General elections in Spain

General elections survey: the crisis in Ceuta boosts the PP to 149 seats and leaves the Government at 110, according to SocioMétrica

What changes after Ceuta: Feijóo gains two seats, Vox cedes one and Sánchez resists at the cost of Sumar

6 minutes

encuesta elecciones generales Ceuta

By Demócrata

Published

10 AUG, 2026 - 07:41

Last updated

10 AUG, 2026 - 09:21

6 minutes

The new survey from SocioMétrica for El Español, compared to the poll from July 5, raises the PP from 147 to 149 seats and keeps the PSOE at 103, although the socialists rise from 25% to 26% of the vote. Vox drops from 58 to 57 deputies and Sumar falls from eight to seven, so PP and Vox go from 205 to 206 seats, while the current coalition Government is reduced to 110.

The Ceuta crisis does not cause a complete turnaround in the SocioMétrica survey, but it does leave a politically clear movement: the PP is the one that improves compared to the previous poll. Feijóo goes from 147 to 149 seats and rises from 33.6% to 33.8% of the vote. The variation is small in percentage, but relevant in seats, because it places the PP just one deputy away from the symbolic barrier of 150.

The PSOE does not lose more deputies compared to July. It remains at 103 seats and improves one point in vote, from 25% to 26%. This data allows us to say that Sánchez contains his electoral floor, but does not recompose the majority: the Government block worsens because Sumar drops from eight to seven deputies. The PSOE-Sumar coalition thus goes from 111 to 110 seats.

Vox also does not come out strengthened in this wave. The party of Santiago Abascal drops from 58 to 57 deputies, although it rises slightly from 16.9% to 17% of the vote. The majority of the right, therefore, does not grow due to a new leap from Vox, but due to the advance of the PP. The sum PP+Vox goes from 205 to 206 seats; with UPN, it would reach 207

The PP appears as the clear winner of hypothetical general elections

SocioMétrica attributes to Feijóo 33.8% of the votes and 149 deputies. It is an increase of two seats compared to the previous poll and leaves the party at the gates of the symbolic barrier of 150. The comparison with the PSOE is the political key. The popular would lead the socialists by 7.8 points and by 46 seats.

The PP would not only be the first force, but would also have more deputies than all the parties that supported Sánchez's investiture, which would sum up to 142 representatives.

The coalition Government falls to 110 seats

The hardest data for Moncloa is in the sum of PSOE and Sumar. The socialists would remain at 103 seats and Sumar at seven. Together they would only reach 110 deputies.

This result greatly distances any possibility of re-editing a Government majority like that of 2023. The coalition would lose weight from both sides: the PSOE remains above 100 seats, but far from the 121 it obtained on 23J; and Sumar collapses from the 31 deputies achieved then by the joint candidacy that also included Podemos.

The weakness is not limited to the Executive. The combination of PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would only sum up to 34.6% of the vote, a level that El Español compares to the worst historical moments of the state left.

PP and Vox would have 206 deputies

The alternative majority appears very consolidated. The PP would obtain 149 seats and Vox 57. Together they would reach 206 deputies, 30 above the absolute majority. The result would be even broader if UPN is included, bringing the block to 207.

Vox would slightly slow down compared to the previous poll, losing one seat, but would still be well above its result from 2023. The party of Santiago Abascal would obtain 17% and 57 deputies, compared to 12.4% and 33 seats achieved in the last general elections.

The reading is clear: although Vox may have reached its peak in this series, its growth since 23J is still sufficient to give Feijóo a comfortable absolute majority.

The investiture block falls below the PP

The survey leaves another impactful data: all the parties that supported Sánchez's investiture would sum up to 142 seats. This figure falls below the 149 deputies that the PP would obtain by itself.

This point summarizes the change in parliamentary arithmetic. In 2023, Sánchez managed to articulate a majority with the support of Sumar, ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG and other partners. In the estimation of SocioMétrica, that block would no longer reach a competitive position against the sum of PP and Vox.

The difference would not only be in the fall of the PSOE. Also in the loss of strength of Sumar and in the limited capacity of nationalist and independentist parties to compensate for that setback.

Sumar drops to seven seats and Podemos to two

Sumar appears as one of the weakest points of the progressive space. The formation would remain at 5.9% of the votes and seven seats, one less than in the previous poll from July. The setback is very strong compared to the result of 2023, when the joint candidacy of Sumar achieved 31 deputies.

We Can, for its part, would obtain 2.7% and two seats. Together they would total nine deputies. The fragmentation of the space to the left of the PSOE would again punish its conversion of votes into seats, especially in small and medium provinces.

The PSOE slows part of its fall by absorbing votes from Sumar

The PSOE manages to contain its decline compared to other recent polls, but it does so largely at the expense of Sumar. The matrix of vote transfers published by El Español indicates that the socialists would capture almost 450,000 former voters of Sumar.

This transfer helps Sánchez to remain at 103 seats, but does not recompose the overall progressive bloc. What the PSOE gains, its government partner loses in part. The consequence is a more concentrated state left around the PSOE, but with less total strength.

The PP attracts 540,000 former socialist voters

The survey also reflects a significant movement between blocs. The PP would manage to attract 540,000 former voters of the PSOE. In addition, it would mobilize 1.2 million voters who abstained in the general elections of 2023.

Vox would also capture votes from abstention: 963,000 former abstainers would now choose Abascal's party, according to SocioMétrica.

These data explain why the majority of the PP and Vox appears so large. It is not only based on the loyalty of its voters from 2023, but also on the ability to capture support from the PSOE and to mobilize voters who did not go to vote.

The nationalists and independents would total 31 seats

The bloc of nationalist and independent parties would reach 31 seats, according to the survey. ERC would rise to eight deputies and take one from Junts, which would drop to six. In Euskadi, EH Bildu would maintain its lead with seven seats, one more than the PNV.

The BNG would maintain its representation and Adelante Andalucía would enter with one deputy, with 1% of the vote. The nationalist sum would still have parliamentary weight, but in this scenario it would not be enough to sustain a investiture majority led by Sánchez.

Feijóo surpasses Sánchez in presidential preference

The survey also offers leadership data. Feijóo appears ahead of Sánchez in preference to occupy the Presidency of the Government. 22.9% of those surveyed want the leader of the PP to reach La Moncloa, compared to 19.5% who prefer Sánchez. They are followed by Santiago Abascal, with 11.9%, and Yolanda Díaz, with 8.3%.

The most striking fact is that 32.7% respond that they do not want any of them to be president, which reflects a high level of disaffection towards the main national leaders.

When the election is reduced to the leaders of the two major parties, Feijóo also prevails: 39.7% against Sánchez's 35.8%.

45% believe that Feijóo will be the next president

The expectation of victory also favors the leader of the PP. 44.8% of Spaniards believe that Feijóo will be the next president of the Government after the general elections. 30.3% bet on Sánchez's continuity.

This data matters because it not only measures political preference but also perception of the electoral climate. A relevant part of the electorate seems to assume that the political cycle has shifted towards a victory for the PP.

This expectation may influence the mobilization of voters, both among those seeking alternation and those wanting to avoid it.

All leaders fail

In leader evaluation, all national leaders fail. Feijóo and Yolanda Díaz top the list with an average score of 3.3. Abascal appears with a 2.9 and Sánchez falls to 2.8.

The position of the president of the Government is especially delicate because he is behind Abascal in overall evaluation. Among his own voters, Sánchez receives a 6.2. It is a passing grade, but lower than that received by other leaders within their electorates: Vox voters give Abascal a 9.1; Sumar voters rate Yolanda Díaz with an 8; and PP voters award Feijóo a 7.2.

The Ceuta crisis enters the electoral reading

The survey is published after the Ceuta crisis and places that episode as one of the factors marking the new political climate. The management of the crisis has opened several fronts: border security, relationship with Morocco, role of the CNI, pressure on the Interior Ministry, and internal debate within the Government partners.

The poll does not allow us to assert on its own that Ceuta is the only cause of the electoral changes. But it does measure a snapshot taken in the full impact of that crisis and with the PP widening its lead over the PSOE.

Party	Estimated vote	Estimated seats
PP	33.8%	149
PSOE	26%	103
Vox	17%	57
Sumar	5.9%	7
Podemos	2.7%	2

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the parliamentary procedure for calling early general elections in Spain?

The information available in the consulted sources does not detail the specific constitutional and parliamentary procedure for calling early general elections in Spain. They do provide data on political control mechanisms such as the motion of no confidence and the vote of confidence, which are closely related to the Government's stability, but they do not explain the formal process of dissolving the Cortes and calling elections. Therefore, it is not possible to describe step by step, based on documentation, that specific procedure.

Available information: parliamentary control mechanisms

The sources focus on explaining the instruments that the Congress of Deputies uses to demand political responsibility from the Government, which is indirectly linked to the possibility of government changes and, sometimes, to the dynamics leading to elections, although without describing the dissolution of the Cortes.

Motion of no confidence

According to the information found about the motion of no confidence, it is an instrument through which the Congress can demand political responsibility from the Government. Its basic features are:

Initiative: it must be proposed by at least one-tenth of the deputies, that is, by 35 deputies.
Content: it must include an alternative candidate for the Presidency of the Government (it is a constructive motion of no confidence).
Form: it is submitted in writing and must be motivated.
Initial processing: the Presidency of the Congress admits it for processing and a 2-day period is opened to present alternative motions.
Debate and voting: it is debated in the Plenary of the Congress and, to be approved, requires an absolute majority.

If a motion of no confidence succeeds, it results in a new President of the Government, but the consulted sources do not indicate that this automatically entails the calling of early elections; it is a mechanism for replacing the Government within the same legislature.

Vote of confidence

Information is also provided about the vote of confidence, which is an instrument exclusively initiated by the President of the Government to verify if he maintains the support of the Congress.

Who proposes it: only the President of the Government can propose it.
Purpose: it is usually linked to a program or a general policy statement.
Processing: it is proposed before the Plenary of the Congress, debated, and voted on.
Majority required: it passes with a simple majority (more votes in favor than against).
Consequence of rejection: if it does not obtain confidence, the Government must resign and the process to appoint a new President begins.

Again, the sources explain the consequences for the Government's continuity, but do not describe that, at this point, an automatic call for early general elections is triggered; rather, a new process for appointing a President is opened.

Absence of information on the dissolution of the Cortes and early call

The question focuses on the procedure to call early general elections (early dissolution of the Cortes Generales). This procedure concerns:

Who has the initiative for dissolution and calling.
The role played by the Government, the President of the Government, and the Head of State.
The formal steps followed (Council of Ministers agreements, formal act of dissolution, publication in the Official State Gazette, etc.).
The deadlines between dissolution and the holding of elections.
Temporal limitations (for example, moments when dissolution is not allowed) and material limitations (for example, the existence of a motion of no confidence in process).

However, none of these issues are explicitly addressed in the provided sources. In particular:

The specific legal act of dissolution of the Cortes is not detailed.
The legal deadlines for holding elections after that dissolution are not specified.
The limitations that may exist regarding the use of that power (for example, linkage to motions of no confidence or certain moments of the legislature) are not included.

Therefore, although there is a general context on how the Congress can withdraw or confirm its support for the Government (motion of no confidence, vote of confidence) and on how the political responsibility of the Executive before the Chamber is articulated, there are no specific data in the consulted sources that allow explaining rigorously the parliamentary and constitutional procedure to call early general elections in Spain.

Conclusion

With the available information, it can only be stated that the stability or instability of the Government, reflected in mechanisms such as the motion of no confidence or the vote of confidence, is closely related to the political dynamics that can lead to an electoral advance. However, the technical detail of the early dissolution of the Cortes Generales and the call for early general elections (initiative, formal procedures, intervention of the King, publication, and exact deadlines) does not appear in the provided sources and, consequently, cannot be described precisely and documented. No further information is available in the consulted sources.

What specific constitutional requirements exist to dissolve the Cortes Generales early and call elections? What temporal limitations or exceptional circumstances prevent or restrict an electoral advance in Spain? How is the call for early elections legally differentiated from automatic dissolution due to failed investiture?

What functions and powers does the President of the Government have according to the Spanish Constitution?

The President of the Government is the highest authority of the Executive Power in the Spanish parliamentary system and the center of direction of general policy. He holds the headship of the Government, coordinates the action of the ministers, is politically accountable before the Cortes Generales, and acts as the main institutional interlocutor with the other powers of the State, with the autonomous communities, and internationally. Although the technical details are found in several provisions of the Constitution, they can be grouped into major functional blocks that allow understanding his position in the system.

1. Direction of general policy and the Executive

First, the President of the Government exercises the function of direction of internal and external policy. This means that he sets the broad lines of action of the Executive (political program, legislative priorities, economic, social, and territorial strategy) and assumes the highest responsibility before Parliament for its orientation and results. He is not a purely formal “primus inter pares,” but the true center of political decision within the Government.

Alongside that political direction, the President directs the Government's action and coordinates the other members. He decides the ministerial structure, promotes and coordinates the development of sectoral policies, resolves conflicts between ministries, and ensures overall coherence. In practice, this function allows him to set the agenda of the Council of Ministers and determine which initiatives are activated and when.

2. Relations with the Cortes Generales and political responsibility

The Spanish system is parliamentary, so the position of the President of the Government is inextricably linked to the Cortes Generales. The President is invested by the Congress of Deputies, before which he must present his program and obtain a certain majority. This relationship is maintained throughout the legislature through political responsibility: the Government, and particularly its President, can be subjected to a motion of no confidence, a vote of confidence, or ordinary control through questions, interpellations, and investigative commissions.

These relations with the Cortes imply that the President of the Government must account periodically and explain the evolution of political action, the main decisions of the Executive, and future orientations. From a constitutional point of view, he is the piece that connects the parliamentary majority with the effective exercise of executive power.

3. Internal powers within the Government

Within the Council of Ministers itself, the President has very relevant organic powers. He is responsible for proposing the appointment and dismissal of ministers, thus shaping the political team with which he will govern. He can also promote restructurings of departments, mergers, or creation of new portfolios according to political needs at the time.

Additionally, the President convenes and presides over the meetings of the Council of Ministers, sets the agenda, and decides which matters are submitted for deliberation and approval. Although decisions are collegiate, the ability to decide what reaches the Council's table and when grants him a position of strong internal leadership.

4. Relations with the Crown

In the Spanish constitutional architecture, the President of the Government maintains a key institutional relationship with the Crown. The King always acts according to the principle of countersignature, which means that his acts must be politically validated by the Government, and particularly by its President or the competent ministers. Thus, the figure of the President of the Government is essential to ensure that the Head of State remains in the realm of neutrality and political irresponsibility, while the Government assumes effective responsibility for decisions.

The President is also the main interlocutor of the King in ordinary political life, especially regarding monitoring the general situation of the country, the formation of Government after elections, or the possible dissolution of the Cortes and calling of elections.

5. Territorial relations and external projection

Although territorial articulation and distribution of powers are developed in detail in other areas, from a constitutional point of view the President of the Government is the political apex from which the general policy regarding the autonomous communities is conducted. This translates into the general coordination of relations with autonomous governments and leadership of the State's response to competence conflicts or exceptional situations affecting the entire territory.

At the international level, the President of the Government assumes the political direction of the State's external action. Although formal representation of the State abroad corresponds to the Crown, it is the President who defines the orientation of foreign and European policy, participates in major summits, and promotes treaties and agreements, which must later be assumed by the Cortes under the terms established by the Constitution itself.

Within this framework, the President of the Government is thus positioned as the core of the country's political direction, subject to democratic control by Parliament and in permanent dialogue with the Crown, the autonomous communities, and society.

Which specific articles of the Constitution regulate the figure of the President of the Government and what does each of them say? How exactly does the investiture procedure of the President of the Government in the Congress of Deputies work? What mechanisms does the Constitution provide to dismiss the President of the Government before the legislature ends?

What were the exact results of the last general elections in Spain and how many deputies did each party obtain?

The last general elections in Spain were held on July 23, 2023. With the information appearing in the available sources, much of the vote and seat distribution can be reconstructed, but not a complete and official table with all parties. The results of the main nationwide parties (PSOE, PP, and Vox) and the seats of several nationalist and minor formations (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, CC, UPN, and Podemos) are clearly recorded. Below I detail what can be stated with explicit data and point out the gaps not found in the consulted sources.

Main nationwide parties

Several post-electoral analyses and surveys published later by the newspaper Demócrata use the official results of 23J as a reference and allow extracting the basic figures of the major parties:

People's Party (PP): according to the Demócrata survey aggregator, Feijóo obtained 33.1% of the votes and 137 deputies in the 2023 general elections, data cited as a historical reference in various polling pieces, such as those from Sigma Dos and the DYM Institute ([link]).
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): the same analyses indicate that PSOE achieved in July 2023 a 31.7% of the votes and 121 seats. These figures appear as a comparison point in later polls, for example in NC Report estimates ([link]) and in the already cited DYM Institute work.
Vox: various polls published after 23J indicate that Vox obtained in the 2023 general elections 12.4% of the votes and 33 deputies, data repeatedly used as a historical reference in analyses such as those from Sigma Dos and GAD3.

In the case of Sumar, none of the recovered pieces explicitly provide the national vote percentage or the total number of deputies from 23J; it is only taken as a reference in survey aggregators and vote flow analyses, such as in this aggregator, or in articles about European electoral coalitions ([link]), but without a numerical table of the overall result.

Nationalist, regionalist formations and other forces

For the rest of the parties, the sources used are political analyses on the parliamentary arithmetic of the Congress after 23J, such as Demócrata's report on the investiture bloc ([link]). That work details the seats each potential partner holds, which allows knowing the number of deputies (although not the votes or national percentage) of several formations:

Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC): 7 deputies.
Junts per Catalunya (Junts): 7 deputies.
EH Bildu: 6 deputies.
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV): 5 deputies.
Podemos: 5 deputies (already separated from Sumar in the current group distribution, as also explained in this analysis on parliamentary groups and in the piece on Finance spokespersons, [link]).
Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG): 1 deputy.
Canarian Coalition (CC): 1 deputy.
Navarrese People's Union (UPN): 1 deputy (the sum PP–Vox–UPN reaches 171 deputies, which, considering the 137 of PP and 33 of Vox, leaves 1 for UPN, data handled in the article on the investiture bloc).

However, the consulted information does not show the complete official breakdown of votes and national percentages of 23J for these parties nor for other candidacies that obtained representation. Nor is there a closed table with the number of seats of Sumar or other minor forces that may have entered the Congress.

Limitations of the available information

The news and analyses from Demócrata and other sources used focus mainly on the parliamentary force correlation, group formation (Congress Regulation reform, constitution of commissions, legislator transfers) and comparison with later polls (SocioMétrica, DYM Institute, among others). None of these pieces reproduce the official and complete results table from the Ministry of the Interior with votes and percentages by candidacy at the national level.

Therefore, with the available documentation, the data of PP, PSOE, and Vox (percentage and seats) and the seats of ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, CC, UPN, and Podemos can be stated precisely, but it is not possible to offer an exhaustive “party by party” list with votes, percentages, and deputies for all the lists that ran on July 23, 2023. No further information is available in the consulted sources.

As additional context on recent electoral processes and system functioning, other analyses and coverages from Demócrata on regional elections (Aragon 2026, Aragon results, [link], Castilla y León 2026, Andalusia 2026) and on the economic and social impact of the legislature (National Accounts 2023, EPA 4Q-2023), as well as parliamentary memory pieces on past elections (Zapatero's investiture, last debate of Suárez, Amnesty Law of 1977).

What was the exact number of seats and vote percentage of Sumar and the rest of the nationwide candidacies in 23J? How did this seat distribution from 23J translate into the configuration of parliamentary groups in the Congress? What investiture agreements were necessary after 23J for Pedro Sánchez to be re-elected President of the Government?

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How many seats would the PP obtain according to the latest SocioMétrica survey?

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