Are the elections in Morocco democratic? What does its Constitution say and what do the observers indicate?

As of September 2026, there is no formal constitutional reform process underway in Morocco aimed at limiting the powers of the monarchy or substantially transforming the role of King Mohamed VI. The available sources rather show a consolidation of royal power and a recent trend to strengthen its political centrality, not to reduce it.

Absence of constitutional reforms to curtail the king's powers

Recent political science analyses on Morocco's internal evolution emphasize that the 2011 Constitution, adopted after the Arab Spring protests, maintained a model of executive monarchy. The king retains control over the main levers of power: he appoints the head of government from the winning party and names the ministers, directs foreign policy, is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and acts as the decisive authority in major political, religious, and security arbitrations.

Reports from the Alternatives Foundation in 2022 describe a “new political cycle” in which the Crown strengthens its centrality and an “authoritarian turn” is observed, with regression in rights and freedoms and a rallying around the Palace ( analysis of the political cycle in Morocco ). Within this framework, experts consider the possibility of a profound political change driven by a coalition of opposition forces capable of imposing a regime reform as “remote” in the short term.

Another work from the same foundation, also from 2022, identifies the government system itself, structured around the king and his advisors, as “one of the biggest obstacles” to institutional improvements, as they interfere with reforms and leave little room for parties, particularly the moderate Islamist PJD ( study on social gap and Moroccan political system ). But this critical diagnosis does not translate into the existence today of a concrete legislative or constitutional file seeking to limit those powers.

Political debate: stability and centrality of the Crown

In practice, the Moroccan Parliament operates within parameters defined by the Palace. A report by Demócrata on the political system recalled in September 2026 that, according to Article 47 of the Constitution, the king appoints the head of government from the party that wins the legislative elections and retains broad powers over the formation of the Executive and the direction of foreign policy ( explanation of the Moroccan institutional system ). No serious parliamentary proposals to modify that architecture are mentioned.

The press and research centers speak of a regressive trend: international actors prioritize stability and the regime has perfected a “surgical repression” that neutralizes key voices without massive repressive drifts, which further reduces internal incentives and capacities to openly propose a constitutional reform that limits the monarchy.

Reforms in other areas that reinforce, not reduce, royal power

The most visible reforms in recent years do not aim at parliamentaryization of the regime, but at adjusting the legal and political framework while preserving the king's position:

• The autonomy plan for Western Sahara refined in 2026 foresees regional self-government, but with a leader appointed directly by Mohamed VI and with a status that would be integrated into the Constitution after a national referendum, not only Saharan. The design itself reinforces the monarch's control over the process and the country's territorial arrangement ( analysis of the autonomy plan for the Sahara ).
• In 2026, the king has taken steps to strengthen the succession, placing his son, Crown Prince Mulay El Hasán, in a key military leadership position, projecting dynastic continuity and stability of the monarchical model ( information on strengthening the succession ).
• In the social sphere, sectoral reforms (education, health, Family Code or Mudawana) are discussed and processed, but under the umbrella of the religious and political authority of the monarch, who presents himself as the ultimate guarantor of rights and stability.

Social mobilization and the role of the king

Even in recent protest episodes — such as the 2025 mobilizations of the youth collective GenZ 212 for social justice — discontented actors have addressed the king as the supreme arbiter and asked him to remove the Government or fight corruption, rather than openly questioning his prerogatives ( letter from the youth collective to the king ). After a speech by Mohamed VI announcing social reforms, the movement temporarily suspended its protests, illustrating the symbolic and practical weight of the monarchical institution.

Conclusion

In summary, as of September 2026 there is no evidence that a constitutional reform aimed at limiting the powers of the monarchy is being processed in Morocco. Academic debate and part of the opposition point to the need for a more parliamentary regime, but the real balance of forces, international support for the kingdom's stability, and internal dynamics tend to consolidate King Mohamed VI's centrality rather than reduce it.

The king of Morocco is one of the heads of state with the greatest effective powers among contemporary monarchies. Although the 2011 Constitution presents itself as that of a “constitutional, democratic, parliamentary, and social monarchy,” the text maintains a central role for the monarch, far superior to that of typically parliamentary European crowns.

Constitutional powers of the king of Morocco

The Moroccan Constitution defines the king simultaneously as:

• Head of State and “symbol of the unity of the nation” and the State.
• “Commander of the Faithful” (Amir al-Muminin), that is, the supreme religious authority within Sunni Maliki Islam in Morocco.
• Guarantee of the permanence and continuity of the State, respect for the Constitution, democratic election, rights and freedoms, and national independence.

From a strictly political-institutional point of view, his main powers are:

• Appointment and dismissal of the head of government: he must choose the head of government from the party that won the legislative elections but retains significant leeway (for example, choosing a person other than the party leader if the latter does not achieve a majority or agreements).
• Appointment of ministers and senior officials: he appoints other government members on the proposal of the head of government, can dismiss some of them, and effectively presides over the Council of Ministers when strategic state orientations are debated.
• Normative power: the king's decisions take the form of dahirs (royal decrees) that have normative rank and serve to enact certain laws, appointments, or fundamental decisions.
• Parliamentary faculties: he can dissolve one or both chambers of Parliament, call elections, and address messages to the Chambers that cannot be debated.
• Referendum faculty: he can submit certain issues to popular referendum, giving him a direct intervention instrument over the political process.
• Supreme commander of the Royal Armed Forces: he holds effective leadership of the armed forces, with a very central role in defense and security policy.
• Presidency of strategic bodies: he presides over the Superior Security Council, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, and other superior councils (education, ulemas, etc.), placing him at the apex of national security, justice, and official religious orientation.
• Power of pardon: he can grant pardons and amnesties, reinforcing his role as arbiter and ultimate guarantor.
• Religious authority: as “Commander of the Faithful,” he controls the official orientation of Islam in Morocco (appointment of ulemas, approval of official sermons, supervision of religious policy), which grants him legitimacy and a sphere of power beyond strictly political matters.

Comparison with other heads of state in parliamentary monarchies

In “classic” European parliamentary monarchies (Spain, United Kingdom, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, etc.), the monarch is primarily a symbolic head of state, with essentially:

• Representative functions: heads the state, exercises international representation, and participates in official ceremonies.
• Formal functions: appoints the head of government proposed by Parliament, sanctions laws already approved, calls elections or dissolves Chambers following guidelines set by the government and parliamentary majority.
• Very limited arbitral functions: in political crises, may play a mediation role in government formation, but within narrow margins and with a high degree of self-restraint.

In these monarchies, the principle of political responsibility of the government before Parliament and the neutrality of the monarch are well established. The king or queen “reigns but does not govern”: their acts are subject to government countersignature, which assumes political responsibility, and the monarch does not direct daily policy.

Compared to this model, the king of Morocco presents several key differences:

• Greater real executive power: effective presidency of the Council of Ministers in major orientations, influence in ministerial appointments, and control over security and defense give him a much stronger executive position than a European monarch.
• Capacity for direct intervention in political life: the ability to dissolve Parliament, resort to referendums, or reconfigure governments in crises has been exercised significantly, not merely symbolically.
• Control of justice and state bodies: by presiding over the Superior Council of the Judiciary and other superior councils, the Moroccan monarch occupies the institutional apex of powers that in European parliamentary monarchies are more clearly separated or have independent checks and balances.
• Institutionalized religious dimension: no current European parliamentary monarch has religious authority comparable to that of “Commander of the Faithful.” Even in systems where the monarch is formally head of a Church (such as the British king regarding the Anglican Church), religious intervention is symbolic and strongly limited by democratic norms; in Morocco, religious legitimacy is a central pillar of the Crown's power.

Comparative balance

In comparative terms, it can be said that Morocco is situated at an intermediate point between a parliamentary monarchy and an executive monarchy: there is an elected Parliament and a responsible government, but the king retains substantive constitutional powers — political, military, judicial, and religious — that far exceed the predominantly symbolic role of heads of state in European parliamentary monarchies.

The latest legislative elections held in Morocco with fully known results, according to the information available in the consulted sources, are those of September 2021, which renewed the House of Representatives (395 seats). The accessible documentation does not offer a complete and detailed numerical table of seats by party nor a closed figure of participation, but it does allow a clear outline of the new balance of forces and some key political insights.

Political composition after the elections

The 2021 legislative elections marked a political cycle change in Morocco. The main conclusion from the Alternatives Foundation's analysis of the Moroccan “new cycle” is the shift from a scenario dominated by moderate Islamism towards a return of traditional parties close to the Palace.

In summary, the political map after the elections is characterized by:

• A very decisive defeat of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamist formation that had led the government during the previous decade. The PJD went from having 125 deputies to only thirteen, a collapse considered by cited analyses as the most relevant fact of the electoral day.
• The formation of a government coalition of three traditional parties, all considered close to the Royal House:
  • The National Rally of Independents (RNI), led by Aziz Ajanuch, positioned as the leading party of the majority. Its victory opens the door for King Mohamed VI to designate its leader as head of government.
  • The Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), a secular force created as a counterweight to political Islam and also part of the current coalition.
  • The historic Istiqlal Party, of nationalist tradition, which also strengthens its presence in the Executive.
• This RNI–PAM–Istiqlal alliance holds the majority of the 395 seats in the House of Representatives and displaces the PJD to a clearly minority role, which analyses interpret as a closure of the cycle opened after the 2011 protests and the constitutional reforms of the “Arab Spring.”

Beyond this general distribution — a broad majority of parties aligned with the Palace and the PJD's collapse — the sources used do not openly provide a complete and precise table of seats by party that can be cited with numerical certainty in this response.

Data on electoral participation

Regarding participation, the consulted information mainly highlights the political debate around disenchantment and disaffection, especially among Moroccan youth, rather than the exact percentage of voters.

The elements that appear most clearly are:

• The 2021 elections are interpreted as a barometer of social mood after years of protests (2011, Rif 2016–2017, subsequent mobilizations) and in a context of discontent over the economic situation, public services, and inequality.
• Studies cited in these analyses, such as those from Afrobarometer, show that around 60 % of the population identifies unemployment as one of the main priorities, and there is a contrast between the perception that the country “is going in the right direction” and the negative assessment of the concrete economic situation. This tension is linked to high youth abstention.
• Experts cited in these documents anticipate and describe a relatively low participation, with a voter roll overrepresented by people over 35 years old and especially over 65, reinforcing the idea of a youth poorly mobilized electorally.

However, the sources consulted in this search do not include a numerical percentage of participation (for example, “X % of the roll voted”), nor a direct statistical comparison with previous citations that can be reproduced here without risk of inaccuracy. For rigor, it is preferable not to invent or complete that data with unverified figures in this same investigation.

Political reading of the results

In the absence of an exhaustive statistical table, the analyzed works agree on the underlying reading:

• The 2021 legislative elections consolidate a recentralization of power around the monarchy and parties most aligned with the Palace, with a more authoritarian agenda on rights and freedoms.
• The drastic weakening of institutional Islamism (PJD) is interpreted as a result both of its government management and a strategy of wear and recentralization driven from above.
• The combination of low participation and majority of traditional parties reinforces regime stability but at the cost of a growing gap between broad social sectors — especially urban youth — and representative institutions.

In summary, the latest known Moroccan legislative elections (2021) left a House clearly dominated by RNI, PAM, and Istiqlal, with the PJD reduced to a very small group, in a context of relatively low participation and growing disaffection, although the reviewed sources do not allow offering here a complete numerical table of seats and vote percentage.