The rise in interest rates returns the war for deposits: which banks have more margin to pay the saver

Modifying the remuneration requirements for bank deposits in Spain (for example, imposing minimums, limits, or new obligations on rates and fees) does not involve a single procedure, but several possible routes, depending on the scope of the intervention and the limits set by EU law. Broadly speaking, there are three layers: law, government regulation, and supervisor regulations (Bank of Spain, and to a lesser extent CNMV).

1. Framework and limits established by the EU

Price setting in retail banking is situated at the intersection between:

• European prudential regulation (Regulation (EU) 575/2013 and its development), which conditions how banks manage resources and liquidity.
• Conduct and payment account regulations (for example Directive 2014/92/EU and its delegated regulations), which harmonize transparency, information on fees, and comparability of accounts and deposits.
• Rules on resolution and deposit guarantee (BRRD, deposit guarantee schemes directive and recent reforms), which affect saver protection and how guarantee funds are used.

Any Spanish measure imposing minimum rates, ceilings, or mandatory remuneration schemes must be compatible with this architecture: it cannot violate freedom of establishment, competition rules, or the harmonized depositor protection framework. A major change may require dialogue with the European Commission and the ECB and, in practice, may be heavily constrained by the Banking Union regulations.

2. Changes requiring law or royal decree-law

Today the “skeleton” of the system is in rules such as Law 10/2014 on the organization, supervision, and solvency of credit institutions and other financial and consumer legislation. If one wants to:

• Introduce a general regime for price intervention on deposits, or
• Radically modify the competences of the Bank of Spain regarding transparency and market conduct,

the usual approach would be to reform laws of this level.

The procedure would be the ordinary one for a law:

• The Government drafts a preliminary bill (impact assessment, formal public consultations), approves it as a bill in the Council of Ministers, and submits it to the Congress.
• In Congress, there is a general debate, committee phase with reports and amendments, and a final vote in Plenary.
• The text goes to the Senate (which can amend or veto) and returns to Congress, which has the final say.
• The law is sanctioned, promulgated, and published in the Official State Gazette (BOE).

If urgent action is intended (for example, in a context of financial crisis or interest rates), the Government could opt for a royal decree-law, which:

• Is approved directly in the Council of Ministers and comes into force upon publication.
• Must be ratified by Congress within 30 days, potentially becoming a bill to introduce amendments.

3. Regulatory development: royal decrees and ministerial orders

Once the legal framework is set, many details about deposits are regulated by regulation. A key case is Order EHA/2899/2011, on transparency and client protection in banking services, which:

• Develops the powers of the Ministry of Economy to protect banking clients.
• Defines what information must be given about rates, fees, and remuneration, including remuneration in kind.

To adjust information obligations, advertising formats, APR calculation, or limits on certain commercial practices related to deposits, in many cases it would suffice:

• With a new ministerial order (or modification of the existing one), following the regulatory procedure: prior public consultation, hearing and public information, mandatory reports (including, when applicable, from the Council of State), and approval by the head of the competent ministry.
• Or with a royal decree from the Government if higher rank is desired or technical aspects of several laws or supervisors are affected.

4. Bank of Spain regulations and soft law

A very relevant part of the “day-to-day” remuneration is defined through:

• Bank of Spain circulars, issued under legal authorizations and Order EHA/2899/2011, which specify:
  • Minimum information on deposits (demand, savings, term deposits).
  • How total remuneration is calculated and communicated, including in kind.
  • Models of reserved statements on conduct, transparency, and client protection.
• Criteria and guides of good banking practices, which guide entities’ actions and serve as reference in complaint resolution.

To modify them, the Bank of Spain follows its own internal procedure: technical drafting, sector consultations when appropriate, approval by the Executive Commission, and publication in the BOE (in the case of circulars). These tools do not set a mandatory minimum rate, but they can effectively limit how and under what conditions retail savings are remunerated.

5. Practical summary

In summary, if one wanted to “touch” deposit remuneration in Spain, the specific channel would depend on the level of ambition:

• Small adjustments in transparency or marketing: modification of ministerial orders and Bank of Spain circulars.
• Redesign of supervisor powers and objectives: reform of laws such as Law 10/2014, via bill or royal decree-law.
• Structural intervention in prices or guarantees: coordinate internal legal reforms with the European framework, to avoid incompatibilities with Banking Union and depositor protection regulations.

In the Spanish and EU legal systems, there is no “banking competition authority” in the strict sense attributed to the Bank of Spain or the European Central Bank. The ECB and the Bank of Spain are primarily prudential supervisors (solvency, risks, stability), while the oversight of competition in banking markets mainly corresponds to competition defense authorities (in Spain, the CNMC, under Law 15/2007 on Defense of Competition). However, both the ECB and the Bank of Spain exercise certain competences that indirectly affect the structure and competitive dynamics of the sector.

1. General framework: Banking Union and competition authorities

The division of functions is supported by several texts:

• Law 10/2014 on the organization, supervision, and solvency of credit institutions, and its development by Royal Decree 84/2015, designate the Bank of Spain as the prudential supervisory authority in Spain, within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), “in cooperation and without prejudice to the competences directly attributed to the ECB” by Regulation (EU) 1024/2013.
• The Single Supervisory Mechanism, as summarized by Royal Decree 84/2015, assigns the ECB supervisory functions (including authorizations, revocations, and sanctions) over credit institutions, exercising direct supervision over significant entities and indirect supervision over less significant ones through national competent authorities (in Spain, the Bank of Spain).
• The Statute of the ESCB and the ECB (Protocol annexed to the EU Treaty) establishes that the ESCB “shall act according to the principle of an open market economy with free competition” and that it will contribute to prudential supervision policies and financial system stability, but it does not make it a competition authority.
• Law 15/2007 on Defense of Competition, after its reform by Law 3/2013, entrusts the CNMC with the application of antitrust rules (prohibition of cartels, abuse of dominant position, and merger control) also in the banking sector, providing for coordination with sectoral regulators.

2. Bank of Spain: prudential supervisor with impact on competition

Law 10/2014 and its regulatory development establish that the Bank of Spain is the supervisory authority of credit institutions in Spain, within the SSM framework. Its competences include:

• Microprudential supervision of less significant entities (significant ones fall directly under the ECB), including monitoring their solvency, corporate governance, risk control, and liquidity, as well as preparing an annual supervisory program.
• Collection of “all necessary information from credit institutions” and powers to intervene in case of solvency regulation breaches, up to, in serious situations, intervention and replacement of governing bodies.
• Prudential sanctioning power against entities and their administrators for infringements of Law 10/2014 and related rules.
• Macroprudential competences regarding capital buffers (countercyclical buffer, systemic risk buffer, buffers for systemic entities) to mitigate risks that may affect the financial system as a whole.

None of these functions equate to “competition supervision” in the antitrust law sense. However, the Bank of Spain significantly influences the competitive structure of the sector:

• It issues technical reports in bank mergers and acquisitions processes, which the CNMC considers when assessing effects on competition and stability.
• It regulates and supervises transparency and good banking practices (through circulars and guides), affecting offer comparability and market discipline.
• It cooperates with the CNMC and other European authorities when analyzing practices or concentrations impacting the financial sector.

3. European Central Bank: significant supervision, not antitrust

According to Law 10/2014 and Royal Decree 84/2015, which incorporate Regulation (EU) 1024/2013:

• The ECB assumes direct supervision of the main banking groups (“significant entities”) in the euro area, including large Spanish banks.
• It shares with national authorities the common procedures (authorization and revocation of entities, acquisitions of significant holdings, suitability of senior managers).
• It can impose additional prudential requirements (e.g., higher capital levels) and sanction breaches of prudential regulations.
• At the macroprudential level, it can strengthen capital buffers set nationally when deemed necessary for the financial stability of the euro area.

The ECB, therefore, conditions the number and size of operators, their capital costs, and their ability to compete, but is not the authority responsible for applying competition rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), which remain with the European Commission and national competition authorities, including the CNMC for Spain. Its mandate, according to the ESCB Statute, is to ensure price stability and contribute to financial stability, acting within a framework of free competition, but it does not investigate or resolve antitrust cases.

In summary, “banking competition” in the legal-economic sense is mainly overseen by the CNMC (and at the EU level by the Commission), while the Bank of Spain and the ECB are prudential supervisors whose powers—especially in authorizations, solvency, and macroprudential matters—have a strong structural effect on how and with whom competition occurs in the banking market, but without being competition authorities in the strict sense.

The current president of CaixaBank is Tomàs (Tomás) Muniesa Arantegui, who has held the presidency of the entity since January 1, 2025, in a non-executive role, while the daily executive management rests with the CEO, Gonzalo Gortázar.

Regarding his political affiliation, the information available in specialized public office databases and recent news does not record known membership in any political party nor the holding of organic or institutional partisan positions. His profile is that of a financial executive with a long career, linked to the La Caixa group and the insurance and banking business, without a personal political projection or presence in parliaments or governments. This does not exclude personal opinions on economics or geopolitics—in fact, as president of CaixaBank he has spoken at public forums—but there is no record of him being a “leader” or representative of any party.

Professional background of Tomàs Muniesa

Muniesa’s career has been developed almost entirely in the banking and insurance field linked to La Caixa:

• Professional origins: according to the biography recorded in the administrative office database, Muniesa (Barcelona, 1952) joined the then Caja de Pensiones para la Vejez y de Ahorros de Cataluña y Baleares (La Caixa) in the 1970s. A notable point in his career is that he started as a unionist at La Caixa in 1976, before taking on managerial responsibilities. This combination of union origin and later jump to senior management is relatively unique in the sector.
• Education: he has training in business management and administration at ESADE, one of Spain’s leading business schools, which reinforces a technical and managerial profile rather than a political one.
• Rise within the La Caixa group: over the following decades, he held various positions of responsibility within the group, especially in the insurance and asset management area. This area is strategic for CaixaBank, as it integrates the insurance and pension fund business that complements traditional banking activity.
• General director of the insurance and asset management area (2011–2018): with the establishment of CaixaBank as a listed bank and the group’s reorganization, Muniesa became general director of the insurance and asset management area of CaixaBank between 2011 and 2018. From this position, he led the development of companies such as VidaCaixa and SegurCaixa Adeslas, key pieces of the group in life, health, and other insurance lines.
• Vice president and shareholder representative director of CaixaBank (since 2018): after leaving direct day-to-day management in the insurance area, Muniesa remained linked to the group’s top management as vice president and shareholder representative director of CaixaBank, representing the main shareholder linked to the “la Caixa” Foundation. This shareholder representative status reflects that he acts as a representative of the main shareholder, not as an independent or executive.
• Positions in the La Caixa ecosystem: simultaneously, he has held leadership roles in companies within the group’s environment, such as VidaCaixa, SegurCaixa Adeslas, the ESADE Foundation, or Allianz Portugal, consolidating his profile as an executive specialized in bancassurance and asset management, with board presence inside and outside Spain.
• Presidency of CaixaBank (since 2025): as recorded both in stakeholder databases and various economic chronicles, Muniesa assumed the non-executive presidency of CaixaBank on January 1, 2025, replacing José Ignacio Goirigolzarri, who was the president who led the Bankia-CaixaBank merger. In 2026, he systematically appears in public documentation as president of CaixaBank, while Gonzalo Gortázar continues as CEO.

In his current role, Muniesa embodies the model of non-executive presidency that has become widespread in European banking: focusing on the functioning of the board of directors, corporate governance, strategy oversight, and shareholder relations, while operational execution and daily management rest with the CEO.

In sum, the president of CaixaBank is a long-serving executive within the group, with union origins and subsequent development in senior banking and insurance management, and there is no record of active party affiliation or political party positions. His public relevance derives from his role in the Spanish financial system, not from an institutional political career.