Will Sánchez resign if he loses on November 29? The 110 seats of his 'risk premium' in the PSOE

Pedro Sánchez does not have a number of seats that forces him to leave the General Secretariat of the PSOE if he loses the elections on November 29. But the socialist precedents, the internal rules approved after his fall in 2016, and the current polls make the 110 deputies a politically significant boundary. The real precipice appears further down: falling below 100 would open a scenario that the PSOE has only known twice in democracy.

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Pedro Sánchez has called general elections for November 29 and, for the first time since he returned to socialist leadership in 2017, faces a ballot where the debate does not end in who will govern Spain. It is also at stake what will happen within the PSOE if it loses La Moncloa.

The question has a trap. No figure exists in the socialist statutes from which a general secretary must resign. Neither 110, nor 100, nor 90.

But there is a political boundary. And today, crossing the electoral history of the PSOE, the current polls and the internal system that protects the general secretary, 110 deputies appear as the most reasonable number to measure Sánchez's "risk premium".

It would not be a good result. It could be a defensible result.

110 seats: why this figure matters

The PSOE currently has 121 deputies, obtained in the general elections of 2023. Reaching 110 would mean losing 11 seats, but it would keep the party clearly above the two worst results in its recent history, the 90 deputies of 2015 and the 85 of 2016.

There is another element that makes 110 a particularly symbolic figure. They were exactly the deputies that the PSOE obtained in 2011, then the worst result in its democratic history. Moreover, 110 is the minimum number to have a 'strong' parliamentary group, capable of rivaling the PP. The 'bonus' here is clear: the closer it is to Feijóo, the better. That is, a 110 against a 130 would not be the same as a 110 against a 140.

Let us remember that in 2011 the socialists came from 169 deputies and fell to 110. They lost 59 seats. If Sánchez were to go from 121 to 110 now, he would lose 11. Therefore, the same number would have a radically different political meaning.

The polls now place the PSOE between 103 and 110

The data makes even more sense when looking at the demographic photographs with which the campaign begins.

The average from DatosRTVE on October 5 places the PSOE at 104 deputies, 17 less than in 2023. PP and Vox would total 202. RTVE builds its average from 146 surveys from 22 polling houses published over the last year.

The latest Sigma Dos for El Mundo estimates 103 deputies for the PSOE. SocioMétrica places it at 106. Data10 is much more favorable to Sánchez and raises the socialists to 110.

That is to say, the 110 are not chosen arbitrarily. They are currently the upper part of the latest private projections of seats. Reaching them would mean that Sánchez would have improved during the campaign compared to the average with which he starts.

But the PSOE already survived with Sánchez at 90 seats

The recent history introduces an even more important precedent.

Pedro Sánchez obtained 90 deputies in December 2015. It was then the worst result in the history of the PSOE. He did not resign. Ferraz defended that the party had resisted the advance of Podemos and Sánchez remained as secretary general, negotiated an investiture, and ran again in the elections six months later. In June 2016, a new low was reached: 85 deputies.

Sánchez also did not resign that night.

He continued at the head of the PSOE for three months and ended up leaving the General Secretariat on October 1, 2016, but not as an automatic consequence of the 85 seats. He fell after losing by 132 votes to 107 in an internal battle in the Federal Committee over the party's strategy and the calling of an extraordinary congress.

The worst electoral result of the PSOE did not expel Sánchez by itself. It was later done by an organic defeat.

And today it would be much more difficult to repeat October 1, 2016

Here is probably the most relevant data to calculate Sánchez's survival after the 29-N.

The internal rules of the PSOE changed after that crisis. The Federal Statutes approved at the 41st Congress establish that to revoke a secretary general elected through primaries, it is first necessary for more than 50% of the Federal Committee to approve starting the censure through secret ballot.

But that is no longer enough. Within a month, the dismissal must also be submitted to a consultation among the membership. Only if the majority of the votes cast supports the revocation does the Executive cease and a caretaker is constituted.

The reform introduced after Sánchez's return in 2017 sought precisely to prevent a dismissal like that of 2016 from occurring exclusively through a battle among leaders. It was then explained that the new model gave the members the final word on the leader's dismissal.

For the PSOE to expel Pedro Sánchez, the critics would first need to win in the Federal Committee and then win among the members.

125 deputies did not save Almunia

There is another precedent that demonstrates why there is no magic number. Joaquín Almunia obtained 125 deputies in the general elections of 2000, fifteen more than the 110 that today could be considered a reasonable line of resistance for Sánchez.

He resigned that same night.

The PP of José María Aznar had obtained 183 deputies and an absolute majority. Almunia considered that the political magnitude of the defeat made his departure necessary and announced an irrevocable resignation. Therefore, 125 can end a leader and 90 may not.

The decisive factor is how the result is interpreted within the party.

Rubalcaba got 110 and did not leave that night

The precedent of 2011 is also more complex than it seems. Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba led the PSOE when it fell to 110 deputies. But he was not the general secretary. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was still holding the position.

Rubalcaba had warned before the elections that he would not disappear from the political scene that night. After the defeat, he called for a Congress and in February 2012 he ended up being elected general secretary of the PSOE.

Once again, the number did not decide the leadership by itself.

The real red line may be at 100, not at 110

Here appears the difference between the survival threshold and the crisis threshold.

A PSOE with 110 deputies would have lost compared to 2023, presumably also La Moncloa if the current estimates of PP and Vox are fulfilled, but it could present the result as a resistance much higher than that anticipated by numerous polls during the legislature.

With 105 or 106, the argument would be more difficult, although Sánchez would still maintain a representation clearly superior to his results of 2015 and 2016.

The qualitative leap appears around 100.

A result of 99 deputies would be the third worst record of the PSOE in a general election since the Transition, only above the 90 of 2015 and the 85 of 2016. During this same year several polls have already placed the party around that threshold.

Falling below three digits would therefore have a much greater political and visual impact than going from 110 to 106.

Sánchez's risk premium

It is not a statutory rule, but a political reading based on precedents.

With 115 deputies or more, Sánchez could present a potential defeat as a resistance close to his 121 deputies of 2023.

Around 110 would be the most interesting zone. He would lose the elections if the PP maintains its advantage, but he would keep more deputies than in 2015 and 2016 and would reach the upper extreme of the estimates with which the campaign begins.

Between 100 and 109, a scenario of increasing internal pressure would begin, especially if PP and Vox together widely exceed 200 deputies.

Below 100, the discussion about succession would stop depending solely on having lost the Government. The PSOE would have entered its third worst parliamentary result since 1977.

And around 90 it would return directly to the electoral territory of the defeats that preceded the great socialist crisis of 2016.

There is another protection for Sánchez: he still controls the party

The electoral result will not reach a PSOE that currently has an open succession process.

Sánchez was reelected secretary general at the 41st Congress in December 2024 without an alternative candidacy being presented. The Federal Executive that proposed him obtained 90% support from the delegates.

In June of this year, despite the accumulation of judicial and electoral problems, the Federal Committee again closed ranks mostly with him. The most notable public exception was Emiliano García-Page.

That does not guarantee what would happen after a national defeat, but it does establish the starting point: whoever wanted to replace Sánchez would need to build an organic alternative and then overcome the mechanism of double legitimacy, Federal Committee and membership, provided for in the statutes.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the parliamentary process for calling general elections in Spain and what steps must be followed after the call?

The call for general elections in Spain combines decisions by the Government and the King with very precise rules set out in the Constitution and the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG). It covers two key moments: the dissolution of the Chambers and the period from the call until the constitution of the new Cortes.

1. Who decides and how is it called?

The basic framework is in the Spanish Constitution (text in BOE):

  • “Ordinary” dissolution (art. 115 CE): the President of the Government, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers and under his exclusive responsibility, may propose the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or both Chambers. The King decrees the dissolution and the royal decree sets the date of the elections.
  • “Automatic” dissolution due to investiture deadlock (art. 99.5 CE): if two months pass from the first investiture vote without any candidate obtaining the confidence of the Congress, the King automatically dissolves both Chambers and calls elections, with the countersignature of the President of the Congress.
  • Limits: dissolution cannot be proposed while a motion of censure is pending, nor can there be a new dissolution by this route before one year has passed since the previous one (except in the case of art. 99.5 CE).

The LOREG (Organic Law 5/1985) specifies that:

  • The call for elections to the Congress and the Senate is always made by royal decree.
  • In case of early dissolution, the same decree includes the dissolution of the Chamber(s) and the call for elections.
  • Except in the case of art. 99.5 CE, the decree is issued with the countersignature of the President of the Government, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers.

2. Deadlines and basic calendar

Article 68.6 CE establishes that the period between the call and the holding of the elections is 54 days, for elections to the Congress (a period that also applies when the elections are joint Congress-Senate).

On that general basis, the LOREG develops the electoral calendar (census, presentation and proclamation of candidacies, campaign, voting, counts, electoral litigation…) and a specific law, the Organic Law 2/2016 (LO 2/2016), introduces a particular regime:

  • For elections called under the art. 99.5 CE scenario, the seventh additional provision of the LOREG sets a shorter process: 47 days between the call and election day.
  • This reduction is mainly achieved by shortening the electoral campaign (8 days instead of 15) and “reusing” elements of the immediately previous process (same Electoral Boards, maintenance of representatives and endorsements, etc.).

After the vote, the Constitution provides that the new Cortes must be constituted within 25 days following the elections, which closes the cycle started with the dissolution.

3. Role of the Congress, the Senate, and the Permanent Deputation

Once the Chambers are dissolved, the Congress and the Senate cease to meet and lose their ordinary activity. However, the Constitution guarantees institutional continuity through the Permanent Deputations:

  • Article 78 CE provides that each Chamber has a Permanent Deputation, of at least 21 members, representing the parliamentary groups and presided over by the Presidency of the Chamber.
  • Upon expiration of the mandate or dissolution, the Permanent Deputation assumes certain powers of the Chambers and continues in office until the constitution of the new Cortes Generales.
  • Its powers with the Cortes dissolved are basically limited to:
    • The validation or repeal of royal decree-laws (art. 86 CE).
    • Necessary decisions in case of states of alarm, exception, and siege (art. 116 CE), when there is no constituted Congress.
  • When the new Chambers are constituted, the Permanent Deputation must account for the matters dealt with and its decisions.

4. What happens after the call until the constitution of the new Cortes?

From the publication of the royal decree of dissolution and call, a complete electoral period opens:

  • The Government goes, if applicable, into caretaker mode after the elections, but during the campaign acts with the limitations inherent to the principle of neutrality and the rules of the LOREG and the Central Electoral Board.
  • The Electoral Boards (Central, Provincial, and Zone) are constituted, the census is updated and reviewed, candidacies are presented and proclaimed, and the campaign is carried out.
  • After the election day, the provisional count is done at the tables, the general count by the Provincial Boards, and, if applicable, electoral litigation appeals.
  • Once the elected are proclaimed, the constitutive session of the Congress and the Senate is convened, in which the Boards of both Chambers are elected and the new Cortes Generales are officially declared constituted.
  • From that moment, the investiture phase of the President of the Government is activated, according to art. 99 CE, and the Permanent Deputation ceases its exceptional functions, limiting itself to accounting.

In summary, the parliamentary process to call general elections combines a political decision — dissolution proposed by the President of the Government or automatic dissolution due to investiture deadlock — with a constitutionally fixed calendar and a system of institutional continuity ensured by the Permanent Deputations until the new Cortes take over.

What functions and powers does the Secretary General of the PSOE have according to its statutes and what has been Pedro Sánchez's political trajectory?

The Secretary General of the PSOE is the highest political and organizational authority of the party between congresses, although subject to what the Federal Congress, the Federal Committee, and the Federal Statutes themselves decide. Pedro Sánchez currently holds that position and, at the same time, the Presidency of the Government, concentrating in his figure the leadership of the party and the Executive.

Functions and powers of the Secretary General of the PSOE

According to the Federal Statutes approved at the 41st Federal Congress of the PSOE (document available, for example, on the PSOE website), the Secretariat General assumes, in summary, the following powers:

  • General political direction: coordinate the party's general policy and strategy in accordance with the congress resolutions and the decisions of the Federal Committee.
  • Highest political representation: exercise the representation of the PSOE before institutions, other political forces, social organizations, and the citizenry, being the main spokesperson of the federal leadership.
  • Head of the Federal Executive Commission (CEF): preside over and coordinate the work of the CEF, responsible for implementing the Congress resolutions and directing the party's ordinary activity.
  • Relationship with the Federal Committee: convene the Federal Committee, propose its agenda, and report to it on the political situation and the leadership's actions.
  • Key strategic proposals: submit to the Federal Committee proposals on congress calls, internal calendars, and, if applicable, on the PSOE's candidacy for the Presidency of the Government.
  • Territorial coordination: politically guide and coordinate the autonomous federations and other territorial structures, ensuring a common line throughout the party.
  • Electoral and parliamentary orientation: set, together with the competent bodies, the general criteria for electoral action and the Socialist Group's performance in the Cortes and other chambers.
  • Internal and parliamentary appointments: propose certain leadership positions in parliamentary groups and in the federal structure.
  • Supervision of compliance with the political line: ensure that PSOE public and organizational officeholders act according to the approved political objectives.
  • Management of internal conflicts: intervene, within statutory margins, in resolving conflicts and internal appeals, usually in coordination with other guarantee bodies.
  • Participation in programmatic definition: promote, together with the CEF and the Federal Committee, the preparation of political documents, programmatic criteria, and major party campaigns.

Although the Secretary General leads the organization, the Statutes make clear that the highest body is the Federal Congress and that the Federal Committee exercises political control of the leadership between congresses. The Secretary General is elected by the membership in primaries and ratified by the Congress, thus reinforcing internal legitimacy.

Pedro Sánchez's political trajectory

Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón (Madrid, 1972) is an economist and holds a PhD in Economics and Business. He joined the PSOE in 1993 and has developed a career ranging from municipal politics to the Presidency of the Government, passing through several terms as a deputy and two cycles leading the Socialist Secretariat General (official biography at La Moncloa and summary in this biographical entry).

Between 2004 and 2009 he was a councilor in the Madrid City Council and was part of bodies of municipal housing and urban promotion companies. In 2009 he first entered the Congress of Deputies as a deputy for Madrid, a seat he held again from 2013. In parliament, he worked especially on economic and European matters.

After Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba's resignation, he was elected Secretary General of the PSOE in 2014 through primaries. He led the party in the 2015 and 2016 general elections, without managing to form a government. The internal conflict over Mariano Rajoy's investiture culminated in the October 2016 Federal Committee, where Sánchez resigned as Secretary General and later left his seat to avoid participating in the abstention that enabled the PP government.

In 2017 he toured the party groups and ran again in primaries against Susana Díaz and Patxi López. He won that internal consultation and was re-elected Secretary General, in what within the PSOE itself is described as a “catharsis” that strengthened leadership legitimized directly by the membership, as highlighted by various socialist leaders in statements collected by the newspaper Demócrata.

The turning point in his trajectory came in June 2018, when the Congress of Deputies approved the motion of censure presented by the PSOE against Mariano Rajoy. Since then Sánchez has been President of the Government; he was formally appointed by the King by royal decree published in the BOE (for example, his re-election in 2023).

Since then he has presided over several governments: first alone, then in coalition with Unidas Podemos, and after the 2023 general elections, leading a majority articulated through agreements with various nationalist and left-wing forces, as reported by various political chronicles from Demócrata. His mandate has been marked by managing the COVID‑19 pandemic, the subsequent economic and energy crisis, the use of European funds, and various labor and social reforms (such as the Minimum Vital Income and the increase of the minimum wage).

Today, Pedro Sánchez combines three central positions: Secretary General of the PSOE, President of the Government, and de facto leader of the parliamentary majority supporting his Executive. His trajectory is marked by the recovery of the party's leadership after the 2016 internal rupture and by using that organizational leadership to reach and maintain the head of government through intense parliamentary negotiation.

What were the PSOE's results in the last general elections and how many deputies does it currently have in the Congress?

In the last general elections held in Spain, on July 23, 2023 (23J), the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) obtained a result of 31.7 % of the votes and 121 seats in the Congress of Deputies. As of today, according to the most recent data on the composition of the Lower House, the Socialist Parliamentary Group maintains 121 deputies with a valid seat, that is, the same number of seats it won in those elections.

PSOE results in the July 23, 2023 general elections

The last general electoral event before the recent call for new elections was on July 23, 2023. According to information gathered from various analyses and electoral summaries, and reported in media such as Heraldo, El Confidencial or Público, the PSOE's balance was as follows:

  • Percentage of vote at the national level: approximately 31.7 % of valid votes cast.
  • Number of votes: around 7.8 million ballots in its favor across Spain (the exact figure varies slightly depending on the source, but is in that order of magnitude).
  • Seats in Congress: 121 deputies out of a total of 350.

This result placed the PSOE as the second largest force in number of seats, but with sufficient representation, combined with other formations, to articulate the parliamentary majority that supported Pedro Sánchez's investiture and the start of the XV Legislature. Much of the subsequent polling analysis uses precisely those 31.7 % and 121 deputies as a reference to compare the evolution of socialist support throughout the legislature.

Deputies currently held by the PSOE in Congress

Regarding the current situation in the Congress of Deputies, information from the parliamentary actors database indicates that the Socialist Parliamentary Group in Congress currently has 121 deputies with a valid seat. That is, the group maintains exactly the same number of seats as it won at the polls in July 2023.

According to our database, which collects official records, as of the reference date of October 6, 2026, it is confirmed that:

  • The Socialist Parliamentary Group in Congress (XV legislature) comprises 121 deputies with current membership status in the group.
  • The count includes both representatives elected on the PSOE lists and those from linked candidacies (for example, PSC) integrated into the same parliamentary group.
  • Substitutions made throughout the legislature — due to resignations, appointments to other positions, or personal reasons — have not altered the total number of seats of the group, as each vacancy has been followed by the corresponding incorporation of the next person on the electoral list.

This stability in the number of PSOE deputies occurs despite, as documented by media such as Demócrata, a significant volume of resignations and replacements in the entire Chamber since the start of the XV Legislature. In the socialist case, there have been several departures and entries of new deputies, but always under the general rule of the Spanish electoral system: the seat belongs to the list, not to the individual person, and is filled by the next candidate.

Summary

  • In the last general elections (23J 2023), the PSOE achieved approximately 31.7 % of the votes and obtained 121 seats in Congress.
  • Currently, in the XV Legislature and as of October 6, 2026, the Socialist Parliamentary Group still has 121 deputies with valid seats in the Congress of Deputies.

Therefore, both the initial electoral result and the current composition of the group coincide in the same number of seats: 121 socialist deputies in Congress.

Can you compare that PSOE result in 2023 with what it obtained in the previous general elections, for example in 2019? What changes in deputies have occurred within the Socialist Group since the start of the XV Legislature until now? How do those 121 PSOE seats compare with those obtained by the PP in the same 23J 2023 elections?

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