The crisis of Ceuta has profoundly changed the perception of Spaniards about Morocco and the bilateral relationship with Rabat.
90.4% believe that Morocco had some degree of responsibility in the massive entry recorded in Ceuta on July 30, according to the new Sigma Dos survey for El Mundo conducted between August 20 and 26.
This 90.4% comes from two distinct responses. 52.6% believe that Morocco was aware of the migratory movement and allowed it to happen without preventing it at its border, while another 37.8% consider that the neighboring country even encouraged the entry into Spain.
The perception crosses practically the entire electoral spectrum. It is shared by 91.3% of those who voted for the PSOE and 92.9% of Sumar voters.
The survey also leaves another result of enormous political and sporting significance: 84.4% of Spaniards reject that Spain continues to share with Morocco the organization of the 2030 World Cup.
Spain, Portugal, and Morocco are officially the three organizing countries of the 2030 World Cup, designated by FIFA in December 2024.
Nine out of ten Spaniards see Morocco behind the Ceuta crisis
The main conclusion of the survey lies in the breadth of the perception about Morocco.
Only a small minority of those interviewed dissociates the Moroccan state from what happened. In contrast, more than nine out of ten believe that Rabat was aware of the mobilization and allowed it to advance towards the border or that it directly contributed to favoring it.
The difference between both responses matters. The survey does not allow us to affirm that 90.4% believe that Morocco organized the entry. What it shows is that this percentage attributes to the neighboring country some degree of knowledge, permissiveness, or encouragement.
In another distinct question, 59.7% define what happened as a way for Morocco to pressure or blackmail the Spanish Government.
The public reading, therefore, is not limited to a migratory crisis. For a majority of those interviewed, there is also a bilateral and diplomatic dimension.
91% of PSOE voters and 93% of Sumar also point to Morocco
Probably the most politically relevant data is within the electorate of the parties that make up the Government.
91.3% of PSOE voters believe that Morocco was aware and allowed the entry or favored it. Among those who voted for Sumar, the percentage is even slightly higher, at 92.9%.
This means that the perception of Rabat cannot be interpreted solely as a position of the electorates of PP and Vox.
The consensus crosses the main political blocks and leaves the Government facing a public opinion much more critical of Morocco than the diplomatic position that the Executive has been publicly defending.
82.2% believe that the Government has not done enough in Ceuta
The second major conclusion directly affects Spanish management.
82.2% of those surveyed believe that the Government of Pedro Sánchez has not done enough to resolve the situation in Ceuta.
A relevant fact also appears here among coalition voters. 56.9% of the socialist electorate shares this assessment, just like 52.7% of Sumar voters.
That is to say, the negative perception of the Executive's response is not limited to the opposition electorate.
The result adds pressure to the Government after several weeks in which the crisis has concentrated the debate on Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, intelligence services, and the relationship with Morocco.
Two Sigma Dos surveys show persistent concern about Morocco
This is not the first measurement by Sigma Dos conducted during this crisis.
In a previous study, conducted on August 5, 47.6% directly pointed to the pressure from the Moroccan Government as the main reason for what happened in Ceuta, compared to 18.4% who pointed to the regularization of migrants and 16.5% who primarily blamed the Spanish Government's migration policy.
The two figures should not be compared as a direct evolution, because the questions are different. In the previous survey, the question was what the main reason for the crisis was. In the new one, the question specifically asks what role Morocco played.
They do allow, however, to detect a constant: Morocco has occupied a central place in the public's interpretation of the crisis since the beginning of August.
66.9% want Felipe VI to visit Ceuta
The survey also includes an institutional question. 66.9% believe that King Felipe VI should visit Ceuta.
This data introduces the Crown into the debate about the institutional response to the crisis and reflects the demand for a greater presence of the State in the autonomous city.
This does not necessarily equate to an assessment of the Government's actions, but it does show that two out of three Spaniards would support a visit from the head of State.
The 77.2% bets on the return of Moroccan minors
The management of unaccompanied minors reappears as another of the major issues of the survey.
The 77.2% shows support for Moroccan minors who arrived in Ceuta to return to Morocco, while 13.8% prefers to distribute them among other autonomous communities.
Also at this point, there is significant backing within the socialist electorate: 59.1% of those who voted for the PSOE support the return route.
The data measures a political preference of the interviewees, but does not eliminate the legal obligations applicable to each minor.
Spain and Morocco have maintained a specific agreement since 2007 regarding unaccompanied minors that contemplates their protection and a possible agreed return. The agreement itself establishes that any return must respect Spanish legislation, international law, and the best interests of the minor, and guarantee effective family reunification or their delivery to a guardianship institution.
Militarizing the border and sanctioning Morocco, among the most supported measures
Sigma Dos also asks what measures should be adopted to avoid a new border crisis.
As it is a multiple-choice question, the percentages do not add up to 100%.
- The option with the most support is to militarize the border, supported by 55% of the interviewees.
- Next is the imposition of sanctions on Morocco, with 52.8%.
- 48% demand greater involvement from the European Union and 45% consider it necessary to expedite expulsions.
The combination is significant: public opinion does not bet on a single solution, but on a set of security measures, diplomatic pressure, European policy, and migration management.
Support for militarizing the border remains majority
The issue of militarization had already appeared in the Sigma Dos survey of August 5.
At that time, posed directly as a yes or no question, 82.4% were in favor of militarizing the southern border again.
84.4% rejects maintaining the shared 2030 World Cup with Morocco
The probably most unexpected result of the entire survey is outside of migration policy.
84.4% of Spaniards reject continuing to share the organization of the 2030 World Cup with Morocco.
The data conveys the Ceuta crisis to one of the largest joint projects between both countries for the coming years.
The FIFA officially designated Spain, Portugal, and Morocco as co-hosts of the 2030 World Cup in December 2024. The tournament will also include three commemorative matches in Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay.
Ceuta divides Spaniards on the solidarity of the rest of the country
Not all questions yield such broad consensus.
52.9% believe that the rest of Spain should provide more support to Ceuta, while 47% think that the solidarity shown so far is sufficient.
While in matters like Morocco, government management, or the 2030 World Cup there are very broad majorities, in the assessment of territorial solidarity society is practically divided in half.