The plans conceived by NATO to face the threat posed by Russia on the eastern flank "exceed" the ground combat capability of European forces, which, although they "improve," do so in an "uneven and late" manner when they already started "from a low base," according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
In the analysis "The Defense of Europe in a New Era," reported by Europa Press, the think tank details that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered the "most significant" reorientation of European ground forces since the end of the Cold War, modifying their strategic approach.
During the period between the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, European armies were primarily configured for crisis management operations, limited expeditionary missions, or rotational support deployments. In contrast, currently, their requirements have shifted towards a "large-scale" conflict scenario, the report emphasizes.
"Advanced defense, rapid reinforcements, high-level command, territorial resilience, sustained firepower, and the ability to fight under constant surveillance, long-range attacks, electronic attacks, and pressure in the rear," the IISS lists as key demands. "NATO has responded by shifting from deterrence to defense planning," summarizes the think tank.
Temporary Pressure and Direct Russian Threat
The "urgency" of adapting NATO forces is marked by an "increasingly explicit" timeline in the face of a "direct military threat" from Russia, warns the organization, which echoes "recent European and NATO assessments" that alert that Moscow could "regenerate" enough military capacity to pose a "serious" threat to the Alliance in the second half of this decade, especially if the war in Ukraine "freezes" or ends in terms that allow Russia to reconstitute its forces.
"These assessments define the timeframe in which European allies must convert force structure plans, procurement announcements, and preparedness commitments into operational combat capability," indicates the IISS, referring to the need to transform promises into real means on the ground.
In this context, the institute considers it "central" to clarify whether European armies "can generate the forces required by NATO plans, ensure they are available within the required timeframe, deployable in the relevant theater of operations, with sufficient ammunition and logistics, protected against attacks and sabotage, and capable of operating within NATO's command structure at the division, corps, and multi-corps level."
The IISS concludes that European ground forces are no longer "in controlled decline" and, although they are "improving," they do so "unevenly and late," starting from "a low base." Therefore, it warns that NATO's new defense plans "continue to exceed" the available ground combat capability in Europe.
"The adaptation of European ground forces remains an outstanding task," warns the report, which identifies as the most "difficult" aspects the generation of "personnel, artillery, air defense, logistical support, ammunition, and the necessary response capability."
Risk of mismatch between capabilities and timelines
The main danger in this scenario, according to the 'think tank', lies in a "mismatch" between "capacity and time." "NATO's plans assume a level of operationally effective European ground power that may not arrive quickly enough to respond to the threat," it explains, warning of the gap between the set goals and the actual pace of modernization.
However, the IISS highlights some advances that show Europe is moving "in the right direction." "Advanced defense is being reinforced and Poland and Germany are becoming the central axis of ground power," it cites as an example of this evolution on the eastern flank.
It also emphasizes that the Baltic and Nordic regions "are being integrated more systematically into NATO's defense plans and territorial defense has once again become the central task for most European armies." "However, plans, headquarters, and acquisition decisions are only a step towards operational combat capability," the document concludes, reminding that the main challenge remains turning planning into effective force.