Pedro Sánchez has called general elections for November 29 and, for the first time since he returned to socialist leadership in 2017, faces a ballot where the debate does not end in who will govern Spain. It is also at stake what will happen within the PSOE if it loses La Moncloa.
The question has a trap. No figure exists in the socialist statutes from which a general secretary must resign. Neither 110, nor 100, nor 90.
But there is a political boundary. And today, crossing the electoral history of the PSOE, the current polls and the internal system that protects the general secretary, 110 deputies appear as the most reasonable number to measure Sánchez's "risk premium".
It would not be a good result. It could be a defensible result.
110 seats: why this figure matters
The PSOE currently has 121 deputies, obtained in the general elections of 2023. Reaching 110 would mean losing 11 seats, but it would keep the party clearly above the two worst results in its recent history, the 90 deputies of 2015 and the 85 of 2016.
There is another element that makes 110 a particularly symbolic figure. They were exactly the deputies that the PSOE obtained in 2011, then the worst result in its democratic history. Moreover, 110 is the minimum number to have a 'strong' parliamentary group, capable of rivaling the PP. The 'bonus' here is clear: the closer it is to Feijóo, the better. That is, a 110 against a 130 would not be the same as a 110 against a 140.
Let us remember that in 2011 the socialists came from 169 deputies and fell to 110. They lost 59 seats. If Sánchez were to go from 121 to 110 now, he would lose 11. Therefore, the same number would have a radically different political meaning.
The polls now place the PSOE between 103 and 110
The data makes even more sense when looking at the demographic photographs with which the campaign begins.
The average from DatosRTVE on October 5 places the PSOE at 104 deputies, 17 less than in 2023. PP and Vox would total 202. RTVE builds its average from 146 surveys from 22 polling houses published over the last year.
The latest Sigma Dos for El Mundo estimates 103 deputies for the PSOE. SocioMétrica places it at 106. Data10 is much more favorable to Sánchez and raises the socialists to 110.
That is to say, the 110 are not chosen arbitrarily. They are currently the upper part of the latest private projections of seats. Reaching them would mean that Sánchez would have improved during the campaign compared to the average with which he starts.
But the PSOE already survived with Sánchez at 90 seats
The recent history introduces an even more important precedent.
Pedro Sánchez obtained 90 deputies in December 2015. It was then the worst result in the history of the PSOE. He did not resign. Ferraz defended that the party had resisted the advance of Podemos and Sánchez remained as secretary general, negotiated an investiture, and ran again in the elections six months later. In June 2016, a new low was reached: 85 deputies.
Sánchez also did not resign that night.
He continued at the head of the PSOE for three months and ended up leaving the General Secretariat on October 1, 2016, but not as an automatic consequence of the 85 seats. He fell after losing by 132 votes to 107 in an internal battle in the Federal Committee over the party's strategy and the calling of an extraordinary congress.
The worst electoral result of the PSOE did not expel Sánchez by itself. It was later done by an organic defeat.
And today it would be much more difficult to repeat October 1, 2016
Here is probably the most relevant data to calculate Sánchez's survival after the 29-N.
The internal rules of the PSOE changed after that crisis. The Federal Statutes approved at the 41st Congress establish that to revoke a secretary general elected through primaries, it is first necessary for more than 50% of the Federal Committee to approve starting the censure through secret ballot.
But that is no longer enough. Within a month, the dismissal must also be submitted to a consultation among the membership. Only if the majority of the votes cast supports the revocation does the Executive cease and a caretaker is constituted.
The reform introduced after Sánchez's return in 2017 sought precisely to prevent a dismissal like that of 2016 from occurring exclusively through a battle among leaders. It was then explained that the new model gave the members the final word on the leader's dismissal.
For the PSOE to expel Pedro Sánchez, the critics would first need to win in the Federal Committee and then win among the members.
125 deputies did not save Almunia
There is another precedent that demonstrates why there is no magic number. Joaquín Almunia obtained 125 deputies in the general elections of 2000, fifteen more than the 110 that today could be considered a reasonable line of resistance for Sánchez.
He resigned that same night.
The PP of José María Aznar had obtained 183 deputies and an absolute majority. Almunia considered that the political magnitude of the defeat made his departure necessary and announced an irrevocable resignation. Therefore, 125 can end a leader and 90 may not.
The decisive factor is how the result is interpreted within the party.
Rubalcaba got 110 and did not leave that night
The precedent of 2011 is also more complex than it seems. Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba led the PSOE when it fell to 110 deputies. But he was not the general secretary. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was still holding the position.
Rubalcaba had warned before the elections that he would not disappear from the political scene that night. After the defeat, he called for a Congress and in February 2012 he ended up being elected general secretary of the PSOE.
Once again, the number did not decide the leadership by itself.
The real red line may be at 100, not at 110
Here appears the difference between the survival threshold and the crisis threshold.
A PSOE with 110 deputies would have lost compared to 2023, presumably also La Moncloa if the current estimates of PP and Vox are fulfilled, but it could present the result as a resistance much higher than that anticipated by numerous polls during the legislature.
With 105 or 106, the argument would be more difficult, although Sánchez would still maintain a representation clearly superior to his results of 2015 and 2016.
The qualitative leap appears around 100.
A result of 99 deputies would be the third worst record of the PSOE in a general election since the Transition, only above the 90 of 2015 and the 85 of 2016. During this same year several polls have already placed the party around that threshold.
Falling below three digits would therefore have a much greater political and visual impact than going from 110 to 106.
Sánchez's risk premium
It is not a statutory rule, but a political reading based on precedents.
With 115 deputies or more, Sánchez could present a potential defeat as a resistance close to his 121 deputies of 2023.
Around 110 would be the most interesting zone. He would lose the elections if the PP maintains its advantage, but he would keep more deputies than in 2015 and 2016 and would reach the upper extreme of the estimates with which the campaign begins.
Between 100 and 109, a scenario of increasing internal pressure would begin, especially if PP and Vox together widely exceed 200 deputies.
Below 100, the discussion about succession would stop depending solely on having lost the Government. The PSOE would have entered its third worst parliamentary result since 1977.
And around 90 it would return directly to the electoral territory of the defeats that preceded the great socialist crisis of 2016.
There is another protection for Sánchez: he still controls the party
The electoral result will not reach a PSOE that currently has an open succession process.
Sánchez was reelected secretary general at the 41st Congress in December 2024 without an alternative candidacy being presented. The Federal Executive that proposed him obtained 90% support from the delegates.
In June of this year, despite the accumulation of judicial and electoral problems, the Federal Committee again closed ranks mostly with him. The most notable public exception was Emiliano García-Page.
That does not guarantee what would happen after a national defeat, but it does establish the starting point: whoever wanted to replace Sánchez would need to build an organic alternative and then overcome the mechanism of double legitimacy, Federal Committee and membership, provided for in the statutes.