Marlaska demands the Police to know since when they were aware of the report that points to Moroccan agents in the massive entry of Ceuta

Based on the available parliamentary information from the conducted search, there is no record in the current XV Legislature of a specific and active investigative committee in the Congress or the Senate dedicated exclusively to the “police and government actions during the mass entry into Ceuta” of May 2021. What does appear are various initiatives of political oversight and guidance (motions, non-legislative proposals, and questions) addressing the migratory pressure on Ceuta and other territories, as well as the role of Morocco.

In the Senate, the initiative most clearly linked to the situation in Ceuta is the motion on the situation of migratory pressure and urgent reinforcement of border control and reception means in the city of Ceuta, promoted by the Popular Parliamentary Group (file (15)661/001931). According to the consulted registry, this motion:

• Was presented in the XV Legislature as an initiative to urge the Government.
• Addresses the strong migratory pressure on the city and the need to reinforce human and material means of control and reception.
• Has been definitively approved, and on 05/18/2026 it was published that the text was officially approved.

It is important to emphasize that a motion of this type does not constitute a “parliamentary investigation” in the strict sense, but rather an urging initiative: it provides a political diagnosis and proposes measures to the Government, but does not deploy the enhanced powers of an investigative committee (systematic hearings, requests for documentation with the scope typical of such committees, drafting a report, etc.). In any case, it shows that the Upper Chamber has addressed the issue from the perspective of border security and migratory pressure on Ceuta.

Also in the Senate, there are written questions that directly link migratory pressure on Ceuta with Morocco’s position and Spanish foreign policy. Among them stand out the initiatives of Senator José Antonio Monago Terraza (Popular Group), with files (15)684/023262 and (15)684/023260, registered on 12/09/2025 and currently awaiting response from the Government. These questions:

• Explicitly refer to “episodes of massive irregular entries in Ceuta.”
• Ask whether the Government acknowledges that the management of migratory flows from Morocco can be used as a political pressure instrument.
• Request an assessment of the relationship between migratory crises like Ceuta’s and Spanish decisions regarding Western Sahara and other sensitive matters.

Again, these are government oversight mechanisms, not an investigative committee: they require the Executive to respond in writing but do not open a structured investigation with hearings or a final report.

In the Congress of Deputies, the database identifies several non-legislative proposals (PNL) related to Ceuta, Melilla, and migratory pressure, which include mentions to the 2021 events, although their main focus is territorial integrity and the Spanish identity of the cities. Notable are:

• The PNL from the VOX Parliamentary Group in the Congress with identifier 161/000120, whose text was published on 01/16/2024 and which, according to the consulted information, was approved (officially approved text published on 06/25/2025). Its statement of reasons explicitly cites the “assault suffered by Ceuta in 2021 by more than ten thousand illegal immigrants,” framing it as part of a Moroccan pressure strategy.
• Another PNL on the defense of the territorial integrity and Spanish identity of Ceuta and Melilla (file 162/000034), presented in October 2023. The text also refers to the massive entry of 2021 as an example of that pressure.

These initiatives from the Congress, as with the Senate motion, are instruments of political guidance. Being non-legislative proposals:

• They do not by themselves open a parliamentary investigation with specific powers.
• They are debated and voted on in committee or plenary, and if approved, they merely urge the Government to adopt certain measures, without direct legal effects.

With all this, and strictly limited to the information found, the situation can be summarized as: there is no investigative committee or subcommittee in the XV Legislature specifically dedicated to clarifying police and government actions during the mass entry into Ceuta in May 2021. What exists is political and oversight monitoring through:

• Motions and non-legislative proposals in Congress and Senate, some already approved.
• Written questions to the Government still pending response.

Consequently, it can be said that, as of today, the “investigation” in parliamentary venue about these events is not channeled through a formal investigative committee in progress, but rather through control and political urging initiatives already processed or underway, whose scope is more limited than that of a proper investigative committee.

In Spanish legislation, the competencies of the Minister of the Interior and the Director General of Police are framed at two different levels: the political and strategic direction of the internal security system (minister) and the senior management and operational management of the National Police Corps (director general).

1. Minister of the Interior

The position of the Minister of the Interior is generally defined by the regulations organizing the General State Administration (currently Law 40/2015, successor to LOFAGE) and by royal decrees that establish the basic organic structure of ministerial departments, particularly the Ministry of the Interior (Royal Decree 139/2020 and its development, modified by Royal Decree 734/2020 and Royal Decree 146/2021, as summarized by the latter).

According to this framework, the Minister of the Interior exercises, among others, the following essential functions:

• Political direction of the department: sets the general lines of internal security policy, immigration and foreign affairs, civil protection, traffic, and other matters proper to the Ministry of the Interior.
• Ultimate responsibility for public security: the Organic Law 2/1986, on Security Forces and Corps, assigns exclusive competence in public security to the State and, within it, to the Government of the Nation and its dependent bodies. In this scheme, the Minister of the Interior is the direct political responsible for the use of the State Security Forces and Corps (National Police and Civil Guard).
• Relations with autonomous communities and general coordination: LO 2/1986 provides coordination bodies such as the Security Policy Council, presided over by the Minister of the Interior and composed of the competent regional ministers. Through this body, general guidelines, cooperation programs, and coordination formulas between state security forces and regional and local police are established.
• Directing and supervising the Secretary of State for Security: Royal Decree 734/2020 (development of the Ministry’s structure) assigns to the Secretary of State for Security, “under the immediate authority of the head of the Department,” command of the State Security Forces and Corps and coordination of their services. Therefore, the minister maintains political and hierarchical leadership over this Secretary of State and all the Ministry’s management bodies.
• Normative promotion and representation: submits to the Council of Ministers draft laws and royal decrees in matters within his competence, proposes appointments of senior officials in the interior area, and exercises Government representation in internal security matters before Parliament and other public powers.

2. Director General of Police

The Director General of Police is a management body of the General State Administration. His general position is described by Law 40/2015 (whose article 66, cited in Royal Decree 146/2021, defines directors general as immediate responsible for executing assigned projects and objectives) and specifically by:

• Royal Decree 734/2020, of August 4, which develops the basic organic structure of the Ministry of the Interior and contains the article structuring and defining the functions of the Directorate General of Police.
• Order INT/859/2023, of July 21, which develops the organic structure and functions of the central and territorial services of the Directorate General of Police.

Based on these regulations, the main competencies of the Director General of Police can be summarized as:

• Highest professional and operational leadership of the National Police: exercises direction, coordination, and supervision of the Corps’ activity, through the central and territorial structure described in Order INT/859/2023 (Deputy Operational Directorate, general commissariats, divisions, superior headquarters, and commissariats).
• Development and execution of the security policy set by the minister and channeled through the Secretary of State for Security, specifying strategic and police action plans and managing assigned human and material resources.
• Internal organization of the Corps: according to Order INT/859/2023, he is responsible for determining and coordinating the central organization (Deputy Operational Directorate, general subdirectorates of Human Resources and Training, Logistics and Innovation, Technical Cabinet, International Cooperation Division, specialized general commissariats, etc.) and the territorial organization (superior headquarters and peripheral/territorial units).
• Specialized operational management: under his authority are units responsible for areas such as judicial police, cybercrime, immigration and borders, public order and citizen security, documentation, international police cooperation (INTERPOL, EUROPOL, SIRENE), among others, according to Order INT/859/2023.
• Technical relations with other forces and institutions: maintains continuous relations with the Civil Guard, regional police, and police services of other countries, within the framework set by the Secretary of State for Security and coordination instruments provided in LO 2/1986 and RD 734/2020.

In summary, while the Minister of the Interior sets and is accountable for the political and strategic orientation of internal security and the use of State Security Forces and Corps before the Government and Parliament, the Director General of Police is the highest technical-operational responsible of the National Police and the daily execution of that policy within the Corps.

Based on the information retrieved in this search, there is no specific development regarding the competence criteria of the National Court in crimes against the independence of the State. Therefore, it is not possible to extract from these sources a closed and verifiable list of concrete requirements (articles, exhaustive enumerations, etc.). However, it is possible to explain in a guiding manner how the competence of the National Court is generally structured and which elements are usually relevant when considering whether it should investigate such crimes or another body should.

In the Spanish legal system, the competence of criminal judicial bodies is determined by a combination of three main criteria: objective competence (based on the subject matter or type of crime), functional competence (based on the procedural phase: investigation, trial, appeals), and territorial competence (based on the place where the acts occurred or other connection points). The National Court is a specialized body that intervenes only when the law expressly assigns it certain types of crimes or situations.

In abstract terms, under the label of “crimes against the independence of the State” are grouped criminally relevant behaviors that endanger or attack the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, or external or internal security of the State. The Penal Code groups much of these behaviors in specific titles dedicated to crimes against the Constitution, against the peace or independence of the State, or against national security. These include figures such as treason, certain forms of collaboration with foreign powers, and other serious attacks on the constitutional order and the very existence of the State.

For a case of this nature to reach the National Court, instead of being processed before an ordinary court or a High Court of Justice, at least two groups of factors usually concur:

• The potential legal classification of the facts. It is decisive that the facts under investigation can prima facie fit into one of the criminal types whose investigation and trial the legislator expressly assigns to the National Court. Competence is not defined by journalistic or political categories (“attack on the State”), but by specific titles and articles of the Penal Code, and by the referral made by the organic law regulating judicial organization.
• The state-wide, supra-regional, or international dimension of the case. The National Court is designed for matters that, by their nature or scope, transcend the framework of a single province or autonomous community, or directly affect essential State interests (security, defense, international relations, etc.). The projection beyond the strictly local or regional level is, in practice, a key element.

Regarding territorial competence, in this type of crimes the precise location (the specific city or community where an act is carried out) is less relevant, and more so the effects and objective scope of the conduct: if it is an attack directed at the entire State or its fundamental institutions, it is usual to centralize the investigation in a body with state competence, precisely to avoid disparate solutions and ensure a uniform response.

On the other hand, in practice, connection with other matters also weighs. Many cases affecting the independence or security of the State are linked to terrorism, organized crime, or coordinated actions with foreign actors. The National Court has a central role in these matters, and when the facts investigated present strong connections with them (for example, financing, logistics, organized structure, or terrorist purpose), this element tends to reinforce its competence.

Finally, the concrete delimitation of who must investigate and judge a case is not decided abstractly, but through jurisdictional decisions on competence (raised ex officio or at the request of a party) that may give rise to conflicts between bodies. In these incidents, the described elements are precisely evaluated: type of crime charged, territorial scope, gravity for State security, and links with organized crime or terrorism.

In summary, for the National Court to investigate crimes against the independence of the State, there must concur, based on current regulations, a combination of: (1) fitting the facts into criminal types that the law expressly assigns to that body; (2) state-wide or supra-regional dimension of the conduct and its effects; and, in many cases, (3) connection with phenomena such as terrorism or organized crime that are already part of its typical scope of action. However, the concrete application of these criteria can only be established case by case through rulings of the competent courts.