General Elections

General elections survey: the PSOE is left without "Maricarmen effect" but shortens the distance with the PP and only the Frente Amplio advances, according to SocioMétrica

There is no water for a lead. At least, according to the express survey published by ElEspañol conducted by SocioMétrica. It places the PP at 33.4% and 143 seats, the PSOE at 26.5% and 106, and Vox at 18.1% and 62. Compared to the previous survey from the same firm, published just a week ago, the PP loses two deputies, the PSOE one, and Vox remains stable, while the space of Sumar, now measured as Frente Amplio, goes from five to six. Regarding the 23J, PP and Vox would jointly gain 35 seats and the PSOE would lose 15.

8 minutes

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By Dolores Sánchez

Published

4 OCT, 2026 - 19:09

Last updated

4 OCT, 2026 - 19:28

8 minutes

The possibility of early general elections finds the PP clearly ahead of the PSOE and the sum of Alberto Núñez Feijóo and Santiago Abascal installed well above the absolute majority, but the latest survey from SocioMétrica for El Español introduces an important nuance regarding the snapshot from just a week ago: the advantage of the PP-Vox bloc remains enormous, although it slightly decreases in seats.

The new survey attributes to the PP 33.4% of the votes and 143 deputies. The PSOE would obtain 26.5% and 106 representatives, while Vox would reach 18.1% and 62. The new Broad Front being prepared in the Sumar space would be at 5.3% and six deputies, and Podemos would retain two representatives.

PP and Vox would jointly sum 205 seats. With the UPN deputy, the figure would rise to 206, thirty above the 176 that mark the absolute majority of Congress.

The comparison with the previous SocioMétrica is especially useful because it was published on September 27, just a week earlier. That measurement placed the PP at 33.9% and 145 seats, the PSOE at 25.7% and 107, Vox at 18% and 62, Sumar at 5.7% and five, and Podemos at 3.3% and two.

PP loses two seats, PSOE one, and Vox remains

The comparison between the last two measurements of SocioMétrica leaves a much more stable picture than what the political climate of recent days might suggest.

The PP drops from 33.9% to 33.4%, half a point less, and goes from 145 to 143 deputies. It loses two representatives.

The PSOE makes exactly the opposite movement in percentage, but not in seats. The socialists rise from 25.7% to 26.5%, eight tenths, although their parliamentary projection slightly decreases from 107 to 106 deputies.

Vox practically does not move. It goes from 18% to 18.1% and maintains its 62 seats.

The Sumar space does change configuration. The previous survey gave it 5.7% and five deputies. The new estimate now measures a hypothetical Broad Front, which would obtain 5.3% and six representatives. The comparison must be made with caution because it is not exactly the same electoral offer.

Podemos maintains two deputies.

The conclusion, therefore, is that in a week there is no upheaval occurring. The PSOE improves in percentage, but does not convert that recovery into more seats; the PP slightly retreats and Vox remains stuck at 62.

PP and Vox drop from 207 to 205 seats compared to the previous survey

The effect is also noticeable in the sum of the right.

In the SocioMétrica of September 27, PP and Vox gathered 207 deputies: 145 from PP and 62 from Vox.

Now they would sum 205: 143 and 62.

They lose, therefore, two joint seats compared to a week ago.

This does not compromise the absolute majority at all, because they would still have 29 more deputies than necessary. If UPN joins, they would reach 206.

The photograph is relevant in light of a possible advance: the PP-Vox majority continues to be very wide, but the new poll does not widen it, rather it slightly reduces it compared to the previous SocioMétrica.

PSOE recovers eight tenths, but loses one deputy

One of the most curious data from the survey shows again that percentage of vote and number of seats do not necessarily evolve in parallel.

PSOE gains eight tenths in just one week: it goes from 25.7% to 26.5%. However, it drops from 107 to 106 representatives.

The explanation lies in the provincial distribution of the vote. In Spanish general elections, it is not enough to sum national percentage; what is decisive is how that vote is distributed among the 52 constituencies and who gets the last deputy in each one.

This means that Sánchez improves compared to the last survey in estimated support, but not in parliamentary representation.

The distance between PP and PSOE reduces from 8.2 to 6.9 points

The advantage between the two major parties also narrows.

A week ago, SocioMétrica placed PP at 33.9% and PSOE at 25.7%. The distance was 8.2 points. Now Feijóo obtains 33.4% and Sánchez 26.5%.

The difference drops to 6.9 points. In just one week, it reduces, therefore, by 1.3 points. The movement comes from both sides: PP gives up half a point and PSOE recovers eight tenths.

Even so, the parliamentary distance remains wide: 143 seats compared to 106, a difference of 37 deputies.

Vox remains at 62 seats and continues to almost double the 23J

Vox is the most stable formation compared to the previous survey.

It goes from 18% to 18.1%, barely one tenth more, and retains exactly 62 deputies.

The really relevant comparison for Abascal is in the 23J. Vox then obtained 33 deputies and approximately 12.4% of the votes. The official results were published by the Central Electoral Board.

The new estimate places it at 62. In votes, it goes from 12.4% to 18.1%, a gain close to 5.7 points.

Vox would thus practically double its current representation.

Against the 23J, PP gains six seats

The PP obtained 137 deputies in the last general elections. SocioMétrica now attributes it 143. The improvement would be six seats.

In percentage, the change is much smaller. The PP obtained approximately 33.1% in 2023 and would now reach 33.4%, just three tenths more. Again, the bulk of the parliamentary growth of the right-wing bloc does not come from the PP, it comes from Vox. PP and Vox go from 170 to 205 deputies.

This is probably the most powerful comparison with the general elections of 2023.

PP and Vox jointly obtained 170 deputies on 23J: 137 and 33. Now they would achieve 205.

That is 35 more seats. The PP contributes six of that gain. Vox, 29.

The alternative majority would therefore be much larger than in 2023, but it would also be much more balanced between the two parties.

Vox would go from contributing less than one in five deputies of that sum to approximately three in ten.

The PSOE loses 15 deputies since the last general elections

The socialist evolution is the reverse.

The PSOE obtained 121 deputies on 23J, adding its corresponding territorial candidacies. SocioMétrica now places it at 106. That is 15 deputies less.

In percentage of votes, the drop is greater: it goes from 31.7% to 26.5%, a little over five points.

The recovery of eight tenths recorded compared to the previous SocioMétrica does not compensate, therefore, for the accumulated deterioration during the legislature.

Sánchez would be better than a week ago in percentage, but still far from the result with which he managed to stay in La Moncloa in 2023.

The left to the left of the PSOE loses a large part of its representation

The comparison of the new Frente Amplio with 2023 requires special care because the electoral offer has changed.

On 23J, Sumar ran as a joint candidacy that included Podemos and obtained 31 deputies.

SocioMétrica now projects six deputies for the Frente Amplio and two for Podemos. Together they would be eight.

Against the 31 of 2023, the space would lose 23 representatives.

This is not a perfect comparison between acronyms, but it does allow measuring the total representation of the political space situated to the left of the PSOE.

PSOE, Frente Amplio, and Podemos would sum 114 deputies

If the three main state leftist forces appearing in the new poll are added, the result would be:

PSOE: 106.

Frente Amplio: 6.

Podemos: 2.

Total: 114 deputies.

In 2023, PSOE and Sumar, with Podemos integrated, jointly reached 152 representatives: 121 and 31. The difference would be 38 seats.

The investiture majority would not be reconstructed either

According to the territorial estimate published alongside the survey, even incorporating ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, and the rest of the forces that facilitated Sánchez's investiture in 2023, the block would be far from the 176 deputies.

The published estimate places that sum around 143 seats.

PSOE retains only 64.2% of its voters from 23J

The transfer matrix again shows one of the main problems of PSOE.

Only 64.2% of those who voted for Sánchez in 2023 say they would repeat now. SocioMétrica estimates that about 369,000 former socialist voters would choose the PP. Another 274,000 would shift towards Vox. And approximately 690,000 remain undecided.

This last group is probably the main margin for socialist recovery in the event of a campaign: they are not voters who have necessarily switched to another party, but former voters who have not yet decided what to do.

PP and Vox retain more than eight out of ten voters

Fidelity is significantly higher on the right. The PP retains 84% of those who voted for it in 2023. Vox, 83.5%.

Moreover, both parties manage to mobilize a relevant part of those who abstained in the last general elections.

According to SocioMétrica, 12.2% of the abstainers from 2023 would now vote for the PP. 10.8% would choose Vox. PSOE would capture 9.2%.

This mobilization differential helps to understand why PP and Vox can notably expand their representation compared to 23J without the PP having experienced significant percentage growth.

Madrid reflects the new balance between the three major parties

The territorial projection also leaves some significant data.

In the Community of Madrid, the PP would retain 17 deputies.

PSOE would drop to nine.

Vox would reach eight, three more than in the 2023 general elections.

The new Broad Front would obtain three and Podemos one.

The result would leave Vox just one deputy behind PSOE in one of the largest constituencies in the country.

Catalonia remains the main socialist counterweight

In Catalonia, the PSC would continue to be the leading force with 18 deputies, one less than in 2023.

ERC would rise to eight.

The PP would also reach eight, two more than in the last general elections.

Vox would achieve six, four more.

Junts would drop to five.

Podemos would obtain one.

Catalonia would thus remain one of the territories where the PSOE retains the greatest advantage over the right, although PP and especially Vox would substantially improve compared to the 23J.

The PSOE would retreat in a good part of the map

The projection of SocioMétrica attributes socialist losses compared to the 23J in numerous communities.

The largest would be Castilla y León, where it would lose three deputies.
In Andalusia, it would cede two.
And it would lose one in Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, and Basque Country.

The loss is not concentrated, therefore, in a single territory.

Vox concentrates its greatest gains in Andalusia and Catalonia

Vox presents the opposite movement in Spain

Its greatest advance would occur in Andalusia, where it would gain six deputies compared to 2023.

In Catalonia, it would add four.

In Valencia Community, Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, and Madrid, it would gain another three in each territory.

This territorial distribution explains why a national increase of around six points can translate into 29 additional deputies.

Published by ElEspañol on 4/10/2026

SocioMétrica Survey: current result, previous survey, and comparison with the 23J

The express survey of SocioMétrica maintains a wide majority of PP and Vox, although both go from 207 to 205 seats compared to the survey published a week earlier. Against the 23J, the sum of PP and Vox gains 35 deputies, while the PSOE would lose 15.

Party	October 4	September 27	Change	23J	Change vs. 23J
PP	33.4% · 143	33.9% · 145	-0.5 points · -2 seats	33.1% · 137	+0.3 points · +6 seats
PSOE	26.5% · 106	25.7% · 107	+0.8 points · -1 seat	31.7% · 121	-5.2 points · -15 seats
Vox	18.1% · 62	18.0% · 62	+0.1 points · no changes	12.4% · 33	+5.7 points · +29 seats
Frente Amplio / Sumar	5.3% · 6	5.7% · 5	-0.4 points · +1 seat	12.3% · 31*	Not directly comparable*
Podemos	2 seats	3.3% · 2	No changes in seats	Integrated into Sumar	Not directly comparable*

* Podemos ran integrated in Sumar in the general elections of 2023. For a homogeneous comparison of the space, Sumar then obtained 31 deputies; Frente Amplio and Podemos would now sum eight, 23 less.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current status of the processing of a possible call for early general elections in Spain?

Currently, the processing of a potential early general election in Spain is at a political stage, not a legal one: there is intense debate and calendar calculations about a possible early election, but no formal decree of dissolution of the Cortes or call published in the BOE exists. Everything is still moving in the realm of decisions that the Prime Minister must finalize.

According to the most recent information, after the defeat of the two housing decrees in Congress, Moncloa has entered a phase of “reflection” on whether to continue trying to rebuild a majority or to activate early dissolution. Several media outlets report that Pedro Sánchez's team is already working with early election scenarios, but they insist that the decision “exclusively belongs to the Prime Minister” and that, as of today, no decision has been made or formalized.

Has any formal procedure been initiated?

For there to be “processing” in the strict sense, it is necessary that the Prime Minister formally propose the dissolution of the Cortes, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, and that a call decree be approved.
That decree must be published in the Official State Gazette (BOE); only then does the electoral countdown begin (the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime establishes that elections are held 54 days after the call).
Recent reports indicate that this step has not yet occurred. What does exist is intense internal discussion within the Government and PSOE about whether it is advisable to complete the legislature or call early elections.

In parallel, some administrative movements (such as Interior Ministry tenders for vote counting services) have fueled speculation, but the Government itself has emphasized that these do not equate to a decision to dissolve the Cortes.

Publicly considered dates

In the short term, after the housing decree crisis, several analyses have focused on a possible date of Sunday, November 29, 2026:

Articles from Demócrata and other media explain that if Sánchez decided to dissolve immediately, November 29 is one of the earliest viable dates that fits the 54-day count from the publication of the decree.
This scenario requires the decree to be published around October 6, which greatly narrows the time margin to make the decision.

In the medium term, the Government and PSOE themselves have spoken of elections in 2027, with several pieces analyzing scenarios of:

A “technical early election” in February or March 2027, closely linked to the ability (or not) to approve the Budget for that year.
Practically completing the legislature, with elections in the final stretch of 2027, an option the Prime Minister has repeatedly defended as his preferred horizon.

In any case, Sánchez has explicitly ruled out a “super Sunday” that would coincide the general elections with the municipal and regional elections scheduled for May 2027, which conditions the possible windows.

What do the Government and main parties say?

Government / PSOE: until a few months ago, Moncloa repeated that it did not at all consider an early election and that the focus was on 2027. The defeat on housing and budget instability have opened an internal debate: today early elections are considered a real option, but officially it is maintained that the decision has not been made.
Sumar: there is division between those who prefer to resist and complete the legislature and those who see an early election as an opportunity to reorder the space. Leaders in the space have admitted that an early election is “on the table,” without taking it for granted.
PP: Alberto Núñez Feijóo and his leadership have been demanding elections “now” for months, presenting the early election as the way out of what they consider a situation of “blockage” and “political decline.” The PP has promoted parliamentary initiatives to demand a vote of confidence or Sánchez’s resignation, accompanied by calls to the polls.
Vox and other parties: Vox, UPN, and other right-wing groups have coincided in calling for an immediate call. Sectors of the PNV and other actors, as well as figures like Felipe González, have also publicly pointed to early elections as a desirable political solution.
Junts: has used initiatives in Congress to pressure for an early election, although the Board has reminded that no vote can legally oblige the Prime Minister to dissolve.

In summary, the early election is currently at a stage of maximum political pressure and scenario calculation, with dates like November 29, 2026, or February–March 2027 on paper, but without the formal dissolution and call procedure having been activated yet that would turn that debate into a legal reality.

Can you explain in more detail the specific legal steps Sánchez would have to follow to call early elections and what limits the Constitution imposes on him? What exact political and parliamentary effects has the defeat of the housing decrees had that are pushing this debate about early elections? How are the polls interpreting a possible early election: what results do they forecast for PSOE, PP, Vox, and Sumar if voting were held in November 2026?

What are the powers and functions of the Spanish Prime Minister according to the Constitution?

The Prime Minister, according to the Spanish Constitution, is the central figure of the Executive Power and the main person responsible for the political direction of the country. His status and functions are articulated in various provisions, mainly articles 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 108, 112, 113, 115, 92, and 116 of the CE.

1. Direction of the Government and general policy (art. 97 CE)

Article 97 establishes the core of his powers: the Government directs domestic and foreign policy, the civil and military administration, and the defense of the State, and exercises executive functions and regulatory authority. Within that Government, the Prime Minister directs its overall action and coordinates that of the other members.

In practice, this translates into the Prime Minister:

Sets the broad lines of domestic policy (economic, social, territorial, security, etc.) and foreign policy (international relations, EU, defense, and diplomacy).
Decides the priorities of the government program and sets the general political strategy.
Coordinates and ultimately arbitrates disagreements between ministries and vice presidencies.
Politically represents the Government before other State institutions and externally.

2. Organization of the Government and Administration (arts. 98, 100 CE)

Article 98 regulates the composition of the Government and assigns the Prime Minister a decisive role in its configuration:

Proposes to the King the appointment and dismissal of vice presidents and ministers.
Can restructure the Government (number of ministries, their names, and competences) within the legal framework.

Article 100 states that “the other members of the Government shall be appointed and dismissed by the King, at the proposal of its president.” Consequently, the real capacity to decide who integrates the Government and which portfolio they hold lies with the Prime Minister, who is politically responsible for that team before Congress.

3. Relations with the King (arts. 99, 115, 62, 92 CE)

The Prime Minister is the main interlocutor of the King in governmental matters:

Appointment of the Prime Minister (art. 99): he is invested by Congress at the King's proposal, but this proposal is made after consultation with parliamentary groups and considering the logic of majorities in the Chamber. Without the confidence of Congress, there can be no Prime Minister.
Dissolution of the Cortes (art. 115): the King can dissolve the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales only at the proposal of the Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister decides whether to propose that dissolution and, therefore, the early call of elections.
Consultative referendum (art. 92): the King calls a referendum at the proposal of the Prime Minister, approved by Congress. The Prime Minister is the one who promotes and assumes political responsibility for submitting a matter of special political importance to popular consultation.
Other appointments: in numerous appointments of high State authorities involving the King, the proposal comes from the Government, particularly the Prime Minister (for example, high military commands or certain constitutional bodies when the law so establishes).

4. Relations with the Cortes and political responsibility (arts. 108, 112, 113, 101 CE)

The Constitution establishes a direct political responsibility relationship between the Government—and centrally its Prime Minister—and Congress:

Joint responsibility (art. 108): the Government is jointly responsible for its political management before the Congress of Deputies. The main responsible and first interlocutor is the Prime Minister.
Vote of confidence (art. 112): the Prime Minister can submit a vote of confidence to Congress on his program or a general policy statement. If he does not obtain a simple majority, he must resign, which opens a new investiture process.
Motion of censure (art. 113): it is the instrument by which Congress can demand political responsibility from the Government. It must be constructive, i.e., propose an alternative candidate for the presidency. If it succeeds, the Prime Minister ceases and the proposed candidate is automatically invested.
Resignation and dismissal of the Government (art. 101): the Government ceases, among other cases, by resignation or death of the Prime Minister, or after losing a vote of confidence or the approval of a motion of censure. The Prime Minister, therefore, also controls, through his possible resignation, the opening of a new political phase.

5. Extraordinary situations: states of alarm, exception, and siege (art. 116 CE)

Article 116 regulates states of alarm, exception, and siege, which are declared by Government decree, with authorization or control by the Cortes Generales depending on the case. Although the Constitution does not formally concentrate all this power in the Prime Minister, in practice he is the one who politically directs the decision and management of these situations, proposing extraordinary measures to the Council of Ministers and reporting to Congress.

In sum, the Constitution configures the Prime Minister as the political decision center of the Executive, the highest responsible before Congress, the main interlocutor of the King, and a key figure in both ordinary and exceptional moments of State life.

Could you explain in more detail how the investiture procedure of the Prime Minister works according to article 99 CE? What are the differences between the vote of confidence and the motion of censure regarding the role of the Prime Minister? How is the Prime Minister's participation constitutionally articulated in the declaration and management of states of alarm, exception, and siege?

What results did the PP and PSOE obtain in the last general elections and how many seats does each group currently have in Congress?

In the last general elections in Spain, held on July 23, 2023 (23J), the People's Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) were the two most voted forces. Official data allow distinguishing between the election night results and the current composition of Congress, which has slightly changed due to resignations and replacements of deputies.

Results of PP and PSOE in the 23J 2023 general elections

According to the official results of the 2023 general elections, the PP and the PSOE obtained:

People's Party (PP):
It obtained 8,091,840 votes, representing approximately 33.05 % of the votes cast nationwide. This result positioned the PP as the most voted force across the State and translated into 137 seats in the Congress of Deputies.
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE):
It achieved 7,760,970 votes, around 31.70 % of the total. With that percentage, the PSOE was the second force in votes and obtained 121 seats in Congress.

These data summarize the initial distribution of forces after 23J: a victory in votes and seats for the PP, but without reaching an absolute majority (set at 176 deputies), and a PSOE that, despite coming second, has been the central piece of the parliamentary majority supporting the current Government.

Current composition of the PP and PSOE groups in Congress

Since the constitution of the XV Legislature, parliamentary arithmetic has undergone slight adjustments due to resignations of deputies, replacements, and changes of affiliation that are usual throughout a legislature (for example, those who leave their seat to assume other positions, join regional governments, enter the European Parliament, etc.).

According to updated information on the Chamber's composition:

The People's Parliamentary Group currently has 136 seats in the Congress of Deputies.
The Socialist Parliamentary Group currently totals 122 seats.

The difference between the seats obtained at the polls and those currently held by each group is explained by internal movements during the legislature:

Some deputies have left their seats and have been replaced by the next candidates on their electoral lists, which does not alter the strength of each party but can introduce nuances if a parliamentarian changes group or moves to the Mixed Group.
In specific cases, the departure of a deputy and their incorporation into another group or the Mixed Group can readjust the effective distribution of seats among parliamentary groups, although the election result remains unchanged.

Consequently, a double snapshot can be made:

Electoral snapshot of 23J 2023: PP, 8.09 million votes (33.05 %) and 137 seats; PSOE, 7.76 million votes (31.70 %) and 121 seats.
Current parliamentary snapshot: Popular Group with 136 deputies and Socialist Group with 122.

This combination of results explains that, despite having won the elections in votes and seats, the PP did not have enough majority to form a government alone, while the PSOE, with fewer seats, has articulated a majority through agreements with other forces. The difference between electoral weight and effective parliamentary weight throughout the legislature is one of the keys to understanding the current political dynamics in the Congress of Deputies.

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