Is Israel behind the migratory avalanche of Ceuta? What is known about the theory that links Morocco to the crisis

At this moment, there is no specific and operational investigative commission in the Spanish General Courts regarding “the use of migration as an instrument of diplomatic pressure by Morocco.” However, the topic is subject to very intense and fragmented political oversight, especially following the new migration crisis in Ceuta at the end of July 2026, through questions, appearances, and motions in both the Congress and the Senate. Additionally, judicial investigations have been activated in the National Court regarding a possible “instrumentalization of migratory flows,” but that belongs to the criminal sphere, not the parliamentary one, as explained by Demócrata in this piece. In parallel, the European Parliament has censured the use of migration as a pressure mechanism in specific resolutions, but that concerns the Eurochamber, not the Spanish Courts.

1. What exists and what does not in the General Courts

Parliamentary bases and the chronicles of the newspaper Demócrata agree on two ideas: on one hand, there is no approved and active monographic investigative commission on the migratory instrumentalization by Morocco; on the other, the issue appears recurrently in the ordinary government oversight.

In the Senate, for example, the Foreign Minister has been requested to appear to explain the “migratory invasion” and the questioning of territorial integrity by Morocco, according to the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Commission with initiatives such as appearance 711/000323 described in the Senate note on the commission’s activity, accessible in this Foreign Affairs Commission news. But this is oversight and information, not an investigative commission with its own mandate, phases, and conclusions.

In the Congress of Deputies, the issue is addressed in the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Mixed EU Commissions, as well as in the Plenary when discussing Ceuta, Melilla, relations with Morocco, or Western Sahara, as reflected in an official Congress note on the foreign policy and Sahara debate in this Congress reference. Here too, based on available information, no specific investigative commission on the use of migration as a pressure weapon has been approved and launched.

2. Offensive of initiatives after the new Ceuta crisis

After the massive entry of migrants into Ceuta on July 30 and 31, 2026, several groups launched a parliamentary offensive demanding explanations about Morocco’s role:

• The PP has registered a “battery of parliamentary initiatives” in Congress and Senate – written questions, requests for appearances, and proposed measures – to clarify whether the Government knew about the avalanche risk, what contacts it maintained with Rabat, and what measures it adopted, as detailed by the party itself in this PP note.
• Vox has demanded that Minister Albares and the CNI director appear in Congress to account for their contacts with Morocco and the implications for national security, as Demócrata reports in this information and in Vox’s political communication in this statement.
• Junts, Sumar, ERC, and other government partners have requested additional explanations on whether Rabat has used migratory pressure as “blackmail” or a “hybrid operation,” according to various Demócrata chronicles such as this piece on Junts or political analyses in this report and this other.

All this configures a strengthened parliamentary scrutiny environment, but still without crystallizing – with the available information – into a formal investigative commission.

3. European and judicial dimension, parallel to Parliament

The migratory instrumentalization by Morocco has been expressly condemned by the European Parliament. Demócrata recalls that the Eurochamber, in its June 10, 2021 resolution on the Ceuta crisis, censured “Morocco’s use of border control and migration, particularly unaccompanied minors, as a political pressure mechanism against Spain,” a quote collected in this article. Additionally, the LIBE Committee has convened urgent debates on the new Ceuta crisis, as detailed in this information.

On the judicial front, the National Court has opened proceedings to determine whether the massive entry of about 50,000 people in Ceuta was a “concerted action” and if there was an “instrumentalization of migratory flows” with deliberate relaxation of Moroccan controls, as detailed in this Demócrata report and in the complementary piece on the opening of proceedings, collected here. These procedures are not strictly “parliamentary investigations,” but they influence the political debate.

4. Conclusion: political monitoring, but no specific commission

In summary, the “status” of the parliamentary investigation is that of intense but scattered monitoring: multiple groups use all oversight tools (questions, motions, appearances, non-legislative proposals) to clarify whether Morocco has used migration as a diplomatic lever, in a context where the Government itself, in its Moncloa notes such as this one or in its public appearances, insists on cooperation with Rabat and avoids speaking of a “pressure weapon.” But, with the available data, there is no further information to affirm that a formal investigative commission with its own mandate and schedule dedicated specifically to this use of migration by Morocco exists today.

To frame the strategic background of this issue, Demócrata’s analysis on the Spain–Morocco relationship can also be consulted in this explanatory article, as well as the coverage of the Ceuta crisis in this international chronicle and in this political follow-up.

The CNI does not have a “single-topic” competence on migration crises, but it does have a clear role in the prevention and neutralization of disinformation campaigns when these affect national security, including those that instrumentalize migratory flows or borders. Its functions derive from the CNI Regulatory Law, the National Security Law, and very explicitly from the Procedure for action against disinformation, which integrates it into the National Security System as a key actor in monitoring, analysis, and response.

General framework of CNI competencies

The Law 11/2002 of the CNI establishes that its main mission is to provide the Government with the intelligence necessary to “prevent and avoid any danger, threat, or aggression” against Spain’s independence and integrity, national interests, the stability of the rule of law, and the welfare of the population. Among its functions are:

• Obtaining, evaluating, and interpreting information to protect Spain’s political, economic, industrial, commercial, and strategic interests (art. 4.a).
• Prevention, detection, and neutralization of activities by foreign services, groups, or individuals that endanger the constitutional order, state security, or population welfare (art. 4.b).
• Functions of cybersecurity and information protection, such as coordinating agencies that use encryption means and ensuring information technology security in that area (art. 4.e), as well as overseeing classified information regulations (art. 4.f).

Although the law does not explicitly mention disinformation or migration crises, these campaigns fit as hostile activities by foreign or non-state actors seeking to destabilize institutions, generate social alarm, or pressure foreign and border policy. The CNI also acts under prior judicial control regulated in the Organic Law 2/2002, and its structure is detailed in Royal Decree 436/2002 and Order DEF/2962/2009.

Other organic norms of the Center itself (such as the electronic headquarters resolution) and international agreements on classified information protection, like the CNI–Uruguay agreement on classified information, reinforce its role in the secure exchange of sensitive information, which is key when a migration crisis has an international dimension.

Insertion in National Security and hybrid threats

The Law 36/2015, on National Security, configures intelligence services as permanent support of the National Security System. Article 10 (from the consulted fragment) establishes that intelligence and information services, “according to the scope of their competencies, will permanently support the National Security System, providing information, analysis, studies, and proposals necessary to prevent and detect risks and threats and contribute to their neutralization.” This includes areas such as cybersecurity and other transversal threats.

The 2021 National Security Strategy, approved by Royal Decree 1150/2021, emphasizes that hybrid strategies combine cyberattacks, espionage, sabotage, and disinformation campaigns to destabilize states. Within this framework, campaigns exploiting migration crises (for example, amplifying messages of chaos at borders or questioning international treaties) are treated as a hybrid threat where the CNI provides strategic intelligence.

Additionally, the system is complemented by Constitutional Court decisions on the National Security Law (STC 184/2016 and appeal 7330-2015), and other general regulations affecting the informational environment (for example, the AEPD Circular 1/2019 on political data or rulings such as STC 86/2017 on audiovisual communication, or STC 14/2021).

Specific procedure against disinformation

The instrument that specifies the CNI’s role against disinformation campaigns is Order PCM/1030/2020, which publishes the Procedure for action against disinformation approved by the National Security Council. This document creates a “National System for prevention, detection, alert, monitoring, and response” against disinformation.

Within this system, the CNI is:

• A member of the Permanent Commission against disinformation, coordinated by the State Secretariat for Communication and directed by the National Security Department. The Order explicitly cites it as part of the Commission and as one of the “competent public authorities.”
• An actor of level 1 (technical-operational) responsible for monitoring, detection, early warning, investigation of the origin and purpose of campaigns, and their follow-up. This level mentions jointly the State Secretariat for Communication, the National Security Department, the CNI, and other Interior and Digital Transformation agencies.

The Order foresees that this system applies both to disinformation campaigns with general impact on National Security and those that affect crisis management. Therefore, if a migration crisis is treated as a situation of interest for National Security (due to border tension, pressure from a third state, etc.), the CNI participates in:

• Detection of hostile narratives about migration and borders.
• Attribution (when possible) to state or non-state actors.
• Provision of intelligence to the National Security Council and the Situation Committee to define political and communicative response.

This scheme is reinforced with later norms such as Order PJC/248/2025, on the procedure for drafting the National Strategy against Disinformation Campaigns, and the creation of the Forum against disinformation campaigns, where collaboration with other public and private actors is articulated.

All this places the CNI as a core intelligence provider in the national system against disinformation, with the capacity to act on campaigns that instrumentalize migration crises, although the regulation does not specifically cite it for that concept. The rest of the legal architecture (including the correction of errors of the Universal Social Card or the resolution on said card, and other sectoral norms such as the strategy against weapons of mass destruction or Order CIN/644/2023) does not directly regulate this area but completes the regulatory context in which the Center operates.

To reinforce border controls in Ceuta, Spain must operate within a multi-level normative framework: the EU Schengen acquis, the Constitution, and internal organic laws on immigration, citizen security, national security, and asylum. Such reinforcement can only be done with a clear legal basis, respecting fundamental rights, the principle of non-refoulement, and the prohibition of collective expulsions, and passing a test of necessity, suitability, and proportionality. Additionally, any operational change must be coordinated with Spain’s international obligations and the European Union’s migration and security policy. Below is a synthesis of the main legal axes applicable to intensifying controls in Ceuta.

1. European framework: Schengen acquis and border control

Spain’s regime for land, sea, and air borders is embedded in the Schengen acquis, included, among other provisions, in the Schengen acquis, Council decisions on its development, such as the Decision of May 20, 1999 and the parallel Decision, and rules on border controls and surveillance, such as Regulation (EC) 790/2001. Also, Spain’s accession to the Schengen Implementation Convention is formalized in the 1994 Ratification Instrument and the 1991 Accession Protocol.

From this block it follows that:

• Ceuta’s land border with a third state is an external border of the Schengen area and is subject to systematic entry and exit controls, with common rules for surveillance, documentation, visas, and entry denials.
• Any reinforcement (more controls, technological means, intensified inspections) must follow Schengen rules on legitimate purposes (security, public order, migration management) and non-discriminatory treatment.

Regarding authorized crossing points, state competence is reflected in orders that designate or modify border posts, such as Order PRA/223/2018, Order PCI/7/2019, Order PRE/1596/2014, Order PRE/3275/2011, Order PRE/2506/2010, or Order PRE/2397/2009.

2. Immigration, returns, and cooperation with third countries

The basic regime is in Organic Law 4/2000 (LOEx), amended by LO 8/2000 and LO 2/2009. The LOEx:

• Recognizes that immigration policy must be based, among others, on respect for rights recognized by the Constitution and international treaties to all persons, and on combating irregular immigration and trafficking.
• Provides that recognition of refugee status entails non-refoulement and non-expulsion “under the terms of Article 33 of the Refugee Status Convention” (principle of non-refoulement).
• Imposes the promotion of agreements with origin and transit countries to regulate flows and, specifically, collaboration agreements on unaccompanied foreign minors, with guarantees of the best interests of the child.

This means that any practice of reinforcing controls in Ceuta (including border returns or readmissions to Morocco) must respect the non-refoulement principle, especially when there are indications of the need for international protection or risk of torture or inhuman treatment.

3. Asylum, non-refoulement principle, and guarantees at the border

Law 12/2009, on asylum, which develops Article 13.4 of the Constitution, regulates international protection (asylum and subsidiary protection). Among its relevant rules for Ceuta are:

• The use of the non-refoulement principle as a criterion to assess concepts such as “safe third country” and “effective protection” (it requires that in that country non-refoulement and the prohibition of expelling those exposed to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment are respected).
• A specific procedure for applications submitted at border posts: the Ministry of Interior may reject or deny them in an accelerated manner, but with strict deadlines (usually 4 days) and with the possibility of requesting reconsideration that suspends the decision; if deadlines are not met, the application proceeds to ordinary processing and provisional entry is authorized.

Applied to Ceuta, this obliges that any reinforcement of controls preserves the real and effective possibility of requesting asylum at the border, with information, access to procedure, and assistance.

4. Citizen security and proportionate use of controls

Organic Law 4/2015, on citizen security, configures security as an instrument at the service of rights, not as an autonomous end. Its preamble emphasizes that any restriction of freedoms must comply with the principle of legality and a triple proportionality test: suitability, necessity, and strict proportionality.

From this it follows that increases in identifications, searches, exit or entry controls in Ceuta for security reasons are only legitimate if provided by law, pursue constitutionally legitimate purposes, are suitable, and no less burdensome equally effective measure exists, besides being applied without discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin.

5. National Security and inter-administrative coordination

Law 36/2015, on National Security, conceives national security as the State’s action aimed at protecting citizens’ freedom and rights and guaranteeing Spain’s defense. It foresees coordination mechanisms among Administrations and with the private sector in situations of special interest for national security, without replacing or altering the regimes of states of alarm and exception.

In a possible scenario of migratory pressure or threat in Ceuta, declaring a situation of interest for national security would allow reinforcing coordination and mobilizing resources, but does not by itself authorize violating rights or ignoring the guarantees of the LOEx and the Asylum Law. The Constitutional Court, in STC 184/2016, has emphasized that this law must be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution regarding competential distribution and respect for rights.

6. Other related instruments

In the regulatory environment of immigration and protection, norms such as Order PRE/1282/2007 (economic means for entry), Order PRE/1283/2007 (invitation letters), or orders extending documentation for foreigners with temporary protection (Order INT/96/2026, Order INT/195/2025, Order INT/169/2024) also operate. Additionally, numerous bilateral visa waiver agreements, such as those published in the BOE regarding Greece, Austria, France, India, Qatar, Angola, Nauru, Guyana, Jordan, Egypt, South Africa, Grenada, Mauritania, Kuwait, or the Dominican Republic (for example, this agreement with India or this with the Dominican Republic), condition who is subject to visa control at Ceuta’s border.

Altogether, all these instruments require that any reinforcement of controls in Ceuta be: legally founded, coordinated with the EU and third states only within the law’s framework, respectful of asylum and non-refoulement, and subject to strict scrutiny of legality, proportionality, and non-discrimination.