Half of young people do not see hoaxes as a risk on social media

As of November 14, 2026, the main Spanish legislative proposals related to disinformation on social networks are no longer in process: they expired on October 6, with the dissolution of the Cortes. The specific proposal to empower the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC) had been rejected earlier, in April. Therefore, it would not be correct to describe them today as pending amendments or approval in committee.

Main proposals: processing concluded

• Governance of digital services and media. The Draft Law modifying various legal provisions to improve democratic governance in digital services and regulation of the media, from the Government, was published on August 29, 2025. It sought to adapt Spanish oversight to the European framework, with obligations for digital intermediaries and a sanctioning regime. During its course, it was in the amendment phase before the Committee on Economy, Trade and Digital Transformation, but expired on October 6, 2026 without becoming law. (Draft in Congress).
• Right of rectification on networks. The Organic Draft Law regulating the right of rectification, from the Government, was published on January 30, 2026 and expired on October 6. It expressly extended rectification to users of special relevance on platforms and provided twenty calendar days to request it in the digital environment, as well as notices and links alongside the original content. These innovations were not approved through this draft. (Draft text; Parliamentary status).
• Truthful information and fight against disinformation. The organic law proposal from the Mixed Group, published on May 31, 2024, also expired on October 6. It proposed a Council for the Right to Information and measures against the deliberate creation and dissemination of false news. Its approval was not completed. (Published proposal; Dissolution of the Cortes).
• Artificial images and voices. The organic law proposal from Sumar, published on March 22, 2024, aimed to regulate simulations through artificial intelligence, including content disseminated on networks and electoral manipulations. It expired on October 6, 2026. An earlier version had been withdrawn on March 15, 2024. (March 2024 text; Withdrawal of the earlier one).
• Protection of minors in digital environments. The Government's organic draft was processed urgently from May 2025 and reached the working group, the small group of deputies working on the articles. It included digital literacy and measures against manipulated content; later, proposals on algorithmic amplification of illegal content were negotiated. It also expired on October 6. (Project status).

A rejected proposal and approved resolutions

The Socialist proposal to legally empower the CNMC as coordinator of digital services was rejected on April 14, 2026 during the consideration phase, the vote that decides whether its legislative examination begins. Its processing was concluded and the rejection was published on April 20. (Publication of the rejection).

Political resolutions were approved, such as the non-legislative proposal against algorithmic opacity on March 13, 2025, and the defense of freedom of information and expression on March 18, 2026. These are not laws: they urge the Government to act but do not themselves create new obligations for platforms. (Algorithmic opacity; Freedom of information).

The Center for Sociological Research (CIS) can prepare barometers, electoral surveys, and studies on disinformation as part of its function to investigate Spanish society. It is important to distinguish two things: its vote estimates are not official electoral results, and responses about disinformation mainly measure declared perceptions, not the verified falsehood of content.

Competencies to prepare electoral barometers

The Law 39/1995, organizing the CIS, constitutes its main legal framework. Among its functions are conducting studies on Spanish society, analyzing matters of public interest, providing information that may guide public authorities, and disseminating the results of its research. It can also collaborate with other public entities through agreements to develop sociological studies and surveys. The organization explains its activity on its general information page.

These functions support the study of political attitudes, electoral preferences, leader evaluations, and citizen concerns. Barometers combine recurring questions with others on current topics; the CIS also conducts specifically electoral research. Its 2024 Activity Report describes this activity.

It is important to separate direct voting intention, that is, what each interviewee responds, from vote estimation, which results from applying statistical treatment to the responses. Neither replaces the count nor makes the CIS an electoral authority.

During electoral processes, transparency obligations and restrictions on the dissemination of polls from electoral legislation apply. For example, article 69.8 of the LOREG establishes obligations to provide information to competing candidacies within 48 hours. Demócrata covers its application in a resolution of the Central Electoral Board on the October 2026 barometer.

How perceptions about disinformation are collected

The method is survey through a questionnaire. Questions about disinformation can be included in a thematic block or a monographic study. It should not be assumed that all barometers include them or that they always use the same questions.

Recent barometers mainly use computer-assisted telephone interviews: the interviewer follows a questionnaire and records the answers. The mode, dates, studied population, and sample size must be checked in the technical sheet of each study.

Depending on the specific questionnaire, questions may include:

• The importance the person attributes to the problem of disinformation.
• The frequency with which they believe they encounter false or misleading news.
• The channels where they consider it circulates and the trust they place in media or institutions.
• Their opinion on measures to combat it.

Answers may be expressed through frequency categories, agreement scales, or multiple options. They can then be analyzed according to age, education, information consumption, or other characteristics collected in the survey.

What these data allow to conclude

That someone declares having seen disinformation does not prove they have received verified false content. Their response also depends on how they understand the term, what they recall, and the trust they have in the source.

Therefore, before interpreting a percentage, one must read the literal question, its options, the period it refers to, and the technical sheet. To also measure the objective falsehood of messages, it would be necessary to complement responses with content analysis or independent verification. The survey alone mainly describes what the public believes, remembers, and declares.

If you are referring to Spain, the last general elections held were on July 23, 2023. The reference found for Vox places its support among young people aged 18 to 24 years at approximately 8.4%, according to vote recall collected by the CIS. But there are two essential clarifications: it is not an official result by age, and that range does not include those who were 25 years old.

What figure can be given

The post-electoral barometer of September 2023 allows an approximation of young people's behavior through their responses about what they voted. The consulted reference offers these percentages for Vox:

• 18–24 years: approximately 8.4% of declared votes to parties in that group.
• 25–34 years: approximately 12.0%, a broader category that does not allow separating 25-year-olds.
• Overall voters mentioning a party: approximately 12.4% in the consulted post-electoral reference.

These figures come from a survey, not from ballot counting. Also, the located documentation presents discrepancies between some percentages and frequencies of interviewees, so the 8.4% should be read as an approximate reference, not as an exact measurement of the youth result. The study and its cross-tabulations can be consulted in the CIS documentation.

Why there is no exact result for 18 to 25 years

The electoral count does not attribute ballots to the age of the person who casts them. To study youth voting, surveys are used, in which interviewees declare their electoral behavior. These include statistical uncertainty and possible differences between what is declared and what was actually voted.

It also matters how the percentage is calculated: it is not the same to divide among all young people interviewed — including those who abstained or did not answer — as to do so only among those who say they voted for a party. Mixing these bases can produce misleading comparisons.

Therefore, it would not be correct to state that Vox officially obtained 8.4% among Spaniards aged 18 to 25. The adjusted formulation is that a CIS post-electoral reference approximates its support at 8.4% among those aged 18 to 24, with the noted reservations.

And the other parties?

For other candidacies, the consulted sources do not offer an individualized youth breakdown that allows giving equivalent percentages. Consequently, a complete and reliable sum for all the parties you mention cannot be constructed. The absence of that breakdown does not mean they did not receive youth votes.

Do not confuse 2023 with subsequent polls

Some much higher figures disseminated later correspond to voting intention, not the result of those elections. For example, Demócrata recorded in October 2026 a 15.6% direct voting intention for Vox among young people aged 18 to 24, according to the CIS; that is, responses about what they would vote then, not what they voted in 2023 (October CIS).

In summary: the located approximation for Vox is 8.4% among young people aged 18–24 in 2023. There is no exact figure here for 18–25 nor a verifiable aggregated result for all the candidacies mentioned in your question.