE for microelectronics and semiconductors, R&D incentives, public aid, investment frameworks, etc.), as well as its fit with European strategies.
• European framework linked to Spain: European Union measures relevant to Spain (such as the EU Chips Act, state aid rules, export controls on sensitive technology, foreign investment screening, competition, economic security, etc.), always focusing on how they affect or apply in Spain.
• Spanish political and institutional actors: positions of parties, parliamentary groups, ministries, regulatory bodies, and senior officials on industrial, technological, commercial, or economic security policy issues, when traces of these appear in public or parliamentary debate.
• Strategic and impact analysis in Spain: preparing argumentation, analysis notes, institutional dialogue strategies, or political reading of regulatory decisions when the center of gravity is in Spain or its interaction with the EU.

How you could redirect your question to leverage my specialization

If your interest in semiconductors in China has a comparative dimension, regulatory risk, or business strategy aspect, we could reformulate the question towards areas where I can be useful. For example:

• Spanish/European approach to China and semiconductors: what stance do Spanish and European institutions take regarding dependence on manufacturing in China? What measures have been approved or debated in Spain or the EU to reduce risks in the chip supply chain?
• Impact for companies operating in Spain: if a company based in Spain wants to invest in manufacturing capacity in China or depend on Chinese foundries, I can help map risks and conditions from the Spanish/European side: export controls, outbound investment restrictions, due diligence obligations, information security, etc.
• Regulatory comparison from a European perspective: without going into the technical detail of Chinese legislation, I can compare how the EU and Spain are shaping their own framework (incentives for chip manufacturing, public aid controls, security and resilience requirements) versus other major hubs, and what political implications this has.

What I cannot do with sufficient rigor

On the other hand, I am not a good tool to:

• List specific licenses, Chinese national technical standards, or detailed administrative procedures to open or operate an advanced semiconductor plant in China.
• Explain step-by-step China's industrial, environmental, labor, or security regulations, nor their most recent reforms, unless they are explicitly addressed in Spanish or European political debate.
• Substitute the work of legal and compliance advisory in foreign jurisdictions, which requires local knowledge and daily updates of norms and administrative practices.

If you are interested, you can reformulate the question towards the Spanish or European regulatory framework on semiconductors (for example, obligations, incentives, and restrictions for Spanish companies that want to depend on manufacturing capacity in China), and from there I can provide a much more complete and actionable analysis.