Argentine press sees Milei's trip to Spain as a failure for not achieving his goal: a photo with Felipe VI

The next step is not an automatic audience with Felipe VI, but rather to restore dialogue between the two governments. As of November 6, the sources consulted do not announce a schedule of meetings or a normalization agreement following the summit. It is important to distinguish between confirmed facts and possible diplomatic channels: there is political distancing, but no record of a rupture in relations.

What really happened

The disagreement should not be understood as a personal confrontation between Milei and the king. According to Demócrata's information, which gathers explanations from the Argentine press, the Royal House conveyed that the usual practice was to accompany a meeting with Felipe VI with another with Pedro Sánchez. Milei was not willing to accept that second meeting. It is not confirmed, however, that Sánchez personally vetoed the audience.

Milei also did not attend the inauguration or the gala dinner. The Argentine foreign minister, Pablo Quirno, denied that these absences were retaliation for not securing the meeting. Furthermore, on November 5 there was indeed a handshake with Sánchez, in front of Felipe VI. It was a protocol greeting, not a bilateral meeting or a reconciliation announcement.

Open channels

• Contacts between Foreign Ministries and embassies. A call, a ministerial meeting, or conversations between delegations could address the disagreement without immediately requiring a presidential photo opportunity. This is a possible de-escalation path, not an already announced appointment. Its usefulness would be to agree on stable dialogue and avoid each visit turning into a conflict again.
• Negotiating a future comprehensive institutional agenda. Argentina can request an audience with the king again. The identified obstacle is political and protocol-related: according to published information, Madrid links that meeting to dialogue also with the President of the Government. A greeting during a summit does not equate to accepting that agenda.
• Preserving practical cooperation. Economic, consular, cultural, and technical contacts offer areas to maintain the relationship while political differences persist. The summit concluded with agreements on artificial intelligence, disaster prevention, and academic mobility, according to the report published by Demócrata. This maintains a multilateral framework, although it does not demonstrate bilateral normalization.

What could hinder rapprochement

The continuation of personal attacks would hinder any progress. There is a specific precedent: on May 19, 2024, Albares announced the calling back of the ambassador and demanded public apologies. Afterwards, the Spanish representative was withdrawn, but Spain appointed a new ambassador in October of that year without a public apology from Milei, as recalled by this reconstruction of the background. Therefore, that withdrawal does not describe the current situation.

A new formal protest or a call to consultations would be escalation options, but none are announced for this episode. There is also no basis to present diplomatic expulsions, sanctions, or a general suspension of cooperation as decided steps.

In short, relevant signals will be a confirmed meeting between Foreign Affairs officials, a joint statement, or a new visit with an agreed agenda. Until these appear, prudence suggests speaking of managing distancing, not of an already agreed reconciliation process. The central question remains whether both governments accept maintaining an institutional relationship despite their differences.

The Spanish Prime Minister can promote, arrange, and lead official meetings with foreign heads of state as part of the governmental direction of foreign policy. This capacity does not displace the institutional representation of the King nor does it turn each encounter into an act requiring parliamentary authorization. The fundamental distinction is between holding a meeting, organizing a visit involving various institutions, and adopting international legal commitments.

Political direction of meetings

The competence to promote these meetings falls within the direction of foreign policy that corresponds to the Government. The Constitutional Court has explained that it includes a function of direction and execution: defining the strategy, positioning, and international action of the State. Therefore, it is not limited to managing already established diplomatic relations but allows promoting political contacts to defend Spain's interests (STC 135/2020).

Within this framework, the Prime Minister can initiate a meeting, set its political objectives, and guide the issues he wishes to address. However, arranging a meeting requires agreement with the foreign interlocutor: the Spanish authority to propose it does not allow unilaterally imposing its holding, date, or conditions.

Institutional organization and coordination

It is important to distinguish the political decision to meet from its diplomatic and material preparation. The former responds to foreign policy objectives; the latter must serve those objectives through coordinated action. The principle of unity of external action requires avoiding fragmented or contradictory actions and allows the Government to order activities with international projection (STC 85/2016).

This offers room to propose the agenda, format, and conditions of the meeting but does not constitute unlimited power over all acts of a visit. If other institutions participate, their actions must be coordinated respecting their respective functions. A political meeting of the Prime Minister should also not be confused with the entire ceremonial of a state visit.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a role in this diplomatic coherence. Jurisprudence highlights its guidelines as a reference to maintain unity of action, even regarding the international activity of the Chambers (STC 137/2021).

Relationship with the King and the Cortes

The governmental direction of foreign policy and the institutional representation of the Head of State are distinct levels. Therefore, meeting with a foreign president or monarch does not, by itself, mean assuming the King's functions. Nor does it allow deducing that the Prime Minister can unilaterally decide the Crown's participation in any official program.

The Cortes do not ordinarily organize these meetings nor is there a specific authorization in the Congress Rules for each meeting. Their relevant function is political control: requesting information and documentation, posing questions and interpellations, and promoting appearances. These instruments are included in the Congress Rules.

Limits and effects of what is agreed

A meeting does not replace the necessary procedures to legally bind Spain. When its results are embodied in treaties requiring authorization from the Cortes, that procedure must be followed: the meeting does not avoid it.

Moreover, foreign action is subject to parliamentary responsibility and control, even when the Government is acting in a caretaker capacity, as recalled by STC 124/2018. In sum, the Prime Minister has political initiative to organize meetings but must respect institutional competences and applicable requirements for their results.

Javier Milei's political trajectory before becoming President was brief in public office but preceded by intense media exposure. He went from working as an economist and television commentator to joining party activity in 2019, becoming a national deputy in 2021, and winning the 2023 presidential elections. Before his presidential election, he had not held government responsibilities.

From economist to public figure

His starting point was not militancy in Argentina's major parties but economics. He worked in the private sector and as an advisor, with activities at HSBC Argentina, Máxima AFJP, Corporación América, and Estudio Broda. He was also a university professor and directed the Fundación Acordar. This stage provided him with the professional profile with which he later entered public debate, according to Britannica and Infobae.

His notoriety increased from the mid-2010s thanks to television. His appearances on Animales Sueltos, since 2016, helped popularize his confrontational style, his criticisms of public spending, and his rejection of what he called the "political caste." Television and social media allowed him to gather followers, especially young people, before having his own electoral structure. This is reconstructed by La Voz and BBC Mundo.

Entry into party politics

In 2019 he announced his adhesion to the Libertarian Party, a step that marked his formal incorporation into party activity. His discourse identified with libertarian and anarcho-capitalist positions: he deeply questioned state intervention and advocated reducing the size of the State.

During 2020 he intensified his opposition to Alberto Fernández's Government, especially regarding measures adopted during the pandemic. That year he communicated his intention to compete for a national deputy seat for the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. The transition from commentator to candidate thus occurred before the 2021 legislative elections, as reported by CNN en Español.

La Libertad Avanza and his first office

For the 2021 legislative elections, he formed the coalition La Libertad Avanza. His list obtained approximately 17% of the votes in Buenos Aires City and secured two seats: one for Milei and another for Victoria Villarruel, who later became his presidential running mate.

Milei assumed office as national deputy on December 10, 2021. It was his first public office, which he held until 2023, according to Perfil. In Congress, he maintained an opposition profile and reinforced his denunciation of political privileges through the public lottery of his parliamentary remuneration, a practice analyzed in this academic study.

The leap to the presidential candidacy

Since 2022 he expressed his intention to run for the Presidency and formalized his candidacy in 2023. His campaign combined drastic public spending cuts, elimination of fiscal deficit, dollarization, and privatization or reform of state companies and agencies. He also directed his criticisms at both Peronism and Juntos por el Cambio.

In the primaries on August 13, 2023, he obtained nearly 30% and was the most voted individual candidate. He came second, behind Sergio Massa, in the first round on October 22 and won the runoff on November 19. His rise thus combined media exposure, electoral organization, and barely two years of parliamentary experience.