Brussels contradicts Sánchez and disassociates Russia from the origin of the migratory crisis in Ceuta

The European Commission acknowledges that Russian channels amplified the crisis on social media since July 30, but assures that there is no conclusive evidence that foreign disinformation triggered the massive influx of migrants into the autonomous city.

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After the Spanish Government pointed out "evidence" of the supposed involvement of Russia and Israel in disinformation campaigns during the Ceuta crisis, the European Commission avoids publicly supporting the thesis that these operations were behind the massive influx of migrants into the autonomous city. Brussels acknowledges that it detected activity linked to Russian disinformation during the crisis, but establishes a substantial difference: there is no conclusive evidence that these campaigns triggered the irregular arrival of more than 80,000 people.

"In the case of Ceuta, we saw attempts by Russia to exploit the crisis on the internet. However, we do not have conclusive evidence suggesting that the crisis itself was triggered by disinformation from foreign state actors," points out a senior official of the European Commission.

The nuance is relevant because Brussels places the disinformation activity in a phase after the outbreak of the crisis, and not as the element that would have caused the massive influx of people into Ceuta. In this way, the community institutions acknowledge the existence of influence operations linked to Russia, but do not attribute to the Kremlin the responsibility for the origin of the migration crisis.

Brussels acknowledges disinformation but questions its role as a trigger

In an interview granted to Cadena SER, the President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, linked the massive arrival of people to Ceuta with a campaign of falsehoods spread through social networks "associated with both Russia and Israel and an ultra-right international".

The statement from the Spanish Executive thus positioned disinformation operations as one of the elements that would have contributed to generating the conditions for the crisis. The Government's own spokesperson, Elma Saiz, later defended that the information handled by the Executive came from "internal reports from Foreign Affairs and the European Commission itself". However, the interpretation now conveyed from Brussels introduces a substantial difference regarding that reading. The Commission does confirm that it detected content related to the Ceuta crisis disseminated from environments linked to Russia, but denies having evidence that allows establishing a causal relationship between those campaigns and the onset of the crisis.

Brussels had already acknowledged in August that, within the usual monitoring carried out by the community institutions on manipulation and information interference operations, certain messages related to Ceuta had been identified. The Commission now avoids publicly commenting on the specific content of the report referenced by Sánchez and which would have been sent to all Member States. The sensitivity of this type of evaluations prevents community institutions from going into details about the sources, the identified actors, or the operational conclusions included in the documents.

The role of Israel, even more limited

The same caution extends to the references made by the Spanish Government to accounts or networks linked to Israel. Brussels does not publicly confirm the participation of agents related to the Israeli state and avoids equating that activity with a coordinated state operation. Community sources place, in this case, the identified messages in specific accounts, without publicly establishing a structure of action that allows attributing the campaign to the State of Israel.

From the European External Action Service (EEAS), they explain that their activity is part of the usual mechanisms for monitoring the information environment. "As a service to our Member States, the EEAS provides periodic assessments of the information environment around crises or political events relevant to the collective interests and political objectives of the EU," they state.

Furthermore, Brussels reminds that information can be shared individually with Member States when their interests are directly affected, which would explain why national governments may have access to more detailed assessments than those that subsequently become public. The episode brings back to the table one of the main challenges of European policy in the face of foreign interference operations: differentiating between the existence of disinformation campaigns and their real capacity to provoke or trigger a crisis.

In the case of Ceuta, the position conveyed by Brussels is clear on this point. The EU acknowledges that Russia tried to exploit the crisis informatively, but does not consider it proven that the Kremlin was behind its origin, as suggested by the Spanish Government. The difference between both concepts —exploiting a crisis once it has started or contributing to provoke it— is now the main element of disagreement between the interpretation of Madrid and the caution maintained by the community institutions.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the status of the parliamentary investigation into the migration crisis in Ceuta and the possible external actors involved?

As of September 1, 2026, there is no specific and ongoing investigative commission in the Spanish Parliament regarding the migration crisis in Ceuta or the possible external actors involved. Parliamentary oversight is being conducted through hearings, special plenary sessions, and control initiatives, but without an investigative body with its own mandate, work plan, and final report.

What is being done in the Congress and the Senate

The most intense institutional response is concentrated in ordinary political control:

  • The Permanent Deputation of the Congress debated on August 24, 2026, the convening of extraordinary sessions of the Plenary and several committees to address the situation in Ceuta, mainly at the request of the Popular Group (official note: note from the Permanent Deputation ).
  • On September 3, 2026, Pedro Sánchez is scheduled to appear before the Congress Plenary to report, at his own and the PP's request, on “the events that occurred in Ceuta since July 30” and the measures to guarantee border integrity and cooperation with Morocco ( Plenary agenda ).
  • Between August 25 and 28, extraordinary committee sessions are or have been held with the appearances of Defense, Presidency, Health, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Inclusion and Migration ministers to explain their actions regarding the late July Ceuta crisis ( note on ministerial appearances ).

This is complemented by an opposition offensive — especially from the Popular Party and Vox — which includes requests for appearances also in the Senate, batteries of written questions, and non-legislative initiatives. However, despite this level of oversight, no ad hoc investigative commission has been established nor has a parliamentary report been approved that closes “an investigation” on Ceuta in terms similar to other major commissions (banking, corruption, etc.).

Attempts at commissions and related initiatives

In the current and previous legislatures, initiatives to tighten political control over Ceuta and the relationship with Morocco have been proposed, but with a broader approach:

  • Non-legislative proposals from Vox in the Congress (for example, initiatives 161/000343 and 161/000120) demanding the defense of territorial integrity and citing the 2021 Ceuta crisis as an example of “invasion” or “migratory instrumentalization” by Morocco.
  • Motions and debates in the Senate about Ceuta and Melilla and about Morocco's unilateral actions at the border.

In this context, investigative commissions on Ceuta's management have been announced or suggested, but according to the information gathered, these proposals have not progressed in the Board or the Plenary, so there is no commission created with that name and specific material object.

External actors and disinformation

The focus on “external actors” today appears mainly on two levels:

  • The role of Morocco, pointed out in numerous debates as possibly responsible for relaxing controls and “using migration as an instrument of diplomatic pressure,” both in the 2021 crisis and in the July 2026 crisis. This is discussed in the Interior and Foreign Affairs committees and in initiatives from PP, Vox, and other groups.
  • The disinformation associated with the 2026 crisis. Pedro Sánchez has cited an investigation by the European External Action Service (EEAS) that would detect Russian and Israeli channels amplifying rumors about Ceuta ( coverage in Demócrata ). Available EU documentation confirms activity linked to Russia; in the case of Israel, the attribution rests on the president's own statements.

In parallel, the EU Council and the EEAS maintain technical investigations on manipulation and informational interference on social networks, but this occurs at the European level, not as an investigative commission of the Spanish Parliament.

Current assessment

In summary, the “parliamentary investigation” into the migration crisis in Ceuta is currently at a phase of maximum intensity of political control (chained ministerial appearances and upcoming special plenary with the president), but without a specific investigative commission nor closed conclusions on the responsibility of external actors. The analysis of these actors — Morocco, disinformation networks linked to Russia, and, in political discourse, possibly Israel or others — is being addressed in a fragmented way in different parliamentary forums and in coordination with European investigations, rather than through a single formal investigative file in the Parliament.

What are the powers of the Prime Minister of Spain in foreign policy and national security?

The Prime Minister of Spain holds a central role in foreign policy and national security, both according to the Constitution and the development laws and political practice. His powers revolve around the general political direction of the Executive, the representation of the State abroad, and the coordination of State resources in crisis or threat situations.

1. Basic constitutional framework

The Spanish Constitution assigns the Prime Minister two major functions that serve as the basis for his powers in these areas:

  • Direct the Government's action (art. 98 CE): this includes setting the major orientations of foreign policy and security, coordinating ministers, and resolving conflicts between departments.
  • Direct internal and external policy (art. 97 CE): foreign policy is not only the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but is subject to the overall orientation set by the Prime Minister.

From there, laws such as the State Foreign Action and Service Law and the National Security Law specify and organize these functions.

2. Powers in foreign policy

In foreign policy, the Prime Minister's powers can be grouped into several blocks:

  • Definition of the major lines of foreign policy
    The Prime Minister sets, together with the Council of Ministers, the strategic priorities: relations with the EU, key partners (United States, Latin America, Maghreb, etc.), position on international conflicts, participation in international organizations, and orientation of development cooperation in its political dimension.
  • Direct relationship with other heads of State and Government
    Although the Head of State is the King (who formally holds the highest representation of the State abroad), in practice the Prime Minister maintains regular political contacts with other leaders: bilateral summits, European Council meetings, NATO, UN, or other organization summits. He is the Government's main political interlocutor and coordinates the position Spain will defend in these forums.
  • Promotion and coordination of the external action of the entire Administration
    External action is not limited to Foreign Affairs: Economy, Defense, Interior, Ecological Transition, etc., participate. The Prime Minister harmonizes these positions, avoids contradictions, and decides the final line on sensitive issues (sanctions, treaties, recognition of States, positions on international crises...).
  • Political direction in the conclusion of international treaties
    The Government is responsible for negotiating and signing treaties, many of which require authorization from the Parliament and subsequent ratification. The Prime Minister decides the political opportunity, the scope of commitments, and authorizes the initiation or conclusion of key negotiations (for example, defense, economic, or judicial cooperation agreements).
  • Appearance and accountability before the Cortes Generales
    Foreign policy is subject to parliamentary control. The Prime Minister appears, at his own or the Chambers' request, to explain summits, changes in international positions, military commitments abroad, or relevant agreements, assuming ultimate political responsibility.

3. Powers in national security

In national security, the Prime Minister plays a role of strategic direction and coordination over all State resources related to defense, internal security, and population protection:

  • Direction of national security policy
    The Prime Minister sets the objectives and priorities of national security, approves the National Security Strategy in the Council of Ministers, and determines how the military, police, cybersecurity, civil protection, economic and energy security dimensions, among others, are integrated.
  • Direction of the National Security System
    National security regulations provide for an articulated system (support bodies, specialized committees, risk assessment centers). The Prime Minister directs this system and exercises the highest political authority over planning and interministerial coordination mechanisms in this area.
  • Presidency of the National Security Council
    The National Security Council is the collegiate body that assists the Prime Minister in directing security policy. By presiding over it, the Prime Minister convenes and guides its work, prioritizes risks and threats, and makes decisions on coordination of means and resources in situations of interest for national security.
  • Crisis management and declaration of special situations
    In cases of severe crises (terrorist threat, cyberattacks, large-scale emergencies, conflicts directly affecting Spain), the Prime Minister leads the political response, can activate crisis management mechanisms of the National Security Council, and propose to Parliament the declaration of states of alarm, exception, or siege, or the deployment of the Armed Forces abroad, according to the constitutional framework.
  • Coordination with Defense, Interior, and other ministries
    Although each ministry retains its operational powers (Defense in the military field, Interior in citizen security and public order, etc.), the Prime Minister decides the joint political line, resolves conflicts between departments, and ensures that the response to risks and threats is integrated.

4. Political responsibility

Both in foreign policy and national security, the Prime Minister is politically accountable before the Congress of Deputies. He can be subjected to control through questions, interpellations, and special debates, and his tenure ultimately depends on parliamentary confidence (motion of censure, investiture). This accountability acts as a democratic counterbalance to the strong concentration of direction in these matters.

Could you detail how the Prime Minister coordinates with the King in Spain's external representation? What exactly is the National Security Council and what bodies support it in its work? How are the Prime Minister's decisions on military missions abroad controlled in the Congress?

What legal requirements exist in the European Union for a commission to formally investigate foreign disinformation operations?

In the EU, there is no single “statute of an investigative commission on foreign disinformation.” What exists is a framework of legal bases that allow different institutions (European Commission, Council, European Parliament, and the EEAS) to open investigations or formal mechanisms when they detect foreign disinformation or information manipulation operations (FIMI).

1. General mandate in the EU Treaties

Actions against informational interference are supported, transversally, by:

  • The obligation to protect democracy and the rule of law and guarantee free and fair elections, which institutions expressly invoke when talking about “protecting electoral processes” against disinformation (for example, in the Commission and Parliament notes on European elections and disinformation: Commission, Parliament).
  • The EU's competences over the internal market and digital services, which serve as the basis for the Digital Services Act (DSA) and allow imposing obligations and controls on large platforms when their activity facilitates disinformation campaigns.
  • Foreign and security policy, within which the Council adopts restrictive measures (sanctions) against persons and entities involved in foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns, as seen in the sanction decisions related to the Ukraine war described in this information.
2. Digital Services Act (DSA): basis for investigating platforms

The DSA is currently the main legal basis allowing the Commission to open formal investigations when there are indications that large platforms facilitate disinformation operations, including those of foreign origin. From the official documentation consulted, it follows:

  • Online platforms of “very large size” (VLOP) must assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to electoral integrity and disinformation, including AI-generated content (arts. 34 and 35 DSA, cited in the Commission note).
  • If the Commission suspects non-compliance with these obligations, it can open a formal procedure:
    • Example: procedure against TikTok for electoral risks and possible foreign interference in Romanian presidential elections, described in this decision.
    • Example: investigation against Meta (Facebook and Instagram) for possible DSA breaches related to disinformation and researcher access to data, according to this note.
  • Opening the procedure empowers the Commission to:
    • Request extensive information, conduct inspections, access algorithms, and issue interim measures.
    • Adopt non-compliance decisions and, ultimately, impose very high fines (up to a significant percentage of global turnover, as noted in Demócrata's analysis of the DSA: analysis article).

In practice, any “commission” or team of the European Commission that formally investigates disinformation operations on platforms does so under the DSA and its investigative procedures.

3. Council restrictive measures against interference and disinformation

Another pillar is the regime of external sanctions:

  • The EU Council can approve restrictive measures (entry bans to the EU, asset freezes, veto on making economic resources available) against persons and entities carrying out “foreign information manipulation and interference activities against the EU,” as detailed in sanctions related to Bucha and Russian propaganda campaigns.
  • Before including someone on the sanctions list, the Council services and the EEAS conduct an administrative investigation on their role in these disinformation operations; the result is reflected in a foreign policy decision and an implementing sanctions regulation.
  • The European Council conclusions emphasize combating FIMI and stress the legal responsibility of platforms in spreading disinformation, inviting the Commission to use all available instruments, as seen in the December 2025 conclusions.
4. Specific committees and task forces on foreign interference

Besides investigations based on the DSA and sanctions regimes, specific structures have been created:

  • The European Parliament has established a Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes, including disinformation, mentioned in notes on the elections. Its formal basis is the Parliament's Rules of Procedure and its mandate is political: to investigate, hold hearings, and make recommendations, but without its own sanctioning powers.
  • The Commission and the EEAS have developed a “toolbox against foreign information manipulation and interference” and networks like EUvsDisinfo, as well as a rapid alert system among Member States, described in the same documentation on elections and disinformation.
  • The Commission has announced a “European Democracy Shield” and a future European Centre for Democratic Resilience, dedicated to coordinating intelligence, detection, and response against FIMI, according to statements by Ursula von der Leyen and commissioners responsible for democracy and rule of law. These would be administrative structures created by Commission decisions, without themselves altering the competences set in the Treaties.
5. Other parts of the framework: parties, lobbies, and foreign funding

To investigate and limit foreign influence in political life (often also articulated via disinformation campaigns), the EU has strengthened:

  • Rules on European political parties and foundations, introducing limits and transparency obligations to reduce the risk of foreign interference in their funding, as reflected in agreements and regulations approved by the Council and Parliament in 2025 (for example, these new rules).
  • A directive proposal to make lobbying on behalf of third countries more transparent, with registration and record-keeping obligations, discussed in Parliament to address foreign influence in democratic processes.

In sum, the “commission” investigating foreign disinformation operations in the EU can be a Commission service acting under the DSA, a Council group preparing sanctions, a Parliament committee, or an EEAS task force. Each relies on its own legal basis: Treaties, sectoral regulations (DSA, European parties, lobby transparency), and foreign policy decisions on sanctions.

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