Sánchez returns to reflection while the street tightens and the electoral advance gains strength

If the Prime Minister (in this case, Pedro Sánchez) decides to call early elections, there is no long chain of “pending parliamentary procedures”: the core is an act of the Executive —the royal decree of dissolution and call— and, from there, the Cortes enter a phase of closure and settlement of matters, leaving only the Permanent Deputations active.

1. Political decision and royal decree of dissolution

The Constitution (art. 115) allows the prime minister, after deliberation of the Council of Ministers, to propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the General Courts and the call for elections. The key steps are:

• Deliberation of the Council of Ministers: the Government politically agrees to go to early elections and formulates the dissolution proposal.
• Signature of the King and publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE): a royal decree of dissolution and call for elections is issued. According to the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), the decree:
  • Is published in the BOE.
  • Sets the date of the election within constitutional and legal margins.
• Entry into force: from that moment, the Chambers are considered dissolved and the electoral calendar is set in motion (submission of candidacies, campaign, etc.).

2. What can happen in the Congress and Senate between the announcement and the decree?

Between the political announcement (“I am going to call elections”) and the effective publication of the decree, technically the Chambers remain alive. This opens a margin, short but real, to:

• Hold one or several last plenary sessions, where it is possible to:
  • Definitively approve laws that are in a very advanced stage (for example, report already issued or in second reading).
  • Validate or repeal royal decree-laws pending.
  • Handle appearances or control debates already convened.
• Rearrange the agenda in the Boards and Spokespersons' Committees to prioritize texts that the Government or the majority want to have approved before dissolution.

Once the decree is published, there are no “ordinary procedures” pending: legislative and control activity is abruptly interrupted, except for the residual functions of the Permanent Deputations.

3. Effects on laws and initiatives in progress

With the dissolution of the Cortes:

• Almost all initiatives lapse: draft and proposed laws, non-law proposals, motions, interpellations, questions pending response, etc., are considered finished if they have not been definitively approved before the day of dissolution.
• Very limited exceptions:
  • Royal decree-laws already validated by the Congress maintain their effectiveness as laws, even if their processing as a draft law was foreseen; that additional processing lapses, but the validated norm remains in force.
  • Constitutional or specially rigid procedures (ongoing constitutional revisions, possibly some treaties) are governed by their own rules, but generally the logic is the same: dissolution cuts ordinary processing and, if it is to be resumed, it must be registered again after the elections.
• There is no “automatic inheritance”: a draft law that has not been completed must be presented again in the next legislature if the Government or groups consider it appropriate.

4. Parliamentary control and Permanent Deputations

Once the Chambers are dissolved, ordinary plenary sessions and committees disappear and, with them, normal political control (control sessions to the Government, interpellations, motions, etc.). Instead:

• In the Congress, the Permanent Deputation:
  • Represents the Chamber until the constitution of the new Congress.
  • Assumes competencies over royal decree-laws (can convene an extraordinary Plenary for their validation) and over states of alarm, exception, and siege, among other constitutional functions.
• In the Senate, its Permanent Deputation exercises an analogous role of minimal institutional continuity.
• The rest of the control mechanisms (questions, requests for information, investigative commissions, ordinary appearances) are, in practice, suspended until the new Chambers are constituted.

5. Practical differences between Congress and Senate

Legally, dissolution affects both Chambers at the same time (except in very exceptional cases), so that:

• The Congress is the key Chamber because:
  • The investiture and confidence in the Government depend on it.
  • Its Permanent Deputation concentrates the main extraordinary control functions.
• The Senate also sees its legislative and control activity interrupted, maintaining only:
  • Residual tasks of its Permanent Deputation.
  • Possible participation in exceptional procedures reserved by the Constitution (for example, a possible application of art. 155 CE, if it occurred in that interregnum, always with the specific applicable rules).

In summary, if Sánchez opts for early elections, the real parliamentary “pending” is reduced to deciding what is approved or not in the last plenary sessions before the decree; from its publication, the legislature closes and everything not completed is lost, leaving only a very limited thread of control through the Permanent Deputations.

According to the Spanish Constitution, the Prime Minister has a central role —although not exclusive nor sovereign— in calling general elections. His power is always exercised through the King and within precise constitutional limits.

1. Who formally calls the elections

The Constitution does not literally say “the Prime Minister calls elections,” but rather:

• The King is the one who dissolves the General Courts and calls elections by means of a Royal Decree.
• That Royal Decree must always be proposed and countersigned by the Prime Minister (art. 115.1 CE), except for the special case of art. 99.5.

In practice, this means that the Prime Minister is the political initiator of the decision: he decides whether or not to propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress (or the Cortes as a whole) and, therefore, the call for general elections, within the margins set by the Constitution and electoral legislation.

2. “Discretionary” power of dissolution (art. 115 CE)

The key power is recognized in article 115 CE:

• The Prime Minister, under his exclusive responsibility, may propose the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the General Courts.
• He does so after prior deliberation in the Council of Ministers and then proposes the dissolution to the King.
• The King signs the Royal Decree of dissolution and call for elections, which the Prime Minister countersigns.

That “exclusive responsibility” means the political decision is the Prime Minister’s: neither the King nor the Chambers can impose the moment of dissolution (except the case of art. 99.5, which is automatic). However, that power is not unlimited; the Constitution itself imposes three express restrictions.

3. Constitutional limits to dissolution

Art. 115.2 CE establishes three clear limits to the Prime Minister’s power:

• Dissolution cannot be proposed while a motion of no confidence is in process. This aims to prevent the Prime Minister from “escaping” parliamentary control by resorting to immediate elections.
• Dissolution cannot be proposed before one year has passed since the previous dissolution agreed by this same procedure. That is, it is not allowed to chain discretionary dissolutions in very short periods to force repeated elections.
• Dissolution cannot occur when a state of exception or siege is in force. In contexts of serious alteration of constitutional order, priority is crisis management, not dissolution of the Chambers.

Besides these express limits, other practical conditions operate:

• The Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) sets the deadlines between the call decree and the election day, so the Prime Minister decides the date within a legally bounded margin.
• While the Government is in caretaker status (after elections or resignation), doctrine and practice impose a restrictive interpretation of its political decisions, including great caution regarding proposing a new dissolution.

4. Automatic dissolution due to investiture failure (art. 99.5 CE)

There is a second mechanism of dissolution and call for elections, in which the Prime Minister does not freely decide the dissolution: the one provided in article 99.5 CE.

If, after the first investiture vote, two months pass without any candidate obtaining the confidence of the Congress, the Constitution orders:

• The automatic dissolution of the Congress by the King.
• The call for new elections, also by the King.

In this case, the King acts “after consultation with the Presidents of the Congress and the Senate,” but there is no political decision margin for the Prime Minister: the Constitution itself imposes dissolution and call for elections, due to the impossibility of forming a Government.

5. Summary: what powers the Prime Minister really has

In sum, according to the Spanish Constitution, the Prime Minister has these key powers regarding general elections:

• Initiate and propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the General Courts and the consequent call for elections (art. 115 CE), assuming political responsibility for that decision.
• Countersign the Royal Decree of dissolution and call, without which the King’s act is not valid.
• Choose the timing of that proposal within constitutional limits (no motion of no confidence in process, no states of exception or siege, and respecting the one-year period since the last discretionary dissolution) and legal limits (LOREG deadlines to set the voting date).
• Comply with automatic dissolution and call for elections if investiture fails within two months, where the Constitution does not grant autonomous decision-making capacity.

Thus, the Constitution configures the Prime Minister as the political protagonist of the decision to call elections, but subjects him to formal controls (intervention of the King, deadlines, limits) and material controls (motion of no confidence, exceptional states) that prevent a purely discretionary or arbitrary use of that power.

In Spain, there is no new “strike law”: the right to strike is recognized in the Constitution, but the Royal Decree-Law 17/1977, of March 4, on labor relations, continues to apply, with corrections from the Constitutional Court (TC). A general strike does not have separate regulation; it is governed by these same rules, applied to a broad conflict (intersectoral or state-wide).

The main legal requirements to call it are as follows:

1. Basic constitutional framework

• Article 28.2 of the Spanish Constitution (CE): recognizes the right to strike of workers for the defense of their interests and requires the law to establish guarantees to maintain essential community services.
• Article 37.2 CE: recognizes the right to adopt collective conflict measures, also conditioned on maintaining essential services.

2. Who can call a general strike

• The right to strike is an individual right of workers, exercised collectively.
• The Royal Decree-Law 17/1977 assumes that the declaration of strike is agreed upon by workers through their representatives or by themselves. The stricter requirements of the text (agreements center by center, certain percentages) have been softened by STC 11/1981, which prevents interpreting those requirements in a way that empties the right.
• In practice, a state-wide general strike is usually called by:
  • The most representative unions at the state or confederal level (for example, CCOO, UGT, others),
  • With agreement adopted by their competent internal bodies, according to their statutes (confederal committees, councils, etc.).
  That internal decision must respect the principles of democratic organization required by union legislation.

3. Prior notice and communication

Article 3 of Royal Decree-Law 17/1977 establishes formal requirements that also apply to a general strike:

• Minimum prior notice:
  • 5 calendar days before the start of the strike, generally.
  • 10 calendar days when it affects companies responsible for providing public services.
• Recipients of the prior notice: it must be communicated in writing to:
  • The affected employers or employer associations, and
  • The competent labor authority (usually, Ministry of Labor or regional authorities, depending on the scope).
• Minimum content of the communication:
  • Objectives of the strike (claims or reasons),
  • Previous efforts made to resolve the conflict,
  • Start date, and, if applicable, expected duration,
  • Composition of the strike committee.
• If it affects public services, the strike must be given the necessary publicity so that users are aware.

4. Strike committee

• It must be formed by workers affected by the conflict.
• Its number cannot exceed 12 members.
• It is the interlocutor with the company, administrations, and, if applicable, mediation or arbitration bodies.

5. Material limits and causes of illegality

Article 11 of Royal Decree-Law 17/1977, interpreted by STC 11/1981, sets the cases of illegal strike. Among others:

• Strikes promoted or sustained for exclusively political reasons or unrelated to the professional or labor interests of the affected workers.
• Solidarity strikes could only be illegal if they lack appreciable connection with the professional interests of those supporting them; the TC has annulled the most restrictive reading of this limit.
• Strikes that intend to alter what is agreed in a collective agreement in force or an award during its validity.
• Strikes that seriously violate other fundamental rights or prevent the maintenance of essential services without respecting minimum services.
• Certain abusive modalities (rotating, slowdowns, etc.) when used disproportionately and with the intent to block.

6. Essential services and minimum services

• The Constitution requires balancing the right to strike with essential community services (health, basic transport, justice, security, etc.).
• Article 10 of Royal Decree-Law 17/1977 empowers the Government and the competent governmental authority to adopt measures ensuring those services, including setting minimum services.
• TC jurisprudence (for example, STC 11/1981, STC 296/2006, STC 58/2013) requires:
  • That minimum services be set by a political governmental authority, not by the employer or mere management bodies.
  • That they be proportional, motivated, and strictly limited to guarantee the essential.

In summary, to call a general strike in Spain it is essential: agreement of the representative workers’ bodies (usually unions), written and timely prior notice with legally required content, designation of a strike committee, respect for material limits set by the Constitution and Royal Decree-Law 17/1977, and effective compatibility with essential services through minimum services set by governmental authority and subject to court control.