Ceuta returns to the spotlight the reform of the CNI of the PNV, blocked for two years.

The reform of the National Intelligence Center (CNI) promoted by the PNV is structured through a Bill to amend the Law regulating the CNI and the Organic Law on prior judicial control of the CNI, filed by the Basque Group (EAJ-PNV) in the Congress of Deputies. According to official and journalistic information available, the initiative has passed the consideration stage in the Plenary of the Congress and is under ordinary processing in the Lower House, in the phase following that first debate.

The key is the plenary session of September 24, 2024, in which the Congress debated the consideration of this bill. The official press release from the Chamber (“The Congress takes into consideration the bill to amend the law regulating the National Intelligence Center and the organic law of prior judicial control of the CNI”) states that:

• The Basque Group's proposal was approved by 177 votes in favor and 170 against, thus it was “accepted for processing” and its parliamentary processing began in the strict sense.
• The text modifies the Law 11/2002, regulating the CNI, and the Organic Law regulating prior judicial control, strengthening political and judicial control over the Center's actions.
• After consideration, the initiative is referred to the competent committee and the period for submitting amendments, both total and to the articles, is opened (Congress press release).

In parallel, the newspaper Demócrata detailed that same day that “the reform of the CNI regulatory framework proposed by the PNV passes consideration in Congress,” confirming the 177 favorable votes and 170 against, as well as the support of PSOE, Sumar, ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, Podemos, BNG, and Coalición Canaria, against the rejection of PP, Vox, and UPN (Demócrata report).

From there, and according to the Congress's own statement, the specific parliamentary situation is that of a bill under processing in Congress after passing consideration. The steps foreseen by the Rules — and therefore the pending procedures until its final approval — are as follows:

1. Amendment procedure in Congress:
   • Opening and successive extensions of the period for amendments to the whole text (with alternative text) and to the articles.
   • If there are total amendments and they are rejected, the bill continues with its original text as the basis.
2. Working group in the competent committee:
   • Constitution of a Working Group that studies the text and partial amendments.
   • Drafting of a Working Group Report incorporating the transactions and agreements reached.
3. Committee report and submission to the Plenary of Congress:
   • The committee debates the Working Group Report and approves a Report, which may introduce additional changes.
   • That Report is submitted to the Plenary of Congress as the text to be debated and voted on.
4. Final debate and vote in the Plenary of Congress:
   • Amendments still “alive” are debated and voted on.
   • The entire text is put to a vote. If approved, the bill passes to the Senate.
5. Processing in the Senate:
   • Qualification by the Senate Board, referral to committee, and period for amendments in the Upper House.
   • Preparation of a Committee Report and debate in the Plenary of the Senate.
   • The Senate may approve the text without changes (the law would then be approved), approve it with amendments, or issue a veto.
6. Second reading in Congress (if the Senate modifies or vetoes):
   • Congress decides whether to accept or reject the Senate's amendments.
   • In case of veto, it can be lifted by immediate absolute majority or, after two months, by simple majority.
7. Sanction, promulgation, and publication:
   • Once the same text is approved by both Chambers (or the veto is lifted), the sanction and promulgation by the King takes place.
   • The reform is published in the Official State Gazette (BOE), at which point it comes into force under the terms of its final provision.

It is important not to confuse this processing with other related initiatives, such as the written question in the Senate with identifier (15)684/009216, which was inadmissible by the Board and merely questioned the Government about its acceptance of the PNV's proposal to reform the CNI. That question is concluded due to inadmissibility and does not affect the course of the bill, which continues its ordinary course in the General Courts until all the described milestones are completed.

According to current legislation, the Prime Minister has a decisive but indirect role in the appointment and dismissal of the Director of the National Intelligence Center (CNI): he is not the one who makes the proposal nor signs the appointment alone, but he politically directs the agency, sets its objectives through the Government, and endorses, together with the competent minister, the acts of the King when the appointment is formalized by Royal Decree.

Basic rule: Law 11/2002, regulating the CNI

Law 11/2002 establishes the CNI as the public body responsible for providing the Prime Minister and the Government with “the information, analysis, studies or proposals” necessary to prevent threats to the independence, integrity, and interests of Spain and the stability of the rule of law (art. 1, according to the consulted excerpt). That is, the Prime Minister is the main political recipient of the intelligence produced by the Center.

The same Law establishes that the CNI's objectives are defined by the Government and “approved annually by the Council of Ministers” in the Intelligence Directive, which is classified. Additionally, the Government Delegated Commission for Intelligence Affairs — of which the CNI Director is a member — has, among other functions, the role of “proposing to the Prime Minister the annual objectives of the National Intelligence Center that must be included in the Intelligence Directive” and monitoring them (art. 6, according to the extracted text).

Appointment and dismissal of the CNI Director

Specifically, Law 11/2002 provides that:

“The Secretary of State Director of the National Intelligence Center shall be appointed by Royal Decree at the proposal of the Minister of Defense. The term shall be five years, without prejudice to the power of the Council of Ministers to proceed with his replacement at any time.”

From this provision, several relevant elements for the Prime Minister's role derive:

• Who proposes: the formal proposal for appointment lies with the Minister of Defense, not the Prime Minister.
• Who formally agrees: the appointment is made by Royal Decree of the Government, agreed upon in the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister, as head of Government and president of the Council of Ministers, drives and directs this collective decision.
• Dismissal regime: although a five-year term is set, the Law expressly recognizes the power of the Council of Ministers to “proceed with his replacement at any time,” which enables early dismissal by political decision of the Government, led by the Prime Minister.

Role of the King and Prime Minister's endorsement

The appointment is formalized by Royal Decree, which implies the intervention of the King and the corresponding governmental endorsement:

• The Constitution, in its article 62, assigns the King the function of “issuing the decrees agreed upon in the Council of Ministers.”
• Article 64 CE establishes that “the acts of the King shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and, where appropriate, by the competent Ministers” and that acts without countersignature are invalid.

Consequently, the Royal Decree of appointment or dismissal of the CNI Director:

• is agreed upon in the Council of Ministers chaired by the Prime Minister,
• is issued by the King,
• and is countersigned by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense as the competent minister.

Law 50/1997, of the Government, reinforces this conclusion by attributing to the Prime Minister, among other functions, the power to “countersign, where appropriate, the acts of the King” and to direct the action of the Government and the Council of Ministers (arts. 2 and 4, according to the consulted excerpts).

Political authority over the CNI and structure

Law 11/2002 and its regulatory development (in particular, Royal Decree 436/2002, on the organic structure of the CNI) place the CNI Director with the rank of Secretary of State and assign the Prime Minister relevant structural powers. The Law itself authorizes the Prime Minister to “modify, by Royal Decree, the organic assignment of the National Intelligence Center,” so he can decide, within the legal framework, in which ministerial department the CNI is integrated and, therefore, under which minister the appointment proposal is made.

Furthermore, as the CNI is an agency that “provides” intelligence to the Prime Minister and the Government, and whose objectives are defined and approved by them, the Prime Minister is configured as the ultimate political authority responsible: he sets the strategic objectives through the Intelligence Directive, presides over the collegiate body that decides the appointment and dismissal of the Director (Council of Ministers), and endorses the Royal Decrees that formalize these acts before the King.

Summary

In summary, current legislation configures a scheme in which:

• the Minister of Defense proposes the CNI Director,
• the Council of Ministers — under the direction of the Prime Minister — agrees on his appointment or dismissal at any time,
• the King issues the Royal Decree of appointment or dismissal,
• and this act is perfected with the countersignature of the Prime Minister (and the Minister of Defense), who assumes political responsibility for the appointment and removal.

All this is inserted in the broader framework in which the Prime Minister is the main recipient of the CNI's intelligence and the authority who sets, through the Government, its annual objectives and its institutional position within the General State Administration.

The Defense Committee of the Congress of Deputies in the current XV Legislature is made up of representatives from all the major parliamentary groups, including smaller groups. According to the updated register of the Chamber itself, nine parliamentary groups participate in the Committee with the following internal seat distribution: PSOE, PP, Sumar, Vox, PNV, ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, and Mixed Group.

Looking at the quantitative distribution, the scheme is as follows:

• Socialist Parliamentary Group in Congress (PSOE): 20 deputies are part of the Defense Committee. It is, along with the People's Party, the group with the largest numerical presence in this body. Among these members are the spokesperson, deputy spokesperson, and the set of vocal members and assigned members of the group.
• People's Parliamentary Group in Congress (PP): 20 deputies also make up the Defense Committee. This places the PP on equal numerical footing with the PSOE within the committee, reflecting the weight of the main opposition force in monitoring defense policy.
• Plurinational Parliamentary Group SUMAR in Congress: has 4 deputies in the Defense Committee. This group carries out its work through a spokesperson and deputy spokespersons, as well as vocal members, following the logic of proportional representation of the Plenary but adapted to the reality of medium-sized groups.
• Basque Parliamentary Group in Congress (EAJ-PNV): has 3 members in the committee. The presence of the PNV is relevant in an area such as defense, where the group usually emphasizes issues related to the defense industry, participation in international missions, and the impact on the Basque economic fabric.
• Mixed Parliamentary Group in Congress: gathers 3 deputies in the Defense Committee. The Mixed Group brings together formations and deputies who do not reach the numerical threshold to form their own group, so their members participate in the committee through turns and internal agreements on the distribution of times and responsibilities.
• Vox Parliamentary Group in Congress: also has 3 members in the Defense Committee. Given the party's ideological profile, it usually focuses its activity in this area on strengthening military spending, supporting the Armed Forces, and Spain's position in NATO and external missions.
• Republican Parliamentary Group in Congress (ERC): has 2 deputies in the committee. Its representation allows ERC to participate in discussions on international missions, military bases, and, in general, in parliamentary control of defense policy from a sovereigntist perspective very attentive to territorial impact.
• Junts per Catalunya Parliamentary Group in Congress: is present with 2 members. As in the case of ERC, Junts uses its presence in this committee to project its positions on sovereignty, foreign policy, and the role of the Armed Forces, with special attention to the Catalan dimension.
• EH Bildu Parliamentary Group in Congress: has 2 deputies in the Defense Committee. Its activity usually focuses on a critical view of traditional defense policy, questioning military spending and participation in certain external operations.

The key fact is that the Defense Committee is made up of nine parliamentary groups and a total of 59 deputies distributed among them, if we add the titular and assigned members considered in the Chamber's register. The presence of assigned members (that is, deputies who, without necessarily being titular members of the committee from the beginning of the legislature, join to follow its work or participate in certain debates) explains why the major groups, such as PSOE and PP, reach such high numbers of members.

This composition ensures that in the parliamentary control of defense policy, both the large governmental and opposition majorities and the entire plurinational spectrum are represented: from the Government's usual partners to nationalist and sovereigntist forces, passing through groups with very different positions on military spending, international alliances, or Spain's role in NATO and the European Union. Thus, debates on foreign missions, armament programs, Armed Forces structure, or defense industrial policy are addressed with a broad range of political sensitivities.