General elections survey: Vox skyrockets after Ceuta, the PP falls 2.6 points and the PSOE approaches it, according to More in Common

The new survey from More in Common places the PP as the leading force with 28.7%, closely followed by the PSOE, with 27%, while Vox reaches 20.3%. Compared to the previous poll from July, Abascal gains 3.2 points, Sánchez recovers 1.3, Feijóo loses 2.6, and Sumar falls back 1.6. The movement coincides with the rise of immigration to the top position among the country's problems after the Ceuta crisis.

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The Ceuta crisis has not reduced the global advantage of the right-wing bloc, but it has profoundly changed the distribution of forces within it.

Vox is the big winner of the new More in Common survey. The party of Santiago Abascal goes from the 17.1% recorded in the previous measurement to 20.3%, an increase of 3.2 points in just two months and its best result since the organization began publishing its current Electoral Pulse.

The PP is going in the opposite direction. Alberto Núñez Feijóo maintains the first position, but goes from 31.3% in July to 28.7%, a loss of 2.6 points.

And the PSOE partially takes advantage of that movement. Pedro Sánchez rises from 25.7% to 27%, recovers 1.3 points and significantly reduces the distance with the PP. In July, the two parties were separated by 5.6 points. Now the gap is only 1.7.

The photograph is especially relevant because the fieldwork was carried out between August 24 and 28, after almost a month marked by the Ceuta crisis and when immigration had taken center stage in the political conversation.

Who wins and who loses compared to July

The comparison with the previous Electoral Pulse of More in Common shows very clear movements.

  • Vox goes from 17.1% to 20.3%: gains 3.2 points.
  • The PSOE goes from 25.7% to 27%: gains 1.3 points.
  • Podemos rises slightly from 3.3% to 3.6%: three tenths.
  • In the opposite direction, the PP falls from 31.3% to 28.7%: loses 2.6 points.
  • Sumar goes from 8.2% to 6.6%: loses 1.6 points.

The July data comes from the previous More in Common study, whose fieldwork was carried out between June 24 and 28 and placed the PP at 31.3%, the PSOE at 25.7%, Vox at 17.1%, Sumar at 8.2% and Podemos at 3.3%.

The big movement, therefore, does not occur between the two major blocs, but within them. On the right, Vox absorbs part of the space that the PP loses. On the left, the PSOE and Podemos advance while Sumar retreats.

Vox breaks the 20% barrier

More in Common places Abascal's party at 20.3% of the votes, 3.2 points more than in July. The growth is even greater if the comparison is made with the general elections of 2023. Vox then obtained 12.4%. Now it appears 7.9 points above. It is, by far, the formation that improves the most compared to the 23J among the major national parties.

The jump occurs in a particularly favorable context for a formation that has placed immigration, borders, and security among its main political axes.

The survey itself offers the most evident clue: immigration is already the main problem identified by Spaniards.

Ceuta turns immigration into Spain's top problem

45.9% of respondents include immigration among the three main problems of the country. That's 16 points more than just two months ago.

Housing, which until now topped the ranking, thus loses the first position. The growth is transversal, although it reaches very different intensities depending on the electorate.

Among Vox voters, 75.7% include immigration among the main problems. Among PP voters, 55.1% do so.

But the phenomenon also reaches the left: 30.8% among those who would vote for PSOE and 18.8% among Sumar voters.

Especially significant is what has happened among the undecided. Concern about immigration has increased by 20.7 points since July and reaches 42.6%.

This last figure may be electorally crucial: immigration not only mobilizes those who already vote for Vox or PP, but has also strongly entered among citizens who have not yet decided their ballot.

PP loses 2.6 points and part of its vote moves to Vox

PP continues to win elections, but it is the party that has retreated the most compared to the previous More in Common. It goes from 31.3% to 28.7%. That's 2.6 points less.

The analysis of transfers helps to understand an important part of that decline.

The loyalty of former PP voters drops from the 80.2% recorded in July to the current 73.1%. At the same time, the percentage of those who voted for Feijóo in 2023 and would now choose Vox increases: it goes from 11.6% to 14.2%.

That's 2.6 points more of direct transfer from PP to Abascal.

Vox, moreover, retains 91% of those who already voted for it in the last general elections, the highest loyalty among the main parties. The picture is especially interesting for Feijóo: his block continues clearly ahead, but he loses weight within that same space while Vox increases its own.

PSOE recovers 1.3 points and approaches PP

The other big surprise is the evolution of PSOE. In July, More in Common placed the socialists at 25.7%, after a drop of more than two points compared to its first measurement.

Now they regain ground and reach 27%. The increase is 1.3 points.

The combination of socialist advance and popular setback drastically reduces the distance between both. PP and PSOE were separated by 5.6 points and now only by 1.7.

More in Common warns, moreover, that the probabilistic intervals of the two formations overlap.

The model places the PP in a range of 25.9% to 31.5% and the PSOE between 24.4% and 29.6%.

This means that the PP continues to be the most likely winner, but the result cannot be considered completely closed. According to the organization's model, approximately four out of five simulations would place the PP ahead of the PSOE.

The PSOE regains loyalty among its voters

The socialist improvement also appears in the transfers.

The PSOE now retains 72.8% of those who voted for it in 2023. Two months ago that loyalty was at 69.1%. The improvement is 3.7 points.

More in Common also detects a reduction in the percentage of former socialist voters who remain undecided.

It is a relevant signal because for a good part of the legislature the main problem of the PSOE has not only been the transfer to PP or Vox, but the existence of a significant pool of former voters who had not decided whether to support it again. The new survey points to a certain remobilization of that space.

Sánchez regains ground, but remains almost five points below the 23J

The recovery compared to July does not eliminate, however, the accumulated wear since the last elections.

The PSOE obtained 31.7% in July 2023. More in Common now places it at 27%: the difference remains 4.7 points. The PP also does not recover its result from 23J. Then it reached 33.1%; now it stays at 28.7%, 4.4 points less.

The big exception is Vox again. Abascal goes from 12.4% in the last general elections to 20.3%, a gain of 7.9 points. The official results of 23J are published by the Central Electoral Board in the BOE. (BOE)

Sumar is the other big loser

The second strongest setback after the PP corresponds to Sumar.

The formation goes from 8.2% in July to 6.6% and loses 1.6 points.

More in Common also identifies Sumar as the party with the most volatile electoral base. It has significant leaks to the PSOE and to Podemos.

The movement partly explains the socialist recovery: a portion of the PSOE's growth does not come from a transfer between blocks, but from a concentration of the vote within the left.

We can, for its part, rise from 3.3% to 3.6%. If both formations are added, Sumar and Podemos now reach 10.2%. In July, they jointly reached 11.5%.

The space therefore loses 1.3 points in two months.

Sumar and Podemos remain below the joint result of 2023

The comparison with the 23J requires significant caution.

In those elections, Podemos ran within Sumar, so it makes no sense to compare both brands individually with 2023. The joint candidacy then obtained 12.3%.

The right maintains more than 51% despite the fall of the PP

Here appears the great paradox of the survey. The PP falls 2.6 points and, even so, the right block hardly weakens.

The explanation is Vox: PP, Vox, and SALF would currently sum up 51.3% of the valid vote. PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos are around 37%.

More in Common concludes that the movements of recent months occur fundamentally within each political space and not through large transfers between blocks.

In July, using the percentages published by the same house, PP, Vox, and SALF summed approximately 50.6%.

The increase of the block is around seven tenths, despite the fall of the PP.

The Ceuta effect seems to redistribute more than change blocks

This is probably the most nuanced reading of the entire survey. The Ceuta crisis coincides with a huge jump in immigration as a social concern.

But the main electoral movement does not consist of millions of voters crossing from left to right. What occurs is a reorganization within the two large spaces.

Vox grows strongly at the expense of a PP that loses loyalty. PSOE regains ground while Sumar weakens.

The overall result barely alters the size of the blocks, but it does considerably modify the internal balance between the parties that comprise them.

Vox is only 6.7 points away from PSOE

There is also another piece of data that may have political implications.

  • Vox reaches 20.3%.
  • PSOE is at 27%.

The distance between the second and third force is reduced to 6.7 points. In July it was 8.6 points. And in the general elections of 2023, the distance between both parties exceeded 19 points.

55% believe that Spain is going in the wrong direction

The survey also outlines a predominantly pessimistic social context. 55% believe that Spain is moving in the wrong direction and only 23% think the course is correct.

Three out of ten choose directly the most negative option, compared to just 6% who believe that the country is clearly moving in the right direction.

64% of current PSOE voters believe that Spain is moving in the right direction. Among Sumar voters, it drops to 47%. On the other side of the board, 83% of those who would vote for the PP and 92% of those who would choose Vox believe that the country is going in the wrong direction.

70% believe that Spain is divided: the highest since 2021

The perception of polarization is also growing. 70% believe that Spain is divided or very divided. More in Common points out that this is the highest percentage recorded since 2021. In their previous measurement on polarization, the figure was 65%.

Rufián is the best-rated leader and everyone fails

None of the six leaders included in the survey pass among the general public.

Gabriel Rufián tops the ranking with a 4.12.

He is followed by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, with 3.63; Pedro Sánchez, with 3.53; Yolanda Díaz, with 3.47; Santiago Abascal, with 3.33; and Irene Montero, with 2.85.

The distance changes significantly when each leader is evaluated exclusively by their own voters.

Abascal reaches an 8.11 among Vox voters, the highest score.

Irene Montero obtains 7.92 among Podemos voters; Sánchez, 7.69 among socialists; Yolanda Díaz, 7.44 among Sumar voters; and Feijóo, 7.19 among popular voters.

General elections survey: result and change compared to July

More in Common places the PP as the leading force, but its lead over the PSOE decreases from 5.6 to 1.7 points. Vox records the largest growth since the previous survey and surpasses 20% for the first time in the current series of the organization.

Party August 2026 July 2026 Change 23J
PP 28.7% 31.3% -2.6 33.1%
PSOE 27.0% 25.7% +1.3 31.7%
Vox 20.3% 17.1% +3.2 12.4%
Sumar 6.6% 8.2% -1.6 12.3%*
Podemos 3.6% 3.3% +0.3 Integrated in Sumar

* In the general elections of 2023, Podemos ran integrated in the Sumar candidacy.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What parliamentary procedures are necessary to modify the electoral system in Spain?

Modifying the electoral system in Spain can be done through two different routes, depending on the scope of the change: (1) by reforming the Constitution, when elements fixed by the Constitution itself are affected; and (2) by reforming the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) and other electoral regulations, when acting within that framework. Each route has different parliamentary procedures and majorities.

1. When the reform requires changing the Constitution

The Constitution establishes the basic framework of the electoral system (the right to vote in article 23, principles of the Congress and Senate system in articles 68 and 69, requirement of an organic law for the electoral regime in article 81, possibility of a referendum in article 92, and reform rules in articles 167 and 168). If the electoral reform intends to alter any of those constitutional elements (for example, the provincial constituency, the number of deputies within the limits set by the Constitution, the proportional nature of the system, or the basic configuration of the Senate), the constitutional reform procedure must be followed.

The procedures are:

  • Reform initiative: it can come from the Government, the Congress, the Senate, or the Assemblies of the Autonomous Communities, under the terms of article 87 CE. A constitutional reform bill or proposal is submitted.
  • Processing in the General Courts:
    • A procedure similar to that of a law is followed, with a debate on consideration (if it is a proposal), an amendment phase, and processing in committee and plenary.
    • The reform must be approved by both Chambers with the reinforced majorities established by the Constitution.

There are two procedures, depending on which articles are affected:

  • Ordinary procedure (art. 167 CE), applicable to most reforms:
    • Approval by a three-fifths majority in both the Congress and the Senate.
    • If there is no agreement, a joint mixed committee of deputies and senators is created to draft a consensus text to be voted on again in both Chambers.
    • If disagreement persists and the text has obtained at least an absolute majority in the Senate, the Congress may definitively approve the reform by a two-thirds majority.
    • Once approved by the General Courts, the reform is submitted to a referendum if requested, within fifteen days, by one-tenth of the members of either Chamber.
  • Aggravated procedure (art. 168 CE), for total revision or reforms affecting the Preliminary Title, the most protected fundamental rights, or the Crown:
    • Initial approval of the principle of reform by a two-thirds majority in each Chamber.
    • Immediate dissolution of the Congress and Senate and calling of general elections.
    • The new Chambers must ratify the decision to reform and approve the new constitutional text by a two-thirds majority in both Chambers.
    • The reform must be obligatorily submitted to a ratifying referendum of all citizens.

Additionally, the Constitution itself provides that a constitutional reform cannot be initiated during wartime or during states of alarm, exception, or siege, which acts as a material and temporal limit to the process.

2. When it is enough to modify the electoral legislation (LOREG)

Many adjustments to the electoral system (minimum vote threshold, details of seat distribution within the proportional model, candidacy requirements, campaign regulation, postal voting, etc.) are situated at the legal development level. These are channeled through the Organic Law 5/1985, of the General Electoral Regime, and its subsequent amendments.

The parliamentary steps are those of a legislative reform of an organic law:

  • Initiative: the Government (organic law bill) or parliamentary groups, the Senate, autonomous assemblies, or popular legislative initiative (organic law proposal), under the general terms of the legislative procedure.
  • Processing in the Congress:
    • Consideration of proposals, if applicable.
    • Presentation of amendments, work in committee and subcommittee.
    • Debate and vote in Plenary. As it is an organic law, the final vote on the entire text requires an absolute majority of the Congress.
  • Senate intervention:
    • It can approve the text, introduce amendments, or issue a veto.
    • If it introduces amendments or vetoes the text, it returns to the Congress, which has the final say: it can accept the amendments or overturn them by simple majority, and can override the veto also by simple majority if it waits two months, or by absolute majority if it wants to do so earlier.
  • Sanction and promulgation: once approved by the General Courts, the King sanctions and promulgates the law, which is published in the Official State Gazette (BOE) and comes into force on the date determined by the norm itself or, failing that, after 20 days.

At this level, if politically appropriate, a consultative referendum on decisions of special political significance (article 92 CE) may also be called, at the Government's initiative and with Congress authorization, although it is not a mandatory procedure to reform the LOREG.

In summary, small and medium adjustments to the electoral system are processed through reform of the organic electoral law with reinforced majorities but within the ordinary legislative procedure, while structural changes affecting the constitutional design of the system require a true constitutional reform with highly qualified majorities, possible dissolution of the Courts, and, in certain cases, a binding referendum.

Which specific parts of the current electoral system could be modified only by changing the LOREG and which would require reforming the Constitution? How has the LOREG been reformed in the past and what examples of relevant electoral system changes have already been approved? What limits do the Constitutional Court and the principle of equality impose on the design of any electoral system reform?

What are the competencies of the president of the Popular Party and in which elections was Alberto Núñez Feijóo elected as leader?

The national president of the Popular Party (PP) is the highest political and organizational leader of the party. During Alberto Núñez Feijóo's tenure, this position involves directing the party's political line, coordinating its leadership, and representing the PP within the entire Spanish political system. Feijóo was first elected leader of the PP at the extraordinary congress in Seville in April 2022, and later re-elected at the XXI National Congress held in Madrid in July 2025.

Competencies of the president of the Popular Party

Although the PP's statutes detail the president's functions technically, the information available in public sources and the party's own communication allows summarizing his main competencies on several levels:

  • General political direction of the party. The president sets the PP's political strategy at the national level: defines programmatic priorities, the opposition line to the Government, and major public messages. Contextual texts about Feijóo's leadership emphasize, for example, that he came to the national Presidency in 2022 “with the goal of consolidating himself as an alternative to Pedro Sánchez's Government” and to chain electoral victories across the territory.
  • Highest internal and external representation. The president is the visible face of the party before public opinion and institutions, and acts as the head of the opposition when the PP does not govern Spain, as noted in Alberto Núñez Feijóo's profile in the political actors database (PP president since 2022 and opposition leader in Congress).
  • Configuration of the leadership and the Steering Committee. The president proposes and reshapes the party's core leadership. Reports on the “new PP leadership” indicate that after assuming the national presidency in 2022, Feijóo formed his own team and later restructured it, reducing vice-secretariats and reconfiguring the National Steering Committee, appointing or moving key figures such as Secretary General Miguel Tellado or the different sectoral vice-secretariats.
  • Promotion and coordination of national bodies. Internal documents and news about congresses record that the president works closely with the National Board of Directors and the National Executive Committee, which are the highest governing bodies between congresses. The president is responsible for guiding their work, coordinating territorial barons, and ensuring the implementation of the lines approved in the political and statutes reports.
  • Relationship with territorial and sectoral structures. The national president also plays an arbitration and cohesion role within the PP, supporting or promoting regional congresses (such as those of the Catalan PP or New Generations) and strengthening the party's territorial presence. Under Feijóo's presidency, reports highlight the strategy to “broaden” the PP and consolidate majorities in autonomous communities and large cities.

Overall, the PP president concentrates the party's strategic direction, the capacity to configure its organizational leadership, and the main political representation of the organization, within the framework set by the statutes and collegiate bodies.

In which internal elections was Alberto Núñez Feijóo elected leader of the PP?

The sources consulted allow identifying two clear milestones in Feijóo's election as national president of the Popular Party:

  • Extraordinary Congress in Seville (April 2022). After the internal crisis that forced Pablo Casado's departure, an extraordinary congress was convened in Seville. An analysis published by the newspaper Demócrata about those events states that “the PP returned to Seville in spring […] and Alberto Núñez Feijóo was elected PP president with 98.35% of votes in favor,” in a conclave that formalized the so-called “Feijóo way.” Another later report recalls that “on April 1, 2022, at the extraordinary congress in Seville […] he presented himself […] and was elevated to the PP presidency.” This congress constituted his first election as national leader, with practically unanimous support from the delegates.
  • XXI National Congress of the PP in Madrid (July 4-6, 2025). Already as incumbent president, Feijóo promoted the holding of the XXI National Congress at IFEMA (Madrid), scheduled for July 4, 5, and 6, 2025. An official PP note titled “‘Take a stand for Spain’ will be the slogan of the 21st National Congress of the PP” indicates that it is a conclave in which “Alberto Núñez Feijóo will be re-elected as party president.” Other Demócrata pieces about that congress emphasize that “the last time they did it was to elevate Alberto Núñez Feijóo as party president, in 2022. Three years later, the party will repeat the decision. There is only one candidate for the presidency,” that is, Feijóo as the sole candidate for his re-election.

Therefore, Alberto Núñez Feijóo initially accessed the presidency of the Popular Party at the extraordinary congress in Seville in April 2022, where he was elected with 98.35% of the delegates' votes; and was later re-elected as leader at the XXI National Congress held in Madrid in July 2025, also as the only candidate for the position.

What differences are there between the PP's primary model with which Casado was elected in 2018 and the delegate system that Feijóo has consolidated? How do the competencies of the PP president relate to the functions of the National Board of Directors and the Executive Committee? What role have the PP's regional congresses played in Feijóo's strategy to “broaden” the party since 2022?

What were the exact results of the 2023 general elections for PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar, and Podemos according to the Central Electoral Board?

The information gathered in this search does not include the exact numerical data (total votes, percentages, and seats) of the general elections held on July 23, 2023, broken down by party for PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar, and Podemos according to the Central Electoral Board (JEC). The consulted sources (mainly articles from the newspaper Demócrata and some general official notes) refer to the political context after 23-J, the parliamentary arithmetic of the XV Legislature, and issues related to the functioning of the Congress and the Senate, but do not reproduce the official results table issued by the JEC that you are requesting.

It is important to emphasize that the JEC publishes the official results of general elections at two levels:

  • Data of final scrutiny by constituency (province), with the number of votes for each candidacy.
  • A state summary that includes for the Congress of Deputies the total votes, the percentage of valid votes cast, and the distribution of seats by candidacy.

The type of table you request (total votes + percentage + seats, party by party) is precisely included in that state summary, which is usually part of the “General scrutiny records” or the “Results proclamation agreement” of the JEC for the Congress elections. However, in the available search trace, neither the original JEC document nor a faithful reproduction of its tables in media or accessible databases has been located in this context.

This means that, to avoid providing inaccurate data or unverified approximations, I cannot provide here the exact results you ask for (the specific figures of votes and official percentages for PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar, and Podemos). Citing percentages or numbers from memory, without being supported by the documents recovered in the search itself, would go against the criterion of using only information effectively located in the sources.

What can be stated, in view of the parliamentary context described in the analyzed articles, is that:

  • The seat distribution resulting from 23-J places the PP and PSOE as the two clearly majority groups in the Congress, with a close difference between them, but without either reaching an absolute majority.
  • Vox remains the third force in number of deputies, behind PP and PSOE, but below its representation in the previous legislature.
  • Sumar enters the Congress as a new political space to the left of PSOE, occupying the place that Unidas Podemos had in 2019, with a medium-sized group.
  • Podemos, by not running integrated in Sumar's lists in all constituencies and not surpassing certain electoral thresholds, obtains a much smaller representation and ends up integrated in the Mixed Group, with barely a few seats.

However, these conclusions are qualitative and do not replace the figures you request (number of votes, exact percentages, and specific seats assigned by the JEC to each of the five formations).

To obtain official and complete data, I recommend going directly to the primary sources of the electoral administration, where you will find the details with full accuracy:

  • The electoral results page of the Central Electoral Board or the Ministry of the Interior (usually accessible from the “General Elections July 23, 2023” section). On those portals you can download:
    • Files in PDF or Excel format with the final scrutiny.
    • Tables of state results for the Congress, which include:
      • Total votes obtained by each candidacy at the national level.
      • Percentage of valid votes attributed to each.
      • Number of seats assigned in the Congress.
  • The Official State Gazette (BOE), where the JEC's results proclamation agreements and, if applicable, annexed tables with the seat distribution are published.

In short: with the information trace available here, it is not possible to rigorously reproduce the exact results you request for PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar, and Podemos according to the JEC. To work precisely (for example, in a report or quantitative analysis), I advise downloading directly the scrutiny record or the results proclamation agreement of the general elections of July 23, 2023, on the official website of the JEC or the Ministry of the Interior.

Can you explain how the distribution of seats in the Congress is calculated from the votes using the D’Hondt system? How was the total distribution of seats by blocs (left/right) after the 23J general elections? What differences were there between the 2019 and 2023 results for PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar, and the former Unidas Podemos?

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