United States attacks Iran for the second consecutive day: "If they want to negotiate with bombs, we will negotiate with bombs"

Current situation of the diplomatic process between the United States and Iran

At this moment, the diplomatic process between the United States and Iran is in a phase of indirect contacts, very fragmented and without a structured global negotiation. There is no formal table equivalent to the former nuclear agreement (JCPOA), but rather punctual exchanges and mediations by third countries focused on specific issues: nuclear program, regional security, hostage release, and limited sanctions relief. Mutual distrust remains high, aggravated by regional tension (especially in the Middle East) and the internal dynamics of both countries. Politically, it can be described as a phase of “containment and crisis management”, rather than comprehensive resolution of the bilateral conflict.

1. General framework of the U.S.–Iran conflict

The conflict between the United States and Iran is mainly political and security-related, with several axes:

On one hand, there is the nuclear issue (the development of Iran’s atomic program and limits on its uranium enrichment), which has been the core of diplomatic efforts over the last decade. On the other hand, there are the U.S. economic sanctions on key sectors of the Iranian economy, and the designation of the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization, which strain any rapprochement. Added to this is the geopolitical competition in the Middle East, where Iran supports various actors (such as militias and political groups) and the United States backs regional allies who see Tehran as a threat.

2. Characteristics of the current diplomatic phase

2.1. Absence of a comprehensive nuclear agreement in force

The multilateral nuclear agreement (JCPOA), which once set verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, is not fully operational. The U.S. withdrawal and Iran’s responses have left the framework very weakened. In practice, what exists today is a search for partial understandings to prevent the situation from escalating into an open crisis, rather than a full reactivation of that agreement with all its reciprocal obligations.

2.2. Indirect contacts and third-party mediation

The bilateral diplomatic relationship is so tense that most contacts are channeled through third countries or multilateral forums. The United States and Iran frequently communicate through:

Allied or partner states (for example, some European powers and regional countries) that act as intermediaries in messages about the nuclear program, the situation of prisoners or hostages, and maritime security. Likewise, international organizations serve as spaces for technical and political exchanges, especially on nuclear matters and inspections. All this configures a low-visibility diplomacy focused on reducing immediate risks.

2.3. “Risk management” approach in nuclear matters

In the nuclear field, the current objective of many international actors is to avoid a qualitative leap in Iranian capabilities that could trigger a military response or a regional arms race. The present phase is not characterized by major mutual concessions, but by attempts to mark red lines and minimal verification mechanisms that allow gaining time and lowering the probability of direct clashes. In the absence of a global agreement, any understanding is designed as an incremental and reversible step.

3. Factors conditioning the evolution of the negotiation

3.1. Internal political calendar in the United States and Iran

The ability to advance toward a broader agreement is highly conditioned by the internal politics of both countries. In the United States, the position toward Iran is a highly polarized issue, which limits maneuvering margins for any administration wishing to ease sanctions or make visible concessions. In Iran, the balance between more pragmatic sectors and more rigid currents also determines how much space there is to accept limits on the nuclear program or changes in regional policy without being perceived as excessive concessions.

3.2. Regional tension and actions of allied actors

The diplomatic process cannot be understood in isolation from the regional environment. Incidents in the region, attacks by militias aligned with Iran, or military responses by U.S. allies directly influence the negotiation climate. Each episode of tension generates internal pressures in Washington and Tehran to adopt harder stances, which hinder sitting at a formal table. Thus, current diplomacy functions almost as a containment mechanism after each crisis, rather than as a linear process toward a definitive agreement.

3.3. Role of Europe and other international actors

Various European countries and other international actors have tried to keep the diplomatic channel alive, promoting proposals for gradual rapprochement between the United States and Iran. Their role consists of offering formulas of limited exchange (for example, partial sanctions relief for certain nuclear or security commitments), as well as facilitating discreet dialogue spaces. However, these efforts, although relevant, have not yet translated into a stable and robust framework like the one that existed in the past.

4. Short- and medium-term prospects

In summary, the process is in a phase of controlled stalemate: there is no broad formal negotiation, but multiple attempts to avoid a total breakdown or irreversible escalation. The possibilities for progress depend on both parties seeing internal political advantages in a partial understanding, and on the regional situation not deteriorating to the point of completely closing communication channels. As long as this does not happen, it is most likely that the conflict will continue to be managed through punctual agreements, discreet mediations, and crisis diplomacy, rather than through a major global pact.

Initial summary

The United States Secretary of Defense, primarily regulated by Title 10 of the U.S. Code, is the head of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the president’s principal civilian advisor on defense matters. His competencies include command and direction of the DoD, formulation of defense policy, planning and execution of the military budget, and oversight of the Armed Forces in peacetime and conflict, always subordinate to the president as Commander in Chief. Although my specialty is Spanish policy and regulations, this is a general summary of the functions that U.S. legislation assigns to the position. Below are the main competencies outlined in U.S. federal law explained in a structured way.

Legal basis and institutional position

The figure of the Secretary of Defense is defined in the U.S. Code, mainly in Title 10 (Armed Forces), which organizes and regulates the U.S. Armed Forces. Legally:

1. Head of the Department of Defense: The secretary is responsible for “direction, authority, and control” over the DoD, which includes the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Space Force, as well as agencies and joint commands.
2. Member of the presidential cabinet: He is part of the cabinet and the president’s principal defense advisor, which gives him a central position in the national security decision-making process.
3. Subordination to the president and Congress: Although he exercises broad executive powers, he always acts under the authority of the president and within the limits set by Congress through defense authorization and appropriation laws.

Civilian direction of military power

A key principle in U.S. legislation is civilian control of the Armed Forces. The Secretary of Defense is the central figure of this principle:

1. Authority over military chiefs: The secretary exercises authority, direction, and control over the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other service chiefs), as well as over unified combatant commands, through the chain of command defined by law and presidential orders.
2. Issuance of directives and orders: He is empowered to issue directives, internal regulations, and administrative and operational orders within the DoD, always compatible with federal law and presidential orders.
3. Internal organization of the DoD: The law grants him broad powers to establish, merge, or restructure agencies, commands, and offices within the Department, respecting limits set by Congress.

Defense policy and strategic planning

Title 10 charges the secretary with formulating national defense policy and planning means and capabilities:

1. Preparation of the National Defense Strategy: He must prepare and periodically update the defense strategy, a framework document that guides missions, priorities, and development of military capabilities.
2. Force and capability planning: Among his functions is determining the needs for personnel, equipment, weapons systems, and force structure to meet strategic objectives set by the president and Congress.
3. Personnel policy and readiness: He oversees recruitment, training, discipline, welfare, and operational readiness policies for military and civilian DoD personnel, including reserves and the National Guard as provided by federal law.

Budgetary and management competencies

U.S. legislation grants the secretary a central role in the economic and administrative management of defense:

1. Defense budget: He is responsible for formulating the DoD’s annual budget proposal, which is submitted to the president and then to Congress. He must justify spending needs, investments in armaments, research and development programs, and infrastructure.
2. Execution and control of spending: Once appropriation laws are approved, the secretary directs budget execution, ensuring proper use of funds, compliance with legal limits, and accountability to the Office of Management and Budget and Congress itself.
3. Contracting and acquisitions: He oversees the DoD acquisition system, including development and purchase of major weapons systems, in accordance with federal contracting regulations. He may establish internal policies and procedures to ensure efficiency, competition, and cost control.

Relationship with Congress and accountability

The Secretary of Defense has specific information and cooperation obligations with the Legislative Branch:

1. Appearances and reports: He must regularly appear before the Defense Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate to explain defense policy, force status, armament programs, and budget execution.
2. Mandatory reports: Various provisions of Title 10 require the secretary to submit periodic reports on topics such as military operations, strategic risks, cyber defense, arms control, or internal DoD reforms.
3. Implementation of legislative mandates: He is responsible for applying within the Department the obligations that Congress introduces in laws such as the National Defense Authorization Act, which annually sets programs, spending limits, force structures, and organizational reforms.

Competencies in military operations

Although the president is the Commander in Chief, the law assigns the secretary a key operational role:

1. Transmission of presidential orders: The chain of command to combatant commands is usually defined as: president – secretary of defense – unified commands, according to current regulations and executive orders.
2. Authorization of deployments and readiness: Within frameworks set by the president and Congress, he can order deployments, exercises, unit movements, and alert levels, as well as organize necessary logistical and intelligence support.
3. Rules of engagement and internal regulations: He participates in approving rules of engagement, conduct standards, and policies for compliance with international humanitarian law by the Armed Forces.

Limits and controls

Despite his great power, U.S. legislation establishes important checks and balances. On one hand, the secretary is subject to the president’s decisions and the political and budgetary oversight of Congress. On the other, federal courts and the Constitution itself set limits on the Department of Defense’s actions, especially regarding fundamental rights, rule of law, and separation of powers. Additionally, the legal requirement that the secretary be a civilian (with very limited and temporally bounded exceptions) reinforces the principle of civilian control over the military.

General results and weight of the main blocs

In the last Iranian parliamentary elections (Islamic Consultative Assembly), detailed data broken down by specific party or coalition are not part of the information scope I work with, which is focused on Spanish politics and current affairs. Therefore, I do not have exact seat numbers for each of the main Iranian forces or lists in those elections. I can generally point out that the Iranian political system usually organizes competition around broad currents (conservatives, moderates/reformists, and independents), rather than parties in the European style. However, since I am not specialized in Iranian electoral dynamics nor have access in this context to official Iranian sources, I cannot offer a reliable and updated numerical distribution of those results.

Furthermore, the Iranian political situation is highly conditioned by the role of bodies such as the Guardian Council, which filters candidacies and defines which forces can run, making it even more difficult to translate that result into a logic of “main parties” similar to Spain’s. Consequently, any figure I would provide without specific documentary support could be inaccurate or outdated. Out of respect for informational rigor, I must stick to what I can substantiate: a general description of the system and an explanation of why it is not possible, from this tool oriented to Spain, to detail the results by parties in Iran.

Why I cannot provide the breakdown by parties

This assistant is mainly designed to address issues related to:

1. Spanish and European politics from Spain. My core information focuses on the Congress of Deputies, the Senate, Spanish regional and local governments, as well as the activity of the Government of Spain and its interaction with European Union institutions. In that scope, I can detail electoral results, parliamentary composition, legislative initiatives, and votes with exact figures, because it is nourished by official Spanish parliamentary and executive sources and, in the informational field, by media such as the newspaper El Demócrata.

2. Limitation of specialization in Iranian politics. Although Iran is a relevant actor in international politics, electoral data and internal currents of its system are managed through specific sources (Iranian electoral authorities, local media, and international organizations). In this interface, I do not have structured access to that database, nor to reports that break down seats by specific candidacies in the last Iranian legislative elections. Since I cannot consult or verify those data in real time, offering numbers or names of specific lists would be speculation.

3. Structural differences of the Iranian system. Even with access to basic data, there is an additional complexity: in Iran, one often speaks of “principalist” (conservative) blocs, reformists or moderates, as well as lists close to the Revolutionary Guards or other power networks. This framework does not coincide with the clearly institutionalized party scheme found in Spain (PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar, PNV, ERC, Junts, Bildu, etc.), which makes the translation to “main parties” less direct as understood in the Spanish or European context.

How the exact data could be found

Although I cannot provide it directly, there are ways to access detailed information on results by party or list in Iranian parliamentary elections:

First, official statements and tables from the Iranian electoral authority or the Ministry of Interior of Iran usually publish results by constituency, with the names of winning candidacies. From that information, the weight of each current or coalition can be reconstructed. Second, reports from international organizations specialized in electoral processes or human rights offer aggregated analyses, explaining how many seats fall into each ideological bloc (conservative, reformist, independent, etc.). Finally, international media with sections dedicated to the Middle East usually summarize after each election the seat distribution among dominant forces.

What I can provide from the Spanish context

Although I cannot give party-by-party figures for Iran, I can help contextualize the impact those results have on Spain’s foreign policy or the European Union’s position. For example, from Spain, the internal Iranian balance is often analyzed to assess issues such as:

Whether a parliament more dominated by hardline sectors could hinder negotiation on the nuclear program or strain relations with the EU; or whether a greater presence of more pragmatic currents could facilitate energy, security, or human rights agreements. It is also relevant to understand the stance adopted by the Government of Spain within the EU Council when sanctions, regional cooperation, or political declarations on Iran are discussed.

In summary, the last Iranian parliamentary elections are organized around blocs and currents rather than parties in the European style and, from this Spain-focused tool, I do not have the precise seat distribution among those forces. I can, however, relate that balance of power to the position of Spain and the EU, but not replace official Iranian or international sources that publish the exact detailed results.