Costa alerts the UN about the power of tech companies: "AI cannot be regulated by a few large companies"

As of September 2026, the Global Digital Compact is no longer in the text negotiation phase at the United Nations: it was agreed upon and adopted by consensus at the General Assembly in September 2024, within the framework of the Summit of the Future, as one of the components of the Pact for the Future. Since 2025‑2026, the debate has focused on its implementation and monitoring, not on its classic normative “processing.”

What is the Global Digital Compact at the UN

The Global Digital Compact is the first global digital governance framework promoted by the UN, with principles and commitments on:

• digital inclusion and universal connectivity;
• respect for human rights online;
• security and resilience of digital infrastructures;
• data governance and artificial intelligence.

Reference documents such as the European Commission’s note on the 2024 General Assembly explain that the Global Digital Compact would be agreed upon at the Summit of the Future, aiming to support “an open, free, and secure digital future for all” and “bridge digital divides” (European Commission note). Analytical articles like those from Telefónica later confirm that the Pact was approved in September 2024 as part of the UN Pact for the Future and describe it as the reference framework for the coming digital decade (Strasbourg Digital Week).

Main milestones 2023‑2026

• 2023‑early 2024: intergovernmental negotiations. Based on the Secretary-General’s digital cooperation roadmap, member states negotiate successive drafts of the Global Digital Compact in New York. The UN Office of Digital and Emerging Technologies (UN ODET), led by Amandeep Singh Gill, acts as technical and secretarial support for these negotiations.
• September 2024: adoption at the Summit of the Future. During the Summit of the Future and the 79th General Assembly, the Global Digital Compact is adopted by consensus as part of the Pact for the Future. Political interventions, such as that of the Spanish Prime Minister in India, explicitly mention that the adoption of the Global Digital Compact at the United Nations Summit of the Future was “supported” (Pedro Sánchez’s speech).
• Late 2024‑2025: alignment and deployment. The EU and other actors begin to refer to the Pact as an already agreed framework and commit to “work jointly on the implementation of the Global Digital Compact, agreed by consensus at the UN General Assembly in September 2024” (EU‑India TTC statement). Forums such as IGF 2025 in Oslo present the Global Digital Compact and the Pact for the Future as the foundations of multilateral digital governance for the next decade (IGF 2025).
• 2024‑2025: institutional strengthening. Spain agrees with the UN to create a division of the Office of Digital and Emerging Technologies in Valencia to support, among other tasks, the monitoring of the Global Digital Compact over the following two years (Ministry for Digital Transformation note). ODET coordinates the implementation of the digital cooperation roadmap and supports processes derived from the Pact.
• 2025‑2026: monitoring in artificial intelligence. As part of the package associated with the Global Digital Compact, the General Assembly approves the creation of an Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance. In February 2026, the appointment of the 40 experts of the Panel, including the Spaniard Román Orús, is made public, highlighting that this initiative “marks a milestone in the Global Digital Compact process, approved during the Summit of the Future” (Digitalization and AI note).
• December 2025: WSIS+20 in New York. According to reports to the EU Council, the +20 review of the World Summit on the Information Society adopts by consensus a global digital policy framework for the next decade aligned with the Global Digital Compact, reinforcing its role as a reference for internet governance and connectivity (ANACOM, Telecommunications Group meetings).

Status as of September 2026

In terms of “processing,” the Global Digital Compact is already formally adopted and in the phase of political and technical implementation:

• its text is not being renegotiated at the General Assembly;
• efforts focus on derived bodies (such as the AI Scientific Panel and the Global Dialogue on AI governance) and on incorporating its principles into sectoral frameworks (for example, the UN Convention against Cybercrime, or the EU digital partnership agreements);
• offices like ODET and its division in Valencia act as monitoring, advisory, and coordination nodes to ensure that the Pact’s commitments translate into concrete norms, programs, and standards.

In summary, today the Global Digital Compact is a political framework already approved at the United Nations whose “processing” as a text concluded in 2024; what remains open is its practical application, which will likely occupy the entire decade, both at the UN and the EU and other multilateral bodies.

The President of the European Council is a figure created by the Lisbon Treaty and mainly regulated in Article 15 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Their central function is to ensure the smooth functioning of the European Council, which brings together the heads of State or Government of the Member States, the President of the Commission, and, where appropriate, the High Representative.

According to the Treaties, the powers and functions of the President of the European Council can be grouped into four blocks: directing the work of the European Council, political drive and coordination, external representation, and mediation and internal cohesion functions.

1. Direction of the work of the European Council

The TEU establishes that the President:

• Presides over and stimulates the work of the European Council. This means convening meetings, setting the pace, and ensuring that debates are conducted in an orderly and results-oriented manner. It is not limited to a formal presidency: they must help build consensus among heads of State or Government.
• Prepares and ensures continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission and based on the work of the Council of the EU (ministerial formations). This includes:
  • Defining the agenda for the summits.
  • Coordinating the technical and political preparation of topics.
  • Ensuring follow-up on the conclusions of the European Council in future meetings.
• Reports to the European Parliament. After each European Council meeting, the President must present a report to the European Parliament on the summit’s results. This obligation, foreseen in the TEU, strengthens democratic oversight and transparency over the activity of the heads of State or Government.

2. Political drive and coordination

The European Council defines the general political orientations and priorities of the Union. Within this framework, the President has specific functions:

• Drive the Union’s action at the highest leadership level, helping the European Council set the strategic course (for example, on major legislative packages, multiannual financial frameworks, climate, digital, migration agendas, etc.).
• Ensure coherence and continuity of decisions: oversees that the various conclusions adopted by the European Council maintain a global strategic line and do not contradict each other, and that political follow-up of commitments made is carried out.
• Coordinate with other institutions, especially with the Commission and, politically, with the European Parliament, so that the priorities set by the European Council translate into concrete legislative and budgetary initiatives.

3. External representation of the Union

The TEU provides that the President of the European Council represents the European Union at the highest level in matters of common foreign and security policy (CFSP), without prejudice to the functions of the High Representative and the Commission. This is concretized in:

• Representing the EU at international summits with other heads of State or Government (G7, G20, EU-third country summits, etc.) when the level is of leaders.
• Maintaining political contacts with third States and international organizations to convey the global political positions agreed by the European Council.
• Contributing, together with the High Representative, to ensuring coherence in the Union’s external action, making sure that the strategic political line set by the European Council is reflected in diplomacy and operational foreign policy.

4. Mediation and internal cohesion functions

Although the Treaties do not explicitly use terms like “mediator,” several functions of the President are aimed at maintaining unity among Member States:

• Foster consensus among heads of State or Government, especially when there are deep divisions on sensitive issues (institutional reforms, enlargements, responses to economic or geopolitical crises, etc.).
• Manage crises at the highest level, convening extraordinary European Council meetings when the situation demands and articulating emergency political commitments.
• Symbolize institutional continuity: unlike the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, the President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority of the European Council itself for a term of two and a half years, renewable once, which provides stability and long-term institutional memory.

Overall, the Treaties configure the President of the European Council as a figure of political leadership and coordination, without executive powers or legislative authority, but with a key role in defining the Union’s strategic agenda, cohesion among Member States, and the EU’s external political representation at the level of heads of State or Government.

António Costa has developed his entire political career linked to the social-democratic family and, in terms of organic membership, his party trajectory has been centered around a single national party: the Socialist Party of Portugal (PS). There is no indication in the consulted sources that he has belonged to any other Portuguese political force before presiding over the European Council.

Recent information repeatedly describes him as a Portuguese socialist leader. The newspaper Demócrata presents him, when explaining the distribution of the main European Union positions, as a “reference of the European socialists” who arrives at the presidency of the Council coming from the Socialist Party of Portugal, after a long career as prime minister, mayor of Lisbon, and minister in various governments, always within the socialist sphere (Demócrata). Similarly, other reports and profiles systematically identify him as a “Portuguese socialist politician” or “Lusitanian socialist leader.”

In fact, even in contexts discussing his current European role, his origin as part of the social-democratic family is emphasized. An analysis of the political power distribution in Brussels after the State of the Union speech recalls that Costa “comes from the social-democratic family and belonged to the Socialist Group during his time in the European Parliament,” which refers both to his national membership in the Portuguese PS and his alignment with the European Socialist Group in the European Parliament, not with other political families (Demócrata).

Additionally, other sources highlight the prolonged and consistent nature of this affiliation. In the profile drawn up on the occasion of the Fórum Europa Award, his “public service career” and status as a “Portuguese socialist leader” are valued, with no reference to party changes or a previous stage in another political formation. Josep Borrell, when praising his career, refers to him simply as Costa, omitting any alternative party qualifier and emphasizing that “he has passed through almost all levels of Portuguese and European politics” always within the same ideological family (Nueva Economía Fórum).

Likewise, the internal framing of Portuguese politics reinforces this reading. When the Portuguese and Spanish press talk about crises or scandals affecting the Socialist Party, they do so expressly in relation to governments led by “former Prime Minister António Costa,” as happens in reports on the so-called “Operation Influencer,” treating him as the central figure of that PS government cycle (Demócrata). This fits with the fact that Costa was also Secretary-General of the Socialist Party, that is, the party’s top leader.

Regarding his beginnings, biographical references collected in the press indicate that his “political journey began when he was still a student” and that he worked in the Lisbon City Council and later as a deputy, secretary of state, minister, and mayor, all always under the socialist banner (Demócrata). Although journalistic pieces do not detail his membership card in the PS youth, they align with the idea of an early and continuous membership in the Portuguese Socialist Party, without jumps to other organizations.

At the European level, when describing his time in the European Parliament, it is recalled that he joined the Socialist Group, the bench that groups the social-democratic parties of the Member States. That membership is not a second party but the projection in Brussels of his national affiliation: MEPs from the Portuguese PS sit in the socialist group precisely because of their membership in that party.

In summary, based on the consulted sources, António Costa’s professional and political career before presiding over the European Council is stably associated with the Socialist Party of Portugal (PS) and, at the European level, with the Socialist Group in the European Parliament. There is no data indicating that, at any point in his career, he has been a member of or stood for election on behalf of any political force other than the PS.