Feijóo promises lower taxes, pensions linked to the IPC, and 4,500 more doctors in his program for the 29N

The fiscal measures of the Popular Party do not have a single parliamentary processing. As of November 11, 2026, the identified state initiatives are divided among expired, withdrawn, or closed proposals, and political agreements that do not themselves modify taxes. The dissolution of the Cortes on October 6 is decisive: pending bills expired and do not automatically continue in the next legislature (BOE, October 6).

IRPF and family support package

• Exemption of the minimum wage. The Popular Group's Senate proposal to adjust the exempt limit of the IRPF to the SMI, published on February 11, 2025 and later transferred to the Congress, expired on October 6, 2026. Therefore, it is not pending approval in either chamber (Senate BOCG).
• The parallel proposal of the Popular Group of the Congress, published on February 21, 2025, had already ended its course on March 28, 2025, without becoming law; its closure was published on April 1 (BOCG, April 1).
• Tax measures and family support for 2025. The Congress proposal included VAT on basic food at 2%, tax reductions on electricity and gas, changes in declaration limits, and adjustment of the IRPF to inflation. Its processing ended on March 28, 2025, without legislative approval (BOCG, April 1).
• The equivalent Senate initiative had been awaiting debate to decide whether to begin its processing. Since it was still pending when the Cortes were dissolved, it also expired; it should not be presented as a law currently in committee (Senate BOCG).

Other identified fiscal initiatives

• Inheritance and Donations. The Popular Group's Senate proposal to repeal the tax was still awaiting its initial debate since November 2023. Its course was interrupted by the dissolution and expired (Senate BOCG).
• Severance payments. The Senate proposal to clarify the exemption in the IRPF of severance payments agreed in conciliation, up to 180,000 euros, was withdrawn: the Board took note on April 7, 2026 and published it on the 9th (Withdrawal published).
• Thalidomide aid. A first Congress proposal ended in December 2024 without approval. The Senate proposal and the new initiative presented in Congress in June 2025 expired on October 6, 2026 (BOCG, December 2024; Senate proposal; New Congress proposal).
• Other files. The modification of food VAT was not admitted, according to an April 2024 publication; the cooperative tax reform was withdrawn in October 2023; and the recovery of employer contributions for Ceuta and Melilla expired in October 2026 (Food VAT; Cooperatives; Ceuta and Melilla).

Political agreements and announcements: a different situation

The Congress supported on April 22, 2026 requests from the PP to adjust the IRPF to inflation and establish a voluntary VAT exemption for self-employed with billing under 85,000 euros. These are political impetus agreements, not an approved tax reform (Congress, April 22).

In conclusion, there is no pending joint state approval of these measures. To recover expired initiatives, they will need to be reintroduced; political agreements, on the other hand, require regulatory modification to produce fiscal effects.

The Prime Minister does not have a personal “constituent power”: he cannot reform the Constitution or the institutional architecture of the State alone. His powers regarding institutional reform are mainly powers of impetus, political direction, and proposal, always subject to the decision of the Cortes Generales and, where appropriate, the electorate.

1. Direction of Government action and definition of the reform agenda

The basis of everything lies in Article 97 of the Constitution: the Government “directs domestic and foreign policy,” and the Prime Minister directs the Government (art. 98 CE). This translates into:

• He is responsible for setting the major priorities of institutional reform (for example, reform of the electoral system, the Senate, the General Council of the Judiciary, etc.).
• He decides, with his Council of Ministers, which bill projects or other initiatives are prepared to modify key institutions (electoral law, organic institutional laws, government laws, etc.).
• He guides political negotiations with parliamentary groups when a reform requires broad consensus (such as constitutional reforms or those requiring qualified majority).

2. Government initiative in constitutional reform

The Constitution provides who can formally initiate a constitutional reform. According to Article 166 CE, the initiative corresponds to:

• The Government,
• The Congress of Deputies,
• The Senate,
• And the assemblies of the autonomous communities, under certain conditions.

The Prime Minister, as head of the Executive, decides whether the Government exercises that initiative. In practice, this means:

• Ordering the preparation of the constitutional reform project (by the competent ministries).
• Submitting it to the Council of Ministers for approval as the Government's formal proposal.
• Sending it to the Cortes Generales to be processed under the procedure of Articles 167 or 168 CE, depending on the scope of the reform (ordinary or “aggravated”).

Without that political decision by the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers, the Government does not exercise its part of the initiative in constitutional reform.

3. Role in constitutional or institutional referendums

Referendums provided by the Constitution are not decided by the Prime Minister alone, but he has a decisive impetus role:

• Article 92 CE allows consultative referendums on political decisions of special importance. They are convened by the King, but at the proposal of the Prime Minister, previously authorized by the Congress. That is, the Prime Minister is the one who can propose submitting a major institutional reform to citizen consultation.
• In constitutional reforms of Title X:
  • The ordinary route (art. 167) allows one-tenth of deputies or senators to force a referendum.
  • In the aggravated route (art. 168), the referendum is mandatory. The Prime Minister does not decide it, but directs the Government's action throughout the process and can propose the date and political conditions of the consultation.

4. Powers over organic and institutional laws

Many institutional reforms do not require changing the Constitution, but modifying organic or ordinary laws that regulate institutions (for example, general electoral regime, organization of the Judiciary, statute of the Public Prosecutor's Office, government regime, General State Administration, etc.). In these cases:

• The Government has general legislative initiative (art. 87.1 CE) and can present bills and organic law projects to reform institutions.
• The Prime Minister decides which projects are prioritized and the scope of the proposed reforms.
• He negotiates with parliamentary groups the necessary support to approve them, especially when an absolute majority or other reinforced majorities are required.

Although formally the competence belongs to the Government as a whole, it is the Prime Minister who guides and politically represents it.

5. Dissolution of the Cortes and calling elections

A power with institutional impact is to propose the dissolution of the Cortes Generales (art. 115 CE). The King dissolves the Chambers and calls elections “at the proposal of the Prime Minister, under his exclusive responsibility,” after hearing the Boards of the Chambers.

This power does not reform norms, but it can reconfigure the institutional system politically (new majorities, new balances), influencing the viability of future constitutional or institutional reforms.

6. Limits: parliamentary centrality and political control

Despite these impetus capacities, the Prime Minister is strictly limited by the Constitution:

• He cannot modify the Constitution or laws by himself: he always needs the approval of the Cortes (and, where appropriate, the electorate in a referendum).
• His actions are subject to parliamentary control (motions of censure, confidence questions, ordinary control), which conditions the viability of any institutional reform agenda.

In summary, the Prime Minister is the political engine of institutional reforms, but the ultimate decision-making power resides in the Cortes Generales and, for major constitutional revisions, in the citizenry through referendum.

The Popular Party won the last general elections held in Spain, those of July 23, 2023, being the candidacy with the most votes and deputies. It obtained 8,091,840 votes, 33.05%, and 137 seats in the Congress. However, that result did not allow it to reach an absolute majority on its own, set at 176 deputies (results of 23J).

The result in the Congress

The main figures of the PP in those elections were as follows (electoral results):

• Votes received: 8,091,840.
• Vote percentage: 33.05%.
• Deputies obtained: 137 of the 350 that make up the Congress.
• Position: first force in votes and seats.

In simple terms, the percentage roughly equals one out of every three votes counted to calculate the candidacies' result. It does not mean that one out of every three Spanish citizens voted for the PP: the electoral percentage is not calculated over the entire population, but over the votes corresponding to the count.

The 137 deputies represent approximately 39.1% of the seats in the Congress. This proportion is higher than its vote percentage. It is important to distinguish both data: 33.05% expresses electoral support and 39.1% expresses the weight of the representatives obtained within the Chamber.

How far was it from the absolute majority?

With 137 deputies, the PP was 39 seats short of the 176 needed for an absolute majority. Therefore, winning the elections did not mean having that majority. The result gave it the first position, but not sufficient capacity to reach that parliamentary threshold on its own (Congress composition).

The distinction is important to correctly interpret what happened: one thing is to be the most voted party and another to gather the necessary support to govern. Electoral results determine how many deputies each candidacy obtains; they should not be confused with a direct election of the Prime Minister.

The result in the Senate

In the same elections, the Popular Party obtained 120 elected senators. This figure corresponds to representatives elected in the polls for the Senate, not to the deputies of the Congress; it should also not be confused with the total number of senators a formation may have by including those appointed by autonomous communities (Senate results).

Therefore, when summarizing the PP result, it is preferable to keep both chambers separate: 137 deputies in the Congress and 120 elected senators. Adding those figures does not serve to calculate a majority in the Congress, because each chamber has its own composition.

Participation and difference from polls

Participation in the elections to the Congress was 66.59% of the electorate. This is a data of the entire call, not a percentage of support for the Popular Party (electoral participation).

Finally, these figures correspond to votes and seats actually obtained in 2023, not to a later poll. Some publications express the PP percentage as 33.1%: this is the rounding to one decimal of 33.05%. To answer your question, the essential reference is, therefore, the electoral victory of the PP with 137 deputies, without an absolute majority.