Germany: the debacle of the CDU in the elections of Saxony-Anhalt puts Friedrich Merz under pressure

Based on the information available from the sources consulted, there is no evidence that the CDU has made public any specific, formalized, or scheduled “internal processing” to redefine its strategy after the Saxony-Anhalt elections. In fact, recent articles from the newspaper Demócrata focus on the electoral scenario prior to September 6, 2026, and the possible AfD majority, but do not yet report a systematized internal process within the CDU following those elections.

The most relevant text found is Demócrata's report on Saxony-Anhalt, which describes a very adverse context for Chancellor Friedrich Merz's CDU: polls place AfD above 40 % of the votes, with a lead of about twenty points over the CDU, which would be around 22 %. The article itself emphasizes that these elections represent a “direct challenge” for Merz and that the result will be read as an assessment of his ability to contain AfD. However, the analysis stops there: no bodies, documents, working groups, or internal steps already agreed upon to redefine the party's strategic line based on that result are detailed.

It is also important to consider the timing: the Demócrata pieces consulted are written on the eve of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt or within the general framework of the regional “super election year” in Germany. They describe:

• The risk that AfD will achieve an absolute majority or a blocking minority in the Land.
• The difficulty of forming governments without AfD where the far-right is the leading force.
• The political pressure these results exert on the federal coalition led by the CDU.

But at no point is it mentioned that the federal or regional leadership of the CDU has already approved a specific internal procedure to “redefine its strategy” linked to a formal party decision (for example, a presidium resolution, the convening of a programmatic congress, or the opening of a strategy commission on eastern Germany). Nor do leaks, draft papers, or internal debates sufficiently concrete enough to speak of an ongoing processing with identifiable phases and milestones appear.

In the absence of that information, the only thing that can be stated with foundation from the sources is the following:

• The CDU faces a critical scenario in Saxony-Anhalt, where, according to polls reproduced by Demócrata, it could lose more than fifteen points compared to 2021 and fall far behind AfD.
• That result is expected to trigger internal debate: the analysis itself points out that what happens in Saxony-Anhalt will be interpreted as a test of Merz's federal strategy against the advance of the far-right.
• However, there is still no documentary trace of a formalized procedure of “strategic redefinition” that would allow describing what phase it would be in (diagnosis, proposal development, internal voting, etc.).

Generally, in similar situations, major German parties usually open internal reflection processes after a defeat or a regional electoral upheaval, combining debate at the leadership level, in parliamentary groups, and in territorial structures. However, in this specific case, there is no verifiable data in the sources consulted confirming that the CDU has already launched such a mechanism specifically linked to the Saxony-Anhalt result, much less allowing it to be dated or its steps described.

Consequently, and strictly adhering to the information found, the most accurate statement is that, to date, the public sources analyzed:

• Do not report a defined internal processing in the CDU to review its strategy after the Saxony-Anhalt elections.
• Only emphasize the political relevance of the expected result and the tensions it may generate, but without describing concrete organic responses beyond the need for reflection.

Therefore, the state of the matter, from the point of view of the available information, is one of public indefinition: everything points to the CDU being pushed to reopen its strategic debate if the anticipated poor result in Saxony-Anhalt is confirmed, but so far there is no evidence of a formal internal procedure developed enough to say it is in a specific phase of “processing.”

I do not have a mandate to conduct detailed research or specialized analysis on German legislation and institutional functioning: I am specifically designed to work with information about the political and institutional system of Spain (General Courts, state and regional governments, Spanish regulations, Spanish political actors, etc.).

Your question involves two different levels:

• The presidency of the CDU, which is an internal position of a German political party, regulated by the CDU's own statutes and, generally, by German party law.
• The Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzler), which is a constitutional figure of the German parliamentary system, whose functions and powers are mainly defined in the Bonn Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and German organic laws.

However, I cannot offer you a reliable, article-by-article summary “according to German legislation” nor go into normative details comparable to those I can provide regarding the Spanish case (for example, regarding the President of the Government, statutes of Spanish parties, or figures provided in the Spanish Constitution and its development laws).

What I can do — within my scope — is help you with analogous issues but referring to Spain, for example:

• Explain in detail what the competencies and functions of the President of the Government of Spain are according to the Spanish Constitution and laws.
• Describe the legal framework of political parties in Spain, what the Organic Law of Political Parties says about internal bodies, internal democracy, responsibility, etc.
• Analyze in depth the political and legal role of a Spanish party leader (for example, the president of PSOE, PP, or others) and how it relates to the institutional positions they may hold.
• Make general comparative analyses between parliamentary models (for example, similarities and differences between the role of the German chancellor and the Spanish president of the government), as long as the Spanish part is the core of the explanation.

I can also help you better understand:

• How the Spanish political system is structured and functions: separation of powers, role of the King, Congress and Senate, government-parliament confidence relationship, motion of censure, vote of confidence, etc.
• What Spanish regulations say about incompatibilities, parliamentary control, appointments, delegations of powers, or other elements conceptually similar to those you are interested in regarding Germany.
• What the formal and informal powers of Spanish party leaders are, both regarding internal organization and their influence on government action or parliamentary groups.

If you wish, we can reformulate your interest in a comparative key, focusing on Spain. For example:

• “Explain to me the competencies of the Spanish President of the Government and compare them, conceptually, with those of a head of government in a parliamentary system like Germany’s.”
• “What functions does the leader of a major Spanish party (PP or PSOE) have within the party and how does that condition their institutional role if they become President of the Government.”

In summary, your question is focused on German constitutional and party law, which is outside the thematic scope for which I am designed. If you orient it towards the Spanish case (for example, the powers of an equivalent position or the regulation of parties and the Executive in Spain), I can provide a much more complete, precise, and technical answer.

Searches conducted in the available sources have not provided a clear and complete series of the number of deputies of AfD and CDU in the Saxony-Anhalt Landtag by legislature. They do allow outlining the general political evolution of both parties in the Land, but without detailing how many seats each obtained in each legislature since AfD's entry.

From the information found, it first emerges that Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered the regional scene of Saxony-Anhalt in the 2010s and that, over the years, it went from being an emerging force to positioning itself as a clear electoral leader in the most recent polls. A Demócrata article about the regional elections scheduled for September 6, 2026 describes AfD as “the clear favorite” and that polls place it above 40 % of the votes, with a lead of almost twenty points over the CDU, emphasizing that it could be in a position to achieve a sufficient majority to govern a federal state like Saxony-Anhalt for the first time.

That same piece contextualizes this leap compared to the previous legislature: in the 2021 elections, the CDU won in Saxony-Anhalt with 37.1 % of the votes and AfD came in second place with 20.8 %. The 2026 polls “completely invert” that relationship, projecting AfD above 40 % and the CDU around 22 %. This comparison illustrates very well the underlying trend: over the last legislatures, AfD has grown steadily to become the leading party in voting intention in the Land, while the CDU has gone from being the clearly dominant party to losing much of its relative weight.

Another news item, focused on the national impact of these elections for Chancellor Friedrich Merz, reinforces this reading. It describes the projected 2026 result as a “debacle” for the CDU, which would fall from 37.1 % in 2021 to approximately 18.5 %, while AfD would jump to nearly 44.5 % of the vote. Although the piece deals with percentages and not seats, it suggests that, assuming the same parliament size and electoral law, the AfD group would have gone from being clearly smaller than the CDU's to more than double in the new legislature.

With these data, at least a qualitative evolution of the weight of both parties in the Landtag can be traced:

• Before AfD's entry into the regional parliament, the CDU played the role of the central force in the party system in Saxony-Anhalt, with results clearly superior to other formations and, consequently, with the largest parliamentary group.
• In the legislature when AfD first entered the Landtag (not precisely documented in these sources, but placed around the mid-2010s), it did so as a relevant force, with a group that was not marginal, although still behind the CDU.
• After the 2021 elections, the CDU remained the largest force in seats, given its 37.1 % vote, but AfD consolidated a significant bench (associated with that 20.8 %), making it the main opposition party or, in any case, the key actor of the radical right in the regional parliament.
• If the 2026 projections are confirmed at the polls, AfD would clearly have the largest group in the Landtag, with a possible absolute majority of seats or at least a blocking minority exceeding one-third of the parliament, while the CDU would fall to a group size clearly smaller than in 2021.

It is important to emphasize that, although these news items allow understanding the shift in the balance of power, they do not provide the exact numerical series of seats of AfD and CDU by legislature (for example: “X deputies in 2016, Y in 2021, Z in 2026”). To obtain that information precisely, one would have to consult the official sources of electoral results of Saxony-Anhalt, particularly the statistical office or the Land's electoral administration, which usually publish the distribution of mandates by party for each regional election.

In summary, with the available data, it can be stated that the evolution in the Saxony-Anhalt Landtag has been a progressive decline of the CDU in relative number of seats and a marked growth of AfD to become, in the last legislature, the probable largest group. However, it is not possible here to rigorously reconstruct the exact number of deputies of both parties in each of the recent legislatures.