General elections poll: PP and Vox would have 33 more seats than the absolute majority and Sánchez would drop to 104, according to Hamalgama

The Hamalgama Métrica poll for Vozpópuli places the PP at 33.8% and 146 seats, while Vox would reach 18.8% and 63 deputies. Both parties would sum 209 representatives, 33 above the absolute majority. The PSOE would remain at 25.9% and 104 seats, with Sumar reduced to seven and Podemos at three.

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An eventual majority of PP and Vox would not depend on a few deputies. The new poll by Hamalgama Métrica for Vozpópuli places both parties at 209 seats, 33 above the 176 that mark an absolute majority in Congress.

The PP would win the general elections with 33.8% of the votes and 146 deputies. Vox would obtain 18.8% and 63 representatives, its best result in this pollster's series.

On the other hand, the PSOE would be at 25.9% and 104 seats. Sumar would achieve 5.9% and seven deputies, while Podemos would reach 3.8% and three representatives.

The sum of PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would be 114 seats, 95 less than PP and Vox. In terms of vote percentage, the two right-wing parties would reach 52.6%, compared to 35.6% for the three main state left-wing parties.

PP and Vox would add up to 209 seats

The main finding of the poll is the breadth of the majority that PP and Vox would form.

The PP would reach 146 deputies and Vox 63. Their sum would reach 209, two more than in the previous measurement by Hamalgama Métrica.

The figure places both parties 33 seats above the absolute majority. It also represents an improvement of 39 deputies compared to the general elections of 23J, when the PP obtained 137 and Vox 33.

The difference is not explained solely by the PP's advance. Alberto Núñez Feijóo's party would gain nine deputies, while Vox would incorporate 30, practically doubling its current representation.

The PP would reach 33.8% and 146 deputies

The PP would once again be the leading political force with 33.8% of the votes.

Compared to the general elections of 2023, when it obtained approximately 33.1%, the popular party would improve by seven tenths. The growth in seats would be greater: they would go from 137 to 146.

Feijóo's party would retain 85.9% of its voters from 23J. Its main leakage would occur towards Vox, which would attract 12.5% of those who supported the PP in the last general election.

Vox reaches its maximum in the series

Vox would obtain 18.8% of the votes and 63 seats.

In the general elections of 2023, it achieved 12.4% and 33 deputies. The poll therefore attributes to it an advance of 6.4 points and 30 representatives.

It also appears as the party with the highest electoral loyalty. 93.9% of those who voted for Vox in 23J would repeat their choice now.

Its growth comes both from the high retention of its base and from transfers received from other parties. The poll estimates that it would attract 12.5% of former PP voters and 4.2% of those who supported the PSOE.

The PSOE would be left with 104 seats

The PSOE would obtain 25.9% of the votes and 104 deputies.

The result would mean a loss of 5.8 points compared to the 31.7% of the last general elections. In parliamentary representation, it would go from 121 to 104 seats, 17 fewer.

The PSOE would retain 72.5% of its 2023 electorate. Although it continues to hold more than seven out of ten voters, the poll detects leaks both towards abstention and towards the right-wing bloc.

10.8% of those who voted for the PSOE would now opt for the PP. Another 4.2% would choose Vox and 8.2% would abstain.

Therefore, the socialist setback would not come solely from demobilization. A relevant part of the lost vote would cross over to PP and Vox.

The PP would attract one in ten former socialist voters

The transfer from the PSOE to the PP is one of the most relevant movements in the survey.

According to Hamalgama Métrica, 10.8% of the 2023 socialist electorate would now vote for Feijóo's party. The leak to Vox would be smaller, but also significant: it would reach 4.2%.

This data allows us to distinguish between two types of electoral loss for the PSOE. On the one hand, voters who remain within the left or remain undecided. On the other, those who move directly to a formation located in the opposing bloc. The fact that there are more abstainers than 'leaks' is key for Ferraz.

Sumar would retain only one in three voters

Sumar would obtain 5.9% of the votes and seven seats.

The formation would lose a very important part of the representation achieved in 2023, when the joint candidacy, which also included Podemos, reached 12.3% and 31 deputies.

Only 33.5% of those who voted for Sumar would repeat their ballot now. 27.4% would move to Podemos, 20.4% would opt to abstain, and 14.1% would move to the PSOE.

The main problem for this space would not be a massive transfer to the right, but its dispersion among PSOE, Podemos, and abstention.

Podemos would obtain three deputies

Podemos, measured separately, would achieve 3.8% of the votes and three seats.

The sum of Sumar and Podemos would reach 9.7% and ten deputies. In the 2023 general elections, the space ran united and obtained 12.3% and 31 representatives.

The comparison reflects a joint loss of 2.6 points and 21 deputies. Electoral fragmentation would have an especially intense effect on the distribution of seats by province.

The state left would lose 38 deputies

PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would gather a total of 114 seats.

In the 23J, PSOE and the Sumar candidacy - which then included Podemos - added up to 152. The joint loss would be 38 representatives.

In votes, the bloc would go from approximately 44% in 2023 to the current 35.6%, a decrease of 8.4 points.

Faced with these 114 deputies, PP and Vox would reach 209. The distance between both blocs would be 95 seats.

The PP-Vox bloc gains seven points since 23J

PP and Vox would add up to 52.6% of the valid vote. In the 2023 elections, they jointly reached around 45.5%. The improvement would be 7.1 points.

Conversely, PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would go from the joint 44% of 23J to 35.6%, a drop of 8.4 points.

The difference between both blocs, which in the last general election was approximately 1.5 points, would now rise to 17 points.

62.9% would support holding elections this year

The survey also asks about a possible early call.

62.9% of those interviewed believe that Pedro Sánchez should call general elections during this year, compared to 26.8% who reject that possibility.

Support for the early call is very high among PP and Vox voters. 21.3% of those who voted for PSOE in the last general election also share it.

Among former Sumar voters, the opposite position predominates: 96.7% reject an early election, according to the published data.

The survey asks about the impact of the Zapatero case

The poll also includes a question about investigations related to former president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

51.8% believe that the revelations known could end up affecting the President of the Government judicially. 39.2% do not share that prediction.

The responses are highly conditioned by vote recall. 71.4% of the PP electorate and the entirety of Vox's believe that the matter could reach Sánchez, while 81.3% of socialist voters rule it out.

This is a perception of those interviewed and not a judicial conclusion.

Junts and PNV would each lose one seat

The survey also reflects changes among nationalist parties.

Junts would obtain around 367,000 votes and six seats, one less than in the 2023 elections. Its loss would be approximately 28,000 votes.

The PNV would go from five to four deputies. The poll attributes about 220,000 votes to it, about 56,800 less than in the last general election.

Between both parties, they would lose approximately 85,000 votes and two representatives. EH Bildu would retain its six seats, although it would also register a slight reduction in votes.

The setback for Junts and PNV would reduce their ability to influence an investiture, although in the scenario projected by Hamalgama Métrica, PP and Vox would not need additional support.

Vote and Seat Estimation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

Party Vote Estimate Seats 23J Seats Difference
PP 33.8% 146 137 +9
PSOE 25.9% 104 121 -17
Vox 18.8% 63 33 +30
Sumar 5.9% 7 31*
Podemos 3.8% 3 Integrated into Sumar

* Podemos ran as part of the Sumar candidacy in the 2023 general elections.

Block Comparison                                                                                                                                                                                                      

Block Estimated Vote Estimated Seats 23J Seats Change in Seats
PP + Vox 52.6% 209 170 +39
PSOE + Sumar + Podemos 35.6% 114 152 -38
Difference between blocks 17 points 95 seats 18 seats
Absolute majority 176 176 PP and Vox: +33

Main Vote Transfers                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

2023 Electorate Destination Percentage
PSOE PSOE Repeat 72.5%
PSOE PP 10.8%
PSOE Abstention 8.2%
PSOE Vox 4.2%
PP PP Repeat 85.9%
PP Vox 12.5%
Vox Vox Repeat 93.9%
Sumar Sumar Repeat 33.5%
Sumar Podemos 27.4%
Sumar Abstention 20.4%
Sumar PSOE 14.1%

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current parliamentary status of the possible call for early elections and what procedures must be followed for its approval?

The possible call for early general elections does not have, as such, a “parliamentary status” in the Congress or the Senate, because it is not a procedure processed as a law or as a parliamentary initiative. The decision to dissolve the Cortes and bring forward the elections is an act of the executive power with the intervention of the Head of State, regulated by the Constitution and electoral legislation, not by the Rules of the Chambers as if it were a bill. Therefore, as long as there is no formal decree of dissolution and call, no specific file on “early elections” appears in the Cortes.

1. Absence of specific parliamentary status

In the usual language of the Cortes Generales, draft bills and legislative proposals, motions, non-legislative proposals, questions, interpellations, etc., have “parliamentary status.” These are numbered, registered, and go through phases (consideration, committee, plenary, Senate, etc.).

The call for early elections does not follow that circuit:

  • There is no bill for “calling elections.”
  • No proposal for early dissolution of the Chambers is submitted to a vote in the Congress or the Senate.
  • There is no identifiable parliamentary file in the registry of the Congress or the Senate whose object is “to call general elections.”

Therefore, strictly speaking, the “possible call” does not appear at any stage of parliamentary processing. Until the decree of dissolution is signed and published, the only thing that can exist are political debates, non-legislative proposals, or group declarations in favor or against an early election, but this does not change that the formal decision does not depend on a vote of the Chambers.

2. Who decides the early dissolution

The early dissolution of the Cortes and the consequent call for general elections is articulated as a decision of the Prime Minister, who submits it to the King. It is an act typically linked to the relationship between the Executive and the Head of State, not to the ordinary parliamentary procedure.

In a simplified way, the scheme is as follows:

  • The Prime Minister politically decides that he wants an early election.
  • He formulates the proposal for dissolution of the Congress and Senate and the call for elections to the King.
  • The King signs the corresponding decree, which is published in the official bulletin, making the dissolution effective and setting the election date and electoral calendar.

The Cortes do not vote on that decree nor do they have to approve it as if it were a legislative initiative. What does exist is a constitutional and legal framework that conditions when and how this power can be used (for example, avoiding temporal abuses or conflicts with other essential State processes), but that framework is not processed as another matter on the agenda of the Chambers each time they are dissolved.

3. Indirect role of Parliament

Although the Congress and the Senate do not approve the early dissolution, their political dynamics can force or encourage it to happen:

  • If the majority supporting the Government breaks or becomes very unstable, the Prime Minister may consider the early election as a political way out.
  • Certain highly relevant parliamentary episodes (systematic loss of key votes, agenda blockage, etc.) can serve as justification for the early election.
  • The opposition forces usually use parliamentary debate to pressure for or against the early call.

Even so, all this remains on the political level, not strictly procedural: groups can request elections, present non-legislative proposals urging the Government to call them, or make it a focus of their discourse, but none of these initiatives is legally binding to trigger the early election.

4. Difference with other parliamentary procedures

It is advisable to distinguish early dissolution from other mechanisms that are processed and voted on in the Chambers, such as the motion of no confidence, the vote of confidence, or the investiture of a president. Those procedures do have formal parliamentary phases, regulated debates, and defined majorities for their approval or rejection.

In contrast, the call for early elections, although it may be politically related to the outcome of those processes, is a subsequent and separate act, which does not appear as its own “parliamentary status” in the records of the Congress and the Senate.

What temporal limits exist for a Prime Minister to bring forward general elections? What differences are there between a dissolution due to early election and an automatic dissolution after several failed investiture attempts? What role do the motion of no confidence and the vote of confidence have in the political decision to call early elections?

What are the main powers and functions of the Prime Minister and how is the call for general elections regulated according to Spanish legislation?

The Prime Minister is the head of the executive power and politically directs the Council of Ministers, with specific powers defined by the Constitution and the Government Law. The call for general elections is always articulated through a royal decree by the King, but the initiative generally lies with the Prime Minister himself, except in the exceptional case of investiture blockage. This power of dissolution and call is subject to temporal and material limits (for example, it cannot be exercised if a motion of no confidence is underway or during states of emergency or siege). The procedural development of the electoral process and campaign deadlines is set by the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), with specific regulation for automatic elections due to investiture failure.

Powers and functions of the Prime Minister

The basic framework is in the Spanish Constitution, especially in the articles about the Government. Article 97 establishes that the Government directs domestic and foreign policy, the civil and military administration, and the defense of the State, and exercises executive function and regulatory power. Article 98.2 specifies that the Prime Minister directs the action of the Government and coordinates the functions of the ministers, without prejudice to their direct competence and responsibility.

The Law 50/1997, of the Government systematically develops these functions. It specifies that, in any case, the Prime Minister is responsible for:

  • Representing the Government.
  • Establishing the political program of the Government and setting the guidelines of domestic and foreign policy, ensuring their compliance.
  • Proposing to the King, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales.
  • Submitting the vote of confidence to the Congress, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers.
  • Proposing to the King the call for a consultative referendum, after authorization from the Congress of Deputies.
  • Directing defense policy and exercising functions over the Armed Forces as provided by defense legislation.
  • Calling, presiding over, and setting the agenda of the Council of Ministers.
  • Endorsing, if applicable, the acts of the King, in accordance with the Constitution.

The political responsibility of the Government before the Congress is articulated through the vote of confidence and the motion of no confidence, according to the Constitution. The Prime Minister can ask the Congress to vote on his program or a general policy declaration; if he loses that vote, the Government must resign and the investiture procedure reopens. Conversely, the Congress can demand responsibility from the Government through a motion of no confidence, which must include an alternative candidate for the Presidency; if approved by an absolute majority, the outgoing Government resigns and the proposed candidate is invested and appointed Prime Minister.

Appointment, dismissal, and relationship with the King

After each renewal of the Congress, the King proposes a candidate for the Presidency, after consulting with the representatives of the political groups and through the President of the Congress, according to the Constitution. That candidate presents his program and requests the confidence of the Chamber; if obtained, the King appoints him Prime Minister. The Government ceases after general elections, in case of loss of parliamentary confidence (vote of confidence or motion of no confidence), or by resignation or death of the Prime Minister, continuing in office until the new Government takes office.

Dissolution of the Cortes and call for general elections

The power to dissolve the Cortes and trigger elections is mainly regulated in the Constitution and specified in electoral legislation. According to the Constitution itself (article appearing in the consulted window), the Prime Minister, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers and under his exclusive responsibility, can propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales. The King decrees the dissolution, and the dissolution decree sets the election date.

There are important limits:

  • The proposal for dissolution cannot be presented when a motion of no confidence is underway.
  • A new dissolution cannot occur before one year has passed since the previous one, except in the specific case of article 99.5 (investiture blockage).
  • While the states of alarm, exception, or siege are declared, the Congress cannot be dissolved (article 116.5 of the Constitution).

Additionally, article 99.5 of the Constitution provides that if two months pass from the first investiture vote without any candidate obtaining the confidence of the Congress, the King automatically dissolves both Chambers and calls elections, with the endorsement of the President of the Congress.

This exceptional case was developed through Organic Law 2/2016, which adds a seventh additional provision to the LOREG. That provision establishes that in these automatic elections the royal decree of call is issued the day after the two-month period expires, is published and comes into force that same day, and sets the election date for the forty-seventh day after the call. For this case, the electoral campaign is shortened to eight days and several procedures are simplified (maintenance of electoral boards, representatives, endorsements, and external vote requests).

In ordinary processes (natural end of the legislature or early dissolution at the initiative of the Prime Minister), the LOREG establishes the general temporal framework of the process and the campaign: the campaign begins on the thirty-eighth day after the call, lasts fifteen days, and ends at midnight on the day immediately before the vote, according to the consulted fragment. On that basis, the complete calendar of the process (from the call to the proclamation of elected representatives) is organized in the LOREG itself and in instructions from the Central Electoral Board, such as Instruction 3/2019, adapting them when several elections coincide.

Could you detail better how the motion of no confidence works in practice and what consequences it has for the Prime Minister? How does a legal early dissolution of the Cortes decided by the Prime Minister differ from the automatic dissolution due to investiture blockage? What specific limitations does the Government have when it is acting in a caretaker capacity after the call for general elections?

What were the exact results of the 2023 general elections for each of the mentioned parties?

The official results of the general elections to the Congress on July 23, 2023, show a clear predominance of the two major state parties (PP and PSOE), accompanied by Sumar and Vox as medium forces and by several nationalist and independentist parties with between 1% and 2% of the vote. At the state level, only eight parties surpassed the 1% vote threshold, and all of them obtained representation in the Congress. Additionally, parties with more territorially concentrated support such as BNG or Coalición Canaria won seats despite not reaching 1% at the state level. Below I detail the exact available data by party, according to the official scrutiny of the Ministry of the Interior collected by media such as RTVE.

Statewide results by party (23J 2023, Congress)

Parties with more than 1% of the vote at the state level and representation in the Congress:

  • PP (People's Party): 137 seats, 8,091,840 votes, 33.1% of the valid vote at the state level.
  • PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party): 121 seats, 7,760,970 votes, 31.7%.
  • Vox: 33 seats, 3,033,744 votes, 12.4%.
  • Sumar: 31 seats, 3,014,006 votes, 12.3%.
  • ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia): 7 seats, 462,883 votes, 1.9%.
  • JxCAT–Junts per Catalunya: 7 seats, 392,634 votes, 1.6%.
  • EH Bildu: 6 seats, 333,362 votes, 1.4%.
  • EAJ‑PNV (Basque Nationalist Party): 5 seats, 275,782 votes, 1.1%.

According to the summary of results used in the analysis by EPData, there are no parties that exceed 1% at the state level without seats. The consulted text also notes that the bipartisanship (PP+PSOE) reached 64.8% of the vote, which explains much of the distribution of seats.

Parties with less than 1% and representation

Although your question focuses on parties with more than 1% of the vote, the mentioned sources highlight two relevant cases that, despite not reaching that state threshold, did win seats due to the territorial concentration of their support:

  • BNG (Galician Nationalist Bloc): around 0.6% state level and 1 seat.
  • CCa (Canarian Coalition): around 0.5% state level and 1 seat.

The exact detail of their state percentage does not appear broken down more precisely in the available fragments; for detailed data by party, constituency, and type of vote, the agreement of the Central Electoral Board published in the BOE and associated official documentation can be consulted, such as the BOE on 23J results and the document on CERA vote from the Central Electoral Board ([link]).

General context of the election

According to data collected by EPData, turnout was 69.64% of the census. The result left a very fragmented Congress in which no bloc reached an absolute majority without support from several nationalist and independentist forces, something also analyzed in parliamentary context pieces such as the Demócrata report on the investiture bloc (investiture bloc analysis).

For comparative analyses of this result with historical series or with elections at other levels (European, regional, etc.), sources such as ABC, the synthetic file from Wikipedia, works on electoral history such as [link], and the aggregation model of polls from the newspaper Demócrata (Demócrata polls) have also been used.

Other relevant links consulted

Within the framework of this response, contents from Demócrata and statistical and official sources have also been reviewed, among others: current articles and analyses from the newspaper Demócrata such as [link], [link], [link] and others; INE notes such as national accounts and EPA; documentation from the Central Electoral Board and the BOE on other elections (2024 European results, correction of European results); and notes from the Catalan Government on regional elections (12M results, 12M turnout, [link]), as well as analyses from other media such as El País and audiovisual references like [link].

Can you break down these results by ideological blocs (left, right, nationalists) and explain what majority was needed to govern after 23J? Which parties were key in Pedro Sánchez's investiture after these elections and how many seats did each contribute? How did these results vary compared to the previous 2019 general elections for PP, PSOE, Vox, and Sumar/Unidas Podemos?

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How many seats would PP and Vox jointly obtain according to the Hamalgama Métrica survey?

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