Fouzi Lekjaa, the head of Moroccan football who aspires to govern the country

In Morocco, government formation after legislative elections combines formal elements provided in the Moroccan legal framework with a political practice strongly marked by the role of the monarchy. Unlike Spain or other European parliamentary systems, there is no tightly regulated investiture calendar with fixed deadlines and automatic sanctions if no agreement is reached: the king's room for maneuver and political flexibility are greater.

1. General framework and role of the king

Recent analyses of Moroccan politics emphasize that the Crown occupies a central position in the system. The Fundación Alternativas, in its study on the "new political cycle" in Morocco following the defeat of the PJD, describes a strengthening of the "centrality of the Crown" and a more authoritarian turn, with an Executive strongly conditioned by the Palace.

In practice, and according to the newspaper Demócrata, the monarch:

• Sets the broad lines of domestic and foreign policy.
• Directly appoints the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ensure "coherence" between the monarchy and the Government, which limits the parties' room in this area.
• Arbitrates government formation, appointing the head of the Executive and giving the green light to coalition balances.

This prominence implies that, although legislative elections determine the balance of power in Parliament, the government formation process is not understood as a negotiation "between equals" in the European style, but as a construction of majorities under the supervision and approval of Mohamed VI.

2. Political procedures after the elections

Based on the available information and recent practice described by the press and analysis centers, the process can be summarized in several political phases rather than purely regulatory ones:

• Announcement of results and seat distribution. After the count and proclamation of seats, it is seen which force has won and which majority combinations are arithmetically possible.
• Informal consultations by the Royal Palace. Although not always detailed explicitly, analysts cited by Demócrata assume that Mohamed VI's environment gauges the main parties, especially those that already form or can form part of the government coalition.
• Appointment of the head of government. Recent political practice has been that the king appoints the head of government as the leader of the hegemonic party within the future majority. Since 2021, for example, the Executive has been headed by Aziz Ajanuch, leader of the National Rally of Independents (RNI), at the head of a coalition with the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) and the nationalist Istiqlal party, as Demócrata recalls.
• Negotiation of the coalition and distribution of portfolios. Once the head of government is appointed, conversations open between parties to set:
  • Which forces will integrate the coalition.
  • Distribution of ministries and key positions.
  • Main lines of the program, knowing that in strategic areas (such as Western Sahara or relations with Spain) the margin is already set by the Crown.
• Composition of the Cabinet and appointments. The future head of government outlines his team and submits it to the king, who retains a decisive role in choosing certain profiles, especially in Foreign Affairs, Interior, and other sensitive portfolios.
• Presentation of the program before the Chamber. The new Executive presents its agenda before the House of Representatives, seeking to ensure a stable majority. The emphasis is not so much on a dramatized investiture vote as on showing that the Government has the support of the agreed coalition.

3. Deadlines: flexibility and centrality of the Crown

The texts consulted do not include a fixed deadline scheme comparable, for example, to that existing in Spain for investiture or electoral repetition. In Moroccan practice, times are governed more by political dynamics and Palace intervention than by a "constitutional clock" with rigid deadlines.

Some features that emerge from recent analyses are:

• There is no single and closed deadline to form a government after the legislative elections. The king has broad discretion to commission the formation of the Executive and to modulate the negotiation times.
• The center of gravity is on system stability, rather than on the pressure of a calendar. Mohamed VI and his environment's priority is to preserve a political balance that ensures continuity in the major orientations (especially on the Western Sahara dossier and policy towards Spain and the EU).
• Recent experience points to relatively quick solutions, without prolonged deadlocks as seen in other countries, precisely because the Crown acts as an arbitrator and because the main parties are aligned on substantive issues, as experts cited by Demócrata and Fundación Alternativas emphasize.

4. Key difference with "pure" parliamentary models

In summary, after legislative elections in Morocco:

• The procedures are above all political and palace-based: consultations, appointment of the head of government, coalition negotiation, and validation by the king.
• Deadlines are not a rigid countdown but a flexible framework in which the monarchy manages the timing to avoid power vacuums and preserve stability.

To analyze a specific case (certain elections, a possible deadlock, etc.) it is advisable to closely follow both the official statements of the Moroccan Royal Palace and specialized analysis, because they better reflect the real rhythms of the process than an abstract legal scheme.

No Moroccan normative text explicitly and systematically detailing the legal powers of the ministre délégué chargé du budget (delegated minister in charge of the Budget) has been found in the consulted sources. The search has scoured press and political analysis databases (including the newspaper Demócrata) with expressions such as “ministre délégué chargé du budget”, “loi organique relative à la loi de finances” or “loi organique 130‑13”, but the results obtained do not include the articles of those norms nor a legal summary of the position's attributions, only general news about Morocco or other countries.

In other words: with the information available in this research, it is not possible to reconstruct a reliable, article-by-article list of the faculties that current Moroccan legislation formally attributes to the delegated minister of Budget, nor to rigorously cite the specific provisions where they are regulated. Any attempt to offer that normative catalog would be speculative and not supported by the sources consulted.

Indirectly, some institutional context elements about Morocco in general emerge, but not about this position in particular. For example, an analysis published in the newspaper Demócrata about the autonomy plan for Western Sahara recalls that:

• The Moroccan central state retains classic "regalian" competencies (defense and national security, foreign policy, currency, nationality, and sovereignty symbols).
• Competencies not expressly attributed to other territorial levels remain under State control, unless otherwise agreed.
• The king appoints the prime minister and other key executive figures, which reinforces the Executive's centrality in the system.

This framework confirms that budgetary and financial policy is conceived as a core function of the central State, but it does not add specific information on how budget responsibilities are distributed between the Minister of Economy and Finance and the delegated minister in charge of the Budget, nor on the details of their respective formal powers.

Comparatively, in many systems where a similar figure exists (budget minister, budget secretary, or delegated budget minister), their functions are usually articulated around four main blocks:

• Preparation of the State budget bill, in coordination with the Minister of Finance or Economy and other departments.
• Monitoring budget execution, including authorization or endorsement of certain spending commitments and supervision of the State's treasury and accounting.
• Multi-year programming and fiscal discipline, participating in defining spending ceilings, deficit targets, and internal fiscal rules.
• Relations with Parliament on budget matters, defending the finance bill and government amendments before the chambers.

It is very likely that the Moroccan delegated minister performs functions of this type, as a specialized political official responsible for the budget within the Ministry of Economy and Finance. However, emphasizing caution: this is an institutional inference based on comparative practices, not an accredited legal description of current Moroccan legislation, which would require direct consultation of:

• The 2011 Moroccan Constitution and the organic development laws related to the Government and the finance law.
• Organizational decrees of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and definition of the delegated ministers' attributions.
• The consolidated text of the organic finance law (loi organique relative à la loi de finances), in its most recent version.

Since none of these texts appeared in the research results used here, it is not possible to go further without leaving the realm of verifiable information. For academic or professional work requiring legal precision — for example, citing the specific articles mentioning the “ministre délégué chargé du budget” — it would be essential to go directly to the Official Bulletin of the Kingdom of Morocco (Bulletin Officiel) or a Moroccan legal database containing those texts in their authentic and updated version.

The sources consulted on the Moroccan legislative elections allow for a good contextualization of the political landscape and the role of the National Rally of Independents (RNI) and the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), but they do not openly provide the exact numerical data of seats and vote percentages you request for the last held legislative elections. For rigor, I cannot invent those figures or reconstruct them from memory: I can only work with what explicitly appears in the accessible materials.

That said, it is possible to clarify several relevant elements to understand the position of both parties after the last parliamentary elections in Morocco:

1. Which elections are the "last Moroccan legislative elections"

At present, the central reference is the legislative elections held in 2021, which marked a political cycle change in Morocco and represented the clear defeat of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), the main Islamist force, after a decade of predominance in Parliament. From that moment, a government coalition was consolidated around:

• National Rally of Independents (RNI), as the first force and pillar of the Government.
• Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), as a central coalition partner, closely linked to the king's environment.
• Istiqlal Party, a historic nationalist formation, also integrated into the Executive.

The consulted pieces indicate that, since those elections, the RNI–PAM–Istiqlal alliance constitutes the core of the Moroccan Government and that the RNI holds the head of the Executive.

2. Role of the National Rally of Independents (RNI)

Recent news describe the RNI as the force leading the government coalition and whose leader, Aziz Ajanuch, serves as head of government. The sources emphasize that:

• The RNI leads the current government alliance, positioning itself in first place after the elections.
• Ajanuch is the political reference of that majority and the face of the new cycle, in which the PJD's Islamism loses centrality and parties closer to the Palace regain space.
• The expectation for upcoming elections (future relative to the news moment) is that the RNI will compete to renew that leadership, although some analyses consider the possibility that the PAM might challenge it for first place.

In summary: in the last held legislative elections, the RNI consolidated itself as the first parliamentary force and as the government's base, with a number of seats clearly superior to its partners. However, the available pieces do not break down how many deputies or what exact vote percentage it obtained.

3. Role of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM)

The PAM is described as a party created in 2008 by Fuad Alí el Himma, a childhood friend and one of King Mohamed VI's main advisors. This explicitly places it as a formation very close to the Palace.

Regarding the last legislative elections, the available information indicates that:

• The PAM is part of the government coalition led by the RNI.
• It remains one of the main parliamentary forces, behind the RNI, and with the capacity to influence the Executive's composition.
• It is one of the parties that most exploits, in campaigns, nationalist rhetoric and claims over Ceuta and Melilla, reflecting its will to compete for conservative and monarchist votes.

Again, the sources describe the PAM's political weight and its integration into the Government, but do not include tables with the total number of seats or the vote percentage obtained in the last elections.

4. Limitation of exact data (seats and percentages)

I have specifically searched for figures on:

• Number of seats of the RNI and PAM in the last Moroccan legislative elections.
• Percentage of votes obtained by each party in that electoral event.

However, the accessible sources in the research (analysis articles on Moroccan politics, notes on Morocco–Spain relations, and current coverage) limit themselves to describing who governs, what coalition exists, and what the trends are, but do not publish the concrete figures of seats or vote percentages.

For strict verification standards, I cannot fill that gap with numbers taken from memory or other sources not present in the consulted results. I can only state with certainty that:

• In the last legislative elections, the RNI emerged as the first parliamentary force and leads the Government.
• The PAM also obtained a very relevant result, placing it as one of the main coalition partners and the second major party of the government bloc, along with Istiqlal.

If you need the exact figures of seats and vote percentages, the most reliable would be to go directly to the official data of the Moroccan Electoral Commission or to specialized statistical databases on electoral results, which publish complete counts by party, constituency, and year.