Sunday, damned Sunday for the PSOE: Sánchez’s excess of calculation with Puente may destroy his campaign for 29N

The support for the minister makes it possible to maintain command during the Urda crisis, but it also links the president to his erosion. Puente’s militant defense threatens to eclipse Sánchez’s actions on the ground and drive away voters who are demanding accountability

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EuropaPress 7855887 ministro transportes movilidad sostenible oscar puente presidente gobierno

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Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

La media de las encuestas

Media a 1 de noviembre de 2026 · 14 institutos

  • PP30,8 %
  • PSOE27,3 %
  • Vox18,9 %
  • Frente Amplio6,4 %
  • Podemos2,7 %
  • ERC2,4 %
010203040ene 2024jul 2024ene 2025jul 2025ene 2026jul 2026

Media del último estudio de cada instituto en 30 días y su evolución semanal desde el 23J. Partidos con al menos un 2 %.

Todas las encuestas

Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

Pedro Sánchez can gain a few days by keeping Óscar Puente. What remains to be demonstrated is that that time works in favor of PSOE. After the tragedy in Urda, the president faces a decision that goes beyond the future of his minister: how to sustain the management of the emergency without turning the entire 29N campaign into a defense of his continuity.

The reports published this Sunday describe an immediate strategy, although they do not certify an agreed outcome. Puente is preparing a railway safety package for Tuesday’s Council of Ministers and the overall mainstream media holds that Sánchez asked him to remain in office when he raised his resignation after the accident. On Puente’s part there is a decision to resist and no confirmation of a postponed resignation.

The risk for PSOE is that this wait produces three simultaneous effects: increasingly compromising the president, mobilizing the party around the defense of the minister, and reducing the visibility of the actions with which Sánchez is trying to convey that the Government is controlling the situation.

More so, the party base is not the electorate: defending Puente may distance those who voted for PSOE in 2023, the critical segment Sánchez needs.

Puente is not just any minister within socialism. His identification with Sánchez and his willingness to confront adversaries had made him an asset for mobilizing the bases. Different federations were calling for his presence in the campaign before the accident. That ability to awaken support explains part of the difficulty of his replacement.

But what unites the militants most identified with a leader does not necessarily convince the whole of his voters. The party base may interpret Puente’s continuity as resistance against the right. A progressive voter may view exactly the same decision as a refusal to assume consequences and end up evaporating any result of minimum endurance by the socialists on 29N.

The problem, moreover, appears when the most mobilized sector turns any criticism of the minister into a sign of hostility toward PSOE. A citizen may reject PP and Vox, support public services and at the same time demand that the head of Transport step down. If he receives in response a disqualification or a demand for loyalty, the party will be making it harder for him to keep feeling represented.

That mechanism could push a part of the progressive electorate toward abstention and open an opportunity for the PP among those who prioritize management. The president of GAD3 already advanced today that a "voting revolution" is coming.

In addition, the organization itself is divided. There is both support for Puente's explanations and internal criticism that he presented his future as a «calvary». Some leaders considered that expression improperly shifted the focus from the victims to the minister's suffering.

The militant defense can reproduce that error: ending up talking more about the treatment Puente receives than about the guarantees citizens need. Personal solidarity with a leader is not enough as an institutional response to a tragedy.

The noise around Puente can overshadow the Sánchez who is on the ground

Sánchez has visited the site of the accident, has participated in emergency coordination meetings and has committed to actions to clarify what happened and reinforce safety.

However, those actions compete with a controversy that the president himself keeps open: why Puente continues and until when.

There lies one of the contradictions of the strategy. Sánchez may be exercising command on the ground and, at the same time, remain politically in the background because the conversation revolves around his minister. Every intervention devoted to defending Puente's continuation offers less room to explain care for those affected, administrative coordination or safety decisions.

The problem worsens if the most visible messages from supporters focus on championing the minister and attacking those who are calling for his departure. That defense may end up eclipsing precisely the image of authority and responsibility that the president desperately needs to project to avoid electoral debacle.

Confusion also affects the role of each person. Puente must explain what happened in his department. Sánchez must establish the criteria by which the Government's response will be evaluated, including responsibilities. If the only account of socialism is to justify the minister's continuity, the president loses the necessary distance to present himself as the one who leads and demands results. Worse still: by hinting at one point at his interest in succeeding Pedro Sánchez in the future, it is a matter of days, perhaps hours, for that defense to be confused with a struggle for leadership of the PSOE after the elections or even a pointing out of a successor by Sánchez of Puente.

A possible operational error does not close political responsibility

Faced with public indignation over the singling out of railway staff, the only argument -which also shows a very risky excess of calculation- for keeping the minister is continuity. Transport must coordinate actions, provide information, and implement measures while what happened is being investigated. Replacing its top official in the middle of an emergency can add difficulties.

However, Puente's defense loses strength when it seeks to settle the debate over responsibilities in advance. The investigation remains open and considers organizational and procedural factors, in addition to breakdowns and operational actions. Added to this is the possible new judicial front for the PSOE -and so it goes- over the leak of the audio recordings of the tragedy, in what seems like a desperate attempt to 'save' the ministry's and Government's actions in Transport.

The excess of rationality has a cost: a resignation does not automatically amount to a confession of guilt. And appearing before journalists, although necessary, does not by itself exhaust accountability.

Waiting for an investigation also requires specifying which one and with what scope. An internal review does not replace the independent technical and judicial investigations. Nor can it be taken for granted that its conclusions will be available before the elections.

Each day of support makes it harder to separate Sánchez from Puente

Moncloa fears that an immediate departure will reinforce the thesis that the Government's management caused the tragedy. It also considers it necessary for Puente to explain the department's actions.

It is an understandable logic, but it has an accumulative cost. Each ratification turns the minister’s permanence into a more personal decision by the president. If, in the end, an exit occurs without new facts to explain it, Sánchez will also have to answer why he postponed it.

Unconditional defense can also reduce his margin within the party. The more Puente is presented as a victim of an unfair campaign, the harder it will be later to explain his departure to those who have been mobilized to support him.

For that reason, the president runs the risk of being trapped between two audiences: those who consider a resignation essential and those who would interpret that resignation as a surrender. The excess of calculation would consist of feeding both expectations to avoid choosing, while uncertainty consumes the campaign.

Puente’s past, with Adamuz and the collapse of the railway structure, furthermore makes it completely impossible for him to restore confidence in the railway.

Renouncing the elections and staying in command: a possible exit, with limits

There is an intermediate formula: for Puente to announce his withdrawal from the candidacy and remain temporarily at the head of Transport. It would make it possible to assume a personal political cost without imposing an immediate replacement during the crisis.

It could help distinguish between the urgent management and the minister’s future continuity, although it would be a political harakiri for the socialists: whoever announces his departure may lose authority, even if he is already at rock bottom, to promote changes that others will have to carry out. Possibly not even from his party. In that line, the little importance that the social majority has attributed to the possible cut of the Madrid-Barcelona AVE, a critical and strategic artery of Spain, is understood. It is evident that the electorate smells change and the Minister of Transport has little legitimacy for announcements years ahead.

Furthermore, withdrawing a candidacy and leaving the Government are different decisions. DEMÓCRATA already explained it: the legislation contemplates withdrawals from electoral lists, while the Government Law establishes that the Executive continues in office after the elections until the swearing-in of the next one. Puente could continue in Transport after 29N even if he had renounced being a deputy, although without any kind of authority and even more so after the tragedy and an electoral defeat.

That Puente should personally announce his resignation would have political significance and would allow his career to be recognized without a public break with Sánchez. But institutional responsibility would still correspond to the president, on whose proposal ministers are appointed and dismissed.

And there is also no guarantee of electoral recovery: for those who judge the response of the Government as a whole, changing a candidacy may prove insufficient.

The replacement of Adif cannot replace an explanation of responsibilities

ABC publishes that the Government is preparing the departure of the president of Adif, Luis Pedro Marco de la Peña, and calculates when to announce it. According to that newspaper, the move would serve to relieve the pressure on Puente and Sánchez.

Beyond how the Comunidad DEMÓCRATA indicated today it would be a crude way to look for a scapegoat, it would be perceived only as a way to protect the minister and would not even shift the discussion one step downward.

Sánchez is moreover doing himself a disservice here and is being little strategic: the administrative structure has continuity and the main posts have their own appointment and dismissal procedures. Therefore a broad renewal would be a decision that would speak of institutional solidity of the department's technicians and civil servants in the face of the certain fact of the destruction within it due to political appointments. A general renewal with Puente at the head would allow Sánchez to refocus the debate and shift the political responsibility for its implosion onto the Minister of Transport.

The stability of the department is a valid argument. Presenting its head as irreplaceable weakens the entire Government: an essential public service must be able to function also when its political leadership changes.

The PP can talk about management while the PSOE keeps talking about Puente

The Demócrata aggregate closed on October 27 offered a previous reference to the accident: 134 seats for the PP, 108 for the PSOE and 67 for Vox. That snapshot does not measure the reaction to Urda nor does it show a later punishment.

The opportunity of the PP that it has known how to take advantage of clearly is to turn the controversy over Puente into a discussion about governing capacity. Feijóo's management and experience approach, every day gains ground and finds space while the PSOE dedicates its digital incursions to defending its minister. For Vox, continuity could fuel its discourse of rupture with the Executive.

But Sánchez has an additional difficulty: he needs to regain trust outside the circle that already supports him. The applause for Puente within that circle may offer a sense of resistance while the distance grows with those who are waiting for decisions.

Tuesday will be a concrete test. The security package must allow measures, deadlines, and those responsible to be assessed. Puente will also appear before the Permanent Deputation of the Congress.

Keeping him may be defensible during the emergency. Turning his permanence into a cause of the party may end up being much more costly. If the militant defense of the minister ends up eclipsing the actions of the president and monopolizing his explanations, Sánchez will have gained time in the Government at the cost of losing it in the campaign.

He can have Puente take the blame. The decision about how long he should keep doing so, and under what conditions, will remain his.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the parliamentary procedure to dismiss a minister in Spain and what deadlines does it involve?

In Spain, there is no parliamentary vote that directly dismisses a minister. The Congress and the Senate can censure their actions and request their departure, but the individual dismissal corresponds to the King, at the proposal of the president of the Government. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between parliamentary pressure on a minister and the withdrawal of confidence in the Government as a whole.

1. Individual dismissal: decision of the president

Article 100 of the Constitution assigns the appointment and removal of ministers to the King, at the proposal of the president of the Government. It does not require prior authorization from the Chambers nor a subsequent ratification vote.

There is no parliamentary deadline to carry out that dismissal, because it is not a parliamentary procedure. Nor does a censure trigger a countdown that obliges the president to replace the minister: he can keep them despite the Chamber's pronouncement.

2. Censure: political rejection without automatic dismissal

Censure expresses disapproval of a minister's actions. In the Congress, it can be channeled through a non-legislative proposal — a resolution proposal without binding effect of dismissal — or a motion following an interpellation, that is, a debate on Government policy.

  • Non-legislative proposal: the parliamentary group presents it; the Board decides its admission, publication, and processing before the Plenary or a committee. There is no general deadline that guarantees its vote on a specific date. Amendments can be submitted up to six hours before the session.
  • Motion after an interpellation: must be submitted the day after the debate. Once admitted by the Board, it is included in the next plenary session; it also allows amendments up to six hours before.

These procedures are regulated in articles 184 and 193 to 195 of the Congress Rules. A Senate censure also does not replace the presidential decision of dismissal.

3. Motion of no confidence: against the entire Government

The motion of no confidence does not allow separating only one minister: it requires political responsibility from the entire Government and proposes an alternative presidency. It is only processed in the Congress.

  • It must be presented by at least one tenth of the Chamber and include a candidacy that has accepted it.
  • During the two following days, alternative motions may be submitted.
  • It cannot be voted on before five days have passed since its presentation. That minimum does not equate to a mandatory voting date.
  • It requires an absolute majority. If it succeeds, the alternative candidacy receives the confidence of the Congress and the Government is replaced.
  • If rejected, its signatories cannot present another during the same session period.

The procedure is developed in articles 175 to 179 of the Rules.

4. Vote of confidence and other controls

The vote of confidence can only be raised by the president, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers. It is not used to vote on the individual continuity of a minister. At least 24 hours must pass from its presentation before voting on it, and a simple majority is enough to obtain it. Its loss affects the Government as a whole, not only the questioned minister.

Appearances and investigative committees allow demanding explanations but not dismissal. In Congress investigations, the summons must be notified fifteen days in advance; for urgent need it can be reduced, never below three.

5. How to interpret the deadlines

As a general rule, regulatory deadlines expressed in days are counted in business days, with the particularities of the parliamentary calendar. In short, there is no dismissal deadline after a censure: the cited deadlines organize parliamentary control, they do not oblige individual dismissal.

What powers and functions does the Minister of Transport have according to current legislation?

The Minister of Transport and Sustainable Mobility leads the department responsible for proposing and executing state policy on transport, its infrastructures, and sustainable mobility. It is important to distinguish their political leadership functions from the administrative powers specifically attributed by regulations to secretariats of state, general directorates, and specialized bodies: not all Ministry decisions correspond personally to the minister.

Regulatory framework and department leadership

The main organizational regulation is Royal Decree 253/2024, of March 12, which develops the Ministry's structure and modifies Royal Decree 1009/2023. It must be read with its amendments, including Royal Decree 690/2025, of July 29, relating, among other issues, to crisis coordination and victim assistance.

Article 1 of Royal Decree 253/2024 assigns the department "the proposal and execution of the Government's policy" in its material scopes. Under the minister's direction, the Secretariat of State for Transport and Sustainable Mobility and the Undersecretariat act directly. It also has a support cabinet and a General Subdirectorate of International Relations directly dependent on it.

This organization allows separating political leadership, sectoral planning, and administrative management. For example, the Secretariat of State defines and proposes policies under the minister's direction; its specialized bodies prepare and execute the corresponding actions.

Main material powers
  • Infrastructure and land transport: policy on infrastructures of state competence, regulation of road and rail transport, railway planning and evaluation, investment programming and infrastructure execution, directly or through attached entities. Priority is given to safety, maintenance, daily mobility, and connection between different transport modes.
  • Air transport: guidance of aeronautical policy, sector planning and regulation, air navigation, and state airports. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation develops regulatory functions and normative proposals, as well as actions on international agreements, traffic rights, and transport aids within its powers.
  • Maritime transport and ports: general regulation of state maritime transport, port planning objectives, and investments in ports of general interest. It also includes safety and maritime rescue actions through competent bodies and entities.
  • Sustainable mobility: promotion of safe and sustainable mobility in its social, economic, and environmental dimensions, including active mobility. It covers strategy coordination, decarbonization, energy efficiency, logistics, aids, and cooperation with other administrations.
  • Other matters: normative regulation of postal services and direction and promotion of state services of astronomy, geodesy, geophysics, and cartography, as well as planning their investments.
Coordination, safety, and limits

Ministerial leadership includes promoting planning and regulatory proposals of the department. However, the regulation expressly distributes functions: the Secretariat of State formulates planning before its submission to the Council of Ministers, coordinates its bodies, and supervises programs and entities. Therefore, leading the Ministry does not mean personally approving each project, authorization, or provision.

In safety, the State Aviation Safety Agency is attached to the department with functional autonomy. SASEMAR carries out the corresponding maritime rescue and safety functions. The 2025 reform strengthens crisis supervision and coordination, without replacing direct management by sectoral bodies, and coordination of victim and family assistance.

Finally, these powers are exercised within the state scope, coordinately and without prejudice to the powers of other ministries. Territorial cooperation in urban mobility does not imply assuming all regional or municipal transport powers.

What results did the PSOE obtain in the last general elections and how many deputies does it currently have in Congress?

In the last general elections held in Spain, on July 23, 2023, the PSOE obtained 7,821,718 votes, 31.68%, and 121 deputies, according to the definitive result recorded by Demócrata. The figure of socialist representation that the most recent sources consulted continue to use is 121 seats. It is important to distinguish that electoral result from poll estimates and, due to the electoral call, from the Chamber's situation after its dissolution.

The results of the last general elections

The definitive balance of the PSOE in the July 2023 Congress elections was as follows, including the PSC and associated candidacies integrated into the socialist total:

  • Votes: 7,821,718 ballots.
  • Percentage: 31.68% of valid votes.
  • Representation: 121 deputies.
  • Position: second force, behind the PP.

These data come from the reconstruction of definitive results published by Demócrata on Pedro Sánchez's electoral trajectory. That information expressly differentiates definitive results from provisional data disseminated during election night. Therefore, to respond with a precise figure of votes and percentage, it corresponds to use the 7,821,718 supports and 31.68%, although some reports round this last figure to 31.7%.

How many deputies does it currently have?

The usual answer about PSOE's representation is 121 deputies. Demócrata still used that figure on October 28, 2026, when reporting on Félix Bolaños's electoral expectations, differentiating socialist seats from forecasts for the next elections (information from October 28).

However, as of this response date, November 1, 2026, the next general elections are scheduled for November 29. Therefore, those 121 should be understood as the socialist representation of the outgoing legislature, not as a new figure obtained at the polls nor as the number of socialist representatives in the Permanent Deputation. This last issue is different and is not determined by the national electoral result.

Why another figure may appear during the legislature

The result of an election and the size of a parliamentary group do not always coincide throughout the legislature. In the socialist case, José Luis Ábalos moved to the Mixed Group in February 2024. His subsequent resignation from the seat, in January 2026, opened the replacement by the next candidate on the socialist list for Valencia; Demócrata explained that this process would allow the Socialist Group to recover the 121 votes in the Plenary (resignation and seat recovery).

Comparison with the previous election

Compared to the November 2019 general elections, the PSOE went from 120 to 121 deputies and added 1,029,519 votes. In that previous call, it had obtained 6,792,199 supports and 28.00%. Therefore, in 2023 it increased both its votes and percentage and gained one seat, although it came second instead of first (comparison of definitive results).

In short: 121 seats in the last general elections and 121 as a reference for the socialist representation of the outgoing legislature. Different figures appearing in polls are forecasts for another election and do not replace that result.

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