89% of Spaniards blame Morocco for the Ceuta crisis and 63% disapprove of Sánchez's management.

A survey by 40dB for EL PAÍS and Cadena SER reflects broad support for tightening border control and speeding up returns, while Vox appears as the party considered most capable of managing immigration.

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The management of the migration crisis in Ceuta leaves a strong weariness for the Government and a practically widespread perception of Morocco's responsibility. 89% of Spaniards attribute "much" or "quite a lot" of responsibility to the Moroccan Government for the massive entry of migrants on July 30 and 31, according to a 40dB survey for EL PAÍS and Cadena SER.

The attribution of responsibilities also reaches the Spanish Executive. 72% believe that the Government of Spain had "much" or "quite a lot" of responsibility in what happened, while 75% point to the mafias and networks of irregular immigration, 74% to the dissemination on social networks of false information, and 73% to the individuals who decided to cross the border.

Sánchez receives a strong failing grade for his management

The assessment of the actions of the President of the Government is mostly negative. 62.7% believe that Pedro Sánchez managed the crisis "badly" or "very badly": 12.8% choose the first response and 49.9%, the second. In contrast, only 14.2% rate his performance as "good" or "very good".

The speed of the response appears as one of the main weak points. Two out of three respondents rate negatively the speed with which the Executive reacted: 18.6% consider it "bad" and 47.7%, "very bad".

Negative assessments also prevail when asked about the cohesion, transparency, and effectiveness of the Government during the crisis. Discontent, according to 40dB data, even reaches a part of the socialist electorate, where more people rate the Executive poorly in effectiveness and speed than those who approve of it.

More supporters of hardening the relationship with Morocco

The results also reflect the impact of the crisis on the perception of bilateral relations. 45.7% believe that Spain should harden its relationship with Morocco and reduce cooperation, compared to 36.8% who advocate strengthening it because they consider Rabat's collaboration essential to control the border.

8.2% opt to maintain relations in their current situation and 9.3% do not know what position to adopt.

The results contrast with the line defended so far by the Government, which has emphasized Moroccan cooperation in returns and maintains that there is no conclusive evidence that allows attributing to the Moroccan Government the planning of the massive entry.

Vox, the party considered most capable of managing immigration

The scenario drawn by the survey especially benefits Vox. 27% points to Santiago Abascal's party as the most capable of managing immigration, ahead of the PSOE, with 18.4%, and the PP, with 13.9%.

The data also reveals a significant leak in the perception of the popular electorate: about 23% of those intending to vote for the PP believe that Vox would manage immigration better, while only 2.4% of potential Vox voters choose the PP.

However, there is a data point that nuances the result: 23% of the population does not consider any of the parties the most qualified to manage immigration, practically as many as those who choose Vox.

The general assessment of the migratory phenomenon also yields a negative balance. 53.6% considers that immigration is "rather negative" for Spain, compared to 33.1% who perceive it as "rather positive".

64% reject questioning the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla

The survey also addresses the debate about the future of the two autonomous cities. 63.6% believes that Spain should not question Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, while 16.8% would be willing to talk with Morocco about their future.

Another 15.7% believes that it should primarily be the inhabitants of Ceuta and Melilla who decide, while only 3.9% thinks that Spain should consider ceding the cities to Morocco to improve bilateral relations.

The defense of sovereignty remains when asked about the consequences that citizens would be willing to assume. 63.8% would support the participation of the Army in a war in the event of an external aggression against Ceuta or Melilla and 53.9% would assume economic consequences arising from sanctions against Morocco.

Support decreases in other scenarios: 44.6% would be willing to pay more taxes to increase defense spending and 41% states that they would personally participate in the defense of Ceuta and Melilla if called to do so.

The crisis remains, moreover, very present among Spaniards. More than 83% claim to have closely followed the events and 72.2% believe that episodes like the one that occurred at the end of July will happen "regularly" in the future. Concern is the predominant feeling, cited by 53.2% of respondents.

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What is the parliamentary status of the latest legal reform on migration management at Spanish borders?

As of today (September 7, 2026), the latest legal reform on migration management linked to Spanish borders currently in parliament is the Bill approving urgent measures to guarantee the best interests of children and adolescents in extraordinary migration contingency situations, stemming from Royal Decree‑Law 2/2025. This bill is being processed in the Congress of Deputies under file number 121/000055 and is still in the amendment phase, with the deadline extended until September 9, 2026.

1. Identification of the relevant reform

Royal Decree‑Law 2/2025, of March 18, approved urgent measures to address extraordinary migration contingencies linked to the arrival of unaccompanied foreign minors, in a context of pressure at the borders. This decree‑law:

  • Introduces new provisions into the Organic Law 4/2000 on Foreigners (articles 35 bis, 35 ter, 35 quáter, and 35 quinquies) regarding the model for managing extraordinary migration contingencies.
  • Regulates the declaration of migration contingency, territorial distribution of minors, and the role of the General State Administration vis-à-vis the autonomous communities.
  • Is expressly enacted under Article 149.1.2 of the Spanish Constitution (state competence in immigration and foreigners) and is aimed at situations of massive border entry.

After its approval and publication in the Official State Gazette, the Congress agreed to process it as a bill, allowing changes via amendments.

2. Current parliamentary status

In the database of initiatives of the General Courts, the processing appears as follows:

  • Type of initiative: Bill stemming from Royal Decree‑Law (RDL 2/2025).
  • Chamber: Congress of Deputies.
  • Identifiers: 130/000016 (phase as decree‑law) and 121/000055 (phase as bill).
  • Status: bill under processing, with the deadline for submitting amendments extended until September 9, 2026.
  • Procedure: processed by urgent procedure, as stated in the official publication.
  • File and latest documents: can be consulted on the Congress portal (initiative detail 121/000055).

The repeated extension of the amendment deadline indicates that the text has not yet moved to the committee drafting or report phase. That is, the substantive core of the reform — including provisions on managing migration contingencies at borders and the redistribution of minors — can still be modified by parliamentary groups.

3. Expected procedural next steps

If the amendment deadline finally closes, the procedure would generally follow this path:

  • Committee drafting: appointment of a drafting committee in the competent commission to prepare a consolidated text based on the bill and amendments.
  • Committee report: the commission debates the drafting committee's report, may introduce additional changes, and approves a report.
  • Congress plenary: debate and vote on the text, with the possibility of total or article-by-article amendments at this stage.
  • Referral to the Senate: if approved by the Congress, the text goes to the Senate, which may approve, veto, or amend it.
  • Possible second reading in the Congress: if necessary, to lift a Senate veto or decide on its amendments.
  • Sanction and publication: once definitively approved, it is sent to the King for sanction and subsequent publication in the Official State Gazette.
4. Related reforms and broader context

In parallel to this bill, the Government has approved the Draft Organic Law amending the Foreigners Law and a Draft new Asylum Law (Council of Ministers agreements of August 25, 2026), precisely to adapt the Spanish framework to the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. However, both texts are still in the governmental draft phase, so they have not yet entered Parliament as bills.

Also underway in the Congress is the processing of other initiatives affecting the Foreigners Law, such as the Organic Law Proposal from the Mixed Group in the Senate to restrict regularization by roots, whose file sent to Congress (124/000038) shares the same amendment extension horizon until September 9, 2026. However, its main object is regularization and roots, not border flow management.

In summary, the most recent and operative parliamentary reform directly impacting the management of exceptional migration situations at the border is the bill derived from Royal Decree‑Law 2/2025, which remains in an initial processing phase, pending the end of the amendment period in the Congress.

What powers does the President of the Government of Spain have in foreign relations according to the Constitution?

The Spanish Constitution does not detail in depth the "personalized" foreign policy powers of the President of the Government, but it does establish a clear framework from which his powers in international relations derive. Essentially, the president directs the Government's action, and the Government is the constitutionally competent body to conduct the State's foreign policy.

General framework: direction of foreign policy

The starting point is Article 97 of the Spanish Constitution, which assigns the Government the direction of internal and external policy, civil and military administration, and the defense of the State. This means that:

  • Conducting foreign relations is primarily the competence of the Government as a whole.
  • The president, as head of the Government, is the one who guides, coordinates, and assumes the highest political responsibility over that foreign policy.

The Constitution does not list "one by one" the president's foreign policy powers, but by assigning him the headship of the Government and direction of its action, most important decisions in this area politically and functionally pass through him.

Constitutional position of the president

Article 98 of the Spanish Constitution regulates the President of the Government and establishes that:

  • He directs the Government's action.
  • He coordinates the functions of the other members of the Government.

Applied to foreign relations, this implies that the president:

  • Sets the general lines of foreign policy (geographical priorities, alliances, position in the EU and international organizations, etc.).
  • Coordinates the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments with external projection (defense, economy, ecological transition, etc.).
  • Assumes the political representation of the Government in summits, official visits, and high-level negotiations, although legally the representation of the State before other States corresponds to the King.

Relation with the King's competencies abroad

The Constitution reserves the King some formal functions in international matters, mainly in Article 63 of the Spanish Constitution:

  • Represents the State in international relations.
  • Accredits ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives.
  • Expresses the State's consent to treaties, according to the Constitution and laws.

However, these functions are exercised always countersigned by the Government, usually by the president or the competent minister, who assume political responsibility. In constitutional practice:

  • The Government — and at its apex the president — determines the content and timing of treaties, recognition of States or governments, alliances, etc.
  • The King formalizes these decisions through acts requiring government countersignature, without which they are invalid.

International treaties and parliamentary control

The Constitution assigns the General Courts a central role in treaties (Articles 93 and 94 of the Spanish Constitution): authorization of certain political, military treaties, those affecting fundamental rights and duties, public finance, or involving transfer of powers to supranational organizations.

Here the president's powers arise from his position at the head of the Government:

  • He promotes, on behalf of the Government, the negotiation of treaties and international agreements.
  • He decides the submission to the General Courts of treaties requiring authorization or denunciation.
  • He defends, personally or through ministers, before Parliament the Executive's position on those treaties.

Foreign relations and security and defense

The connection between foreign policy and defense also places the president in a key position:

  • The Government directs the defense of the State (art. 97 CE), which includes participation in military alliances or international missions.
  • Article 63.3 of the Spanish Constitution reserves to the King, with authorization from the General Courts, the declaration of war and peace, but again this decision is taken at the initiative of the Government, headed by the president.

Summary

In short, according to the Constitution, the President of the Government is not the formal holder of all foreign relations powers (which are shared with the King, the Government as a collegiate body, and the General Courts), but he is the political center of direction of the State's external action: he sets the major orientations, coordinates the involved ministers, promotes negotiation and approval of treaties, and assumes political responsibility for the Government's international decisions.

What were the results of the last general elections for Vox, PSOE, and PP in Ceuta and Melilla?

I have not found in the consulted sources specific and detailed data on votes and percentages for Vox, PSOE, and PP in Ceuta and Melilla in the last general elections. The search in the database of the newspaper Demócrata and other texts related to the general elections and the July 23, 2023 (23J) returns information on national results, polls, bloc balances, and Congress composition, but not a specific table of results by constituency for these two autonomous cities.

In the research trail, there appear, for example, analyses on the arithmetic of the Congress after 23J, the role of the PP–Vox–UPN bloc with 171 seats, or articles evaluating the evolution of support for PP, PSOE, and Vox in subsequent polls. However, these are always:

  • Results at the national level (vote percentage and seat estimates across Spain).
  • Post-election opinion studies (poll averages, voting intention evolution, comparisons with 23J).
  • Parliamentary analyses discussing the "investiture bloc" and the sum of seats of PP, Vox, PSOE, and other groups.

None of these materials include the territorial detail level you ask for (Ceuta constituency on one hand and Melilla on the other, with the exact number of votes and percentage for each of the three parties). Attempts were also made to restrict the search by dates around July 23, 2023, and by term combinations such as "final scrutiny," "votes," or "percentage," both for Ceuta and Melilla, without finding tables or specific summaries for these constituencies.

This does not mean the data do not exist, only that within the corpus consulted to prepare this answer, there is no document explicitly recording "how many votes and what percentage Vox, PSOE, and PP obtained in Ceuta" and "how many votes and what percentage Vox, PSOE, and PP obtained in Melilla" in the last general elections. That information is usually available but in more technical or specialized channels than general analysis articles.

To obtain precisely what you ask — that is, the exact numerical data of votes and vote percentage of each party in each autonomous city — the most reliable approach is to refer to:

  • Official electoral results databases, which allow filtering by constituency and candidacy and reconstructing the result in each territory. These platforms usually allow exporting results by autonomous city and, within it, checking how many votes each list received and what percentage it represented of the valid votes cast.
  • Result reports published after each call, where annexes with tables by constituency are often included. Sometimes summaries of "main results by province and autonomous city" are also published, which at least indicate which party was first, second, or third.
  • In some cases, the parties themselves prepare internal or public materials with territorial breakdowns of their results, comparing what they obtained in Ceuta and Melilla with previous elections. These documents can serve as a contrast, although the primary reference remains the official scrutiny data.

The advantage of consulting those repositories is that they will allow you to:

  • See the exact number of votes for Vox, PSOE, and PP in Ceuta and Melilla.
  • Check the percentage over the total valid vote (and, if interested, over the census or turnout).
  • Contrast those data with previous general elections or other types of elections.

Since your query is very specific and numerical, and the sources handled in this research do not include that territorial detail level, any figure I provided without relying on an explicit document would be speculative. For rigor, it is preferable to refer to official results and not invent percentages or vote totals.

If you want, in a subsequent query I can help you interpret the data once you have them (for example, comparing how Vox, PSOE, and PP behaved in Ceuta versus Melilla, or versus the national average, or among different calls).

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How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

What percentage of Spaniards primarily blame Morocco for the Ceuta crisis according to the survey?

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Which party is considered by the highest percentage of respondents as the most capable of managing immigration?

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What percentage of respondents reject questioning Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla?

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