Will Sánchez resign if he loses on November 29? The 110 seats of his 'risk premium' in the PSOE

Pedro Sánchez does not have a number of seats that forces him to leave the General Secretariat of the PSOE if he loses the elections on November 29. But the socialist precedents, the internal rules approved after his fall in 2016, and the current polls make the 110 deputies a politically significant boundary. The real precipice appears further down: falling below 100 would open a scenario that the PSOE has only known twice in democracy.

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Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

La media de las encuestas

Media a 21 de noviembre de 2026 · 19 institutos

  • PP31,0 %
  • PSOE28,0 %
  • Vox18,9 %
  • Frente Amplio6,2 %
  • ERC2,6 %
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Media del último estudio de cada instituto en 30 días y su evolución semanal desde el 23J. Partidos con al menos un 2 %.

Todas las encuestas

Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

Pedro Sánchez has called general elections for November 29 and, for the first time since he returned to socialist leadership in 2017, faces a ballot where the debate does not end in who will govern Spain. It is also at stake what will happen within the PSOE if it loses La Moncloa.

The question has a trap. No figure exists in the socialist statutes from which a general secretary must resign. Neither 110, nor 100, nor 90.

But there is a political boundary. And today, crossing the electoral history of the PSOE, the current polls and the internal system that protects the general secretary, 110 deputies appear as the most reasonable number to measure Sánchez's "risk premium".

It would not be a good result. It could be a defensible result.

110 seats: why this figure matters

The PSOE currently has 121 deputies, obtained in the general elections of 2023. Reaching 110 would mean losing 11 seats, but it would keep the party clearly above the two worst results in its recent history, the 90 deputies of 2015 and the 85 of 2016.

There is another element that makes 110 a particularly symbolic figure. They were exactly the deputies that the PSOE obtained in 2011, then the worst result in its democratic history. Moreover, 110 is the minimum number to have a 'strong' parliamentary group, capable of rivaling the PP. The 'bonus' here is clear: the closer it is to Feijóo, the better. That is, a 110 against a 130 would not be the same as a 110 against a 140.

Let us remember that in 2011 the socialists came from 169 deputies and fell to 110. They lost 59 seats. If Sánchez were to go from 121 to 110 now, he would lose 11. Therefore, the same number would have a radically different political meaning.

The polls now place the PSOE between 103 and 110

The data makes even more sense when looking at the demographic photographs with which the campaign begins.

The average from DatosRTVE on October 5 places the PSOE at 104 deputies, 17 less than in 2023. PP and Vox would total 202. RTVE builds its average from 146 surveys from 22 polling houses published over the last year.

The latest Sigma Dos for El Mundo estimates 103 deputies for the PSOE. SocioMétrica places it at 106. Data10 is much more favorable to Sánchez and raises the socialists to 110.

That is to say, the 110 are not chosen arbitrarily. They are currently the upper part of the latest private projections of seats. Reaching them would mean that Sánchez would have improved during the campaign compared to the average with which he starts.

But the PSOE already survived with Sánchez at 90 seats

The recent history introduces an even more important precedent.

Pedro Sánchez obtained 90 deputies in December 2015. It was then the worst result in the history of the PSOE. He did not resign. Ferraz defended that the party had resisted the advance of Podemos and Sánchez remained as secretary general, negotiated an investiture, and ran again in the elections six months later. In June 2016, a new low was reached: 85 deputies.

Sánchez also did not resign that night.

He continued at the head of the PSOE for three months and ended up leaving the General Secretariat on October 1, 2016, but not as an automatic consequence of the 85 seats. He fell after losing by 132 votes to 107 in an internal battle in the Federal Committee over the party's strategy and the calling of an extraordinary congress.

The worst electoral result of the PSOE did not expel Sánchez by itself. It was later done by an organic defeat.

And today it would be much more difficult to repeat October 1, 2016

Here is probably the most relevant data to calculate Sánchez's survival after the 29-N.

The internal rules of the PSOE changed after that crisis. The Federal Statutes approved at the 41st Congress establish that to revoke a secretary general elected through primaries, it is first necessary for more than 50% of the Federal Committee to approve starting the censure through secret ballot.

But that is no longer enough. Within a month, the dismissal must also be submitted to a consultation among the membership. Only if the majority of the votes cast supports the revocation does the Executive cease and a caretaker is constituted.

The reform introduced after Sánchez's return in 2017 sought precisely to prevent a dismissal like that of 2016 from occurring exclusively through a battle among leaders. It was then explained that the new model gave the members the final word on the leader's dismissal.

For the PSOE to expel Pedro Sánchez, the critics would first need to win in the Federal Committee and then win among the members.

125 deputies did not save Almunia

There is another precedent that demonstrates why there is no magic number. Joaquín Almunia obtained 125 deputies in the general elections of 2000, fifteen more than the 110 that today could be considered a reasonable line of resistance for Sánchez.

He resigned that same night.

The PP of José María Aznar had obtained 183 deputies and an absolute majority. Almunia considered that the political magnitude of the defeat made his departure necessary and announced an irrevocable resignation. Therefore, 125 can end a leader and 90 may not.

The decisive factor is how the result is interpreted within the party.

Rubalcaba got 110 and did not leave that night

The precedent of 2011 is also more complex than it seems. Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba led the PSOE when it fell to 110 deputies. But he was not the general secretary. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was still holding the position.

Rubalcaba had warned before the elections that he would not disappear from the political scene that night. After the defeat, he called for a Congress and in February 2012 he ended up being elected general secretary of the PSOE.

Once again, the number did not decide the leadership by itself.

The real red line may be at 100, not at 110

Here appears the difference between the survival threshold and the crisis threshold.

A PSOE with 110 deputies would have lost compared to 2023, presumably also La Moncloa if the current estimates of PP and Vox are fulfilled, but it could present the result as a resistance much higher than that anticipated by numerous polls during the legislature.

With 105 or 106, the argument would be more difficult, although Sánchez would still maintain a representation clearly superior to his results of 2015 and 2016.

The qualitative leap appears around 100.

A result of 99 deputies would be the third worst record of the PSOE in a general election since the Transition, only above the 90 of 2015 and the 85 of 2016. During this same year several polls have already placed the party around that threshold.

Falling below three digits would therefore have a much greater political and visual impact than going from 110 to 106.

Sánchez's risk premium

It is not a statutory rule, but a political reading based on precedents.

With 115 deputies or more, Sánchez could present a potential defeat as a resistance close to his 121 deputies of 2023.

Around 110 would be the most interesting zone. He would lose the elections if the PP maintains its advantage, but he would keep more deputies than in 2015 and 2016 and would reach the upper extreme of the estimates with which the campaign begins.

Between 100 and 109, a scenario of increasing internal pressure would begin, especially if PP and Vox together widely exceed 200 deputies.

Below 100, the discussion about succession would stop depending solely on having lost the Government. The PSOE would have entered its third worst parliamentary result since 1977.

And around 90 it would return directly to the electoral territory of the defeats that preceded the great socialist crisis of 2016.

There is another protection for Sánchez: he still controls the party

The electoral result will not reach a PSOE that currently has an open succession process.

Sánchez was reelected secretary general at the 41st Congress in December 2024 without an alternative candidacy being presented. The Federal Executive that proposed him obtained 90% support from the delegates.

In June of this year, despite the accumulation of judicial and electoral problems, the Federal Committee again closed ranks mostly with him. The most notable public exception was Emiliano García-Page.

That does not guarantee what would happen after a national defeat, but it does establish the starting point: whoever wanted to replace Sánchez would need to build an organic alternative and then overcome the mechanism of double legitimacy, Federal Committee and membership, provided for in the statutes.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What are the competencies of the PSOE Federal Committee according to its statutes?

According to the Federal Statutes of the PSOE approved at the 41st Federal Congress, the Federal Committee is the highest governing body of the party between Congresses and concentrates the main political and organizational competencies when the Federal Congress is not in session. Its functions combine defining the political line, controlling the leadership, and making key decisions on internal processes and candidacies.

Firstly, the Federal Committee has the competence to define the PSOE's policy between Congresses, always within the framework set by the congressional resolutions. That is, it translates the general lines agreed upon at the Congress into concrete guidelines and decides the party's position on major political issues of the moment when the Congress is not convened. On that basis, it approves the general lines of political action and the party's strategic decisions, setting the calendar, priorities, and general orientation of alliances and campaigns.

Secondly, it exercises an internal control function. The Statutes assign it the competence to examine and judge the management of the Federal Executive Committee and other federal bodies subject to its control. This includes the political accountability of the Executive for its actions, the application of congressional resolutions, and the ordinary management of the party. The Committee can demand political responsibility from the Federal Executive Committee through an internal motion of censure which, to succeed, must be presented with a minimum support from members of the Committee itself and approved by a reinforced majority, according to the provisions of the Statutes.

A third major area of competence relates to the Federal Congresses. The Federal Committee is the body that calls the Federal Congress, both in its ordinary mode, with the periodicity established by the statutes, and in its extraordinary mode, when circumstances so require. It is responsible for setting the date and place of the event and approving the basic elements of the call. Additionally, when certain relevant vacancies occur — for example, in the General Secretariat or in a substantial part of the Federal Executive Committee — the Federal Committee can agree to call an extraordinary Congress to renew the leadership.

The Federal Committee also plays a central role in primary processes and electoral candidacies. According to the Statutes and the Federal Development Regulation, it is responsible for calling federal primary processes or approving their bases when foreseen, and in any case approving or ratifying the candidacies and electoral lists submitted for its consideration. Various statutory and regulatory sources emphasize that the final approval of the lists for parliaments and other institutions is an exclusive competence of the Federal Committee, although the preparation of proposals is done at territorial levels and with reports from the Federal List Commission.

Regarding internal structure, the Federal Committee has the capacity to elect certain federal bodies and commissions when so provided by the Statutes, such as the Federal List Commission itself or other specialized bodies. Likewise, it can fill vacancies that occur in the Federal Executive Committee and the Federal Ethics and Guarantees Commission, according to the procedures established by the statutes. In this same logic of internal organization, the Statutes indicate that the Federal Committee is the body that authorizes the constitution of “currents of opinion” within the party, upon proposal of the Federal Executive Committee and under very specific conditions regarding militant support and territorial presence.

Alongside all this, the Federal Committee is empowered to approve rules, regulations, and agreements in those matters expressly reserved to it by the Statutes, and to exercise all competencies not specifically attributed to another federal body, thus acting as the final instance of the organic system. The Statutes also contemplate the possibility that the Committee delegate certain competencies to other bodies, always within the limits set by the statutory text itself.

Finally, the Statutes establish that the Federal Committee must meet at least twice a year. In the last meeting of each year, the Federal Executive Committee presents the balance of its management, which reinforces the Committee's role as an instance of control and general political guidance of the PSOE between Congresses.

What legal requirements must be met to initiate a revocation process of the general secretary in the PSOE?

To initiate a process of revocation of the federal general secretary of the PSOE, a “motion of censure” in the parliamentary sense does not apply, but rather the internal revocation mechanism provided in the Federal Statutes of the PSOE (article 6 of the Statutes approved at the 41st Federal Congress). The Organic Law 6/2002 on Political Parties only requires that there be internal democracy and that the statutes regulate these procedures, but does not establish a specific procedure to dismiss the general secretary; that procedure is designed by the party itself in its internal rules.

General legal framework (Organic Law on Political Parties)

The Organic Law on Political Parties requires that:

  • The election and possible dismissal of governing bodies comply with principles of internal democracy.
  • The party's statutes regulate its structure, functioning, and procedures for control and accountability of leaders.

However, it does not establish percentages, deadlines, or specific bodies to revoke a general secretary: it refers those decisions to what each party provides in its statutes. In the case of the PSOE, therefore, one must refer to its current Federal Statutes.

Who can initiate the revocation

In the PSOE, the position of federal general secretary is elected by primaries of the entire membership. Therefore, the revocation also combines representative bodies and consultation with the base. The basic requirements are:

  • Competent body to initiate the process: the Federal Committee, the highest party body between congresses.
  • No direct initiative from the membership: the base cannot call the federal consultation by themselves; the Federal Committee must act first.
Internal requirements to start the procedure

According to article 6 of the PSOE Federal Statutes (41st Congress), the revocation procedure of the general secretary includes, in summary, these steps:

  • Motivated proposal in the Federal Committee. A motivated initiative must be formulated, that is, with an explanation of the political, organizational, or statutory reasons justifying the revocation.
  • Secret vote in the Federal Committee. The decision to open the process is taken by secret vote of the members of the Federal Committee.
  • Reinforced majority in the Federal Committee. The opening of the procedure requires the support of more than 50 % of the votes of the Federal Committee (exactly half is not enough: this threshold must be exceeded).

This agreement of the Federal Committee does not yet dismiss the general secretary or the Executive; it only authorizes consulting the membership about the revocation.

Consultation to the membership and effects

Once the Federal Committee has approved starting the process:

  • Deadline for the consultation: the consultation to the membership must be called and held within a maximum period of one month from the Federal Committee's agreement.
  • Who votes: all PSOE members (and direct federal affiliates, if applicable), by individual and secret vote.
  • Majority required in the consultation: the revocation passes if it obtains the majority of votes cast. The statutes do not set a minimum participation threshold, only a simple majority of those who actually vote.

If the consultation concludes with a majority in favor of revocation:

  • The Federal Executive Committee is dismissed as a whole, including the general secretary.
  • The Federal Committee must immediately appoint a Managing Commission, which assumes the party's temporary leadership.
  • The managing commission has a mandate with a time limit (maximum 90 days), and its function is basically to organize new primaries and the congress that will elect a new general secretary and new Executive.
What the PSOE system does not require

Additionally, in light of the statutes and the Organic Law on Political Parties, it is relevant what is not required:

  • No specific number of member signatures is required to formally register the revocation of the federal general secretary; the legal “trigger” is the Federal Committee's agreement.
  • The Federal Committee's decision alone does not remove the general secretary: it initiates the procedure, but dismissal only occurs if the membership endorses it in the consultation.
  • There is no internal “motion of censure” with a parliamentary structure (alternative candidate included in the same vote); the model is revocation and calling a new election process.

In summary, from a legal-statutory point of view, to initiate the revocation of the PSOE general secretary it is essential to have a majority over 50 % of the Federal Committee, in a secret and motivated vote; and for the revocation to be effective, that decision must be ratified by the majority of votes cast by the membership in a binding consultation held within a maximum period of one month, followed by the dismissal of the Executive and the appointment of a managing commission of up to 90 days.

Could you explain in more detail exactly what article 6 of the PSOE Federal Statutes says about the revocation of the general secretary? How does this internal revocation procedure of the PSOE differ from a parliamentary motion of censure against the Prime Minister? What practical role does the PSOE Federal Committee have in the election and dismissal of the general secretary beyond this revocation mechanism?

What has been Pedro Sánchez's political and professional background before becoming Prime Minister?

Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón (Madrid, 1972) became Prime Minister in June 2018 after a long career combining economic training, international experience, university teaching, and a political career developed in the Madrid City Council, the Congress of Deputies, and the leadership of the PSOE.

Academic background

Sánchez completed his Baccalaureate at the Ramiro de Maeztu Institute in Madrid, where he also played basketball in the youth system of Club Estudiantes. Later, he focused on economics:

  • Degree in Economic and Business Sciences from the Royal University Center María Cristina of El Escorial, affiliated with the Complutense University of Madrid.
  • Master's in European Union Economics from the Free University of Brussels, which consolidated his specialization in European integration.
  • Diploma of Advanced Studies in European Economic and Monetary Integration at the Ortega y Gasset University Institute.
  • PhD in Economics from Camilo José Cela University (2012), where he later became a professor.

This combination of studies places him in the profile of an economist with solid training in European affairs and community institutions.

Professional and international experience

Before holding top political positions, Sánchez developed a professional and international career linked to public policies and economics:

  • He joined the PSOE in 1993, at age 21, starting his activism in the Socialist Youth and the Madrid federation.
  • In the late 1990s, he worked as an assistant in the European Parliament, on the team of socialist MEP Bárbara Dührkop, which gave him first direct contact with community politics.
  • He was part of the cabinet of the United Nations High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the post-Balkan conflict period, gaining experience in institutional reconstruction and international relations.
  • He served as head of international relations at the Organization of Consumers and Users (OCU).
  • Between approximately 2000 and 2004, he worked as a consultant and advisor, combining assignments for the PSOE leadership with work for private companies.
  • From the late 2000s, he began teaching as a university professor of Economics at Camilo José Cela University, an activity he combined with his political career.

Early steps in institutional politics

His leap to representative politics occurred at the municipal level:

  • In 2004, he entered the Madrid City Council as a councilor for the socialist group.
  • He renewed his seat in the 2007 municipal elections and remained on the council until 2009.

As a councilor, he served from the opposition and took on various indirect responsibilities:

  • Member of the General Assembly of Caja Madrid.
  • Member of the boards of the Madrid Municipal Promotion Company and the Municipal Housing and Land Company, which gave him knowledge of urban management, housing, and the public financial sector.

Deputy in the Congress

In 2009, Sánchez made the leap to national politics by entering the Congress of Deputies for Madrid, initially to fill a vacancy in the IX Legislature.

In this first parliamentary stage:

  • He was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  • He participated in the Joint Committee for the European Union.
  • He acted as deputy spokesperson in the Territorial Policy Committee.
  • He was recognized by the Association of Parliamentary Journalists as the “breakthrough deputy” of 2010.

He did not win a seat in the 2011 general elections but returned to Congress in January 2013, already in the X Legislature, after the resignation of a socialist deputy. Since then, he consolidated his presence in the parliamentary group and increased his internal visibility in the PSOE.

PSOE leadership and opposition role

Sánchez's national projection skyrocketed from 2014:

  • In July 2014, he was elected PSOE general secretary through primaries, following Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba's tenure.
  • As socialist leader, he was candidate for Prime Minister in the general elections of December 2015 and June 2016, without managing to form a government.
  • In October 2016, after a deep internal crisis over the party's position on Mariano Rajoy's investiture, he resigned as general secretary and gave up his seat to avoid supporting the PSOE's abstention.
  • He reorganized his support among the membership and socialist groups and, in the May 21, 2017 primaries, was again elected general secretary, defeating Susana Díaz and Patxi López.

Between 2017 and spring 2018, Sánchez was again PSOE general secretary and opposition leader, rebuilding the organization and preparing the alternative to the Popular Party government.

Immediate situation before the Premiership

After the Gürtel case verdict, which questioned the Popular Party's credibility, Sánchez presented a motion of censure against Mariano Rajoy on May 25, 2018. The motion was approved by Congress on June 1, 2018, with a majority of 180 votes, and on June 2 he was appointed Prime Minister.

In summary, before reaching La Moncloa, Pedro Sánchez had been an economist and consultant with European and international experience, university professor, Madrid councilor, national deputy in two legislatures, and, above all, PSOE general secretary and opposition leader, from where he promoted the motion of censure that opened the doors to the Premiership.

Could you detail only Pedro Sánchez's stage as a councilor in the Madrid City Council (2004-2009), with specific committees and responsibilities? What role did Pedro Sánchez play in the 2015 and 2016 general elections and the failed investiture attempts? How does Pedro Sánchez's trajectory prior to the premiership compare with that of other Prime Ministers of Spain?

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How many deputies does the PSOE currently have after the 2023 general elections?

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What is the symbolic number of seats considered the 'risk premium' for Pedro Sánchez in these elections?

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What mechanism must internal critics overcome to remove Pedro Sánchez as general secretary of the PSOE according to the current statutes?

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