Read here the 55-page police report on the mass entry recorded in Ceuta on July 30 and 31, 2026. The document was prepared by the National Immigration and Borders Center (CENIF), dependent on the General Commissariat of Immigration and Borders, and sent to the magistrate of the National Court María Tardón.
Read and download here the police report on Ceuta
DOCUMENT | Police report from the National Immigration and Borders Center on the mass entry in Ceuta
The report reconstructs the events before, during, and after the arrival of tens of thousands of people to the autonomous city. Its conclusions rule out that it was an occasional or spontaneous episode and point to the existence of prior planning, strategic direction, and coordination on the ground.
The Police rule out that it was something spontaneous
The document analyzes the calls disseminated on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and closed WhatsApp groups; the movements to the border; the actions of the Moroccan security forces; the different profiles of the people who entered Ceuta and the institutional, political, and geopolitical effects of the crisis.
The first conclusion of CENIF is that the events must be analyzed as a process composed of three phases: a prior preparation stage, the mobilization developed during July 30 and 31 and a subsequent phase whose effects were still ongoing when the report was closed.
"It is not something incidental whose generation can be associated with an occasional or spontaneous factor," states the document published by Demócrata.
The Police compare what happened with the entries recorded in Ceuta during 2021 and 2024. According to the analysis, the experience gained in those episodes would have allowed for the organization to be refined and to turn the mobilization of 2026 into a "much more complex and elaborate" action.
The chosen location, the specific access areas, the date, the time slots, and the different profiles mobilized are considered elements whose coincidence reveals prior planning.
The migratory purpose would have functioned as a cover
The report states that immigration operated as a "formal cover" to direct a massive flow of people towards Ceuta.
The researchers base this conclusion on the fact that approximately 90% of those who entered the city did not remain in Spanish territory and later returned to Morocco. Only about 10% would have maintained behavior compatible with that of conventional irregular immigration.
For the CENIF, the main objective would not have been to permanently relocate tens of thousands of people to Spain, but to provoke a mobilization capable of overwhelming the border system and generating institutional, political, and geopolitical consequences.
"Active guidance" by Moroccan forces
One of the most relevant passages of the report refers to the actions of the Moroccan Security Forces.
The document notes a Moroccan police and military presence significantly lower than usual during the first hours of the entry. It also includes testimonies and images in which uniformed agents and plainclothes individuals would have given directions to those moving towards the border.
In its conclusions, the CENIF explicitly speaks of the "active guidance" of the mass towards the crossing points by the Moroccan security forces.
The report does not literally state that the Moroccan Government planned or executed the entirety of the operation. It also does not identify the chain of command or the person who would have made the decision. It does attribute to Moroccan agents specific behaviors that facilitated movement towards the entry points.
The tactic to collapse the Ceuta border
The Police describe a tactical configuration developed in two phases.
The first would have sought to collapse the border management system in a specific place and manner. The massive arrival by sea forced Spain to dedicate resources to rescue efforts, saturated reception and containment areas, and reduced the available resources to maintain perimeter surveillance.
Once the collapse was provoked and the "opening of doors" occurred, the second objective would have been to "eliminate Spain's response capacity."
The report observes that at that moment the profile of the people accessing Ceuta changed. Young men from the first waves were joined by families, women, and minors, which further limited the possibilities for action of the Spanish forces.
The mafias did not have the capacity to organize the mobilization
The report rules out the participation of the criminal organizations known to the Police as responsible for the call.
The CENIF assures that it monitored the groups, profiles, and phones commonly used by networks dedicated to human trafficking and that it found no references to those organizations promoting mass entry.
The investigators consider that the mafias operating in Morocco did not have the capacity to immediately mobilize between 75,000 and 85,000 people, coordinate their arrival, modify the profiles of the different waves, and simultaneously control the movements of entry and exit.
The document does detect an economic exploitation afterwards by organizations and individuals who clandestinely transported some people from Ceuta to the Peninsula.
An alert about the CNI and the destabilization of Spain
The CENIF concludes that the effects of the entry projected onto different areas.
On the institutional level, it caused the saturation of the capacities for prevention, containment, assistance, and response. In civil society, it affected public safety, health, trust in institutions, and the exercise of rights.
The report also notes an "evident internal political destabilization," a deterioration of Spain's international image, and coordination problems among the different structures of the State.
The last warning directly affects the National Intelligence Center. The document points out that the questioning of the CNI's ability to detect what happened ended up becoming what the investigators describe as a "manual offensive counterintelligence action."