Brazil 2026 elections: the polls anticipate a tight contest and the counting starts favoring Bolsonaro

The reform of the Brazilian electoral law that directly affects presidential processes is still under consideration and is not yet in force. The core of the changes revolves around two major initiatives: the new Electoral Code (PLP 112/2021) and a constitutional reform (PEC 12/2022) concerning re-election, election unification, and terms of office. Neither has yet completed the full legislative process, so the presidential elections are still governed by the current rules.

1. The new Electoral Code (PLP 112/2021)

The project for a new Electoral Code aims to unify and update the dispersed Brazilian electoral legislation, including the rules that apply to presidential elections (candidate registration, campaigns, financing, propaganda, use of social networks, infractions and sanctions, etc.).

According to available information, this project:

• Was approved in the Chamber of Deputies and sent to the Federal Senate, where it is registered as PLP 112/2021.
• In the Senate, it is still pending a vote in the Constitution and Justice Committee (CCJ), which must issue an opinion before the text can go to the Senate Plenary.
• After passing the Plenary, depending on amendments, it might require further review by the Chamber of Deputies before final approval.

In practice, this means the new Electoral Code has not been approved or enacted. It is still a proposal under discussion in the Senate, with sensitive points regarding campaign regulation, social networks, and the Electoral Justice's role. Until this process is completed, it does not change the current presidential rules.

2. The constitutional reform (PEC 12/2022)

Simultaneously, a Proposed Constitutional Amendment (PEC 12/2022) is being processed, aiming to modify the political-electoral system's architecture in key aspects for the Presidency: end of re-election in the Executive, unification of election dates, and adjustments in term lengths.

The status of this PEC is as follows:

• The proposal was debated in the Senate CCJ, which approved the text in committee.
• After this endorsement, the reform still requires a vote in the Senate Plenary, where it must reach the reinforced constitutional quorum.
• Even if approved in the Senate, it would then have to pass the Chamber of Deputies, also with two rounds of voting and qualified majorities.

In other words, the PEC has passed an initial technical phase in the Senate but has not completed the constitutional process and therefore is not incorporated into the Constitution. Neither the possibility of presidential re-election nor the electoral calendar has changed yet.

3. Effects on presidential elections

In Brazil, the principle of electoral annuality applies: laws that alter the electoral process can only be applied to an election if they have been approved and enacted at least one year in advance of the election date. The Electoral Justice itself and specialized sources remind that any reform approved outside this timeframe cannot affect the current cycle.

As of today, the combination of factors is clear:

• The new Electoral Code is still pending in the Senate, without a final vote in Plenary.
• The PEC 12/2022 has only been approved in the Senate CCJ and has not yet passed both chambers in Plenary.
• Neither of these texts has been enacted or published as current law.

Consequently, the presidential elections are still held under the current legal framework: the model of absolute majority of valid votes in the first round (excluding blank and null votes) remains, with the possibility of a second round between the two most voted candidates if no one surpasses 50%.

4. General assessment

In summary, the Brazilian electoral reform aiming to comprehensively reorganize presidential processes is in an advanced but incomplete stage. Congress has accumulated significant initiatives, but the necessary political agreements—especially in the Senate and for constitutional majorities—have not yet materialized. Until that happens and the annuality deadlines are respected, there will be no effective changes in how the President of the Republic is elected.

The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) is the highest body of the Brazilian Electoral Justice. According to current legislation—mainly the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the Electoral Code (Law No. 4,737/1965)—it exercises jurisdictional, administrative, normative, and advisory competencies to guarantee the legality and legitimacy of elections throughout the country.

Basic constitutional framework

The 1988 Constitution integrates the Electoral Justice within the Judicial Branch and establishes the TSE as its highest instance. Generally, the Constitution:

• Positions the TSE as responsible for organizing and conducting federal elections, in coordination with the Regional Electoral Courts (TRE), electoral judges, and electoral boards.
• Recognizes its central role in the tabulation of results, the proclamation of the elected, and the certification of the President and Vice President of the Republic.
• Empowers it, along with the rest of the Electoral Justice, to adjudicate electoral disputes and crimes related to electoral processes.

Although the Constitution sets this general framework, it is the Electoral Code that specifies in detail the TSE's powers, especially in its articles 22 and 23.

Jurisdictional competencies

As a superior court, the TSE acts both as a court of first instance in certain matters and as a reviewing court for decisions of the TREs:

• Processes and judges originally the registration and cancellation of national political parties, as well as the registration of their national directories.
• Has first-instance jurisdiction over issues related to the registration of candidacies for President and Vice President of the Republic, including challenges to these registrations.
• Judges appeals against decisions of the Regional Electoral Courts, both in jurisdictional and administrative matters (for example, regarding candidacies, propaganda, vote counting, and certification at the state level).
• Resolves conflicts of jurisdiction between regional courts and between these and electoral judges from different states.
• Judges certain electoral crimes and related offenses committed by magistrates of the electoral courts themselves.
• Hears habeas corpus and mandados de segurança in electoral matters in cases provided by the Code (for example, when acts of ministers of State or decisions of regional courts are involved and there is an alleged risk of violence or serious harm before the competent judge acts).

Administrative competencies

In its administrative role, the TSE coordinates the functioning of the electoral system throughout Brazil:

• Directs and supervises the voter registration and the electoral roll at the national level.
• Sets guidelines for the logistical organization of voting, the operation of polling stations, and election infrastructure, including electronic voting machines and tabulation systems.
• Exercises direct control over the certification of the President and Vice President, issuing the official titles accrediting the elected.
• Approves the division of states into electoral zones and the creation of new zones, at the proposal of the TREs, to ensure adequate territorial coverage.
• Oversees the compliance with legal obligations of political parties regarding accounting and electoral financing, with the power to impose sanctions in cases of infractions.
• May requisition federal forces to ensure compliance with electoral legislation and its own decisions, as well as resolutions of regional courts when necessary to preserve normality and security of the process.

Normative and advisory competencies

The TSE is not limited to applying the law: it also has an important role in regulating and interpreting electoral law:

• Issues resolutions and instructions of general scope that develop and specify electoral legislation for each election cycle (for example, on propaganda, financing, use of social networks, or operation of voting machines and result dissemination systems).
• These infra-legal norms are mandatory for parties, candidates, electoral authorities, and media involved in the process.
• Performs an advisory function, responding to electoral queries submitted by authorities and legitimate actors, helping to standardize the interpretation of the law before and during elections.
• May adopt “other necessary measures” for the execution of electoral legislation, a formula granting it leeway to respond to new challenges, such as digital disinformation campaigns.

Overall, the TSE's competencies make it the institutional guarantor that Brazilian elections are conducted with legality, transparency, equal conditions among candidacies, and respect for the electorate's will, combining its jurisdictional functions with strong regulatory and supervisory powers over the electoral process.

Flávio Bolsonaro is a right-wing Brazilian politician, the eldest son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who has built his career mainly in the state of Rio de Janeiro and, more recently, in national politics. His trajectory combines a long period as a state deputy, his leap to the Senate, and, from 2025‑2026, a central role as the main reference of bolsonarism and presidential candidate.

Regarding his affiliation, sources agree that he currently belongs to the Liberal Party (PL), which today is the main electoral vehicle of bolsonarism. Throughout his career, he has been affiliated with several parties: he has successively joined parties such as PP (Progressistas), PSC (Social Christian Party), PSL (Social Liberal Party), Republicans, and Patriota, before settling in the PL, to which he is currently linked as senator and presidential candidate.

His entry into politics was very early. At just 21 years old, in the 2002 elections, he was elected state deputy in the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro (Alerj). He took office in 2003 and, since then, served four consecutive terms as state deputy, consolidating an electoral base in the capital of Rio and the metropolitan area. During this stage, his work focused on public security, penal hardening, and a conservative values agenda, in line with his father's discourse.

This long period in the Alerj allowed him to become a known figure within the conservative field of Rio de Janeiro. In parallel, he changed parties within the spectrum of Brazilian right and center-right, a relatively common movement in the country's politics, where alliances and party labels are very fluid. He passed through the PP and PSC, and later joined the PSL, the party with which Jair Bolsonaro won the Presidency in 2018 and with which Flávio himself projected into national politics.

The turning point in his career came precisely in the 2018 general elections. That year he left the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro to run for a seat in the Federal Senate, representing the state of Rio. He was elected senator and, since 2019, has held that position, initially associated with the PSL and later relocated within the PL environment after internal ruptures and realignments of bolsonarism.

In the Senate, his profile remained consistent with his previous positions: a conservative moral agenda, defender of Christian values, traditional family, and strong religious presence; a marked emphasis on tough security policies and penal legislation hardening; and a frontal opposition to social and regulatory policies identified with the left and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's Workers' Party (PT). Various analyses describe him as one of the most visible faces of Brazil's hard right, although trying to project a somewhat more “moderate” tone than his father to broaden support.

From 2025, with Jair Bolsonaro electorally disqualified and later convicted for his involvement in the coup attempt after the 2022 elections, Flávio was explicitly designated by his father as political heir and the main bolsonarist bet for the 2026 presidential elections. The former president made this public in letters and messages read by Flávio himself, presenting him as the one responsible for “continuing” the family's political project.

In 2026, the Liberal Party (PL) formalized this strategy by proclaiming him presidential candidate. Since then, Flávio Bolsonaro has focused his activity on touring the country, negotiating support with other conservative forces, and articulating a candidacy that combines defending his father's legacy with the promise of his own leadership. Reports highlight that, despite having the hard core of the bolsonarist electorate, he has had difficulties building a broad coalition of parties around him, precisely because of Jair Bolsonaro's figure's weight and resistance from moderate right sectors.

In summary, Flávio Bolsonaro's political trajectory is structured as follows: young state deputy in Rio de Janeiro for four consecutive terms; leap to the Senate in 2018; consolidation as a bolsonarist reference; and, from 2025‑2026, leadership of Brazil's radical right as the presidential candidate of the Liberal Party (PL), after previously passing through other right-wing parties such as PP, PSC, PSL, Republicans, and Patriota.