IU brings to Congress a proposal to prevent Deoleo from ending up in foreign hands due to its "strategic character"

With the information available in this search, it is not possible to identify with absolute certainty a single initiative that unequivocally corresponds to “the initiative registered by IU in the Congress.” Two levels can be distinguished: what the parliamentary registry shows about the latest initiative located in the IU/Sumar environment and what the press news reflect about the initiative that IU announced on August 27 regarding the far-right “paramilitary patrols.”

In the parliamentary database of the XV Legislature, the latest initiative linked to the parliamentary space in which IU is integrated (within the Plurinational SUMAR Group) is the Bill on the recognition of the profession of biologist and social worker as a health profession (file 122/000297), published on July 27, 2026.

For this file, the official processing recorded is very incipient:

• The status shown corresponds exclusively to the initial publication of the initiative.
• No subsequent processing steps are recorded in the information consulted: neither opening of amendment periods, nor consideration by the Plenary, nor appointment of a committee, nor committee report, nor final debate.
• Consequently, the bill is still in a very early phase, without further milestones recorded in the official file accessible in this search.

However, there is an important element of caution: the structured file of file 122/000297 returns the Socialist Parliamentary Group as the promoting group, while the relational query used to locate initiatives linked to the IU/Sumar space associates it with the Plurinational SUMAR Group. Additionally, the file does not clearly detail individual authors. This attribution inconsistency means that it cannot be stated with full certainty that this bill is precisely the “initiative registered by IU” you refer to.

In parallel, the press information clearly identifies a specific initiative promoted by IU very recently. According to an article in Demócrata dated August 27, 2026, IU has presented “a parliamentary initiative in Congress for the Ministry of the Interior to specify what actions it plans to deploy against the increase of ‘far-right paramilitary patrols’ on the streets, such as those in Valencia.” The text is attributed to IU parliamentary spokesperson, Enrique Santiago, and Valencian deputy Nahuel González, and raises questions and demands to the Ministry of the Interior about:

• The measures planned to prevent private uniformed groups from assuming functions proper to the Security Forces and Corps.
• Whether the risk of hate crimes, coercion, illegal detentions, or assaults linked to these patrols has been evaluated.
• Whether the structure, financing, and members of these groups and their relationship with far-right organizations are being investigated.

This news confirms the existence of a parliamentary initiative registered by IU in Congress regarding the “paramilitary patrols.” However, in the institutional results we have in this search, the detailed file of that initiative (with file number, exact type, and phase) has not yet been located, so its procedural status cannot be detailed with the same precision as in the case of bill 122/000297.

Since the registry of that Interior initiative is dated August 27, 2026, it is reasonable to infer that, as of September 1, 2026, its processing is likely in an initial phase: qualification by the Board, possible referral to the Government, and, if applicable, incorporation into the corresponding circuit (whether as a non-legislative motion, questions to the Government, etc.). But, in the absence of the specific official file in the data consulted, it would be speculative to go further or assign a precise phase.

In summary, with the information available:

• The latest initiative located in the parliamentary registry associated with the IU/Sumar environment (PL 122/000297 on health professions) is only published, without further processing milestones recorded.
• The initiative IU announced on August 27 to demand explanations from the Interior Ministry about the “paramilitary patrols” is clearly described in the press, but its detailed processing file could not be identified in the institutional search we handle here.
• Therefore, it can only be stated with certainty that IU’s initiative is at a very early stage of its parliamentary journey, with no specific debates or votes recorded in the data consulted.

If you need to follow the specific file (number, type of initiative, and subsequent movements), it is most advisable to consult the Congress initiative search engine directly, filtering by Izquierda Unida, by registration date (late August 2026), and by subject related to the Ministry of the Interior and actions against far-right groups.

The Government of Spain has a very broad set of powers to protect strategic companies against foreign acquisitions, structured around the regime of control of foreign investments. This system allows certain operations to be subject to prior authorization, conditioned, or even denied when there is a risk to national security, public order, public health, or essential strategic interests.

Basic legal framework

The central pillar is Article 7 bis of Law 19/2003, on capital movements and economic transactions with abroad, as it has been amended since 2020 by several royal decree-laws (among others, Royal Decree-Law 8/2020, 11/2020, 34/2020, and Royal Decree-Law 20/2022) and developed by regulation through Royal Decree 571/2023 on foreign investments. Additionally, the sole transitional provision of Royal Decree-Law 34/2020, successively modified, maintains a reinforced transitional regime for certain large intra-community investments or in listed companies.

At the European level, these powers are exercised in coherence with Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investment, currently undergoing reinforcement: all Member States must have a control mechanism and cooperate with each other and with the Commission in the evaluation of potentially sensitive operations.

Competent bodies within the Government

The final decision on strategic operations lies with the Council of Ministers, which has the power to:

• Authorize the foreign direct investment.
• Deny the operation, as happened in 2024 with the proposed acquisition of Talgo by Ganz MagVag Europe, due to “insurmountable” risks to national security and public order, according to the official note from the Ministry of Economy.
• Impose conditions or commitments on the investor to mitigate risks before authorizing, a common practice in this type of control systems.

The technical analysis is carried out mainly through:

• The Foreign Investment Board (JINVEX), an interministerial collegiate body that reports on each file based on information provided by the affected ministries and agencies (Economy, Defense, Interior, Ecological Transition, Digital, etc.).
• The Directorate General for International Trade and Investments, which acts as the managing body and, in sanctioning matters, as the instructing body.
• The sectoral ministries involved (for example, the Ministry for Digital Transformation in the case of telecommunications, as in the authorization of the purchase of Vodafone Spain by Zegona approved by the Council of Ministers in 2024).

Operations subject to control and material criteria

Foreign direct investments potentially subject to authorization include, among others, those that:

• Grant the foreign investor a participation equal to or greater than 10 % of the capital of a Spanish company, or control of it according to the criteria of the Competition Defense Law.
• Affect strategic sectors defined in Law 19/2003, such as:
  • Critical infrastructures (energy, transport, water, health, communications, data, defense, financial, etc.).
  • Critical and dual-use technologies (AI, semiconductors, cybersecurity, nuclear, biotechnology, etc.).
  • Supply of fundamental inputs (energy, critical raw materials, food security, strategic connectivity).
  • Companies with access to sensitive information, especially personal data, or that control such information.
  • Media with relevance for public opinion formation.
• Are made by investors controlled directly or indirectly by a third-country government, or with a history of activities that may affect security or public order.

Temporarily, until the end of 2024 and subsequently extended, certain large investments (above 500 million euros) or directed at listed companies are also subject to authorization, even when the investor is resident in the EU or EEA, if the risks provided in the regulation concur.

Intervention and sanction powers

When the liberalization regime is suspended in a sector, the Government may:

• Require prior authorization for the operation. Lack of authorization implies that the transaction lacks validity and legal effects until it is “legalized.”
• Set regulatory exemptions for operations of small amount or without appreciable impact on security.
• Classify information of certain files for national security reasons, as was done in the Talgo case.
• Exercise sanctioning power against investments made without authorization or breaching conditions, with a regime of very serious, serious, and minor infractions. In the most serious cases, the imposition of sanctions corresponds to the Council of Ministers itself, at the proposal of the competent economic ministries.

Relation with the European Union

Although the decision to authorize or not an investment remains a national competence, Spain must notify relevant operations and cooperate within the framework of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 and its revision. This entails:

• Exchanging information about operations that may affect the security or public order of other Member States or the EU as a whole.
• Considering observations from the Commission and other member countries on operations in critical sectors.
• Aligning, in practice, the functioning of the Spanish mechanism with common European standards for foreign investment control.

In summary, the Government of Spain combines a broad capacity to attract foreign investment with a robust system of authorization, conditioning, and veto of operations in strategic companies, coordinated with its European partners and strongly anchored in the protection of national security and strategic autonomy.

In Spain, there is no general prohibition on strategic companies being acquired by foreign capital, but there is a control and prior authorization regime that allows blocking specific operations when they are considered to pose a risk to public order, security, or health. This regime is mainly articulated through Law 19/2003, on capital movements and foreign investments, as amended since 2020, and its subsequent regulatory development.

The starting rule of Law 19/2003 is the liberalization of capital movements. However, the Government can suspend that liberalization for certain foreign direct investments and subject them to prior administrative authorization. This suspension is precisely what has been done for a series of sectors considered strategic.

The law defines as foreign direct investment in Spain (for control purposes) those operations by which the foreign investor:

• Comes to hold a participation equal to or greater than 10 % of the share capital of a Spanish company, or
• Acquires control of the company (total or partial), applying the criteria of the Competition Defense Law.

Additionally, not only investors resident outside the European Union and the EEA are covered, but also those investors from the EU/EEA whose ultimate beneficial ownership corresponds to residents of third countries, when these control more than 25 % of the capital or voting rights or exercise control by other means.

The suspension of the liberalization regime has been established for foreign direct investments in a series of strategic sectors (Article 7 bis of Law 19/2003), among others:

• Critical infrastructures, physical or virtual: energy, transport, water, health, communications, media, data processing and storage, aerospace sector, defense, electoral, financial, etc., including key real estate for their operation.
• Critical and dual-use technologies and other key technologies (telecommunications, artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace and defense technologies, energy storage, quantum, nuclear, nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, materials, and advanced manufacturing systems).
• Supply of fundamental inputs, especially energy (electricity and hydrocarbons sectors), strategic connectivity services, raw materials, and food security.
• Access to sensitive information, particularly personal data or the capacity to control it.
• Media, with the particularities of the audiovisual sector.

Besides these sectors, the suspension also applies when certain investor risk profiles concur (Art. 7 bis.3), for example:

• Investor controlled, directly or indirectly, by the government or public bodies or armed forces of a third country.
• Investor who has made investments or activities in sensitive sectors in other Member States.
• Existence of a serious risk that the investor engages in criminal or illegal activities affecting security, public order, or public health in Spain.

When an operation fits these categories, the consequence is that it cannot be completed without prior authorization. The current regime foresees that the Government (through the competent bodies in trade and foreign investments, and specialized bodies such as the strategic investments committee) analyzes each case and may:

• Authorize the operation, possibly with conditions or commitments.
• Or deny authorization, which in practice prevents the acquisition of the strategic company by that specific investor.

Operations carried out without the required authorization, when subject to this control, lack validity and legal effects until legalized, and the law classifies them as a very serious infringement. Among very serious infringements is expressly included carrying out acts, transactions, or operations without requesting authorization when it is mandatory or before it is granted, or breaching its conditions. This enables the imposition of significant administrative sanctions, in addition to the possible practical nullity of the operation.

In summary, for a strategic company not to be acquired by foreign capital in Spain, it is necessary that: (1) the operation is a foreign direct investment (≥10 % or control); (2) the investor falls into the foreign investor categories defined by law; (3) the company operates in one of the strategic sectors or an investor risk profile applies; and (4) the Government, when processing the prior authorization, concludes that the acquisition poses a risk to security, public order, or public health and therefore denies authorization, which legally blocks the operation.