Netanyahu returns to the White House to gauge Trump's support despite the ICC arrest warrant.

In the Spanish legal system, there is no “parliamentary processing” of the arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Benjamin Netanyahu as such: ICC arrest warrants are international judicial decisions that are neither voted on nor ratified in the Cortes. What does exist are parliamentary initiatives that take a position on those warrants or propose how Spain should react. According to the records consulted up to the end of 2025, there are mainly non-legislative motions (PNL) and one bill that explicitly mention the arrest warrant against Netanyahu and Gallant, with very different processing statuses (some pending, others already rejected). No more updated information is available beyond what is reflected in those official publications.

1. General framework: what Parliament can and cannot process

The ICC arrest warrant is a decision of an international judicial body, not a treaty or a norm requiring ratification. Spain is already a party to the Rome Statute, so the Congress and the Senate do not “approve” or “reject” that specific warrant. What they do is debate political initiatives about:

• Supporting or rejecting the ICC’s actions.
• Conditioning Spain’s cooperation or its funding to the Court.
• Approving internal laws that regulate how cooperation with international jurisdictions is carried out or how arrest warrants or precautionary measures are applied.

2. Initiatives directly focused on the arrest warrants against Netanyahu

a) Vox’s PNL rejecting the arrest warrants

The most explicit initiative is the Non-Legislative Motion expressing rejection of the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, from the Vox Parliamentary Group (file 161/001553). The text is published in the Congress Bulletin, where it details that the ICC issued those arrest warrants and critically assesses the Court’s actions. It can be seen in the original PNL publication.

Among the resolution proposals, Vox requested, for example, to condition any economic contribution from Spain to the ICC on the withdrawal of those arrest warrants. The processing status is clear: according to the subsequent publication, on 01/29/2025 the “publication of the rejection” was recorded. This means the PNL was debated and rejected, concluding its processing.

b) Initiatives supporting or coordinating with the ICC

Conversely, the Plurinational SUMAR Group registered a Non-Legislative Motion supporting the International Criminal Court (161/002172), which mentions that the U.S. president’s executive order to sanction the ICC responds “directly” to the arrest warrants issued in November 2024 against Netanyahu, Gallant, and a Hamas leader. The text can be consulted in the bulletin itself: PNL supporting the ICC.

This PNL appears in the 06/03/2025 bulletin as “Pending (publication of the initiative)”, meaning it was admitted and published but no debate or vote in committee or Plenary is recorded in the available information.

3. Other initiatives connected with Gaza, Israel, and the ICC

a) Bill on inspection of ships linked to genocide or war crimes

There is a Bill from the Plurinational SUMAR Group to create a protocol for inspecting ships originating from or destined to States subject to judicial measures, indications, or suspicions of genocide or war crimes (file 122/000219). Its explanatory statement explicitly cites that on November 21, 2024, the ICC ordered arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant “for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity” in Gaza. The text is in the BOCG: Bill on ship inspection, and the general file on the Congress website: initiative detail 122/000219.

According to available information, on 11/18/2025 the initiative was admitted for processing and was awaiting consideration by the Plenary. The debate on consideration or voting has not yet been recorded, so its processing remained pending at that stage.

b) PNL on Israel’s offensive in Gaza and the West Bank

From sympathetic positions, the Mixed Group (Ione Belarra and Lilith Verstrynge) presented a PNL “regarding measures to be adopted by the Government of Spain in response to Israel’s offensive in Gaza and the West Bank” (161/000086). Among the measures is “supporting the investigation by the ICC Prosecutor of crimes committed in Gaza and the West Bank since October 7,” politically framing support for actions such as the arrest warrants. The PNL appears as “Pending (publication of the initiative)” in the 01/16/2024 bulletin: PNL on Gaza offensive.

c) Initiatives in the Senate

In the Senate, the Left for Independence Group registered an initiative whose heading literally states that “on November 21, 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant…”. The reference can be seen in the Upper House file: initiative (15)684/010652 in the Senate. The available information does not detail the processing status (debate or approval) of this initiative.

4. Broader regulatory context

Although not exclusively focused on Netanyahu, the Organic Bill on measures regarding the efficiency of the Public Justice Service (121/000016 in the Congress, (15)621/000009 in the Senate), definitively approved on 12/19/2024, introduces rules on recognition or denial of orders and resolutions in judicial cooperation. The final text can be consulted in the Senate BOCG, and a prior publication in another bulletin. These provisions are part of the framework in which, if necessary, the recognition and execution of international orders would be assessed, although the published text does not mention Netanyahu by name.

5. Other tangential references

The Amnesty Law for Catalonia (122/000019 in the Congress, (15)624/000001 in the Senate), already definitively approved, contains a general clause on lifting precautionary measures and search and arrest orders, “as well as national, European, and international arrest warrants” within its scope. The text is included in the Senate BOCG. It is a generic reference to international orders, not specifically linked to the ICC or the Netanyahu case.

Finally, a PP PNL on Bolivia (161/000884) mentions the Vox PNL on Netanyahu merely as documentation when listing initiatives treated in the same session. Its rejection is published in the same bulletin that records the rejection of the Vox PNL: PNL on Bolivia.

6. Conclusion

In summary, the General Courts are not “processing” the ICC arrest warrant against Netanyahu; what they process are political and regulatory initiatives that take a position for or against that warrant or regulate international judicial cooperation. Vox’s PNL rejecting it was already debated and rejected, while other initiatives supporting the ICC or tightening cooperation with States suspected of genocide remain, based on available information, in initial phases (pending debate or consideration). No data beyond the dates recorded in the cited official bulletins is available.

Alongside these parliamentary texts, the international debate also includes documents such as the ICC prosecutor’s statement on the issuance of the arrest warrants, accessible on the Court’s official page: ICC prosecutor’s statement, which serves as the legal and political basis for several of the initiatives discussed.

In the U.S. constitutional system, the president holds very significant power in foreign policy, but not absolute: many powers are shared with or conditioned by Congress and judicial interpretation. The U.S. Constitution establishes some explicit powers (such as commander in chief or treaty negotiation) and, based on these, political practice and legislation have expanded and specified their scope. Still, in key areas like war, foreign trade, or treaties, Congress’s participation is structural.

As a specialist assistant in Spanish politics, not in U.S. constitutional law, I can offer only a general synthesis based on the typical U.S. constitutional framework, without going into the same technical detail as in the Spanish case.

Direct constitutional powers

The U.S. Constitution (Article II) assigns the president several functions directly relevant to foreign policy:

• Chief Executive: The president is the head of the federal executive power, which includes directing the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other agencies involved in foreign policy, defense, and intelligence.
• Commander in Chief: The president is commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. This grants broad authority to direct military operations, deploy troops, and make tactical and strategic decisions, although formal declarations of war and funding depend on Congress.
• International treaties: The president has the power to negotiate and sign treaties with other States. However, for a treaty to have the status of “supreme law of the land,” it requires the “advice and consent” of the Senate, with a two-thirds majority of senators present.
• Appointment of ambassadors and senior officials: The president appoints ambassadors, consuls, and other diplomatic representatives, as well as the Secretary of State and other senior foreign policy officials, with Senate approval.
• Reception of ambassadors: By “receiving ambassadors and other public ministers,” the president effectively exercises the power to recognize foreign governments and States, a central tool of foreign policy.

Derived powers and constitutional practice

Besides these express powers, political practice and legislation have shaped other common presidential tools in foreign policy:

• Executive agreements: The president can conclude executive agreements with other States without the need for Senate-ratified treaties. Many trade, military cooperation, or intelligence agreements are structured this way. Legally, they rely on the president’s constitutional authority and prior Congressional laws.
• Direction of diplomacy: The president is the main international spokesperson for the United States. They define foreign policy lines, hold summits with other leaders, participate in international organizations, and set the general orientation of U.S. diplomacy.
• Sanctions and economic measures: Under laws passed by Congress (e.g., emergency economic powers laws), the president can impose economic sanctions, embargoes, or financial restrictions on other countries, organizations, or individuals, especially in national security contexts.
• Use of military force without formal declaration of war: Although only Congress can “declare war,” in practice presidents have ordered numerous military interventions without formal declarations, relying on their commander-in-chief status and prior authorizations for use of force (AUMF) approved by Congress.

Relationship with Congress and legal limits

The president’s foreign power is balanced by Congress’s constitutional powers:

• Declare war and fund defense: Congress can authorize or restrict the use of force through budget control and approval or denial of AUMFs. Without funding, the president’s military action margin is drastically reduced.
• Foreign trade: The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Through trade laws, trade agreements, and delegated powers, the president’s maneuvering room in tariffs and trade negotiations is structured.
• Ratification and oversight: The Senate can block treaties and key appointments (ambassadors, Secretary of State), conditioning foreign policy. Additionally, foreign affairs committees in both chambers exercise continuous political and informational oversight.
• War Powers Resolution: Following the Vietnam War, a law was passed attempting to limit the president’s ability to keep troops in combat without Congressional authorization, requiring notification and time limits. Although debated, it constitutes a legal reference framework.

Role of the courts

Federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, can review certain presidential decisions when they affect fundamental rights or conflict with Congressional laws. However, in classic “political power” matters (recognition of States, general conduct of foreign policy), they usually show notable deference to the Executive.

Overall, U.S. legislation and practice configure the presidency as the main operational actor in foreign policy, but subject to a system of checks and balances in which Congress retains decisive powers over war, treaties, trade, and budget.

The last legislative elections in Israel were held on November 1, 2022 (25th Knesset). The results gave a clear majority to the right-wing and religious parties bloc led by Benjamin Netanyahu: his Likud party was the most voted with just over thirty seats, followed by Yesh Atid of Yair Lapid as the main opposition force. The Zionist left parties and part of the Arab vote were very weakened, with several formations falling below the electoral threshold and out of Parliament. Although my specialization is Spanish politics, I can offer you a structured summary of those results and their political significance.

Results by main parties

The Knesset has 120 seats; the absolute majority is 61. The key data for the main parties were as follows (seats obtained):

• Likud (national-conservative right, led by Benjamin Netanyahu): 32 seats. It was clearly the first force, allowing Netanyahu to lead the government again.
• Yesh Atid (center-liberal, led by Yair Lapid): 24 seats. It consolidated as the second force and opposition leader, but far from being able to form an alternative majority.
• Religious Zionism (alliance of national-religious right-wing parties): 14 seats. It was the big winner within the right-wing bloc and was key for Netanyahu’s majority.
• National Unity (moderate center-right, list of Benny Gantz and others): 12 seats. Positioned as a potential swing force but ended up in opposition.
• Shas (Sephardic ultra-Orthodox party): 11 seats. Traditional ally of Netanyahu, it strengthened the religious pillar of the coalition.
• United Torah Judaism (UTJ) (Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox): 7 seats. Another classic government partner for Likud.
• Israel Beiteinu (secular right, led by Avigdor Lieberman): 6 seats. Maintained representation but positioned in opposition to Netanyahu’s bloc.
• Ra’am (moderate Arab Islamist party): 5 seats. Managed to renew its presence in the Knesset after having supported the previous anti-Netanyahu coalition government.
• Hadash-Ta’al (joint list of Arab left-wing parties): 5 seats. Maintained representation but with less weight than in previous cycles.
• Avoda (Labor): 4 seats. The historic labor party, which dominated Israeli politics for decades, was reduced to a very minor force.

Other traditionally relevant formations, such as Meretz (Zionist left) and Balad (Arab nationalist), did not surpass the electoral threshold and lost representation, contributing to an imbalance favoring the right-wing bloc.

Bloc distribution and government formation

Beyond party-by-party results, what was decisive was the sum of seats by ideological blocs:

• The Netanyahu bloc (Likud + Religious Zionism + Shas + UTJ) clearly exceeded the absolute majority, with just over 64 seats.
• The anti-Netanyahu bloc (Yesh Atid, National Unity, Israel Beiteinu, Avoda, Ra’am, and Hadash-Ta’al) fell short of 60 seats, lacking the capacity to replicate an alternative coalition like in 2021.

This balance allowed the formation of a coalition government led by Netanyahu together with ultra-Orthodox and national-religious right-wing parties. The resulting majority was comfortable enough to push an ambitious legislative agenda, particularly on institutional and justice reforms, which generated strong internal polarization.

Political significance of the results

From a political point of view, the 2022 elections meant:

• The return of Netanyahu to power after a period of very unstable governments and repeated elections.
• A strengthening of the weight of religious and national-religious parties within the governing coalition, influencing priorities on religious legislation, settlements in the West Bank, and judicial reforms.
• The historic weakness of the Zionist left (Avoda and Meretz), which became very fragmented and partly outside Parliament, and a divided Arab representation among different lists.
• The consolidation of Yesh Atid as the main opposition party, but without enough allies to build an alternative bloc in the short term.

Although my field of expertise is politics and institutional activity in Spain, the above data reflect the general panorama of the latest Israeli legislative elections and help understand why the country’s political system has shifted toward a right-wing majority with a strong religious and nationalist component since 2022.