The map of the left: this is how the puzzle of alliances for the elections of 29N looks.

Check the alliance map on the left for the 29N: the pacts of Frente Amplio and Podemos and the candidacies for Congress, community by community.

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Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

La media de las encuestas

Media a 19 de octubre de 2026 · 16 institutos

  • PP31,7 %
  • PSOE26,8 %
  • Vox18,7 %
  • Sumar6,3 %
  • Podemos3,1 %
  • ERC2,2 %
010203040ene 2024jul 2024ene 2025jul 2025ene 2026jul 2026

Media del último estudio de cada instituto en 30 días y su evolución semanal desde el 23J. Partidos con al menos un 2 %.

Todas las encuestas

Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

The deadline for registering electoral coalitions has confirmed the fragmentation of the alternative left to the PSOE ahead of the general elections on November 29. After almost two weeks of negotiations, Frente Amplio and Podemos have only reached agreements to run together in Congress in Canary Islands and the Valencian Community, while in most autonomous communities voters will find separate candidacies.

The Frente Amplio driven by Sumar, Izquierda Unida, Más Madrid and Comuns, with Ada Colau as the candidate for the Presidency of the Government, has managed to expand its alliances through agreements with territorial formations such as Compromís, Chunta Aragonesista, Batzarre or Somos Asturies. However, negotiations with Podemos have not allowed for the configuration of a joint state candidacy, a division that will have special visibility in Madrid, where Emilio Delgado and Irene Montero will head different lists.

Map of the left's agreements for the 29N: all coalitions, community by community

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With Podemos Other agreements ERC with Podemos Separately

Electoral agreements for the Congress of Deputies, general elections on November 29, 2026. The PSOE-Frente Amplio agreement for the Senate is not included. Cartography: geographic service of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Agenda.

Canary Islands and Valencian Community, the exceptions

The Valencian Community is one of the two territories where Frente Amplio and Podemos will share a candidacy. They will do so under the name Compromís-Front Valencià, a coalition that brings together Més Compromís, Iniciativa del Poble Valencià, Verds Equo del País Valencià, Coalició Compromís, Podemos, Esquerra Unida del País Valencià, Esquerra Republicana del País Valencià, and Recortes Cero.

In Canary Islands, the candidacy Unidad del Pueblo Canario groups together Nueva Canarias-Bloque Canarista, Podemos, Izquierda Unida, and Movimiento Sumar. The Drago formation, linked to the former Podemos leader Alberto Rodríguez, does not participate in this agreement and will run separately.

Territorial alliances without Podemos

Outside of these two communities, Frente Amplio has resorted to agreements with parties of regional implantation to expand its candidacies. In Aragón, Chunta Aragonesista will run alongside Izquierda Unida, Movimiento Sumar, Partido Verde, and Recortes Cero under the name Chunta Aragonesista-Frente Amplio Aragón. Podemos has not joined this formula, and there will also be a candidacy from Coalición Existe, made up of Teruel Existe and Aragón Existe.

In Balearic Islands, the coalition Ara Més-Front Ampli brings together Més per Mallorca, Més per Menorca, Ara Eivissa, Movimiento Sumar, and Esquerra, without the participation of Podemos. For its part, Frente Amplio has closed agreements with Somos Asturies in Asturias and Batzarre in Navarra, two territories where the purple formation will also run separately.

In Andalusia, the candidacy Frente Amplio por Andalucía will be made up of Izquierda Unida de Andalucía, Movimiento Sumar, Iniciativa del Pueblo Andaluz, and Verdes Equo. Podemos Andalucía has been left out of the agreement, while Adelante Andalucía, the formation linked to Teresa Rodríguez and José Ignacio García, will also present its own lists.

Catalonia, an agreement between ERC and Podemos

The electoral situation in Catalonia presents a particularity compared to the rest of the country. Podemos will not present its own candidacy in Catalonia, but will incorporate representatives into the lists of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). The agreement will be accompanied by joint campaign events between Gabriel Rufián and Irene Montero.

Frente Amplio will run separately, with Ada Colau as head of the list for Barcelona. The former mayor is also the coalition's candidate for the Presidency of the Government, although she will not head the candidacy for Madrid.

Madrid and other communities, with separate candidacies

The lack of agreement between Frente Amplio and Podemos will have one of its most visible expressions in the Community of Madrid. Frente Amplio has designated Emilio Delgado from Más Madrid as number one, while Irene Montero, elected Podemos candidate in their primaries, will head the list of her formation for the same constituency.

Both spaces will also run separately in Cantabria, Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Murcia, and La Rioja. In Galicia, in addition to the lists of Frente Amplio and Podemos, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) will present itself, while in the Basque Country voters will be able to choose differentiated candidacies from EH Bildu, Frente Amplio, and Podemos.

A joint agreement for the Senate with the PSOE

The division of candidacies for Congress contrasts with the agreement reached between the PSOE and Frente Amplio to present joint lists for the Senate under the name Senado de Progreso. The alliance includes the socialists, Izquierda Unida, Movimiento Sumar, Más Madrid, Compromís, Chunta Aragonesista, and Batzarre.

The formula responds to the particularities of the electoral system of the Upper House, where the concentration of votes in the same candidacy can be decisive for the distribution of senators elected directly. The participating parties aim to prevent the dispersion of support from facilitating a new absolute majority for the Partido Popular.

In this way, the left will arrive at the 29N with different strategies for Congress and the Senate: a fragmented candidacy offer in much of the territory for the Lower House and a broader agreement with the PSOE for the Upper House. The coalition map also reflects the weight that regional negotiations have acquired in the absence of a shared state candidacy between Frente Amplio and Podemos.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What are the procedures and deadlines remaining for the definitive proclamation of candidacies after the closure of the deadline for electoral coalitions for the 29N?

After the deadline to communicate coalitions closed on October 16, the remaining steps are the submission of lists, their publication, the review of possible defects, and the proclamation by the provincial electoral boards. The key dates are November 2, when candidacies will be proclaimed, and November 3, when they will be published in the Official State Gazette (BOE). It is important to distinguish this administrative proclamation from its subsequent finality, as judicial appeals can still be filed.

1. Submission of candidacies: from October 21 to 26

Parties, federations, coalitions, and electoral groupings must submit their candidacies for the Congress and the Senate before the provincial electoral boards. The period starts on Wednesday, October 21, and ends on Monday, October 26. Therefore, having communicated a coalition within the deadline does not replace the submission of their lists: these are two different procedures.

Formations that require endorsements must also submit the signatures before the deadline of October 26 ends. Subsequently, the boards will send the endorsements to the Electoral Census Office to verify that the signatories meet the requirements, as explained by Demócrata about endorsements.

2. Publication of submitted lists: October 28

On Wednesday, October 28, the BOE will publish the submitted candidacies. This publication allows official knowledge of the registered lists but does not equate to their proclamation. It is still necessary to review if they meet the requirements and correct any detected irregularities.

This distinction is relevant to interpret candidate announcements: neither a public presentation nor appearance in this first publication alone guarantees that the candidacy will finally be proclaimed. The sequence is outlined in the Demócrata electoral calendar.

3. Review and correction: before proclamation

After publication, the review phase begins. The consulted calendar places the communication of irregularities and the start of defect correction between October 29 and 30. Candidacies must respond to communications from the competent board and provide necessary corrections before it decides on their proclamation.

This phase should not be confused with the subsequent judicial appeal: first, lists are reviewed and corrected in the electoral venue; then the decision to proclaim or exclude them can be challenged. The appeals calendar covers this continuation of the procedure.

4. Proclamation and publication: November 2 and 3

On Monday, November 2, the provincial electoral boards will proclaim the candidacies once the documentation has been examined and defects corrected, if applicable. On Tuesday, November 3, the proclaimed candidacies will be published in the BOE.

This second publication is the reference to know the lists that have passed the administrative phase. This is distinguished by Demócrata about proclamation: the initially submitted lists are not yet the proclaimed lists.

5. Appeals: possible judicial closure until November 12

If there are challenges, the calendar continues with these milestones:

  • November 5: deadline to appeal the proclamation before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
  • November 7: expected deadline to resolve these appeals.
  • November 9: deadline to request protection before the Constitutional Court.
  • November 12: expected deadline to resolve the protection request.

In conclusion, to know the proclaimed candidacies, one must refer to the BOE of November 3; for those affected by appeals, one must also consider subsequent resolutions. The calendar places the closure of this route before the start of the campaign, on November 13.

What powers does Ada Colau have as a candidate for the Presidency of the Government according to the Spanish Constitution?

The Spanish Constitution does not assign any specific powers to a person simply for being a candidate for the Presidency of the Government. That is, as long as Ada Colau is only a candidate and has not been invested by the Congress of Deputies, she does not have constitutional powers as President of the Government. Her powers as a candidate are political and partisan (campaigning, negotiating support, presenting a program), but not legal or constitutional.

The Constitution regulates the powers of the Presidency of the Government, regardless of who holds the office. If Ada Colau were to be elected President of the Government according to the constitutional procedure, she would then assume the following main functions:

1. Direction of domestic and foreign policy

According to Article 97 of the Constitution, the Government directs domestic and foreign policy, the civil and military administration, and the defense of the State. In practice, this means that the President of the Government:

  • Sets the broad lines of domestic policy (legislation, budgets, institutional reforms, sectoral policies).
  • Guides foreign policy (relations with other States, European Union, international treaties) and politically represents Spain in this area, along with the King in his role as Head of State.
  • Assumes the political direction of defense, although the supreme command of the Armed Forces corresponds to the King.
2. Direction of the Government and coordination of ministers

The President of the Government is the head of the Executive Power and, therefore:

  • Freely appoints and dismisses the members of the Council of Ministers.
  • Sets the political orientation of the Government and coordinates the actions of the different ministries.
  • Calls, presides over, and adjourns meetings of the Council of Ministers and determines the matters to be discussed.

If Ada Colau were President, all these powers would allow her to configure her own team and carry out the government program she had agreed upon with her parliamentary majority.

3. Promotion of legislation and relationship with the Cortes

Although legislative power corresponds to the Cortes Generales, the Government—under the direction of its President—has a central role in normative production:

  • Can present bill projects before the Congress and the Senate.
  • Can approve royal decree-laws in cases of extraordinary and urgent need, which must later be ratified by the Congress.
  • Can approve royal legislative decrees when the Cortes delegate the power to enact laws on specific matters.
  • Is politically accountable before the Congress, which can demand responsibility through a motion of censure or a vote of confidence.

As President, Colau would have to constantly maintain the support (or at least tolerance) of the majority of the Congress to sustain her program and advance her legislative initiatives.

4. Functions in relation to the King and other constitutional bodies

Many formal State decisions require the joint intervention of the King and the Government. In these matters, the President:

  • Proposes to the King the appointment and dismissal of ministers.
  • Proposes the dissolution of the Cortes and the calling of general elections, except within the limits set by the Constitution.
  • Participates in decisions related to consultative referendums, which are called by the King at the proposal of the President of the Government, previously authorized by the Congress.

All these actions are carried out through the Government, of which the President is the highest responsible.

5. Political responsibility and parliamentary control

The Constitution establishes a parliamentary system: the President of the Government is accountable to the Congress. This implies that:

  • She must undergo the investiture debate and obtain the confidence of the Chamber before assuming office.
  • She is subject to parliamentary control: questions, interpellations, investigative commissions, etc.
  • She can lose the confidence of the Chamber through a motion of censure, which implies the election of a new President.
6. Essential difference between being a candidate and being President

In summary: as long as Ada Colau is only a candidate, her capacities are political, not constitutional. She cannot enact norms, does not direct the Council of Ministers, does not represent the Government before other powers, nor assumes the described responsibilities. Only once she is:

  • Proposed by the King as a candidate after consultations with parliamentary groups,
  • Invested by the Congress of Deputies through a vote of confidence, and
  • Formally appointed by the King,

would she acquire the constitutional powers proper to the Presidency of the Government, identical for anyone holding that office, without any special regime for her specifically.

What specific steps does the Constitution set for Ada Colau to be invested as President of the Government? If Ada Colau were President, what limits would her power have vis-à-vis the Congress and the King according to the Constitution? What is the difference between the functions of the President of the Government and those of the King in the Spanish constitutional system?

What has been the historical evolution of the electoral pacts of the alternative left to the PSOE in the last three general elections?

The evolution can be summarized in three stages: alliance around Podemos, competition between two candidacies, and electoral reunification under Sumar. The last three general elections held were on April 28, 2019, November 10, 2019, and July 23, 2023. The main change was who articulated the state agreement and how territorial organizations fit into it.

April 2019: Unidas Podemos, with territorial alliances

Podemos and United Left maintained their electoral alliance under the name Unidas Podemos, accompanied by differentiated territorial formulas. In Catalonia, En Comú Podem ran; in Galicia, En Común-Unidas Podemos, after the division of the En Marea space; and in the Valencian Community, Unidas Podemos–Esquerra Unida. Compromís presented a separate candidacy. (El País, 04/28/2019).

Therefore, it was not a single organization: the agreement combined a state core formed by Podemos and IU with candidacies that preserved their territorial identity. The separation of Compromís and the Galician fracture showed that previous alliances were not automatically renewed. Unidas Podemos and its confluences jointly obtained 42 deputies. (El País, 04/28/2019).

November 2019: a second candidacy appears

The repeated election introduced a substantial change: Más País, led by Íñigo Errejón, ran separately from Unidas Podemos. Its candidacy made pacts with Equo and with Compromís, which ran under the formula Més Compromís. Thus, competition was no longer limited to territorial differences: there were two distinct electoral projects with supra-autonomous presence. (10N Results).

Unidas Podemos maintained its main alliance and the Catalan and Galician confluences. Más País and Compromís obtained jointly three seats, while Unidas Podemos and its confluences reached 35. The relevant comparison is, therefore, between the 42 deputies of April and the 38 that both candidacies summed in November, without attributing all the difference exclusively to the electoral separation. (Europa Press, 07/23/2023).

July 2023: Sumar brings together the previous competitors

The agreement promoted by Yolanda Díaz changed the structure of the pact: Sumar brought together Podemos, IU, Más País, Más Madrid, Catalunya en Comú, and Compromís, along with other organizations. The coalition also incorporated Chunta Aragonesista, Més per Mallorca, Més per Menorca, Verdes Equo, Proyecto Drago, Alianza Verde, Batzarre, Izquierda Asturiana, and Iniciativa del Pueblo Andaluz. (RTVE, 06/09/2023).

The integration did not eliminate territorial identities: denominations such as Sumar-En Comú Podem and Compromís-Sumar were used. The lists were negotiated among the organizations, with distribution of positions and territorial prominence, instead of replacing all parties with a single structure. The agreement allowed forces that had competed in November 2019 to share a candidacy. (El País, 06/10/2023).

Sumar obtained 31 deputies: four fewer than Unidas Podemos and its confluences in November 2019, and seven fewer than the sum of these with Más País and Compromís. The expansion of the pact did not translate into a recovery of representation. (Europa Press, 07/23/2023).

The historical conclusion is that sharing a ballot does not equate to consolidating a lasting alliance: Podemos left the Sumar parliamentary group in December 2023, months after the electoral agreement. (Demócrata, 08/08/2025).

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