Survey elections Community Valenciana: Compromís approaches PSOE and PP would win, according to Sigma Dos

The socialists would go from 31 to between 23 and 25 deputies, while the PP would obtain between 33 and 36 and Vox, between 16 and 18.

fotonoticia 20261008114804 1920

fotonoticia 20261008114804 1920

Add DEMÓCRATA to Google

Ask FREN

Published

Last updated

2 minutes

Most read

Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

La media de las encuestas

Media a 12 de noviembre de 2026 · 15 institutos

  • PP31,5 %
  • PSOE26,7 %
  • Vox19,1 %
  • Frente Amplio6,2 %
  • ERC2,4 %
01020304050ene 2024jul 2024ene 2025jul 2025ene 2026jul 2026

Media del último estudio de cada instituto en 30 días y su evolución semanal desde el 23J. Partidos con al menos un 2 %.

Todas las encuestas

Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

The PP would win the regional elections again in the Community of Valencia, but the PSPV-PSOE would have more difficulties in maintaining the second position. The Sigma Dos survey published by EL MUNDO reduces the distance between the socialists and Compromís to half a point, with 22.3% and 21.8% of voting intention, respectively.

The poll, conducted from interviews carried out between October 1 and 6, also projects a decline for the two main parties that govern or have governed the community: the PP would fall back compared to the 2023 elections and the PSPV-PSOE would lose between six and eight deputies. Vox, for its part, would increase its representation.

Compromís approaches the socialists

The estimate leaves a reduced difference between the PSPV-PSOE of Diana Morant and the Valencianist formation. The socialists would obtain between 23 and 25 seats, compared to the 31 they achieved in the 2023 regional elections. Their voting percentage would also drop by nearly two points compared to the previous Sigma Dos poll published in May.

The territorial distribution reinforces the position of Compromís in the province of Valencia. There, the coalition would achieve between eleven and twelve deputies, compared to the nine or ten attributed to the PSPV-PSOE.

Party Voting intention Estimated seats Seats in 2023
PP 32% 33-36 40
PSPV-PSOE 22.3% 23-25 31
Compromís 21.8% Not specified in the provided data —
Vox 17.5% 16-18 13

The matrix of electoral transfers indicates that Compromís could capture part of the socialist vote from 2023: 13.1% of those who then chose the PSPV-PSOE would now lean towards the Valencianist coalition. Additionally, 14.5% of former socialist voters remain undecided, according to the study.

The PP leads and Vox increases its representation

The PP candidacy led by Juanfran Pérez Llorca would stand at 32% of the votes and achieve between 33 and 36 deputies. The range is below the 40 representatives obtained by the popular party in 2023, although they would maintain a lead of 9.7 points over the PSPV-PSOE.

Vox would rise to 17.5% and reach between 16 and 18 seats, compared to the 13 it achieved in the last regional elections. The survey estimates that the party would retain 80.9% of its former voters and would also receive 11.7% of those who supported the PP in those elections.

The ranges of both parties add up arithmetically between 49 and 54 deputies. The absolute majority of the Valencian Courts is set at 50 seats, so that calculation does not ensure that PP and Vox reach that threshold in all scenarios. It is the sum of the individual intervals, not a joint range attributed to Sigma Dos.

Baldoví obtains the best rating among the leaders

Joan Baldoví tops the rating of the four analyzed leaders, with an average score of 4.2 out of ten. He is followed by Pérez Llorca, with a 4.1; Diana Morant, with a 3.7; and José María Llanos, with a 3.2.

Regarding the preference to preside over the Generalitat, Pérez Llorca occupies the first position, with 29.9%. Baldoví obtains 21.4% and Morant, 20.5%.

Check the original Sigma Dos survey published by EL MUNDO, including its technical sheet.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current phase of the processing of electoral reforms in the Valencian Community?

At this moment, the only reform of the regional electoral system listed in Les Corts Valencianes is a popular legislative initiative (ILP) to modify Law 1/1987, of March 31, Valencian electoral law (RE 45,505, with correction RE 46,632). From a formal point of view, the reform is in a very initial phase –qualification, admission for processing, and subsequent consideration– and, from a political point of view, practically frozen and outside the effective calendar of the legislature, so it is not expected to be approved before the 2027 regional elections.

Which electoral reform is being processed

The relevant initiative is the ILP to modify Law 1/1987, Valencian electoral law, registered after collecting more than 10,000 valid signatures. Its central content is:

  • Lowering the electoral threshold from 5 % to 3 % of valid votes.
  • That the threshold is calculated by provincial constituency (Alicante, Castellón, and Valencia), not on the total regional level.
  • Adapting the system so that Les Corts better reflect territorial political pluralism, facilitating the entry of forces with county or local presence, as detailed in the explanatory statement published in the Official Bulletin of Les Corts.

The ILP was declared validly supported by the Electoral Board of the Valencian Community, and the Board of Les Corts, in its meeting on May 12, 2026, agreed to initiate its parliamentary processing and urged the Consell to set criteria and, if applicable, express an opinion on the budgetary impact, as stated in the agreement published in the BOCV on May 22, 2026.

Exact procedural phase in Les Corts

According to the institutional file of the initiative (RE 45,505):

  • The Board agreement of May 12, 2026, declares the start of parliamentary processing of the ILP to reform Law 1/1987.
  • The publication in the BOCV of 05/22/2026 states that the ILP moves to the status of initiative under processing pending action by the Board and advisory bodies, with referral to the Consell to issue criteria and the possibility of requesting an opinion from the Consell Jurídic Consultiu.
  • It is not recorded that the debate on consideration in Plenary has yet taken place, which implies that the reform has not entered the stage of committee or commission, much less final voting.

In parallel, specialized press information indicates that the Consell Jurídic Consultiu (CJC) issued an opinion in July 2026 endorsing the constitutionality of the reduction to 3 %, emphasizing that the Valencian Community has sufficient normative competence and that the proposed threshold fits within the margin of configuration of the regional legislator. This endorsement removes the main legal-constitutional doubt but makes clear that the final decision rests with the political majority of Les Corts, as reported by, among others, media such as Demócrata and the general regional press.

Political situation: initiative blocked de facto

Despite being formally “under processing,” the ILP is, in practice, frozen:

  • The reform of the Valencian Electoral Law requires a qualified two-thirds majority of Les Corts (66 deputies) to modify core elements of the electoral system.
  • The current majority –supported by PP and Vox– has not incorporated the ILP into the effective parliamentary calendar of the last session period, according to agenda chronicles and the agreements of the board of syndics published by Les Corts and analyzed by Demócrata.
  • Recent political press coverage emphasizes that the reform is not among the legislative priorities of the regional government bloc and that, barring a last-minute political shift, it will not be processed in time to apply in the 2027 elections.

In practical terms, therefore, the current phase can be described as follows:

  • Formal status: ILP to reform Law 1/1987 initiated and incorporated into the register of initiatives of Les Corts, pending its consideration by the Plenary and completion of the consultation phase (criteria from the Consell and, if applicable, opinion from the CJC).
  • Political-real status: blockage or shelving of the reform, with no scheduled debate for consideration nor active processing in committee or commission, and no clear majority to reach the required two-thirds.

What does not count as regional “electoral reform”

In the same period, other regulations related to sectoral electoral processes or internal organization have been approved or processed in the Valencian Community (for example, Order 1/2026 on elections in sports federations or the reform of the Rules of Les Corts), but none of these modify the basic rules of the regional elections to Les Corts.

Consequently, as of October 9, 2026, it can be summarized that there is no regional electoral reform in an advanced phase: only an ILP to lower the threshold to 3 % in an initial phase and without sufficient political momentum, so the current rule will remain 5 % unless there is a very substantial change in the remainder of the legislature.

Can you detail what specific changes the ILP proposes regarding Article 12 of Law 1/1987 and how it would alter the seat distribution? What majorities and exact procedure does the Statute and Valencian electoral law require to approve a reform like this? What positions have PP, PSPV, Compromís, and Vox publicly expressed about lowering the threshold from 5 % to 3 % in the Valencian Community?

What are the functions and powers of the President of the Generalitat Valenciana according to the Statute of Autonomy?

According to the Statute of Autonomy of the Valencian Community (Organic Law 5/1982, of July 1, as amended in 2006), the President of the Generalitat is the central figure of the Valencian institutional system. His functions and powers are mainly concentrated in Articles 20, 22, 27, and 28, and they project both over Valencian self-government and the relationship with the State.

Institutional position of the President

Article 20.2 establishes that the Generalitat is composed of three basic institutions: Les Corts Valencianes, the President, and the Consell. That is, the President is part of the core institutional self-government, on equal footing with the Parliament and the Valencian Government.

Article 28.1 specifies this position: the President, who is also head of the Consell, directs the action of the Consell, coordinates its functions, and holds the highest representation of the Valencian Community, as well as the ordinary representation of the State within it. From this derive three basic traits:

  • He is head of the Consell (regional government) and, therefore, the highest authority of the regional executive power.
  • He is the highest political representation of the Valencian Community, both internally and externally.
  • He acts as the ordinary representative of the State in Valencian territory, being the main institutional link between the Generalitat and the General State Administration.

Election, appointment, and political responsibility

The Statute configures the President as a parliamentary-origin magistracy. Article 27.1 establishes that he will be elected by Les Corts from among its members and appointed by the King. The initiative to present candidates corresponds to parliamentary groups, and the entire procedure is carried out according to the Statute and the Rules of Les Corts.

Article 27 details an investiture procedure that essentially follows the general parliamentary logic:

  • After the renewal of Les Corts, the president of the Chamber proposes a candidate, after consulting the groups (art. 27.2).
  • The candidate presents his program and requests the confidence of the Chamber (art. 27.3).
  • In the first vote, an absolute majority is required; if not reached, a second vote forty-eight hours later can succeed by simple majority (art. 27.4).
  • If within two months from the first vote no one obtains confidence, Les Corts are dissolved and new elections are called (art. 27.6).

Once elected, the President is politically responsible before Les Corts. Article 28.2 establishes that Les Corts can demand responsibility from the Consell through a motion of censure, which must be constructive (including an alternative candidate for the Presidency) and requires an absolute majority to be approved. If it passes, the President and the Consell cease, and the candidate of the motion is appointed new President (art. 28.3). Additionally, Article 22 includes among the functions of Les Corts the election of the President and, if applicable, demanding his responsibility (art. 22.c and d).

Political leadership and government functions

As head of the regional executive, the President has a series of leadership and political impetus powers, highlighted in Article 28:

  • Direct the action of the Consell and coordinate its functions (art. 28.1), which implies setting major political orientations and ensuring coherence of government action.
  • Dissolve Les Corts and call elections by decree, after deliberation and agreement of the Consell (art. 28.4), except when there is a motion of censure in process that meets the Rules' requirements. The power of dissolution makes the President a key actor in shaping political timing.
  • Propose the holding of popular consultations within the Valencian Community on matters of general interest in regional or local matters, in accordance with state legislation (art. 28.5). This consultative impulse power reinforces the participatory dimension of self-government.

Moreover, as president of the Consell, the President has decisive influence in the appointment of consellers, whose election statutorily corresponds to the President of the Generalitat himself (art. 29.2), although details are referred to the law of Les Corts. He also intervenes in the promulgation of laws of the Generalitat, which must be promulgated in the name of the King by its President (art. 25.5), underscoring his role as the ultimate guarantor of the formal validity of the regional legal order.

Summary

In sum, the Statute of Autonomy attributes to the President of the Valencian Generalitat a set of functions that combine:

  • Political leadership of the regional executive (direction of the Consell, coordination of its members, and orientation of the government program).
  • Institutional centrality in the self-government system (basic institution of the Generalitat, supreme representation of the Community).
  • Link with the State (ordinary representation of the State in the Valencian Community and promulgation in the name of the King).
  • System configuration powers (dissolution of Les Corts, calling elections, and proposals for popular consultations).

All framed within a parliamentary scheme in which legitimacy and permanence in office ultimately depend on the confidence of Les Corts Valencianes.

Could you explain in more detail how the investiture procedure of the President of the Generalitat works according to the Statute? What are the main differences between the functions of the President of the Generalitat Valenciana and those of the president of another autonomous community, such as Catalonia or Andalusia? How is the motion of censure against the President of the Generalitat Valenciana articulated and what effects does it have on the Consell?

What was the composition of the regional parliament after the last elections in the Valencian Community?

After the last regional elections held in the Valencian Community on May 28, 2023, Les Corts Valencianes were composed of a total of 99 seats distributed among four political forces. This distribution has structured the entire subsequent legislature and explains the current right-wing majority in the Generalitat.

Seat distribution by party

The composition of the regional parliament after the final count was as follows:

  • People's Party (PP): 40 seats
  • PSPV-PSOE: 31 seats
  • Compromís: 15 seats
  • Vox: 13 seats

In total, the 99 seats of Les Corts are distributed only among these four parties. Parties that had representation in previous stages or aspired to enter, such as Unides Podem-EUPV or Ciudadanos, failed to win seats as they did not reach the effective thresholds in the provincial constituencies. Various subsequent reports recall that Unides Podem-EUPV obtained around 3.5 % of the regional votes, failing to surpass the barrier that would have allowed them to enter the chamber.

This distribution has been reiterated in different subsequent analyses of the legislature. For example, a profile on Mónica Oltra published in 2026 reviews the 2023 result and summarizes the map of Les Corts as: PP 40 seats, PSPV 31, Compromís 15, and Vox 13, emphasizing that Unides Podem-EUPV was left out with just over 3.5 % of the votes. Also, later polling analyses take these numbers as a reference when comparing projections for future elections with the actual 2023 result.

Majorities and parliamentary blocs

In Les Corts, the absolute majority is set at 50 seats. From there, the arithmetic of blocs after May 28 can be summarized as follows:

  • Right-wing bloc (PP + Vox): 53 seats (40 + 13). This is a clear absolute majority, three seats above the 50-seat threshold.
  • Left-wing bloc (PSPV + Compromís): 46 seats (31 + 15). They fall four seats short of an absolute majority.

The immediate political consequence of this balance of forces was the end of the Pacte del Botànic cycle (coalition governments of PSPV–Compromís with support from forces to the left of PSOE) and the formation of a coalition government between PP and Vox, with the PP presiding over the Generalitat and Vox as a necessary partner to ensure the parliamentary majority. Various analytical articles note that the right “recovers the Generalitat thanks to Vox’s support” and that the sum of both parties consolidates as the dominant bloc with those 53 deputies.

In practice, this means that:

  • PP alone (40 seats) is far from an absolute majority and needs Vox to approve key laws, budgets, or appointments requiring a qualified majority.
  • Vox, with 13 seats, becomes an indispensable ally: without their support, there is no right-wing absolute majority.
  • PSPV and Compromís, even adding up to 46 seats, do not reach a governing alternative on their own. The exit of Unides Podem-EUPV from parliament leaves the progressive bloc without additional partners with representation.

This arithmetic is recurrently reflected in parliamentary life. Reports on relevant votes, such as the approval of the Generalitat’s budgets or certain laws promoted by the current Consell, highlight that these pass with the votes in favor of PP and Vox against the rejection of PSPV and Compromís, reproducing the 53 versus 46 scheme. Likewise, opposition protest actions are often described as joint initiatives of “the 46 deputies of PSPV and Compromís,” emphasizing their minority status against the conservative majority.

Political summary of the composition

In summary, after the last regional elections in the Valencian Community:

  • Les Corts have 99 deputies distributed among four groups: PP, PSPV-PSOE, Compromís, and Vox.
  • The PP is the leading force (40 seats), followed by PSPV-PSOE (31), Compromís (15), and Vox (13).
  • The absolute majority is guaranteed by the sum of PP and Vox with 53 seats, against the 46 of PSPV and Compromís.
  • Parties to the left of PSPV that ran in coalitions such as Unides Podem-EUPV were left without representation, weakening the progressive bloc’s ability to form a governing alternative in this legislature.

All this explains the current balance of power in the Generalitat: a right-wing executive supported by the parliamentary majority shared by PP and Vox, against an opposition formed by PSPV-PSOE and Compromís that, despite having a considerable number of seats, does not reach the absolute majority threshold.

Can you explain how the seats are distributed by provinces (Alicante, Valencia, and Castellón) in those same 2023 elections? What changes did these results imply compared to the previous legislature in terms of seat gains or losses by party? How has this composition of Les Corts influenced the approval of budgets and main laws of the current Valencian government?

Play

Test your knowledge with FREN!

How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

How many seats could the PSPV-PSOE lose compared to the 2023 elections according to the survey?

Question 1 of 3

Who is the highest-rated leader among the main political leaders according to the survey?

Question 2 of 3

What is the estimated voting intention percentage for the Popular Party (PP) in the survey?

Question 3 of 3