Trump loses power in the United States: what changes for Europe after the midterms

The consequences of the midterms for Europe will be measured in tariffs, support for Ukraine, and the relationship with NATO. A Democratic victory opens new avenues for limiting Donald Trump’s decisions, although the president retains broad international powers and the ability to veto laws

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Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

La media de las encuestas

Media a 3 de noviembre de 2026 · 17 institutos

  • PP30,4 %
  • PSOE27,4 %
  • Vox19,2 %
  • Frente Amplio6,5 %
  • ERC2,4 %
  • Podemos2,4 %
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Media del último estudio de cada instituto en 30 días y su evolución semanal desde el 23J. Partidos con al menos un 2 %.

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Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

Europe will have more interlocutors with the capacity to put limits on Donald Trump in Washington. The Democratic victory in the Senate and the projections that also attribute it to the House of Representatives open a different stage in the transatlantic relationship. The president will remain at the head of U.S. foreign policy, but he will have to deal with a Congress willing to scrutinize his decisions.

For a European company that exports to the United States, the first question will be whether tariffs will go down. For Ukraine, whether new aid will arrive. For European governments, whether they will be able to count on a more predictable relationship with their main military ally.

The answer will not be the same on every front. The new parliamentary balance offers tools to negotiate and exert pressure, but it does not imply an immediate withdrawal of the measures adopted by Trump. It also does not change the person responsible for meeting with foreign leaders or for directing U.S. diplomacy.

Tariffs do not disappear with Republican defeat

The most immediate commercial effect will be political: Trump will face greater scrutiny over the costs of his tariffs and over the companies and consumers that pay them. Democrats will be able to promote investigations, demand explanations, and propose legislative changes.

That does not equate to an automatic reduction for European products. Congress has delegated certain tariff powers to the president through different laws. Modifying those assignments or reversing measures may require legislation that Trump has the capacity to veto.

Reuters had already pointed out before the elections that a Democratic victory would increase parliamentary pressure on trade policy, but it would hardly, by itself, produce a general withdrawal of tariffs. Overcoming a presidential veto requires two-thirds in both chambers, an requirement far higher than obtaining an ordinary majority.

For Spanish and European exporters, the outcome opens an opportunity to influence U.S. trade policy. It still does not allow recalculating costs by assuming that selling in that market will be cheaper.

Brussels wins another route for negotiation in Washington

The change reinforces the importance of the relationship between European institutions and Congress. The committees that deal with trade, budgets, and foreign affairs can become spaces to discuss White House decisions and their effects on allies.

The European Union will still have to negotiate with the Trump Administration. But it can look for parliamentary support to defend commitments, explain the impact of a measure, or promote solutions that also interest American businesses and workers.

That work will have to be based on specific interests. A Democratic majority does not mean that Washington will adopt European preferences on industry, agriculture, or regulation. U.S. lawmakers will also answer to their own voters.

The economic relationship at stake is considerable: the Council of the EU describes the transatlantic link as the largest bilateral relationship for trade and investment in the world. Existing trade commitments will continue to be the starting point for any negotiation.

Ukraine can find more backing, though the aid is not guaranteed

For Kyiv, a Congress more favorable to supporting Ukraine can facilitate aid initiatives, pressure on Russia, and monitoring of presidential decisions. It can also raise the political cost of a change of course that harms European allies.

The most important tool will be the negotiation of the funding and defense laws. Lawmakers can try to incorporate measures to support Ukraine into broader packages that the White House needs to approve.

However, turning that possibility into supplies and resources requires concrete agreements. The president retains veto power and a central role in the implementation of foreign policy. Experts consulted by Kyiv Independent before the elections warned precisely about that difference between having a receptive Congress and getting new measures to come into effect.

Europe cannot budget starting today for an increase in U.S. aid. It can, however, work with a more favorable correlation of forces in order to try.

The pressure to spend more on defense will continue

Trump’s defeat does not undo the commitments made by NATO members nor does it eliminate Europe’s military needs. The agreed goal in The Hague includes reaching in 2035 5% of GDP on defense and security-related spending, with at least 3.5% earmarked for the core defense requirements.

The midterms may change the tone of the discussion and bolster those who advocate transatlantic cooperation. They do not replace national decisions on budgets, capabilities, and procurement of military equipment.

For Spain as well, they do not themselves constitute a change in its position or in the demands it receives within the Alliance. Any change will have to be spelled out in decisions by governments and in negotiations among allies.

Iran and energy: more control does not mean an immediate end to the war

U.S. policy in the Middle East affects Europe due to its consequences for security, maritime transport, and energy markets. A Democratic majority will be able to investigate the management of the war with Iran and challenge its funding or its objectives.

But it would be premature to translate the election outcome into a guaranteed drop in oil prices or an end to military operations. The president retains broad powers in foreign policy, and parliamentary initiatives aimed at restricting them may encounter legal obstacles and vetoes.

For Europe, that leaves two scenarios open: more negotiation with Washington or a presidency that seeks to offset its internal difficulties with international decisions. The election outcome does not allow either of them to be taken for granted.

A weakened Trump may still be unpredictable

Europe’s temptation will be to interpret the shift as a return to the relationship prior to Trump. However, the change occurs in Congress, while the president retains the Oval Office and will continue to be the main interlocutor of foreign governments.

Before the elections, European and NATO officials interviewed by AFP were already expressing doubts about how much his foreign policy could be moderated by a parliamentary defeat. The concern was that internal limits would not necessarily translate into a more predictable international course.

The new majority in the Senate will be able to intervene in the confirmation of ambassadors and other senior positions subject to that procedure. This adds oversight over future appointments, although it does not automatically relieve those who are already holding their posts.

What Europe must look at from now on

The first indicators will be the priorities of the new majorities, the proposals on tariffs, and the financing negotiations of the Administration. It will also be necessary to observe which measures on Ukraine manage to gain support from both parties.

The institutional change does not happen immediately. The terms of the new members of Congress begin in January 2027; until then, the outgoing Congress will continue to operate. This interval will make it possible to check which decisions the Administration is trying to close before facing the new distribution of power. subsequent to European leaders.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What are the powers of the United States Senate and House of Representatives regarding international trade policy?

In the United States, the authority over international trade policy is, in constitutional terms, a function of the federal legislative branch as a whole (Congress), not the President. However, within Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives have partially differentiated roles based on the types of powers that the Constitution grants them and the legislative practice developed throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.

General constitutional framework

The starting point is Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress the power to:

  • Regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.
  • Lay and collect taxes, duties, and tariffs, with certain uniformity limitations.

That is, major decisions about tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and trade agreements require legislative intervention. The President negotiates and directs foreign policy, but the basic architecture of international trade policy is established by laws passed by both chambers.

Powers of the House of Representatives

The House of Representatives has a special weight in fiscal and tariff matters, because:

  • All revenue bills must originate in the House of Representatives. Traditionally, broad tariff reforms are considered revenue laws.
  • The main committee of reference is the House Ways and Means Committee, which handles:
    • Designing and processing legislation on tariffs and taxes related to foreign trade.
    • Overseeing the implementation of trade legislation by the Executive branch.
    • Promoting or blocking the renewal of the so-called Trade Promotion Authority (TPA, also known as “fast track”), which defines how Congress reviews trade agreements negotiated by the President.

In practice, the House:

  • Negotiates the specific design of tariffs and many trade defense instruments (antidumping measures, countervailing duties, etc.) through ordinary legislation.
  • Participates in the approval of implementation laws for trade agreements (for example, to incorporate into domestic law what was agreed in a free trade treaty).
  • Exercises intense political oversight over the Executive through committee hearings, requests for reports, and conditions included in authorization and appropriations laws.

Powers of the Senate

The Senate shares with the House the legislative power over international trade (any law must be approved by both chambers), but adds three distinctive features:

  • Ratification of international treaties: Article II of the Constitution requires the “advice and consent” of the Senate, by a two-thirds majority, for the ratification of treaties. Many major trade agreements have been processed as treaties, so that:
    • The President negotiates the text with other countries.
    • The Senate examines the agreement in committee and in the full chamber.
    • Decides whether or not to give its consent for ratification.
  • Confirmation of senior trade policy officials: the Senate confirms the appointment of:
    • The United States Trade Representative (USTR), the country’s chief trade negotiator.
    • Senior officials in the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and other agencies with trade responsibilities.
    This gives it indirect capacity to influence the direction of trade policy.
  • Its key committee is the Senate Finance Committee, with powers parallel to Ways and Means in the House, including:
    • Debating and amending tariff and trade policy legislation.
    • Overseeing trade negotiations and the execution of agreements.

Joint action: “fast track” and implementation laws

In recent decades, a central piece has been the Trade Promotion Authority. Through this legislation, both chambers:

  • Authorize the Executive to negotiate trade agreements under certain criteria and objectives.
  • Commit to submit the implementation law of those agreements to an accelerated procedure (no amendments and limited timeframes) when the President presents it.

Thus, Congress retains the ultimate power to approve or reject the outcome, but agrees to limit its ability to amend it to give credibility to the Executive’s international negotiation. The Senate and the House vote equally on these implementation laws.

Comparative summary

  • Shared functions: passing laws on tariffs and trade, approving implementation laws for agreements, exercising political oversight over the Executive.
  • House-specific features: mandatory origination of revenue bills (including many tariff reforms); leading role of the Ways and Means committee.
  • Senate-specific features: consent for ratification of international treaties and for the appointment of senior officials responsible for trade policy.

Overall, the United States’ international trade policy results from continuous interaction between the Executive and both chambers of Congress, with a distribution of functions that seeks to balance effectiveness in external negotiation and internal democratic oversight.

What requirements must the U.S. Congress meet to override a presidential veto and modify tariff measures?

In the United States, Congress can both override a presidential veto and change tariff measures, but these are two distinct legal levels that often combine in the same law. Below are the key requirements explained.

1. How to override a presidential veto

The U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7) establishes a very precise procedure to override a presidential veto, known as a veto override:

  • Bill already approved by Congress: first, the House of Representatives and the Senate approve a bill in identical terms, by a simple majority in each chamber (except in special cases requiring another majority).
  • President's veto: the president may return the bill without signing it, indicating objections. This is the veto.
  • Override vote in each chamber: for the law to take effect despite the veto, it requires:
    • two-thirds of the votes present in the House of Representatives, and
    • two-thirds of the votes present in the Senate.
  • Same text: Congress cannot change the content at this point; it only decides whether to insist on the text already sent to the president.
  • Deadlines: the vote must occur while Congress is still in session. If Congress adjourns and the president does not sign, a “pocket veto” may occur, which cannot be overridden because there is no session to vote.

Thus, the fundamental requirement to override the veto is achieving a qualified two-thirds majority in both chambers. Without that reinforced majority in both, the veto stands and the law does not take effect.

2. Congress’s power over tariffs

Regarding tariffs, the Constitution assigns Congress the power to:

  • “regulate commerce with foreign nations” (commerce clause).
  • “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts”, which includes customs duties or tariffs.

In practice, since the 20th century Congress usually passes framework trade laws (for example, the famous Trade Acts) that:

  • set general criteria and limits for tariff policy, and
  • delegate to the president some authority to raise, lower, or suspend tariffs in specific circumstances (national security, safeguards against massive imports, etc.).

Therefore, when talking about “modifying tariff measures” against the president’s will, two different legal scenarios may arise.

3. Scenario A: tariff modification is in the vetoed law itself

If Congress passes a law that directly sets or modifies tariffs (for example, changing tariff rates or revoking a specific presidential authority) and the president vetoes it, then:

  • for those tariff changes to take effect anyway, Congress must override the veto with two-thirds in each chamber, as explained above;
  • if only one chamber reaches two-thirds or none does, the veto stands and tariff measures do not change.

In this case, the requirement to override the president’s will is entirely procedural and constitutional: achieving that reinforced vote threshold.

4. Scenario B: the president uses powers delegated by Congress

Many controversial tariff measures are adopted because a prior law gave the president some margin to act (for example, allowing him to impose tariffs for national security reasons). If Congress wants to limit or revoke that delegation, it has two basic paths:

  • Pass a new ordinary law that:
    • modifies or repeals the provision granting power to the president, and/or
    • directly sets tariff rates or specific conditions.
  • Include that change in an essential text, such as a budget law or a major spending bill, to increase political pressure on the veto.

But formally, none of this avoids the presidential filter. If the president vetoes the new law that cuts his own tariff powers, the same veto override rules apply:

  • a two-thirds majority is needed in the House of Representatives, and
  • another two-thirds majority in the Senate,
  • voting on the same text that was vetoed.

5. Joint summary

  • Congress has, by Constitution, the original authority to set and modify tariffs.
  • The president participates through signing or vetoing laws, and through tariff powers delegated by Congress.
  • If a tariff law is vetoed and Congress wants to impose it anyway, it must reach two-thirds of the votes present in each chamber. That is the key requirement to override the presidential veto and modify tariff measures against his will.
Can you explain with historical examples when the U.S. Congress has successfully overridden a presidential veto on trade or tariff matters? What is the difference between an ordinary presidential veto and a “pocket veto,” and how does each affect Congress’s ability to change tariffs? How do these veto override requirements in the U.S. compare with mechanisms in Spain to limit or reverse government decisions on tariffs or foreign trade?

What have been the results of the latest United States Congressional elections and how many seats do the Democratic and Republican parties currently hold?

I cannot provide you with a precise and up-to-date answer regarding the results of the latest United States Congressional elections or the exact seat distribution between the Democratic and Republican parties, because I specialize in Spanish politics and institutions and do not work with detailed electoral data from other countries.

My focus is centered on everything related to the Spanish political system: the Cortes Generales (Congress and Senate), central and regional governments, regulations published in the BOE and regional bulletins, legislative processing, parliamentary activity, Spanish political actors, as well as the regulatory dimension and public policies in Spain (energy, housing, health, education, taxation, etc.) and their reflection in the press and public debate.

This means that, although I conceptually understand how the U.S. system works (House of Representatives and Senate, midterm elections, etc.), I cannot guarantee here concrete, official, and verified figures about:

  • The exact vote and seat results of the latest U.S. Congressional elections.
  • The current number of seats controlled by the Democratic Party.
  • The current number of seats controlled by the Republican Party.
  • Recent changes due to resignations, replacements, special elections, etc.

Since this information is very time-sensitive (in the U.S. there are partial elections, “special elections,” and relatively frequent seat changes), for reliable data you should consult directly:

  • The official website of the United States House of Representatives, where the updated party distribution usually appears.
  • The official website of the United States Senate, which also publishes the party division.
  • Specialized journalistic sources on U.S. politics, which offer summaries of the latest elections and resulting seat distribution.

Where I can help you in detail is with all equivalent matters but referring to Spain. For example, if you are interested in a parallel analysis in comparative terms, I can provide the Spanish part with precision and context:

  • Results and current composition of the Congress of Deputies (seats by party, parliamentary groups, etc.).
  • Results and composition of the Senate and how seats are distributed by constituencies.
  • How seats are allocated in Spain (D’Hondt system, provincial constituencies, effective thresholds).
  • Comparing, in general terms, the Spanish bicameral model with the U.S. one: election of each chamber, term lengths, type of representation, powers, etc.
  • Any question about majority formation in Spain: investiture, motions of no confidence, minority government, use of royal decree-laws, role of the Senate, etc.

If you want, you can reformulate your question towards the Spanish case, for example:

  • “What is the current seat distribution in the Spanish Congress of Deputies by party?”
  • “Compare, broadly, the electoral system of the U.S. Congress and the Spanish Congress of Deputies.”
  • “Explain how majorities are formed in the Spanish Congress and what role the Senate plays.”

With a question in that area, I can provide a detailed answer, with institutional and political context, adjusted to the Spanish reality and supported by official sources.

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