When would Sánchez have to call elections to vote on November 29?

The defeat of the housing decrees would open an immediate electoral window for Pedro Sánchez: the president could announce the advance this Friday, over the weekend, or on Monday and formalize the dissolution of the Cortes so that the elections are held on Sunday, November 29.

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The scenario that Pedro Sánchez wanted to avoid has materialized at the doors of the voting on the two housing decrees. Junts has decided to vote against both texts, closing the possibility of an abstention from its seven deputies that would allow the Government to save at least the main package of measures. The parliamentary defeat thus becomes the scenario the Executive is heading towards if there is no last-minute change in the arithmetic of the Chamber.

What happens this Friday will have a dimension that goes beyond housing. A defeat would leave the Government facing new evidence of the fragility of the investiture majority and would bring back to the forefront the question that has accompanied the legislature for months: how much time is the president willing to continue without a stable majority to push forward his agenda.

The decision of Junts also introduces an element that until now belonged to the realm of hypothesis: the electoral calendar already allows for the polls to be held at the end of November. And the date of Sunday, November 29 fits precisely into the machinery of the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG).

Junts closes the door to the decrees

The National Executive of Junts has agreed that its seven deputies reject the two royal decree laws on housing if the Government does not previously withdraw the texts. The Executive has decided to keep them on the agenda and submit them to a vote, despite the ultimatum from Carles Puigdemont's party.

The decision is particularly relevant for the first of the decrees, for which the Government had tried to build a parliamentary majority by the minimum. Junts' rejection eliminates that route and leaves the Executive facing a vote with a predictably adverse result. The second text arrives even more compromised, after other groups have also announced their rejection.

Sánchez has also raised the political component of the vote. After learning of Junts' decision, the president has publicly urged PP, Vox, and the independentist formation to position themselves on the decrees, while the Government maintains that it will not withdraw the texts.

An eventual defeat does not legally cause the fall of the Government. Sánchez can continue in La Moncloa even if Congress rejects the decrees, negotiate each initiative separately, and keep the legislature open. An adverse vote does not equate to a vote of confidence nor does it automatically trigger an electoral process. The Constitution establishes that the president can propose the dissolution of the Cortes, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers and under his exclusive responsibility. The dissolution is decreed by the King and the decree itself sets the date of the elections.

The question, therefore, is not whether a parliamentary defeat forces Sánchez to call elections. It does not. The question is whether the president decides to use that power and when.

The clock of the LOREG opens the door to 29-N

Here the precision of the electoral calendar comes into play.

Article 42 of the LOREG establishes that, when the president makes use of his power of early dissolution, the call decree is published the day after its issuance and comes into effect on the same day of its publication. Elections must be held between the fifty-fourth and sixtieth day following the call.

This means that it is not necessary for Sánchez to wait until October 6 to call elections on November 29. October 6 would be the final limit of the margin for November 29 to be the 54th day after the call.

The arithmetic is as follows:

  • Publication of the decree on October 1: 59 days until 29-N.

  • Publication on October 2: 58 days.

  • Publication on October 3: 57 days.

  • Publication on October 4: 56 days.

  • Publication on October 5: 55 days.

  • Publication on October 6: 54 days.

Therefore, November 29 is legally compatible with any call published between October 1 and October 6. October 6 is not a unique and mandatory date, but the last day of that margin to keep November 29 as an electoral day.

Friday 2, Saturday 3 or Monday 5: what would happen

The calendar thus acquires a distinct political dimension depending on the moment Sánchez wants to make his decision public. If the president were to announce the advance this Friday, October 2, after the voting on the housing decrees, he would still have room to legally formalize the decision. The political announcement and the publication of the decree do not have to occur at the same moment. The Constitution requires prior deliberation by the Council of Ministers for the president to propose the dissolution.

If the decision were communicated on Saturday, October 3, the calendar would still be compatible with November 29 as long as the decree was issued and published within the corresponding legal margin. And if Sánchez were to wait until Monday, October 5, he could also take the ballots to November 29. In that case, the decree could be issued on Monday and published on Tuesday, October 6. Precisely that publication on October 6 would place November 29 on the 54th day after the call.

The most recent precedent also demonstrates that the machinery can be activated quickly. In 2023, Sánchez proposed the dissolution of the Cortes after the regional and municipal elections on May 28; Royal Decree 400/2023 was issued on May 29 and published in the BOE on the 30th, calling for the general elections on July 23.

From the housing defeat to the electoral campaign

If the decree were published on October 6, the electoral calendar would begin to unfold immediately.

The parties would have ten days from the call to communicate coalition agreements. The candidacies for the general elections would subsequently be presented within the deadlines established by the LOREG, and their proclamation would occur before the start of the campaign. The next relevant milestone would be the campaign. Article 51 of the LOREG establishes that it begins on the thirty-eighth day after the call, lasts fifteen days, and concludes at zero hours on the day before the vote.

With a call published on October 6, the campaign would start on November 13 and would last until zero hours on Saturday the 28th. Saturday would remain as the day before the vote, and on Sunday November 29, voters would go to the polls. The calendar would thus turn a parliamentary defeat that occurred on October 2 into the starting point of an electoral process that would culminate just eight weeks later.

The decision that remains in Sánchez's hands

The defeat of the housing decrees, by itself, does not determine the end of the legislature. The Government can continue governing, present new initiatives, and seek different majorities for each vote. But the rejection by Junts modifies the political scenario in which Sánchez must make that decision. The Executive had managed to incorporate Podemos into the block favorable to the decrees and, despite this, Junts' refusal threatens to bring down the two regulations.

Housing thus becomes the episode that can mark a before and after in the legislature. The question is no longer solely whether the Government manages to validate two decrees, but what reading Moncloa makes of a possible defeat and whether it considers that there is still room to maintain a sufficient parliamentary majority.

From a legal point of view, the clock is already ticking: to vote on November 29, the call would have to be published in the BOE between October 1 and 6. This leaves open the three political windows that now appear on the table: an immediate decision after the vote this Friday, an announcement over the weekend, or a formalization on Monday. The electoral calendar, on the other hand, does not allow for too many interpretations. If Sánchez decides to dissolve the Cortes, November 29 is within the window allowed by the LOREG and the last day to publish the decree that would maintain that date would be October 6. From there, the next move would no longer be in the hands of the electoral calculator and would pass to the political decision-making of the president.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the parliamentary processing status of the two housing decrees rejected by Junts?

The two housing decrees that Junts has announced it will reject in Congress are, according to our database, the Royal Decree-Law 26/2026, of September 29, on social function and affordable housing supply, and the Royal Decree-Law 27/2026, of September 29, on the stability of rental contracts for primary residences. As of today (October 2, 2026), both are already published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) but are not yet recorded as parliamentary initiatives with closed processing; their validation or repeal is pending the Plenary of Congress.

1. Royal Decree-Law 26/2026 (social function and affordable housing supply)

This decree is officially identified as Royal Decree-Law 26/2026, of September 29, adopting urgent measures for the protection of the social function of housing and the expansion of affordable housing supply, published in the BOE on September 30, 2026 (text in the BOE).

From an institutional point of view, the available information includes:

  • Executive phase completed: the Council of Ministers approved the royal decree-law on September 29, 2026, and it was publicly reported in the official Moncloa reference of 09/29/2026, as a regulation of “urgent measures for the protection of the social function and the expansion of affordable housing supply.”
  • Publication in the BOE: the text came into force after its publication on September 30, 2026, with the rank of royal decree-law and full legal effect until Congress pronounces.
  • Parliamentary status: it appears as an executive regulation subject to validation or repeal debate within 30 days, but it does not yet appear linked to a specific parliamentary file in Congress (a number 130/0000XX with registration, debate, and voting schedule is not yet shown).

Consequently, at this moment its parliamentary status is: pending validation or repeal by the Plenary of Congress. The announced decision of Junts to vote against conditions the political outcome, but legally the file remains in the phase prior to the validation debate and vote.

2. Royal Decree-Law 27/2026 (stability of rental contracts)

The second text is the Royal Decree-Law 27/2026, of September 29, adopting urgent measures to reinforce the stability of rental contracts for primary residences, published in the BOE on October 1, 2026 (text in the BOE).

The recorded phases are:

  • Approval by the Council of Ministers on September 29, 2026, with official reference in Moncloa as a royal decree-law aimed at reinforcing the stability of rental contracts for primary residences.
  • Publication in the BOE on October 1, 2026, after which the decree-law is in force.
  • No parliamentary file developed yet: in the consulted parliamentary information, it does not yet appear as a registered initiative with its own file number in Congress (no process type 130/0000XX associated with this royal decree-law appears).

Therefore, in this case as well, the parliamentary processing status is: pending validation or repeal debate in the Plenary. The scheduled vote will determine whether it is validated or repealed, and at the time of consultation, that result has not yet been recorded nor, therefore, any possible additional decision to process it as a bill.

3. Comparative summary of the status of both decrees
  • Both texts are royal decree-laws on housing approved by the Government on September 29, 2026, and already published in the BOE.
  • Institutionally, both are at the same parliamentary stage: pending the validation or repeal vote in the Plenary of Congress.
  • It is not yet recorded in the parliamentary database that Congress has held and closed that vote, nor that it has agreed, if applicable, further processing as a bill.
  • The political decision of Junts to vote against places both decrees at risk of being repealed, but until the Plenary is held and votes are recorded, they will formally remain in open processing, pending validation.

What are the powers and functions of the Prime Minister according to the Spanish Constitution?

The 1978 Spanish Constitution establishes the Prime Minister as the head of the executive power and the central figure in ordinary political life, although the head of State is the King. His powers and functions mainly appear in articles 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 112, 113, 114, 115, and 92.2 of the Constitution.

1. Direction of the Government and general policy (art. 97 CE)

Article 97 sets the core of his functions:

  • Direct the Government's action: sets the general political line, coordinates and guides the actions of all ministers, and decides the Executive's main priorities.
  • Direct internal and external policy: defines strategy in areas such as economy, health, education, internal security, or international relations, always within the legal framework and under parliamentary control.
  • Direct the civil and military Administration: supervises the entire General State Administration (ministries and agencies) and defense policy and the Armed Forces, through the Ministry of Defense.
  • Direct the defense of the State: in coordination with the King as supreme commander of the Armed Forces, promotes political and regulatory decisions on national security and defense.
  • Exercise executive function and regulatory power: the Government, under his direction, applies laws and issues regulations (royal decrees and others) to develop and execute them.

2. Relationship with ministers and Government structure (art. 98 CE)

The Prime Minister occupies the top of the governmental organization:

  • Appoint and dismiss ministers: proposes to the King the appointment and dismissal of Government members. In practice, he chooses the ministerial team and can reshuffle it.
  • Set the Government's structure: decides the creation, suppression, or modification of ministries and vice presidencies, through royal decrees.
  • Preside over the Council of Ministers: convenes and directs its meetings, orders the debate, sets the agenda, and seeks cabinet cohesion.
  • Coordinate ministerial action: resolves conflicts of competence between ministries and ensures the Government's actions are coherent.

3. Appointment, responsibility, and dismissal (arts. 99–101 CE)

The Prime Minister is directly linked to the Congress of Deputies:

  • Appointment: proposed by the King, after consultation with party representatives, and must obtain the confidence of Congress through investiture.
  • Political responsibility: the Government, especially the Prime Minister, is politically accountable to Congress, which can demand responsibility.
  • Dismissal: the Prime Minister ceases, among other cases, after general elections, loss of a motion of censure, denial of a vote of confidence, resignation, or death.
  • Dismissal of the Prime Minister implies the dismissal of the entire Government, which remains in office until the new Executive takes office.

4. Key parliamentary instruments (arts. 112–114 CE)

The Constitution grants the Prime Minister tools to manage his relationship with Parliament:

  • Vote of confidence (art. 112): he can raise it before Congress to check or reinforce parliamentary support regarding a program or general policy statement. If lost, he must resign and a new investiture process begins.
  • Response to the motion of censure (arts. 113–114): the motion of censure is always “constructive,” i.e., it proposes an alternative candidate for the premiership. If it succeeds, the Prime Minister is replaced by the motion's candidate.

5. Dissolution of Chambers and referendum (arts. 115 and 92.2 CE)

The Prime Minister also has decisive powers in shaping the Cortes Generales and in consulting the citizenry:

  • Proposal to dissolve the Congress, Senate, or the Cortes: can propose to the King the dissolution of one or both Chambers and the calling of general elections, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers.
  • Proposal of consultative referendum (art. 92.2): can propose to the King the calling of a consultative referendum on political decisions of special importance, with prior authorization from Congress.

6. Other political-constitutional functions

Additionally, the Prime Minister exercises other relevant functions, although the Constitution formulates them less in detail:

  • Political representation of the Government in its relations with the King, the Cortes Generales, other State powers, and foreign governments.
  • Crisis and exceptional states management, promoting decisions on states of alarm, exception, and siege, which must be approved according to the Constitution and corresponding organic laws.
  • Countersignature of many acts of the King related to the Government (appointment and dismissal of ministers, dissolution of Chambers, calling elections, etc.), which implies assuming political responsibility for those acts.

Overall, these powers make the Prime Minister the central figure of the political leadership of the State within the Spanish constitutional framework, under parliamentary control and within the parliamentary Monarchy.

How is the Prime Minister exactly chosen and appointed according to the investiture procedure? What differences exist between the functions of the Prime Minister and those of the King as head of State? What mechanisms exist to remove a Prime Minister before the legislature ends?

How many laws or royal decrees has the Government presented in the current legislature that have been rejected in Congress?

In the XV Legislature (started in 2023), according to our database that collects official records, the Government has presented in Congress a total of 11 legislative initiatives (bills and royal decree-laws) whose processing ended with a negative result in the Lower House, either by rejection of a bill or by non-validation of a royal decree-law.

The breakdown is as follows:

  • Rejected bills: 2 (both ordinary laws).
  • Non-validated royal decree-laws: 9.
  • Total Government initiatives rejected or non-validated: 11.

In all cases, the dates indicated below are those of the decisive vote in the Congress of Deputies (session in which the bill is rejected or the validation of the decree-law is voted), not those of their subsequent publication in official bulletins.

1. Government bills rejected

In the current legislature, there are two ordinary bills promoted by the Government that were rejected by the Plenary of Congress in the final vote:

  • Bill for the State Public Health Agency and amendment of Law 33/2011
    This is an ordinary bill to create the State Public Health Agency and amend Law 33/2011, General Public Health Law. Its processing ended with a rejection in Congress in the vote held on March 20, 2025.
  • Bill to reduce the maximum duration of the ordinary working day and guarantee the recording of working hours and the right to disconnection
    This ordinary bill aimed to reduce the maximum ordinary working day and strengthen mechanisms such as time registration and the right to digital disconnection. It was subjected to a final vote in the Plenary of Congress on September 11, 2025, where it was also rejected.

There is no record in this legislature of any organic bill from the Government whose processing ended with rejection in Congress.

2. Government royal decree-laws not validated

In addition to the above bills, the Government has seen nine royal decree-laws not validated by Congress. Non-validation implies that the decree-law is repealed, without prejudice to the fact that, in some cases, the content may be later resumed by other normative means.

  • Royal Decree-Law 7/2023, on work-life balance and improvement of unemployment assistance level.
    The validation vote took place on January 10, 2024 and Congress decided not to validate it.
  • Royal decree-law on temporary energy levy during 2025 (identified as part of the late 2024 package).
    It was subjected to validation on January 22, 2025 and was not validated.
  • Royal Decree-Law 9/2024, on economic, tax, transport, and Social Security measures.
    The validation vote was also held on January 22, 2025, resulting in non-validation.
  • Royal Decree-Law 7/2025, on urgent measures to strengthen the electrical system.
    Its validation was debated and voted in the Plenary on July 22, 2025, being not validated.
  • Royal Decree-Law 16/2025, on social vulnerability, tax, and Social Security measures.
    Its validation was submitted to Congress on January 27, 2026; the result was non-validation.
  • Royal Decree-Law 4/2026, on equitable accessibility to goods and services in emergencies.
    The Plenary voted its validation on February 26, 2026, deciding not to validate it.
  • Royal Decree-Law 2/2026, on social vulnerability, tax measures, and territorial financing.
    It was also voted on February 26, 2026, likewise not validated.
  • Royal decree-law on rental measures due to the economic and social consequences of the Iran War.
    The Chamber held the validation vote on April 28, 2026, with a result of non-validation.
  • Royal Decree-Law 21/2026, on transparency and integrity of interest group activities.
    Its validation was voted in Congress on September 16, 2026, ultimately being not validated.

Overall, these data reflect that, in the current legislature, the Government has had a significant number of key initiatives—especially in the form of royal decree-laws—that have encountered a negative majority in Congress, either in the validation vote or in the final approval of bills.

Can you explain in more detail the content and objectives of the State Public Health Agency bill that was rejected? What majorities and parliamentary alliances explain the non-validation of each of those royal decree-laws? How does this number of rejected laws and decrees compare with previous legislatures in relative terms?

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Test your knowledge with FREN!

How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

Which parliamentary group has decided to vote against the two housing decrees, jeopardizing their approval?

Question 1 of 3

According to the LOREG, between which dates must the call decree be published for the elections to be held on November 29?

Question 2 of 3

When would the electoral campaign begin if the call decree were published on October 6 to vote on November 29?

Question 3 of 3