Survey crisis in Ceuta: 82% support militarizing the border with Morocco and 72% of PSOE voters also request it, according to Sigma Dos

In the Spanish legal system, there is no specific legal figure called “militarizing a border.” What does exist are different legal frameworks for: the ordinary control of borders by security forces, the occasional support of the Armed Forces, and the states of alarm, exception, and siege, which may involve enhanced powers and a central role for the military. In most cases, the Government can deploy military means without prior parliamentary authorization, but always under political control of the Cortes. Only in extreme scenarios (state of exception or siege, or missions abroad) is a formal act of Congress with specific majorities required.

1. “Normal” border control: internal security

Under ordinary circumstances, border control is a function of the State Security Forces and Corps, not the Armed Forces. The Organic Law 2/1986 on Security Forces and Corps and the Organic Law 4/2000 on Foreigners establish that the Civil Guard and National Police assume the surveillance of borders, ports, airports, and the management of entries, inadmissions, returns, expulsions, and foreigner internment centers.

Within this framework, the Government acts through regulations and executive decisions (royal decrees, ministerial orders) that do not require a specific prior parliamentary procedure, beyond the approval of enabling laws through the ordinary legislative procedure described by the Cortes.

2. Use of the Armed Forces on national territory

The Constitution (art. 8) and the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defense assign to the Armed Forces the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the constitutional order. That same law foresees that the Government “orders the missions of the Armed Forces” both nationally and internationally, and that they may carry out maritime and airspace surveillance operations and other actions in crisis situations.

For internal support (for example, reinforcement at borders in a specific crisis), the Government can order military operations on national territory without prior authorization from the Cortes, as long as it acts within the current legal framework. Regulations such as Royal Decree 194/2010 regulate the functions of the military police and the status of military personnel as agents of authority in certain missions, and Royal Decree 1438/2010 details the military-type missions that can be assigned to the Civil Guard.

In these cases, there is no “militarization procedure” in the Cortes; parliamentary control is exercised through ordinary channels (questions, interpellations, appearances, investigative commissions), as reflected in the parliamentary practice of government oversight.

3. States of alarm, exception, and siege

When the Government intends to grant itself exceptional powers that may intensely affect the rights and faculties of the Security Forces and Corps and the Armed Forces, the regime of article 116 of the Constitution and Organic Law 4/1981 applies:

• State of alarm: declared by the Government by royal decree (Council of Ministers) for 15 days, with immediate report to Congress. Any extension requires authorization from Congress, which sets conditions and scope. The law foresees that all civil authorities and police forces remain under the orders of the “competent authority,” which may affect deployment at the border.
• State of exception: requires prior authorization from Congress, which determines effects, scope, and duration (up to 30 days, extendable once). It allows more intense restrictions on rights and reinforced command over security forces and, in practice, a much more visible military presence.
• State of siege: declared by Congress by absolute majority, exclusively at the Government’s proposal. It is the highest figure of internal “militarization”: Congress sets scope, duration, and conditions and, de facto, enables a central role for the Armed Forces in controlling the affected territory, including the border.

In all three cases, in addition to the initial declaration or authorization, Organic Law 4/1981 obliges the Government to inform Congress of the measures adopted and their evolution, subjecting the action to political parliamentary control and also to constitutional and judicial control (as shown by several Constitutional Court rulings published in the BOE).

4. Military operations abroad linked to border control

If the plan is to project forces outside Spain (for example, in an international operation to stop flows towards the Spanish border), the scheme of Organic Law 5/2005 and Law 2/2014 on Foreign Action and Service applies: the Government decides politically, but for missions abroad not directly related to the defense of Spain or national interest it must carry out a prior consultation and obtain authorization from the Congress of Deputies. In urgent cases, it may act first and then submit the decision for parliamentary ratification; it must also periodically inform Congress about the development of operations.

5. What role would the Cortes Generales have?

In summary, the “militarization” of a border can be done:

• Within the ordinary framework (military support reinforcement): Government decision, without prior authorization, but subject to ordinary parliamentary control.
• Through a state of alarm: Government decree and, for extension, authorization from Congress.
• Through state of exception or siege: these require from the start decisive intervention of Congress (prior authorization or declaration by absolute majority).
• If it involves missions abroad: for many of them prior authorization from Congress is required according to the National Defense Law.

Any structural modification of the border regime or the distribution of functions among bodies (for example, giving the Armed Forces a permanent competence in border control) would require a legal reform (probably organic) following the full legislative procedure in Congress and Senate.

Additional key regulations cited in the research: LO 1/1984, INTA Resolution 2018, Order 284/2001, Correction LO 1/1984, Law 22/2021 PGE, RD 521/2020, Order DEF/808/2019, Order DEF/316/2015, RD 194/2010, STC 183/2021, STC 148/2021, STC 83/2016, Resolution 200/38061/2019, Order DEF/2097/2015, RD 679/2014, Correction RD 194/2010, RD 872/2014, Order INT/28/2013, Order PCM/577/2021, Order PRE/2593/2015, Order PRE/422/2013, Order INT/985/2023, Order INT/859/2023, Congress Resolution 29.4.2010, RD-law 3/2010, LO 4/2015, Unconstitutionality appeal 3848/2015, Unconstitutionality appeal 2896/2015, STC 387/1993, LO 2/2009, Order INT/1926/2009, Correction LO 4/2000, Order 3.4.1995, LO 14/2003, STC 17/2013, Law 11/2023, RD-law 11/2018, Correction RD 194/2010, RD 1438/2010, Order PRE/2840/2015, Law 46/2007, LO 12/2007, LO 11/2011, LO 11/2007, Law 112/1966, Law 60/1964, Decree 93/1962, LO 4/2010, LO 9/2015, STC 73/1994, STC 55/1990, Order 8.2.1988.

The competencies of the President of the Government in a migratory crisis in Ceuta and Melilla do not appear in a “special law” for these cities, but derive from the general framework of immigration, defense, and national security. In summary, the president politically directs the response (migration policy, defense, and national security), can declare a situation of interest for national security, order the use of the Armed Forces under the terms of the National Defense Law, and activate and coordinate the National Security System. Operational management then falls to the Council of Ministers, ministries (Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Inclusion/Migration), and the Government Delegates in Ceuta and Melilla.

1. General political direction and Government Law

Law 50/1997, on the Government, configures the Government as the “supreme body of direction of the internal and external policy of the Kingdom of Spain” and recognizes a clear principle of presidential direction, by which the president “determines the political guidelines that the Government and each of the Departments must follow” (preamble of Law 50/1997). From this derive, applied to a border crisis:

• Set the political line of the response (criteria on border control, relationship with Morocco, humanitarian approach, coordination with the EU, etc.).
• Convene and preside over the Council of Ministers, setting the agenda and guiding decisions (for example, approval of emergency royal decree-laws, agreements on means and resources, etc.).
• Delegate own competencies to vice presidents and ministers, except those non-delegable (directly attributed by the Constitution), according to art. 20 of the Government Law, which foresees delegation by the president to ministers and avocation by the Council of Ministers of especially relevant matters.

2. Immigration and foreigner policy

Organic Law 4/2000, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners, assigns to the Government “the definition, planning, regulation, and development of immigration policy” (article appearing in the initial window of Organic Law 4/2000). It also states that:

• The State will guarantee the principle of solidarity “taking into account the special circumstances of those territories where migratory flows have a special impact,” a mention that in practice includes Ceuta and Melilla.
• The General State Administration “will cooperate with the Autonomous Communities, the Cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and the Town Councils” in the integration of immigrants and unaccompanied foreign minors.

In a migratory crisis, this means that, under the political direction of the president, the central Government (especially the Ministry of Inclusion/Migration and Interior) defines and executes measures for entry control, diversion, reception, and cooperation with Ceuta and Melilla. The Law does not assign specific and personal functions to the president in foreigners matters, but his role as head of Government means he guides these policies and the decisions of the Council of Ministers.

3. National defense and use of the Armed Forces

Organic Law 5/2005, on National Defense, specifies personal competencies of the president when a migratory crisis has a security and defense dimension (e.g., massive pressure on the fence or need for military support):

• “Corresponds to the President of the Government the direction of defense policy and the determination of its objectives, the management of crisis situations affecting defense and the strategic direction of military operations in case of use of force” (art. 6 of Organic Law 5/2005).
• He can “order the missions of the Armed Forces” and “arrange their use.”

In Ceuta and Melilla, this translates into that, if the crisis is considered to affect defense, the president can order the deployment of the Armed Forces (for example, Military Emergency Unit or surveillance and support units) and preside over the National Defense Council, a body that “assists him in managing crisis situations affecting defense” and of which the ministers of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, among others, are members.

4. National Security and crisis management

Law 36/2015, on National Security, is key for large migratory crises, as it configures a policy and a National Security System “under the direction of the President of the Government and the responsibility of the Government” (art. 3 of Law 36/2015). It establishes that:

• The president directs the National Security policy and the National Security System and can “declare the Situation of Interest for National Security” (article included in the position window 15000‑22500).
• The National Security Council, chaired by the president, “directs and coordinates crisis management actions” and supervises the National Security System.
• The Government Delegates in the cities with Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta and Melilla are considered “competent bodies in National Security matters” (art. 9), making them a key piece of execution on the ground, under the political direction of the president and Government.

Therefore, in a major migratory crisis in Ceuta or Melilla, the president can: qualify it as a situation of interest for national security, activate the National Security System, preside over the National Security Council, and set coordination guidelines among Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Inclusion/Migration, and the authorities of Ceuta and Melilla.

5. Distribution with Council of Ministers and ministries

From that presidential leadership, the basic distribution is:

• Council of Ministers: declares states of alarm and exception, approves royal decree-laws, regulatory norms, and plans that materialize the response.
• Ministry of Interior: border control, Civil Guard and National Police; application of the foreigners regime (including border distancing measures provided in LO 4/2000).
• Ministry of Defense: execution of the president’s orders on the use of the Armed Forces.
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs: relations with Morocco and the EU on migratory matters.
• Ministry of Inclusion/Migration: reception, territorial diversions, coordination with autonomous communities and with Ceuta and Melilla.

No specific norm has been found in the consulted sources that assigns the president singular competencies different from those cited just for being Ceuta and Melilla; his position is supported by the overall direction of immigration, defense, and National Security policy and the capacity to activate and coordinate the legal instruments already described.

The protection of unaccompanied foreign minors in Spain is supported by a block of immigration, child protection, and asylum laws, complemented by a specific Framework Protocol and by distribution agreements and subsidies among administrations. Relocation (transfer) can be internal, between autonomous communities, or international, to the country of origin or, in certain cases, to another Member State where institutional protection already exists. In all cases, the guiding criterion is the best interest of the minor and the mandatory intervention of public child protection entities. Below is the framework and main conditions.

Basic state legal framework

Immigration and asylum

• Organic Law 4/2000, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners (LO 4/2000). Its article 35 establishes the applicable regime for unaccompanied minors and refers to regulatory development (Immigration Regulation, REX) that details actions and coordination (arts. 189‑198, mentioned in the 2014 Framework Protocol).
• Law 12/2009, regulating the right of asylum and subsidiary protection (Law 12/2009). It dedicates Title V to minors and vulnerable persons; especially, article 48 sets guarantees for unaccompanied minors requesting international protection (notification to the Public Prosecutor, age determination, appointment of representative, reception in child protection), expressly cited in the Framework Protocol.

Child protection

• Organic Law 1/1996, on Legal Protection of Minors (LO 1/1996). Defines neglect, assumption of guardianship by the public entity, obligation to act in risk situations, and the principle of the best interest of the minor, which also applies to foreign minors.
• Reforms of the protection system (Law 26/2015, modifying the child and adolescent protection system, Law 26/2015, and Organic Law 8/2021 on comprehensive protection against violence, LO 8/2021) reinforce the centrality of the best interest and the obligations of administrations.

2014 Framework Protocol and age determination

The Resolution of October 13, 2014 publishes the Framework Protocol on certain actions regarding unaccompanied foreign minors. It is the key technical piece:

• Defines the UFM as a foreigner under 18 from a third country who arrives in Spain without a responsible adult, and extends its scope to minors at risk (e.g., possible victims of trafficking or stowaways).
• Orders action from location to documentation and placement with the public child protection entity, including police record, registration in the Registry of Unaccompanied Foreign Minors (RMENA), and notification to the Public Prosecutor.
• Details rules on documentation and doubts about age, including the evidentiary value of passports and the possibility of medical tests when there is no certainty, and refers to article 48 of Law 12/2009 for asylum seekers.
• Foresees specific intervention when there are indications of human trafficking, with reference to Directive 2011/36/EU and other international instruments.

Relocation between autonomous communities

Basic legislation does not establish a mandatory “quota,” but a system of co-responsibility and cooperation between State and autonomous communities:

• LO 4/2000 obliges the General State Administration to cooperate with communities and municipalities, and includes among the objectives of the strategic immigration plan the care of unaccompanied foreign minors.
• The communities, under article 148.1 CE and LO 1/1996, assume guardianship and custody when there is neglect, regardless of the community where the minor is located.

In practice, relocation is articulated through agreements in the Sectoral Conference and royal decree subsidies that finance transfers and reception. Among the most recent:

• Royal Decree 881/2021, on subsidies for the reception of unaccompanied migrant minors from Ceuta in other autonomous communities (RD 881/2021). Its article 3 declares subsidizable both the transfer from Ceuta and the immediate care, schooling, social inclusion, and psychosocial support in the destination community.
• Royal Decree 767/2022, direct subsidy to Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla for care and reception of unaccompanied migrant minors (RD 767/2022), which reinforces this logic of solidarity distribution.

The material conditions derived from these norms and the Framework Protocol for internal relocation are essentially:

• Strict respect for the best interest of the minor, as required by LO 1/1996 and the Protocol.
• Existence of a collaboration agreement between the community holding guardianship and the destination one, usually channeled through the Sectoral Conference and supported by state funding.
• Guarantee of adequate reception resources at destination (protection place, schooling, psychosocial support), explicitly stated as subsidizable expenses in RD 881/2021.
• Continuity of public guardianship by the competent entity of the destination community, without protection gaps.

In parallel, the Constitutional Court Ruling 43/2025 (STC 43/2025) reminds that autonomous communities cannot exclude from their protective function unaccompanied migrant minors rescued at sea or intercepted on the coast, reinforcing the basic protection obligation before any possible transfer.

Transfer to other States

The Framework Protocol foresees, on the one hand, that the policy on UFM is primarily oriented to family reunification or return to the country of origin when it is in the best interest of the minor, and on the other, that transfer to another EU Member State “where their institutional protection or public guardianship is already exercised” can be managed, according to article 35 of LO 4/2000 and articles 191 and following of the Immigration Regulation (cited in the Framework Protocol itself). These transfers require international administrative and judicial cooperation and a case-by-case evaluation of the best interest of the minor.