How many votes are moving in Ceuta due to the migration crisis? The PSOE sinks 15 points and loses five of its six seats while Vivas takes the PP to 50.5%

The Sigma Dos survey for El Mundo measures the political earthquake caused during the most difficult month for Ceuta: the PP goes from 34.4% in 2023 to 50.5% and would reach an absolute majority with 13-14 seats, while the PSOE falls from 21% to 5.6% and would retain only one of its six deputies. Vox barely capitalizes on the crisis. Almost three out of ten former socialist voters would switch to the PP. The poll is known on Ceuta Day, when more than 260 municipalities have called for support concentrations for the city at 8:00 PM.

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The crisis of Ceuta can now also be measured in votes. One month after the massive entry on July 30, a new survey by Sigma Dos for El Mundo outlines an extraordinary transformation of the political map of the autonomous city: the PP of Juan Jesús Vivas goes from winning the elections with 34.4% in 2023 to now concentrating 50.5% of the vote and achieving an absolute majority on its own.

In the opposite direction, the PSOE goes from 21% to 5.6%. It loses more than 15 points, five of the six deputies it obtained three years ago, and is reduced to a single representative in an Assembly of 25 seats.

The survey was conducted between August 26 and 30, after practically a full month of crisis. And it is published just as Ceuta becomes the center of national conversation again this Wednesday, September 2: more than 260 municipalities have called for gatherings at 8:00 PM coinciding with the Day of Ceuta. In Madrid, the call is moved in front of the Congress of Deputies. ([La Razón][2])

It is difficult to find a clearer photograph of the political cost of a crisis in the very territory where it has occurred.

The electoral cost of Ceuta: PP +16 points, PSOE -15

The comparison with the regional elections of May 2023 allows measuring the magnitude of the movement.

The PP obtained 34.37% of the votes and nine deputies then. Sigma Dos now places it at 50.5%, an increase of 16.1 points, and between 13 and 14 seats.

The PSOE traveled practically the same distance in the opposite direction. It would go from 20.96% to 5.6%, a drop of 15.4 points, and from six representatives to one.

The official results of 2023 were 11,738 votes for the PP and 7,158 for the PSOE. Vox obtained 7,050; MDyC, 3,839; and Ceuta Ya!, 3,428. ([RTVE.es][3])

The distance between PP and PSOE was then 13.4 points. Now it would be 44.9. That is, the gap between the two parties would have widened by more than 31 points in three years.

Almost three out of ten PSOE voters switch directly to PP

The most significant movement is not only in the final result but in the transfer of votes. According to Sigma Dos, 29.4% of those who voted for the PSOE in the regional elections of 2023 would now choose the PP. It is an extraordinarily high transfer between two rival parties.

It cannot automatically convert into absolute votes because participation and the size of the electorate can change. But as a magnitude reference, the PSOE obtained 7,158 votes in 2023: 29.4% of that amount represents a volume equivalent to about 2,100 voters.

The survey, therefore, does not only describe abstention or socialist demobilization. A very important part of the electorate that the PSOE loses would directly cross over to Vivas.

Vivas absorbs practically all the socialist punishment

The striking thing is that Vox does not star in the big rise. In 2023 it obtained 20.64%. Sigma Dos now places it at 21.6%. It is less than a point of growth.

The Popular Party gains 16 points, while Vox remains practically at its 2023 level. The result thus points to a very local political phenomenon: the response of the electorate seems to especially reward the management and leadership of the president of Ceuta rather than producing a simple general shift to the right.

Vivas could govern Ceuta without any partner

The Assembly of Ceuta has 25 seats and the absolute majority is set at 13.

The PP currently governs with nine. Sigma Dos now grants it between 13 and 14, which would allow Vivas to govern alone without needing either Vox or any of the local formations.

It would also be a recovery of a type of majority that the PP had lost in the last electoral cycles. In 2015, the PP obtained precisely 13 seats. In 2019 and 2023 it dropped to nine. The current estimate would return Vivas to the realm of absolute majority. ([RTVE.es][4])

The PSOE, on the verge of disappearing

There is an even more striking fact.

The electoral barrier to enter the Assembly of Ceuta is set at 5%. Sigma Dos places the PSOE at 5.6%.

That is to say, the socialists would be just six tenths away from the threshold that allows access to the distribution of seats.

The estimate still grants them one representative, but illustrates to what extent the fall is exceptional: a party that obtained six deputies just three years ago now enters the zone where its own parliamentary presence begins to be at risk.

Vox becomes the second force, but barely grows

Vox would become the second force with 21.6% of the votes. In 2023 it obtained 20.64%. The advance would be approximately one point, far from the 16 points that the PP gains.

In representation, it would go from five seats to five or six.

This result is especially interesting because in the national polls conducted during August, Vox has appeared as one of the beneficiaries of the political climate following Ceuta. In the national series of Sigma Dos, it has risen from 17.3% in July to 17.9% at the end of August and reaches 61 deputies. ([Sigma Dos][5])

In Ceuta, however, the effect has another recipient: Vivas.

Ceuta Ya! also grows

The PP is not the only party that improves. Ceuta Ya! goes from the 10.03% obtained in the 2023 regional elections to 12.2%.

The increase is 2.2 points. This would allow it to go from two to three seats and become the third force in the Assembly, ahead of MDyC and a PSOE reduced to a single representative.

MDyC would experience the opposite movement. It goes from 11.24% to 8.9% and would lose one of its current three deputies, remaining with two.

The future Parliament that Sigma Dos outlines would therefore be greatly reordered: PP 13-14; Vox 5-6; Ceuta Ya! 3; MDyC 2; PSOE 1.

Vivas Effect: 58% of his own socialist voters would prefer him

The electoral transfer is not the only problem for the PSOE of Ceuta. Sigma Dos also asks who should preside over the city. Among those who voted for the PSOE in 2023, 58.2% respond Juan Jesús Vivas. Only 12.4% of that same electorate bets on Miguel Ángel Pérez Triano, the general secretary of the Ceuta PSOE and government delegate.

This is an unusual fact: an absolute majority of the voters of a party prefers as president the main leader of its opponent.

The personal evaluation reproduces that distance.

Vivas scores an 8 out of 10.

Fátima Hamed, from MDyC, reaches a 4.5; Juan Sergio Redondo, from Vox, a 4.1; Mohamed Mustafa, from Ceuta Ya!, a 3.5; and Pérez Triano scores a 2.

Two out of three socialists believe that Vivas has defended Ceuta better

The question that connects the survey most directly with the crisis is who has defended the interests of Ceuta better. 75.4% of all respondents point to Vivas. Among PP voters, the percentage reaches 95.4%.

But the politically most significant data is again found in the PSOE. 67% of former socialist voters believe that Vivas has defended the interests of Ceuta better during this crisis.

Only 16.1% point to the Government delegate. Here appears a possible explanation for the extraordinary transfer from PSOE to PP: for a part of the socialist electorate, the crisis seems to have altered the assessment of who better represents the specific interests of the city.

Ceuta reaches September 2 with the crisis still open

The survey is also known on a particularly symbolic date. This Wednesday is Ceuta Day and more than 260 municipalities have announced support gatherings for the city at 8:00 PM.

The initiative was born from the citizen platform Por Ceuta and was later supported by various town halls and by the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces. In Madrid, the event is scheduled in front of Congress.

The mobilization has also opened a new political battle. The PSOE communicated to its territorial leaders that they would not participate in the calls promoted by the FEMP, while the PP announced that it would support gatherings even in municipalities governed by socialists that did not join institutionally.

JUCIL and JUPOL have also expressed their support for the mobilizations and have demanded more resources and protocols for the forces deployed in Ceuta.

Source: El Mundo/Sigma Dos, published on 2/09/2026

Result of the Sigma Dos survey in Ceuta

The PP of Juan Jesús Vivas would reach 50.5% of the votes and between 13 and 14 seats, enough to achieve an absolute majority in the Assembly of Ceuta. Vox would be the second force, while the PSOE would fall to 5.6% and would retain only one deputy.

Party Estimated vote Seats Seats 2023 Change
PP 50.5% 13-14 9 +4/+5
Vox 21.6% 5-6 5 0/+1
Ceuta Ya! 12.2% 3 2 +1
MDyC 8.9% 2 3 -1
PSOE 5.6% 1 6 -5

Absolute majority: 13 seats. Source: Sigma Dos for El Mundo. Fieldwork conducted between August 26 and 30, 2026.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current status of the electoral reform process in Ceuta and what requirements would be necessary to modify the seat allocation system?

As of today, no specific electoral reform for Ceuta is recorded in the official sources consulted that is in advanced processing to modify the system of election and seat allocation of the Ceuta Assembly. There have been recent reforms of the LOREG (for example, to regulate the election of a senator for Formentera) and general debates about the electoral system, but without an identified procedure that changes Ceuta's own rules. Any relevant modification should be made, in any case, through a organic law approved by the General Courts.

1. Current status of the electoral reform in Ceuta

Institutional and press information includes:

  • Reforms of the Organic Law 5/1985, of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) of national scope (for example, for the Formentera constituency in the Senate).
  • A governmental draft reform of the LOREG aimed at issues such as mandatory debates during campaigns or electoral transparency.
  • Resolutions and agreements of the Central Electoral Board and explanatory notes on constituencies and seat allocation where Ceuta is mentioned as its own constituency.

However, in that documentation there is no identified bill or organic law project focused on modifying the election system of the Ceuta Assembly (number of seats, allocation formula, thresholds, etc.), nor a text that has already been approved with that content.

It follows that, as of 2026, the electoral regime of Ceuta remains according to the current framework: a single city constituency, 25 deputies, proportional representation with the D’Hondt formula, and rules basically set by the LOREG and the Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta.

2. Legal framework conditioning any reform

Ceuta's electoral system is framed within several highest-ranking norms:

  • Spanish Constitution:
    • Art. 23: right to suffrage and political participation.
    • Art. 81: reservation of organic law for the general electoral regime.
    • Art. 68 and 69: principles on the election of Congress and Senate.
  • LOREG, which regulates the general electoral regime and contemplates the treatment of Ceuta and Melilla as specific constituencies both in general elections and other processes.
  • Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta (Organic Law 1/1995), which creates the Ceuta Assembly, sets its number of members, and refers to the general electoral regulations for system details.

These texts establish that the essential elements of the system (type of constituency, proportional nature, rights of voters and parties) are matters of state organic law.

3. Requirements to modify the seat allocation system

3.1. Type of norm and majorities
  • Any substantive change to the electoral regime of Ceuta (number of seats, assignment rules, access thresholds, etc.) must be made through an organic law, as it is linked to the “general electoral regime.”
  • An organic law requires an absolute majority of the Congress in the final vote on the entire text.
  • The Senate participates in the process: it can introduce amendments or veto, but the Congress has the final word within the general rules of relations between Chambers.
3.2. Role of the Ceuta Assembly

The Ceuta Assembly cannot, by itself, reform its electoral system. It can:

  • Approve proposals or reports addressed to the Government and the Courts.
  • Politically promote a reform initiative, which must then be materialized in a project or bill of state organic law.

The “hard” normative margin therefore lies with the General Courts.

3.3. Possible reform of the Statute

If the modification of seat allocation implied changing aspects directly set in the Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta (for example, the number of Assembly members), a statutory reform would also be necessary, which must also be approved by organic law by the Courts and respecting the procedure that the Constitution itself provides for statutes and their reforms. In principle, this does not entail a mandatory referendum in Ceuta, unless a constitutional reform required it, which is not considered here.

3.4. Material limits
  • Respect for the right to suffrage and equality (art. 23 CE): the system must remain reasonably proportional and non-discriminatory.
  • Maintenance of proportional representation, although the degree of proportionality can be modulated by district magnitude or threshold.
  • Observance of legal certainty: avoiding abrupt changes immediately before elections without solid justification.

4. Summary

In summary, today there is no specific electoral reform for Ceuta in an advanced phase or already approved that alters its seat allocation system: the current model defined by the LOREG and the Statute still applies. To modify it, a state organic law approved by absolute majority in the Congress would be essential, possibly accompanied by a reform of the Statute of Autonomy if aspects fixed there are touched, and always within the limits set by the Constitution regarding suffrage, proportionality, and democratic guarantees.

What are the competencies and political trajectory of Juan Jesús Vivas as president of Ceuta and which party does he belong to?

Juan Jesús Vivas Lara is the president of the Autonomous City of Ceuta and belongs to the People's Party (PP), being one of the most veteran popular leaders in office. As Ceuta's president, he heads the city's Government and exercises the highest institutional representation of the autonomy, with a central role in political, economic management and relations with the State and the European Union.

Competencies as president of Ceuta

The competencies of the president of the Autonomous City are framed within the institutional framework described for Ceuta, whose main bodies are the Government Council and the Ceuta Assembly, according to an informative note from the Senate. In this scheme, the president is the figure who directs the action of the local Executive and represents the city before national and European institutions.

Substantively, his political functions can be summarized on several levels:

  • Direction of the Autonomous City Government: he leads the Ceuta Executive, sets political priorities, and coordinates the actions of the different ministries (Health, Economy, Presidency and Governance, etc.), which have had special prominence during the recent migration crisis.
  • Institutional representation: acts as the main interlocutor of Ceuta before the Government of Spain and the European Union. Official agendas of La Moncloa record numerous meetings of ministers with Vivas in Madrid and Ceuta to address issues such as the border, the external dimension of the city, or the Comprehensive Socioeconomic Development Plan.
  • Defense of the city's financial and fiscal interests: at a Nueva Economía Fórum breakfast, Vivas demanded that Ceuta be included in the “map” of autonomous debt forgiveness and defended that the city's special economic and fiscal regime be adapted to new development models, emphasizing digital industry, the port, and tourism (Nueva Economía Fórum).
  • Crisis and security management: during the migration crisis that began at the end of July 2026, Demócrata reports how Vivas has demanded strengthening the border, accelerating legal return mechanisms, and establishing stronger state coordination, even calling for a single direction in a situation he considers beyond the ordinary capacities of the Autonomous City.
  • External projection and sovereignty: Vivas himself has emphasized that what is at stake in Ceuta is “the cause of all Spain” and has linked the territorial integrity of the city with that of the entire country, placing his role also in defending Spanish identity and Ceuta's strategic position vis-à-vis Morocco and the EU.

Political trajectory

According to the profile outlined by the newspaper Demócrata, Juan Jesús Vivas has been leading the Autonomous City for around 25 years, making him the autonomous president with the longest uninterrupted time in office in all of Spain. The same medium describes him as “the longest-serving PP leader in his position since 2001,” the year he assumed the Presidency of Ceuta.

Over these decades, he has consolidated as a central figure in Ceuta's politics, combining the defense of the city's Spanish identity with a line of institutional loyalty towards the different governments of Spain. At an event with Pedro Sánchez inaugurating Ceuta's new maritime terminal, the Prime Minister expressly thanked Vivas for his “institutional loyalty,” while Vivas emphasized that his priority is always to place Ceuta's interests above any other political consideration.

During the recent migration crisis, his profile has gained even more visibility: he has held constant meetings with ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Territorial Policy, and other departments; he was received by King Felipe VI at the Marivent Palace to inform about the city's situation; and he announced a trip to Brussels to directly convey the problem to community institutions, according to various reports collected by Demócrata.

Internally, his leadership projects over a government of coalitions and variable agreements in the Ceuta Assembly, in which the PP is the central force. Political chronicles highlight that, despite pressures from other formations, Vivas has tried to preserve his own profile and a line of collaboration with the central government when he considered it benefited the city.

Political affiliation

All sources agree that Juan Jesús Vivas belongs to the People's Party. Media such as Demócrata and various press notes from the PP itself repeatedly refer to him as “president of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas (PP)”, and place him as one of the main territorial references of the party due to his longevity in office and his weight in the debate on Ceuta and Melilla, migration policy, and national security.

What results did Vox, MDyC, and Ceuta Ya! obtain in the last Ceuta autonomous elections and how is the Assembly composed after those elections?

Based on the sources consulted, it can be stated clearly that after the last elections to the Ceuta Assembly, Vox obtained 4 seats, while MDyC (Movement for Dignity and Citizenship) and Ceuta Ya! entered the Chamber as localist forces present in the Board of Spokespersons. However, the available texts do not show a complete and precise numerical breakdown of votes and seats for MDyC and Ceuta Ya!, so it is not possible to offer those figures with guarantees without resorting to information external to the analyzed sources.

Results of Vox, MDyC, and Ceuta Ya!

One of the key pieces to understand the distribution of forces is the information published by the newspaper Demócrata in the article "Vox demands PP to enter the Government of Ceuta and also holds Vivas responsible for the migration crisis" . It indicates that the Vox leader in Ceuta, Juan Sergio Redondo, defends that in the city there is an "alternative absolute majority" by adding the nine PP deputies and the four from Vox.

This data allows to firmly establish Vox's result in those elections: 4 deputies in a 25-seat Assembly. The same article positions Vox as a potential partner of the PP to form a coalition government, demanding key areas of the local Executive.

Regarding MDyC (Movement for Dignity and Citizenship) and Ceuta Ya!, the consulted sources confirm that:

However, neither that text nor the rest of the recovered documents provide the exact number of seats and votes obtained by MDyC and Ceuta Ya! in the autonomous elections, beyond confirming that both achieved a group or at least their own presence in the Chamber. To specify the fine data of seats and vote percentages of these two parties, it would be necessary to directly consult the official results of the Ceuta Electoral Board or the specific electoral results portal, which is not detailed in the available trace.

Assembly composition after the elections

Even without having the complete table of seats by party, it is possible to reconstruct the basic political structure of the Ceuta Assembly after the last autonomous elections, combining several references:

  • The Assembly has 25 deputies.
  • The PP is the leading force with 9 seats, according to Demócrata in the cited information, from which Vox demands a PP–Vox coalition supported by that "alternative absolute majority" of 9 + 4.
  • Vox has 4 deputies, positioning itself as the third force and a potential partner for a right-wing government.
  • The PSOE maintains significant representation and is part of the Assembly's Board of Spokespersons, also participating in institutional statements and agreements during the 2026 migration crisis.
  • MDyC and Ceuta Ya! are present in the Board of Spokespersons and in the main joint declarations of the Chamber, confirming that they obtained enough seats to have their own voice in the legislature.
  • Another Demócrata piece about reactions to protests in the city also mentions the participation of two non-attached deputies in joint group initiatives, indicating that the effective composition of the Assembly also includes representatives who have left their formations or are outside their original group.

Based on this, the resulting political composition can be described as follows: a clearly majority PP but below absolute majority, a Vox with four deputies that allows, combined with the PP, to form an alternative majority of 13 seats, and a diverse bloc formed by PSOE, MDyC, Ceuta Ya!, and, if applicable, non-attached deputies, completing the 25 seats of the Assembly.

This distribution explains both the current tensions — Vox pressing to enter the Autonomous City Government — and the need for President Juan Jesús Vivas to rely on broader agreements, which have included PSOE and MDyC at different times, to ensure governability in a context marked by the migration crisis and the high fragmentation of Ceuta's party system.

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