Von der Leyen is studying an internal shake-up in the Commission to reorganize all its directorates-general.

The possible administrative reform of the European Commission is not yet at a parliamentary stage. As of October 27, 2026, it is being prepared within the Commission itself: Ursula von der Leyen has received recommendations from a group of experts and plans to finalize the design before the end of the year. This timeline corresponds to the definition of the reform, not its approval by the European Parliament.

What is being prepared

The initiative seeks to reorganize the functioning of the Community Executive, not to approve a single European law for now. According to Demócrata's information, the report questions the compartmentalization of the current 42 directorates-general and proposes changes in coordination, human resources, and the use of technology.

Its main recommendations are:

• Interdepartmental teams: bringing together officials from different directorates-general to develop specific priorities, with defined leaders, resources, and objectives.
• Greater coordination: strengthening the Secretariat-General as a strategic link between political leadership and administration.
• Artificial intelligence: creating a responsible person for the entire Commission, accompanied by departmental heads, and studying assistants for staff.
• Human resources: facilitating mobility, reviewing the selection of executives, opening certain positions to external candidates, and creating a central mechanism for staff reassignment.
• Decentralized agencies: evaluating the existing 35 agencies and studying adjustments of competences, mergers, or eliminations, along with a moratorium on the creation of new agencies.

These are recommendations submitted for consideration, not measures already approved. They should also not be confused with legislative packages for regulatory simplification: those modify legal obligations, while this initiative focuses on how the Commission works.

What are the next steps

1. Finalize the project. The Commission must integrate the experts' recommendations and contributions from its staff. The announced commitment is to define the details before the end of 2026.
2. Decide on internal measures. Once the project is defined, it will be up to the Commission to adopt organizational decisions within its powers. Not every reorganization requires a vote by Parliament and the Council.
3. Separate organizational from legislative aspects. It will be necessary to determine which changes can be executed internally and which require modifying rules, budget allocations, or existing legal instruments. This is especially relevant for possible changes in agencies or staff regulations.
4. Present legislative proposals when appropriate. Only then would the processing of texts requiring legislative intervention begin. The Commission explains this process on its page about law-making tracking.

What role would the European Parliament have

If any measure is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, the European Parliament and the Council must approve the same text. The Parliament would examine it in the competent parliamentary committee and then set its position in plenary; the Council would establish its position, and both institutions would negotiate differences.

As the Parliament explains about its legislative powers, agreement can be reached in the first reading. If not, a second reading and eventually conciliation may follow. After adoption, the corresponding rules would be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and enter into force according to their provisions.

In conclusion: the next milestone is the presentation of the final design by the Commission, not a parliamentary vote already scheduled. There is no known legislative approval timetable; this will depend on which measures require legislation and the applicable procedure for each.

According to the Treaties of the European Union, the President of the European Commission is the main person responsible for the political direction and functioning of the EU's executive body. Their powers are mainly set out in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in the organizational provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Below are their main powers and functions.

1. Election and institutional position

The President of the Commission is proposed by the European Council, taking into account the results of the European Parliament elections, and is elected by the Parliament itself by a majority of its members (Art. 17.7 TEU). This method of election grants them dual legitimacy: derived both from the States, through the European Council, and from the citizens, through the Parliament.

Once elected, the President occupies the top of the Commission, which is defined in the Treaties as the institution that “promotes the general interest of the Union” and exercises the almost exclusive monopoly of legislative initiative, ensures the application of the Treaties, and executes the budget and policies (Art. 17.1 and 17.2 TEU). The President directs and coordinates the entire College of Commissioners within this general mandate.

2. Definition of the Commission's political guidelines

Article 17.6 TEU establishes that the President “shall lay down the guidelines within which the Commission shall work.” That is:

• Sets the political priorities of the Commission for the entire term (for example, through political guidelines and annual work programs).
• Defines the general line of action in the main policy areas of the Union (internal market, climate, digital, migration, etc.).
• Ensures that the legislative proposals and executive decisions of the College conform to those guidelines.

This political leadership capacity is one of their essential functions and distinguishes them from other members of the Commission.

3. Internal organization and leadership of the College

Always according to Article 17.6 TEU, the President:

• Decides the internal organization of the Commission, determining the structure of portfolios (competences of each commissioner) and the distribution of responsibilities.
• Appoints the Vice-Presidents from among the commissioners, being able to assign them coordination functions over major political areas.
• Can reorganize portfolios during the term and reassign responsibilities among commissioners if deemed necessary for the proper functioning of the institution.

Additionally, the President chairs the meetings of the College of Commissioners, sets its agenda, and guides deliberations. Although the College decides collegially (in principle by simple majority), the President plays a decisive role in prioritizing dossiers, mediating internal conflicts, and seeking consensus positions.

4. Appointment and dismissal of commissioners

Regarding the composition of the Commission, Article 17.6 TEU establishes that the President:

• Participates in the selection process of commissioners proposed by Member States, in cooperation with the Council and the States themselves.
• Can demand the resignation of a Commission member. If they consider that a commissioner is no longer fit for office or has engaged in behavior incompatible with their duties, they can ask them to resign. This power reinforces their authority over the College and the individual responsibility of each commissioner.

In any case, the Commission as a whole remains politically accountable to the European Parliament, which can force its resignation through a motion of censure (Art. 17.8 TEU).

5. External representation of the Commission and the Union

The Treaties also assign the President a representative role:

• Represents the Commission in its relations with other Union institutions, especially before the European Parliament and the Council.
• Participates in European Council meetings (without voting rights) to present the Commission's position and proposals in major strategic debates.
• In the external sphere, the Commission “shall ensure the Union's external representation, except in the common foreign and security policy and other cases provided for in the Treaties” (Art. 17.1 TEU). The President thus assumes a key role as the political spokesperson of the Commission in negotiations and international forums on EU competences (trade, climate, economic regulation, etc.), in coordination with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs.

6. Guarantee of the Union's general interest

Overall, the President guarantees that the Commission always acts in defense of the Union's general interest and the integrity of the Community legal order. They lead the preparation of legislative initiatives, supervise the execution of policies and programs, and ensure that the institution performs its functions independently from national governments, as required by the Treaties.

The directly comparable precedent is the Kinnock reform of 1999-2004. If we broaden the comparison to institutional changes, work processes, and political leadership, four major families of reforms can be distinguished. There is no official homogeneous count: counting each portfolio reorganization as an independent reform would yield a higher number but would mix transformations of different scopes.

The current review does propose a transversal transformation. On October 26, Ursula von der Leyen pointed out three priorities: simpler procedures and structures, better use of resources, and preparing staff for new technologies. The final recommendations will be presented at the end of 2026; therefore, there are no results yet to compare with previous cases (President's statement).

Four major comparable precedents

• Kinnock reform, 1999-2004. It is the closest reference because it simultaneously modified human resources, career paths, financial management, auditing, and managerial responsibilities. It came after the crisis and resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, which revealed problems of control and accountability. Its main result was better separation of management and control, strengthening internal auditing, and modernizing financial procedures. The outcome was not fully satisfactory: administrative complexity, slowness, risk aversion, and uneven application of results-based management persisted. The lesson is that strengthening safeguards does not automatically lead to greater agility.
• Creation of the European External Action Service, 2009-2011. It was an institutional reorganization linked to the Lisbon Treaty, not a comprehensive reform of the Commission. It integrated structures from the Commission, the Council, and national diplomacies. It consolidated a permanent European diplomatic capacity and a worldwide network of delegations but maintained tensions between administrative cultures, overlapping competences, and coordination difficulties. Its architecture remains subject to debate: in June 2026, Demócrata reported Franco-German talks to review its functioning.
• Better Regulation and REFIT, since 2012. They mainly transformed working methods, not the organizational chart. They extended evaluations, consultations, impact analyses, and quality controls over proposals. The result was a more structured and traceable policy preparation. However, demonstrating net savings and effectively reducing regulatory complexity remained difficult. It is the most relevant precedent to assess promises of simplification: improving the procedure alone does not guarantee less burden. The Commission explains this approach on its pages about REFIT and its Better Regulation stocktaking.
• Reorganizations of the College under Juncker and von der Leyen, 2014-2024. Vice-presidencies, project groups, and transversal portfolios sought to coordinate priorities crossing several directorates-general. They increased strategic leadership and facilitated joint responses but also introduced hierarchical ambiguities, possible overlaps, and greater dependence on the Presidency. These are precedents of political reorganization, not equivalent to an administrative reform like Kinnock.

Other changes and assessment

Also to be distinguished are the expansion of executive agencies in 2000-2005, which brought specialization but required more coordination; adaptation to enlargements in 2004-2010, which increased capacity without eliminating administrative compartments; and management and digitalization reforms of 2010-2014, with concrete improvements rather than a single transformation. The portfolio adjustment started in 2024 still lacks a mature evaluation.

The conclusion is that it is not starting from scratch, but neither is there a succession of equivalent comprehensive reforms. Kinnock is the central comparator; the others provide partial lessons. The historical balance combines better controls and operational capacity with persistent difficulties in coordination, simplification, and clarity of responsibilities.