General elections survey: PSOE rises 1.9 points, but PP and Vox would add up to 208 seats, according to DYM

In Spain, the early election at the state level is organized through the early dissolution of the Cortes Generales and the subsequent call for general elections. The basic framework is in the Spanish Constitution (CE), especially in articles 68, 99, and 115, and in the Organic Law 5/1985, of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), supplemented by LO 2/2016 for the case of automatic dissolution due to investiture failure.

1. Who can call early elections and how

The ordinary mechanism for an early election is the early dissolution provided for in article 115 CE:

• Initiative: corresponds to the President of the Government, who can propose the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or both Chambers (Cortes Generales).
• Deliberation and countersignature: the proposal must be deliberated in the Council of Ministers. The dissolution is formalized in a royal decree signed by the King, at the proposal of the President and with his countersignature (art. 115.1 CE and LOREG, provisions on calls by royal decree).
• Content of the decree: according to LOREG, the royal decree must dissolve the Chamber(s) and contain the call for elections, indicating the date of the vote and the number of seats per constituency.
• Publication: the decree is published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) and from that moment the electoral process begins.

2. Material and temporal limits to dissolution

The power to dissolve is not absolute. The Constitution establishes several limits:

• Ongoing motion of no confidence: the President cannot propose dissolution if there is a motion of no confidence underway in the Congress (art. 115.2 CE).
• Minimum period between dissolutions: no new dissolution can occur before one year has passed since the previous one (art. 115.3 CE), except for the special case of article 99.5.
• States of alarm, exception, and siege: while any of these states is declared, the Congress cannot be dissolved (art. 116.5 CE).
• Special case of investiture deadlock: article 99.5 CE provides that if two months pass from the first investiture vote without any candidate obtaining the confidence of the Congress, the King will dissolve both Chambers and call new elections, with the countersignature of the President of the Congress. LO 2/2016 details the special timing rules in this case.

3. Key deadlines for the call and the electoral process

The CE and LOREG set different deadlines, depending on whether the dissolution is ordinary or automatic under art. 99.5 CE:

• General duration of the electoral process (ordinary dissolution): LOREG establishes a process of 54 days from the publication of the royal decree calling the election until the vote (a figure that LO 2/2016 uses as a reference when shortening it in the case of art. 99.5).
• Ordinary electoral campaign: according to LOREG, the campaign:
  • Begins on day 38 after the call.
  • Lasts 15 days.
  • Ends at 00:00 hours on the day immediately before the vote.
• Between dissolution and voting: LOREG specifies the voting day in the royal decree, within that framework of about 54 days for ordinary general elections.
• Between voting and constitution of the Cortes: article 68.6 CE provides that elections to the Congress shall be held between 30 and 60 days from the end of the mandate and that the elected Congress must be convened within 25 days after the elections. This is the reference period for the constitution of the new Cortes.
• Case of art. 99.5 CE (LO 2/2016): the seventh additional provision added to LOREG establishes that:
  • The royal decree calling the election is issued the day after the expiration of the two-month period from the first failed investiture.
  • The elections are held on day 47 after the call (a shorter process than ordinary).
  • The electoral campaign is reduced to 8 days, maintaining other guarantees but shortening deadlines for designations and submission of candidacies.

4. Government in office regime after the call

Once the elections have been held or a loss of confidence has occurred, the CE provides that:

• The Government ceases but continues in office until the new one takes office (art. 101 CE).
• The Government Law limits its actions to the ordinary management of public affairs and to measures essential for reasons of urgency or duly justified general interest.
• It cannot, among other things, approve bills to be sent to the Cortes nor the General State Budget Bill; it can issue royal decree-laws in cases of extraordinary and urgent need, which will be ratified by the Permanent Deputation or by the new Cortes.
• The acting President of the Government cannot raise a vote of confidence nor propose to the King the call for a consultative referendum.

5. Early election in regional parliaments

At the regional level, the possibility of calling early elections depends on each Statute of Autonomy and the respective electoral laws:

• In many communities, the regional president has the power to early dissolve the Parliament and call elections, with temporal limits (for example, not doing so during the first or last year of the legislature or immediately after another dissolution).
• Some regional chambers have “protected” or fixed-duration legislatures, with no or very limited margin for early elections.
• Deadlines for campaign, voting, and constitution usually follow, with adjustments, the LOREG scheme, but always according to the applicable regional regulations.

The President of the Government has a central but not exclusive role in calling general elections. The formal power to dissolve the Cortes and call elections corresponds to the King, but always at the proposal of the President of the Government and with the countersignatures and limits established by the Constitution and the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG).

1. Power to propose early dissolution

The Constitution recognizes the President of the Government the power to propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales and the consequent call for general elections. This power is formalized through a Royal Decree of dissolution and call, signed by the King and countersigned by the President of the Government.

It is a discretionary and political power: the President is not required to legally justify the convenience of dissolution (for example, due to parliamentary deadlock or end of cycle), although he must always respect the constitutional and temporal limits.

2. Material limits to dissolution at the President's initiative

The Constitution establishes several circumstances in which the President cannot propose early dissolution:

• Prohibition during a state of exception or siege: while one of these states is in force, early dissolution cannot be used. This aims to prevent strategic use of elections in a context of exceptional powers.
• Motion of no confidence in process: if a motion of no confidence has been presented and is pending debate and vote, the President cannot neutralize it by dissolving the Chamber and calling elections.
• Recently passed vote of confidence: after passing a vote of confidence raised by the President himself, the Constitution prevents immediate dissolution of the Cortes under that same temporary majority.

These limits ensure that the power of dissolution is not used to evade parliamentary control mechanisms (motion of no confidence and confidence) nor to take advantage of exceptional situations.

3. Temporal limits to early dissolution

The power to dissolve is not completely free in time. The Constitution and LOREG establish that:

• There must be, as a general rule, at least one year between two early dissolutions. That is, the President cannot chain successive dissolutions immediately.
• The ordinary duration of the mandate of Congress and Senate is four years, so if there is no early dissolution, the President must allow the mandate to expire and then the “automatic” dissolution and call for elections occur within the deadlines set by LOREG.

LOREG also specifies the technical deadlines: between the call and the holding of elections there is a set period during which the electoral campaign and electoral operations take place. The call decree, prepared by the Government and countersigned by the President, sets the exact date of the vote within those margins.

4. Role of the King and the President in dissolution

The King does not decide by himself when to dissolve and call elections: he always acts at the proposal of the President of the Government, except in the special case of dissolution due to failed investiture (see next section). The political decision to bring forward elections therefore corresponds to the President, who:

• Deliberates the dissolution proposal in the Council of Ministers.
• Submits to the King the draft Royal Decree of dissolution and call.
• Countersigns the Royal Decree with his signature, assuming the political and legal responsibility for the measure.

5. Automatic dissolution due to failed investiture

There is a different mechanism for calling elections that is not based on the President's political initiative but on a constitutional automatism linked to investiture:

• If no candidate has obtained the confidence of the Congress within two months from the first investiture vote, the Cortes are automatically dissolved.
• In this case, the Constitution provides that the King proceed to the dissolution and call new elections, but the countersignature of the corresponding Royal Decree falls on the presidency of the Congress, not on the President of the Government (who may be acting).

Consequently, in this case the President of the Government does not control the decision to dissolve: it is imposed by the investiture failure and the passage of the constitutional deadline.

6. Government in office and electoral period

Once the dissolution is signed, the Government goes into acting status until the new Executive takes office. The acting President:

• Cannot raise a new vote of confidence.
• Must limit himself to the ordinary management of public affairs, although he can adopt urgent and essential measures, usually through royal decree-laws, which will be controlled by the Permanent Deputation.

Although the key decision (to dissolve and call) has already been made, the President of the Government remains the central institutional figure of reference throughout the electoral process.

Spanish regulations do not set a fixed “mathematical recipe” (for example, a minimum sample size or a specific margin of error) for an electoral poll to be statistically representative. What they do require is methodological transparency and certain technical guarantees, so that any expert can judge whether the poll meets representativeness standards.

1. Basic framework: LOREG (article 69)

The central piece is the Organic Law 5/1985, of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), whose article 69 regulates the publication of electoral polls and surveys during the electoral period. It does not define “representativeness” with a concrete number, but requires that every published poll be accompanied by a very detailed technical sheet:

• Identification of the responsible party: name and address of the entity (public or private) conducting the survey and of the one commissioning it.
• Mandatory technical characteristics that must be published when disseminating the survey:
  • The sampling system used (simple random, stratified, quota, etc.).
  • The sample size (number of interviews conducted).
  • The margin of error of the sample.
  • The level of representativeness (usually, statistical confidence level, e.g., 95%).
  • The selection procedure of the surveyed individuals.
  • The dates of fieldwork.
• Complete questionnaire: full text of all questions asked.
• No response: number of people who did not answer each question.

These requirements do not guarantee representativeness by themselves but require revealing all necessary elements to evaluate it (how the sample was made, how much error it has, etc.).

2. Role of the Central Electoral Board

LOREG itself entrusts the Central Electoral Board (JEC) with ensuring:

• That published surveys do not contain forgeries, concealments, or deliberate manipulations.
• The effective compliance with the above technical specifications.

The JEC can require the survey conductor to provide additional technical information to verify its quality. Violations of the electoral survey regime can be sanctioned with significant fines, and there are even criminal cases for serious breaches.

3. Instruction 1/2024 JEC: surveys by public bodies

Instruction 1/2024 of the JEC develops article 69.8 of LOREG for voting intention surveys conducted by bodies dependent on Public Administrations (such as the CIS or equivalent regional bodies) during electoral periods. It requires that:

• Before starting fieldwork, the survey must be reported to the JEC.
• That report must include, again, the complete description of technical characteristics:
  • Sampling system.
  • Estimated sample size.
  • Estimated margin of error.
  • Level of representativeness.
  • Selection procedure of respondents and survey technique (phone, online, face-to-face, etc.).
  • Planned dates of fieldwork and study completion.

Again, the JEC does not impose a fixed number of interviews or a maximum error, but it conditions the actions of public bodies on the design being technically justifiable and transparent.

4. Sociological Research Center (CIS)

Royal Decree 1214/1997, on the organization of the Sociological Research Center, does not set concrete parameters for sample size or error of electoral surveys, but it does establish:

• The obligation that CIS surveys enter its database without personal identifying data.
• The need to carry out verification, cleaning, and anonymization operations before dissemination.
• That the available documentation allows the correct use of the data, which in practice implies complete technical sheets.
• That when preparing custom tabulations, CIS assesses whether the cross-tabulations “maintain sufficient scientific rigor, due to sample size.”

That is, it is explicitly recognized that sample size sufficiency is a technical criterion but is not converted into a legally fixed figure.

5. Practical standards of representativeness

In practice, statistical representativeness in Spain is judged by combining these regulatory elements with professional standards in polling:

• Use of sampling methods appropriate to the universe (preferably probabilistic or, if quota-based, with solid justification).
• Sufficient coverage of the entire reference census (territory, age, sex, municipality size, etc.).
• Sample size and margin of error consistent with the study objectives (for example, not attempting to read small constituencies with very small samples).
• Complete publication of the technical sheet required by LOREG.
• Absence of obvious biases (in the questionnaire, sample selection, or treatment of non-response) that distort the result.

In short, Spanish regulations require very demanding technical transparency and grant control powers to the JEC, but leave to statistical science—and public scrutiny—the concrete assessment of whether a poll can be considered statistically representative.