Compensations for the earthquake in Colombia: who can claim them and how to request them

Modifying the compensation system for natural disasters in Colombia, in practice, requires combining legislative procedures in Congress (to change the basic rules of who is entitled, how much, and how it is paid) with administrative procedures in the Executive (to regulate, manage resources, and implement the system). It usually involves an ordinary law or its reform, budget adjustments, and regulatory norms from the Government. Exceptional mechanisms, such as states of emergency, may also intervene, but they are subject to strong control by Congress and the Constitutional Court. I am not specialized in the Colombian framework, but based on how its constitutional system works, the legal-political itinerary can be outlined in general terms.

1. Ordinary legislative route in Congress

If a fundamental change to the compensation model is desired (criteria for access, caps, distribution of powers between the Nation and territorial entities, role of insurers, etc.), the usual path is a legal reform or a new law. In Colombia, this generally follows these steps:

• Bill initiative: It can be presented by the national Government (through a competent minister, for example Finance or Interior) or by congress members. If it seriously affects public finances (creates new expenses or modifies the Budget), in practice, initiative or endorsement by the Government is almost indispensable.
• Filing in Congress: The bill is submitted to the Secretariat of the Senate or the Chamber, with a statement of reasons and articles. It is then assigned to the competent permanent constitutional commission (usually the economic or territorial affairs commission, depending on the content).
• Four mandatory debates: The Colombian Constitution requires two debates in each chamber:
  • First debate in the corresponding commission (discussion article by article and voting on amendments).
  • Second debate in the plenary of that chamber.
  • Repetition of the scheme (commission and plenary) in the other chamber.
  At each stage, substantial modifications to the proposed compensation system can be introduced.
• Conciliation: If the versions approved by the Senate and Chamber differ, a conciliation commission is formed to unify a final text, which must be approved again by both plenaries.
• Presidential sanction: Once approved by Congress, it goes to the President for sanction. The President can object it for inconvenience or unconstitutionality; in the latter case, a conflict arises that may end in review by the Constitutional Court.
• Promulgation and effectiveness: The sanctioned law is published in the Official Gazette and comes into force on the date it determines or, failing that, from publication.

2. Regulatory development and administrative management

Once the law is modified (or if it is considered sufficient to adjust the application without touching the legal level), the Government must carry out several administrative procedures:

• Regulatory decrees: The President, with the signature of the competent minister or directors of the administrative department, issues decrees that specify procedures: how compensations are requested, deadlines, formats, damage verification, inter-institutional coordination, etc.
• Resolutions and circulars: The responsible entities (for example, risk management bodies, ministries, public insurers, or special funds) issue internal resolutions detailing technical criteria, operational manuals, and protocols.
• Planning and public policy: The modification can be inserted into policy documents (such as national risk management plans or sectoral strategies) and into the National Development Plan, which is also approved by law, with its own legislative procedure.
• Budget adjustments: If the new system increases or redistributes spending on compensations, it must be reflected in the Annual Budget Law or budget additions, which also follow ordinary legislative procedure. Additionally, administrative acts of budget execution are required by the Ministry of Finance and executing entities.

3. Exceptional route: states of emergency

In the face of a major disaster, the Colombian Government can declare a state of economic, social, or ecological emergency. In this scenario:

• The President can issue decrees with the force of law that temporarily adjust the compensation regime, create special funds, or relax requirements.
• These decrees must be directly related to the emergency, are subject to automatic control by the Constitutional Court, and Congress can repeal or modify them.
• Due to their exceptional nature, they are not the ideal route for a permanent structural reform but are suitable for urgent short-term changes.

4. Judicial and constitutional control

Both laws and decrees regulating compensations are subject to constitutionality and legality control. The Constitutional Court can review the law (directly or through citizen lawsuits), and the Council of State can annul decrees and administrative acts that violate the Constitution or the law. In such a sensitive area as natural disasters, this control is usually key to balancing fiscal sustainability, rights protection, and territorial coordination.

In Colombian legislation, ADRES and the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD) are national-level entities with clearly differentiated functions: the former is responsible for managing the financial resources of the health system, and the latter coordinates public policy and actions regarding risk and disaster occurrence. Both report directly to the national Government and act as “technical agencies” that coordinate other entities. Their competencies according to their basic legal framework are detailed below.

Competencies of ADRES

ADRES (Administrator of the Resources of the General System of Social Security in Health) was created as a specialized entity to centralize and manage the resources of the General System of Social Security in Health (SGSSS), replacing the former FOSYGA. Its main regulatory framework comes from the National Development Plan 2014–2018 (Law 1753 of 2015) and subsequent regulatory norms that develop its structure and functions.

Among its core competencies are:

• Comprehensive administration of SGSSS resources: collecting, safeguarding, and managing social security health resources, coming from contributions, national budget allocations, and other sources defined by law.
• Disbursement and flow of resources to system actors: recognizing and paying the Capitation Payment Unit (UPC) to EPS and other obligated entities, as well as making direct payments to providers when the regulations so provide.
• Management of funds and specific subaccounts: administering the different “pools” of system resources (contributory regime, subsidized regime, promotion and prevention, among others), including those inherited from FOSYGA.
• Recognition of economic benefits and reimbursements: processing and paying reimbursements for health services and technologies financed with public resources, as well as associated economic benefits (e.g., licenses and sick leaves when the law establishes it).
• Management of insurance and data cleansing: consolidating affiliate databases, cleansing them, and cross-checking with other official sources to reduce multiple affiliations, evasion and avoidance of contributions, and generally optimize resource use.
• Audit and control of resource use: supporting inspection, surveillance, and control tasks through financial and technical audits on resource flows, detecting irregularities, and supporting collection and recovery processes.
• Production of information for public policy: generating reports and analyses on the financial behavior of the health system, serving as input for the Ministry of Health and the Government to define regulatory and policy adjustments.

In summary, ADRES is a specialized financial administrator of the health system, focused on proper collection, management, disbursement, and control of resources to ensure sustainability and timeliness in health service financing.

Competencies of the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD)

UNGRD was created as an entity attached to the Presidency of the Republic (Decree 4147 of 2011) and is the coordinating body of the National Disaster Risk Management System (SNGRD), mainly developed by Law 1523 of 2012. Its mission centers on comprehensive risk management before, during, and after events.

Its main competencies include:

• Formulation and coordination of national risk management policy: proposing guidelines to the Government, coordinating the implementation of Law 1523 of 2012, and articulating plans, programs, and projects with ministries, territorial entities, and other SNGRD actors.
• Interinstitutional articulation: serving as a coordination instance among national entities, governors, mayors, relief organizations, and the private sector for risk management and emergency response.
• Knowledge management and risk reduction: promoting studies, risk maps, information systems, and training processes to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats (natural, technological, or anthropic).
• Preparation and response to emergencies: coordinating contingency plans, drills, and action protocols; activating national response to disasters; supporting and complementing local capacities when overwhelmed.
• Recovery and reconstruction: leading, in coordination with other sectors, the planning and execution of rehabilitation and reconstruction processes after disasters, articulating public, cooperation, and private sector resources.
• Administration of the corresponding national fund: managing resources of the National Fund for Disaster Risk Management, prioritizing risk reduction, response, and recovery projects according to current regulations.
• Risk communication and participation: promoting citizen awareness campaigns, emergency communication lines, and community participation mechanisms in risk identification and management.

Thus, while ADRES focuses on financial administration of the health system, UNGRD is the central political and technical body for disaster risk management in Colombia, both with competencies defined in laws and decrees that position them as key actors in the state apparatus.

In the area in which I am specialized — policy, regulations, and institutional current affairs of Spain — I do not have detailed, structured, or verified information about the specific regulations governing in Colombia the coverage of material damages and housing reconstruction after natural disasters. In particular, I cannot confidently cite specific Colombian laws, decrees, articles, or official programs regarding insurance, disaster funds, or reconstruction aid. For coherence and rigor, I should not invent names of regulations or describe procedures not supported by the sources I handle, which focus on the Spanish context.

My design is oriented to answer questions about:

• Spanish regulations: laws, royal decree-laws, royal decrees, and other provisions published in the BOE, both at the state level and, in some cases, regional when they have general political relevance.
• Parliamentary activity in Spain: bills and legislative proposals, procedures in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, debates, hearings, and votes, as well as the position of the main parliamentary groups (PSOE, Sumar, PP, Vox, PNV, Bildu, Republican Group, Junts, etc.).
• Activity of the Spanish executive power: Council of Ministers agreements, draft laws, public consultations, hearings, and institutional information on ongoing public policies.
• Spanish political and social current affairs: political context, pacts, ongoing reforms, economic and social measures announced by the Government or debated in the Cortes, and their treatment in media such as the newspaper Demócrata.

On the other hand, issues like the one you raise — the legal regime of coverage of material damages and housing reconstruction after natural disasters in Colombia — belong to a different legal system (Colombian) and, moreover, to a sectoral field (insurance law, disaster risk management, housing and habitat, civil protection) on which I do not have a direct normative corpus. This means that:

• I cannot identify with certainty the Colombian framework law regulating mandatory or optional insurance of housing against catastrophic risks.
• I cannot describe how, in Colombia, the possible intervention of the State, emergency funds, subsidies, or public housing reconstruction programs are articulated.
• I cannot detail whether Colombia has a system similar to public compensation consortia, catastrophic risk funds, or mixed public-private schemes, nor their exact legal basis.

If what you seek is a technical answer about the Colombian legal system, the most prudent is to refer you to legal and official sources from the country itself, such as:

• Legislation published in the Colombian official gazette and compiled in state normative databases.
• Websites of the Government of Colombia and ministries competent in housing, disaster risk management, and finance or public treasury.
• Regulations governing the financial and insurance system in Colombia, as well as the supervisory authority of the insurance sector.

Where I can help is if you are interested in making a conceptual comparison or a methodological analysis taking the Spanish case as a reference. For example, in Spain, coverage of material damages from certain extraordinary risks (floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.) is articulated through a mixed scheme in which private policies are complemented by the intervention of a specific public entity for extraordinary risks. On these models, I can offer you a detailed explanation, their legal bases, and practical functioning, always limited to the Spanish regulatory framework.

I can also analyze, from the political and public policy perspective, how the issue of protection against natural disasters is debated in Spain: for example, incentives for contracting insurance, urban planning in risk areas, protection of vulnerable groups, or coordination among administrations in emergencies. From there, we could extrapolate general criteria (principles of solidarity, risk sharing, role of the private sector, etc.) that serve as a conceptual framework for studying the Colombian case with appropriate sources.

If you reformulate your question towards the Spanish context (for example: what regulations govern in Spain the coverage of damages from natural disasters or how the institutional and political response to catastrophes is organized), I will be able to offer you a much more precise and complete normative and political answer.