¿Early elections? Junts' 'no' leaves Sánchez facing a defeat on housing and opens the door to the polls again.

The seven deputies of Puigdemont will reject the two decrees this Friday and leave the Government facing a vote that could become a test of the viability of the legislature.

4 minutes

EuropaPress 7805912 presidente gobierno pedro sanchez presentacion informe vidas futuras

EuropaPress 7805912 presidente gobierno pedro sanchez presentacion informe vidas futuras

Add DEMÓCRATA to Google

Ask FREN

Published

Last updated

4 minutes

Most read

The scenario that Pedro Sánchez wanted to avoid has materialized just hours before Congress votes on the two housing decrees. Junts has decided to vote against both texts, closing the possibility of an abstention from its seven deputies that would allow the Government to save at least the main package of measures. The parliamentary defeat thus becomes the scenario that the Executive is heading towards if there is no last-minute change in the arithmetic of the Chamber.

What happens this Friday will have a dimension that goes beyond housing. A defeat would leave the Government facing new evidence of the fragility of the investiture majority and would bring back to the forefront the question that has accompanied the legislature for months: how long is the president willing to continue without a stable majority to advance his agenda.

Junts closes the door

The National Executive of Junts has agreed that its seven deputies reject the two royal decree laws. The party believes that the measures will reduce the rental supply, raise prices, and do not adequately protect small property owners nor stop investment funds. Junts also demands that the Government replace the current regulation with a new decree that meets its demands.

The decision is particularly relevant for the first of the texts. Until this Thursday, an abstention from Junts would allow for a minimal majority, after Podemos confirmed the support of its four deputies and PNV and Coalición Canaria announced that they would vote favorably for that package. The calculations placed the result at 172 favorable votes against 171 opposed if the seven deputies of Junts abstained and there were no absences or changes in position.

This avenue disappears with the agreement adopted by the independentist leadership.

The second decree arrives even more compromised. PNV and Coalición Canaria had already announced their rejection, so Junts' refusal broadens the opposing majority against a norm that includes the automatic renewal of certain rental contracts.

From housing to the legislature

If the two decrees fall this Friday, the problem for Sánchez will stop being limited to the content of the norms. The Government will have lost a vote that it turned into a political test throughout the week regarding the response to the housing crisis, after the protests triggered by the eviction of Maricarmen and the camp set up in Puerta del Sol.

The defeat would also come after the Executive has managed to incorporate Podemos into the supportive bloc. The four purple deputies will support both texts despite labeling them as insufficient, after the Confederation of Tenant Unions demanded their validation.

The problem is on the other side of the investiture majority. Junts once again demonstrates that the support that allowed Sánchez to continue in La Moncloa does not guarantee a stable legislative majority. The party had already voted alongside PP and Vox on other initiatives during this legislature and in June supported a popular motion demanding the president's resignation and the calling of a vote of confidence.

A defeat this Friday would not be equivalent to losing a vote of confidence. Sánchez can continue governing even if the decrees are rejected, negotiate the next laws individually, and maintain the legislature as long as he considers he has political leeway to do so.

But he can also decide that that leeway has run out.

The narrative of a defeat

Housing also offers the PSOE a very different political ground than other parliamentary defeats. Sánchez has publicly positioned the decrees as a choice between different models of protection and has urged the groups to explain their vote. If the norms are repealed, the Government could politically use the rejection of PP, Vox, and Junts to defend before the electorate that certain social measures have been blocked in Congress.

That would be, in any case, the political narrative of the Executive, not a legal consequence of the vote.

Junts has also prepared its own. Carles Puigdemont's party argues that the decrees would harm precisely those they claim to protect and demands that the Government immediately approve a different regulation.

The clash thus allows both parties to defend opposing positions in the event of a possible rupture: Moncloa can hold responsible the majority that rejects the decrees to prevent the definitive entry into force of the measures, while Junts can argue that it has halted a regulation that it considers harmful to families and small property owners.

An electoral calendar that is already available

If Sánchez concludes that the legislature is exhausted, the LOREG establishes that, when the president uses the power of early dissolution, the call decree is published the day after its issuance and the elections are held 54 days later.

This makes the end of November a possible window if Sánchez decided to immediately activate the electoral calendar. November 29 could be an electoral date if the call decree were announced this weekend and published on October 6.

The precedent of 2023 also shows that a president can react quickly to an adverse political outcome: Sánchez announced the dissolution of the Cortes the day after the municipal and regional elections on May 28, and the decree was approved on the 29th and published on the 30th.

Reaching 2027 or resetting before

The decision would also have a strategic dimension due to the calendar awaiting the PSOE. The municipal elections and a good part of the regional elections will be held in May 2027, so general elections before the end of this year would separate both electoral cycles.

An advance would allow the general elections to be resolved before that territorial battle. This does not allow anticipating whether the result would benefit or harm the PSOE electorally nor what the outcome of an election would be, but it would completely alter the political calendar with which the parties would prepare for the municipal and regional elections.

The alternative for Sánchez is to continue. Losing the decrees does not force him to resign, does not trigger elections, and does not alone demonstrate that he has lost parliamentary confidence. He can maintain the Government, negotiate each vote, and try to rebuild bridges with Junts.

The difference from the previous hours is that this Friday no longer begins with an uncertainty about Puigdemont's vote. Junts has said no. If that rejection ends up causing the fall of the two decrees, it will be Sánchez who has to decide what interpretation he makes of the defeat and how much leeway he considers he has left in the legislature.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the status of the parliamentary processing of the housing decrees following the rejection announced by Junts?

As of October 1, 2026, the two new housing royal decree-laws approved by the Government are in the key phase of their ratification in the Congress, they have not yet been voted on, and their future is very uncertain following Junts' announcement that it will vote against them. The extraordinary Plenary session to decide whether to ratify or repeal them is scheduled for Friday, October 2, within the maximum period of 30 days from their approval by the Council of Ministers.

Which decrees are at stake

According to the Government's own notes, the Council of Ministers on September 29 approved two royal decree-laws on housing:

  • A decree with urgent measures for the protection of the social function of housing and the expansion of affordable housing supply, which includes restrictions on speculative housing purchases by funds, reinforcement of the suspension of certain evictions, new regulation of seasonal rentals and rooms, property tax surcharges on tourist apartments, and tax deductions linked to rent and protected housing. Moncloa details it in the note “Urgent measures to promote and protect the right to housing.”
  • A second decree focused on the automatic renewal of rental contracts for primary residences and strengthening tenant stability, referred to by unions such as UGT and CCOO in their joint statement on the “housing emergency” royal decrees (UGT and CCOO note).

Both texts have been sent to Congress for ratification, and the Ministry of Housing has confirmed that an urgent Plenary session has been requested for Friday. Various reports (for example, ConSalud) note that even sectoral meetings have been postponed to avoid coinciding with this special housing Plenary session.

Exact procedural status as of October 1

From a formal point of view, the situation of these decrees is as follows:

  • They have been approved by the Council of Ministers and published in the Official State Gazette (the decree on social function and affordable housing supply was published on September 30, according to Moncloa).
  • They are registered in Congress and pending debate on ratification or repeal in an extraordinary Plenary session.
  • As of October 1, they are not yet recorded as ratified, repealed, or converted into bills. All this depends on the vote on Friday.
  • Since they are royal decree-laws, Congress can only ratify or repeal them as a whole; they cannot be amended at this stage. If ratified, the Chamber may also decide that one of them continues its processing as a bill, thus opening an ordinary process with amendments and committee and Senate phases.

Politically, the balance of power is very tight. The press and social actors describe the ratification as “at risk” or “very compromised,” because Junts has announced a negative vote and demands the text be redone. Demócrata, for example, has been reporting how Junts has hardened its position on the housing and indefinite rental decrees, up to maintaining a declared “no” (analysis on the no to the rental decree).

What will happen depending on the vote

Pending that Plenary session, the scenarios are clear:

  • If ratified, they will remain in force as currently drafted. Congress could decide, in the same session, that one or both decrees continue as a bill, allowing changes via amendments but without interrupting the validity of the measures.
  • If rejected, the decrees will expire: they will cease to have effect, and the government would have to redesign its regulatory strategy, either with a new royal decree-law or a bill from scratch. They cannot be “tweaked” in Congress once repealed; a new procedure would have to be initiated in the Executive.
Context: recent precedents

This conflict follows other clashes in housing. In April, a crisis royal decree-law focused on rent and evictions was rejected in Congress, also with Junts voting against, forcing the Government to redesign its strategy. Additionally, the extension of the suspension of evictions on primary residences included in Royal Decree‑law 1/2024 remains in processing as a bill, now redirected to an ordinary legislative initiative, where amendments are being presented and negotiated.

With this background, Junts' announcement to block the new decrees places the parliamentary processing at its most delicate point: legally the texts are alive and pending ratification; politically, the risk of their expiration is very high and will shape the housing agenda in the coming months.

Can you detail the specific content of each of the two new housing decrees and what changes they would introduce in rentals and evictions? What regulatory alternatives would the Government have if Congress ultimately repeals these two housing decrees? How are the other groups (PP, Sumar, Podemos, ERC, PNV, Bildu, etc.) positioned regarding the ratification vote of the housing decrees?

What are the powers and functions of the President of the Government of Spain according to the Constitution?

The President of the Government of Spain is, according to the 1978 Constitution, the central figure of the executive power and the main person responsible for the political direction of the country. His powers combine functions of initiative, coordination, representation, and accountability before the Cortes Generales, especially before the Congress of Deputies.

Constitutional position of the President of the Government

The Constitution establishes the president as head of the Government (not of the State, a function that corresponds to the King). This means that:

  • He directs the action of the Government and coordinates the functions of the other members of the Council of Ministers.
  • He is politically responsible before the Congress, which can demand accountability through a motion of censure or a vote of confidence.
  • He acts as the main political interlocutor before the Cortes, other State institutions, and abroad.

Functions of political direction and initiative

One of the core powers is directing the country's internal and external policy. Among others:

  • Set the major orientations of Government policy (economic, social, foreign, security, etc.) and ensure its coherence.
  • Establish the legislative priorities of the Executive, promoting the presentation of bills before the Cortes and, when constitutional requirements are met, proposing to the King the approval of royal decree-laws.
  • Direct defense policy, in coordination with the competent minister, within the framework set by the Cortes Generales.

Appointment and dismissal of ministers

The internal organization of the Government is structured around an essential power of the president:

  • Proposes to the King the appointment and dismissal of vice presidents and ministers. Legally, the King signs the appointments and dismissals, but the political decision is the president's.
  • He can reorganize the Government's structure (creation, suppression, or renaming of ministries) by royal decrees, within the existing legal framework.

This grants him broad scope to configure his team and adapt the governmental structure to his political priorities.

Relationship with the Cortes Generales

Although the Government as a whole is accountable to Parliament, the prominence falls on the president:

  • He is invested by the Congress through a specific initial confidence procedure, proposed by the King.
  • He can raise a vote of confidence before the Congress to reinforce or verify his parliamentary support regarding his program or a general policy statement.
  • He must answer for his political action in control sessions, appearances, and parliamentary debates.
  • He personally suffers the effects of a possible motion of censure: if it passes, the president ceases and the alternative candidate is invested.

This centrality explains that, in practice, Government stability is identified with the personal stability of the president.

Power to dissolve the Cortes

A particularly relevant power is the ability to propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales as a whole, which entails calling general elections. This power:

  • Is discretionary but must be exercised within constitutional limits (for example, it is not possible during the processing of a motion of censure nor before one year has passed since a previous dissolution for the same reason).
  • Functions as a political arbitration instrument when the relationship between Government and Parliament is blocked.

Relations with the King and institutional representation

The President of the Government is also the King's main political advisor. Among his functions:

  • He intervenes decisively in acts where the King must appoint or dismiss high officials (Government members, some heads of constitutional bodies), since these acts are carried out at the proposal of the president or the Government.
  • He countersigns the King's acts in governmental matters, assuming political responsibility for them.
  • He exercises the ordinary representation of the State internationally regarding the Government, without prejudice to the symbolic and representative role of the King as head of State.

Responsibility and limits

Despite his very broad powers, the president is subject to clear limits:

  • He must always respect the Constitution and the rest of the legal system, as well as the territorial distribution of powers between the State and autonomous communities.
  • He is criminally responsible for crimes he may commit in the exercise of his functions, with a specific procedural regime, and politically responsible before the Congress.
  • He does not hold absolute powers: his acts are inserted in a system of mutual checks among Government, Cortes, judiciary, and other constitutional institutions.

Overall, the figure of the President of the Government concentrates the political direction of the Executive, but always framed within a parliamentary democracy in which the confidence of the majority of Congress is the ultimate basis of his legitimacy and powers.

What legal requirements are necessary for the president to call early elections in Spain?

In Spain, the possibility of calling early general elections is articulated through the dissolution of the Cortes Generales, mainly regulated in the Spanish Constitution and the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG). Although formally the King dissolves by royal decree, the political initiative corresponds to the President of the Government, who must meet a series of material, temporal, and formal requirements.

1. Constitutional basis of early dissolution

The core is in Article 115 of the Constitution:

  • Initiative: the President of the Government, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers and under his exclusive responsibility, may propose the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or both Chambers (the Cortes Generales).
  • Formal decision: the dissolution is materialized by a Royal Decree of the King, which includes the President's proposal. That dissolution decree includes the call for elections, setting the voting date.
> Other relevant provisions are Articles 68.4 and 69.6, which establish that the mandate of deputies and senators lasts four years and ends upon expiry or the day of dissolution, and Article 99.5, which provides for automatic dissolution if there is no investiture in two months (a different case, since there the initiative is no longer discretionary for the President).

2. Material limits: when dissolution cannot be proposed

The Constitution imposes several important restrictions:

  • Motion of censure in process: Article 115 itself states that a dissolution proposal cannot be presented when a motion of censure is underway in Congress. This is a safeguard to prevent the President from neutralizing a parliamentary initiative aimed precisely at demanding political responsibility from the Government.
  • Exceptional states: Article 116 provides that during states of alarm, exception, and siege, the Cortes maintain a reinforced role. In particular, when these states are declared, the Congress cannot be sidelined: if dissolved, it is considered automatically convened. In practice, this acts as a strong political and legal limit to discretionary dissolution during a state of exception or siege.
  • President and Government in caretaker status: although the Constitution does not expressly say so in a single article, it is derived from the set of provisions on Government cessation (art. 101) and the system's logic that a caretaker Government should not use the power to dissolve the Cortes. The power is conceived for a President with full parliamentary confidence, not for an already ceased Executive.
3. Temporal limits to early dissolution

Article 115.3 of the Constitution establishes a clear temporal limit: a new dissolution cannot be agreed upon before one year has passed since the previous one, when that dissolution was adopted at the President's initiative (i.e., not in the case of automatic dissolution for lack of investiture under Article 99.5).

Additionally, the dissolution power must be exercised within the ordinary legislative period: when the natural end of the four years approaches, the difference between an “early” dissolution and the expiration of the mandate becomes purely practical, but legally the framework is the same.

4. Formal requirements and electoral deadlines (LOREG)

The LOREG (Organic Law 5/1985) completes the constitutional framework:

  • Article 42 provides that the call for elections to the Congress, Senate, or both Chambers is made by Royal Decree.
  • Except for the case of Article 99.5 of the Constitution, the decree is issued at the proposal of the President of the Government, under his exclusive responsibility and after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, with the President's countersignature.
  • In the case of early dissolution, the same Royal Decree must contain both the dissolution and the call for new elections.
  • As a general rule, the electoral process lasts 54 days from the call to the vote (art. 68.6 CE and development in LOREG). For the exceptional case of dissolution due to lack of investiture (art. 99.5 CE), a specific reform (Organic Law 2/2016) shortens this period to 47 days, but this does not affect the discretionary dissolution proposed by the President.
5. Summary

In summary, for the President of the Government to trigger early elections, he must: have a Government not merely in caretaker status; ensure the Council of Ministers deliberates the proposal; formulate it under his exclusive responsibility; respect the limits (not do so with a motion of censure underway, not repeat a dissolution within one year of a previous one adopted on his initiative, and consider the framework of exceptional states); and finally obtain the King's signature on the Royal Decree dissolving the Chambers and calling elections, respecting the deadlines set by the Constitution and LOREG.

Play

Test your knowledge with FREN!

How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

Which political party has decided to vote against the two housing decrees presented by the Government?

Question 1 of 3

What parliamentary majority would allow saving the main housing measures package if Junts abstained?

Question 2 of 3

According to the LOREG, how many days after the decree of the call is published would early general elections be held?

Question 3 of 3