Ceuta crisis survey: 90% see Morocco behind and 84% reject sharing the 2030 World Cup, according to Sigma Dos

The new Sigma Dos survey for El Mundo reflects a transversal consensus after the Ceuta crisis: 90.4% of Spaniards believe that Morocco knew about and allowed the massive entry or directly favored it, a perception shared by more than 91% of PSOE voters and 92% of Sumar voters. In addition, 82.2% believe that the Government has not done enough and 84.4% reject maintaining the joint organization of the 2030 World Cup with Morocco.

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The crisis of Ceuta has profoundly changed the perception of Spaniards about Morocco and the bilateral relationship with Rabat.

90.4% believe that Morocco had some degree of responsibility in the massive entry recorded in Ceuta on July 30, according to the new Sigma Dos survey for El Mundo conducted between August 20 and 26.

This 90.4% comes from two distinct responses. 52.6% believe that Morocco was aware of the migratory movement and allowed it to happen without preventing it at its border, while another 37.8% consider that the neighboring country even encouraged the entry into Spain.

The perception crosses practically the entire electoral spectrum. It is shared by 91.3% of those who voted for the PSOE and 92.9% of Sumar voters.

The survey also leaves another result of enormous political and sporting significance: 84.4% of Spaniards reject that Spain continues to share with Morocco the organization of the 2030 World Cup.

Spain, Portugal, and Morocco are officially the three organizing countries of the 2030 World Cup, designated by FIFA in December 2024.

Nine out of ten Spaniards see Morocco behind the Ceuta crisis

The main conclusion of the survey lies in the breadth of the perception about Morocco.

Only a small minority of those interviewed dissociates the Moroccan state from what happened. In contrast, more than nine out of ten believe that Rabat was aware of the mobilization and allowed it to advance towards the border or that it directly contributed to favoring it.

The difference between both responses matters. The survey does not allow us to affirm that 90.4% believe that Morocco organized the entry. What it shows is that this percentage attributes to the neighboring country some degree of knowledge, permissiveness, or encouragement.

In another distinct question, 59.7% define what happened as a way for Morocco to pressure or blackmail the Spanish Government.

The public reading, therefore, is not limited to a migratory crisis. For a majority of those interviewed, there is also a bilateral and diplomatic dimension.

91% of PSOE voters and 93% of Sumar also point to Morocco

Probably the most politically relevant data is within the electorate of the parties that make up the Government.

91.3% of PSOE voters believe that Morocco was aware and allowed the entry or favored it. Among those who voted for Sumar, the percentage is even slightly higher, at 92.9%.

This means that the perception of Rabat cannot be interpreted solely as a position of the electorates of PP and Vox.

The consensus crosses the main political blocks and leaves the Government facing a public opinion much more critical of Morocco than the diplomatic position that the Executive has been publicly defending.

82.2% believe that the Government has not done enough in Ceuta

The second major conclusion directly affects Spanish management.

82.2% of those surveyed believe that the Government of Pedro Sánchez has not done enough to resolve the situation in Ceuta.

A relevant fact also appears here among coalition voters. 56.9% of the socialist electorate shares this assessment, just like 52.7% of Sumar voters.

That is to say, the negative perception of the Executive's response is not limited to the opposition electorate.

The result adds pressure to the Government after several weeks in which the crisis has concentrated the debate on Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, intelligence services, and the relationship with Morocco.

Two Sigma Dos surveys show persistent concern about Morocco

This is not the first measurement by Sigma Dos conducted during this crisis.

In a previous study, conducted on August 5, 47.6% directly pointed to the pressure from the Moroccan Government as the main reason for what happened in Ceuta, compared to 18.4% who pointed to the regularization of migrants and 16.5% who primarily blamed the Spanish Government's migration policy.

The two figures should not be compared as a direct evolution, because the questions are different. In the previous survey, the question was what the main reason for the crisis was. In the new one, the question specifically asks what role Morocco played.

They do allow, however, to detect a constant: Morocco has occupied a central place in the public's interpretation of the crisis since the beginning of August.

66.9% want Felipe VI to visit Ceuta

The survey also includes an institutional question. 66.9% believe that King Felipe VI should visit Ceuta.

This data introduces the Crown into the debate about the institutional response to the crisis and reflects the demand for a greater presence of the State in the autonomous city.

This does not necessarily equate to an assessment of the Government's actions, but it does show that two out of three Spaniards would support a visit from the head of State.

The 77.2% bets on the return of Moroccan minors

The management of unaccompanied minors reappears as another of the major issues of the survey.

The 77.2% shows support for Moroccan minors who arrived in Ceuta to return to Morocco, while 13.8% prefers to distribute them among other autonomous communities.

Also at this point, there is significant backing within the socialist electorate: 59.1% of those who voted for the PSOE support the return route.

The data measures a political preference of the interviewees, but does not eliminate the legal obligations applicable to each minor.

Spain and Morocco have maintained a specific agreement since 2007 regarding unaccompanied minors that contemplates their protection and a possible agreed return. The agreement itself establishes that any return must respect Spanish legislation, international law, and the best interests of the minor, and guarantee effective family reunification or their delivery to a guardianship institution.

Militarizing the border and sanctioning Morocco, among the most supported measures

Sigma Dos also asks what measures should be adopted to avoid a new border crisis.

As it is a multiple-choice question, the percentages do not add up to 100%.

  • The option with the most support is to militarize the border, supported by 55% of the interviewees.
  • Next is the imposition of sanctions on Morocco, with 52.8%.
  • 48% demand greater involvement from the European Union and 45% consider it necessary to expedite expulsions.

The combination is significant: public opinion does not bet on a single solution, but on a set of security measures, diplomatic pressure, European policy, and migration management.

Support for militarizing the border remains majority

The issue of militarization had already appeared in the Sigma Dos survey of August 5.

At that time, posed directly as a yes or no question, 82.4% were in favor of militarizing the southern border again.

84.4% rejects maintaining the shared 2030 World Cup with Morocco

The probably most unexpected result of the entire survey is outside of migration policy.

84.4% of Spaniards reject continuing to share the organization of the 2030 World Cup with Morocco.

The data conveys the Ceuta crisis to one of the largest joint projects between both countries for the coming years.

The FIFA officially designated Spain, Portugal, and Morocco as co-hosts of the 2030 World Cup in December 2024. The tournament will also include three commemorative matches in Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay.

Ceuta divides Spaniards on the solidarity of the rest of the country

Not all questions yield such broad consensus.

52.9% believe that the rest of Spain should provide more support to Ceuta, while 47% think that the solidarity shown so far is sufficient.

While in matters like Morocco, government management, or the 2030 World Cup there are very broad majorities, in the assessment of territorial solidarity society is practically divided in half.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current status of the parliamentary processing of proposals to modify border management in Ceuta?

Currently, there is no record of a specific and monographic major legal reform on border management in Ceuta having been approved. What does exist is very intense parliamentary activity, divided between a bill on immigration promoted by the PP and multiple initiatives for promotion and control (PNL, motions, questions, and appearances) focused on the migration crisis and the control of the Ceuta border.

1. Bill to reform the Immigration Law

The Popular Group has registered in Congress a reform of the Organic Immigration Law with a central objective: to allow the border rejection of migrants who enter swimming in Ceuta and Melilla, following the Supreme Court ruling 814/2026, of June 29. According to the PP itself, it is about “providing support” to the State Security Forces and Corps to carry out border returns “with all legal guarantees.”

According to the PP's note on its “parliamentary offensive” in the migration crisis, this bill was registered on July 16, 2026, and the Populars emphasize that it could even be processed by a single reading and immediately, although for now the available information places it in an initial processing phase (registration and qualification, pending consideration and for the majority of the Chamber to decide whether to promote or block it).

2. Non-legislative proposals and motions related to Ceuta

Alongside that legal reform, various non-legislative initiatives have been activated that impact border management and the consequences of migratory pressure on Ceuta:

  • A non-legislative proposal in Congress, registered by the PP on August 3, 2026, to launch an extraordinary health strategy for Ceuta and Melilla in emergencies like the current one, strengthening human, material, and structural resources of the health system of both cities. According to Gaceta Médica, the PNL is pending debate in the Health Commission.
  • In the Senate, various motions and proposals have addressed the situation of Ceuta and Melilla, calling for strengthening border control means, improving coordination with Morocco and the EU, and demanding a comprehensive security and development plan for both cities. Some have been approved and others rejected, but all fall within the realm of political guidance to the Government, without direct normative rank.

3. Battery of questions and requests for documentation

The parliamentary offensive includes an extensive battery of written questions in Congress and Senate about border management in Ceuta: Government’s forecast in the face of the migratory avalanche, reinforcements of the Civil Guard and National Police, action protocols after the Supreme Court ruling, number of entry attempts and deceased persons, and measures to dismantle human trafficking networks. All this is processed as control initiatives, ongoing while responses from the Executive are received and published.

4. Appearances and thematic Plenary on Ceuta

Politically, the immediate focus is on the appearances:

  • The Permanent Deputation of Congress has debated PP requests for the Prime Minister and up to eight ministers (Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Presidency, Inclusion and Migrations, Youth and Childhood, Health, and Equality) to appear regarding the situation in Ceuta and the increase in irregular entries. See the Congress press release of August 24, 2026: Permanent Deputation note.
  • The Congress Plenary will hold on September 3, 2026, an appearance by the Prime Minister, at his own request and that of the Popular Group, to report on “the events that occurred in Ceuta” and the measures to guarantee the integrity of the border and cooperation with Morocco. The call is in the press release of August 27, 2026: Plenary call.

These appearances do not themselves change the regulations, but they are key to setting positions and, eventually, deciding the fate of the legislative initiatives underway.

5. General assessment of the processing

In summary, the parliamentary processing on border management in Ceuta is currently characterized by:

  • A bill to reform the Immigration Law promoted by the PP, newly registered and in an initial phase, without a consideration debate held yet.
  • Various PNLs and motions in Congress and Senate on strengthening means, cooperation with Morocco, comprehensive plans, and health and social consequences of migratory pressure, with some texts already voted on and others pending debate.
  • Intense control activity (questions and appearances), including a thematic Plenary by the Prime Minister, which keeps the issue at the center of the agenda but still without resulting in an approved and in-force specific legal reform for the Ceuta border.

What are the powers of the Prime Minister regarding migration policy according to Spanish legislation?

In the Spanish legal system, there is no specific “catalog” of the Prime Minister’s powers in migration policy isolated from the rest of his functions. The Prime Minister’s position is built from his general powers of directing the Government and interior and exterior policy, which extend over immigration, foreigners, and asylum.

Basic constitutional and legal framework

The Constitution, in its article 97, establishes that the Government directs interior and exterior policy, the civil and military Administration, and the defense of the State, and exercises the executive function and regulatory power in accordance with the Constitution and laws. Although the submitted text does not show article 97 itself, it is evident how the Law 50/1997, of the Government, takes it as a key provision of the Executive’s position.

The Organic Law 4/2000, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration, specifies in its initial article that:

  • The Government is responsible, in accordance with article 149.1.2.ª of the Constitution, for the definition, planning, regulation, and development of immigration policy, without prejudice to the powers assumed by autonomous communities and local entities.
  • All administrations must exercise their powers in immigration respecting principles such as coordination with the EU, regulation of labor migratory flows, social integration, or the fight against irregular immigration.

The Law 12/2009, regulating the right of asylum and subsidiary protection, organizes the asylum and international protection system; although it does not directly attribute singular powers to the Prime Minister, it is integrated into that material scope of migration policy directed by the Government.

On the other hand, the Law 2/2014, on the Action and Foreign Service of the State, recalls that based on article 97 of the Constitution, the Government exclusively directs foreign policy, which includes the international dimension of migration, agreements with countries of origin and transit, and participation in the European asylum and immigration policy.

Powers of the Prime Minister according to Law 50/1997

The Government Law specifies the Prime Minister’s role:

  • The article transcribed indicates that “the President directs the Government’s action and coordinates the functions of the other members”, without prejudice to the direct competence of the ministers.
  • Among his functions, he is responsible for:
    • Representing the Government.
    • Establishing the Government’s political program and determining the guidelines of interior and exterior policy and ensuring their compliance.
    • Directing defense policy.
    • Calling, presiding over, and setting the agenda of the Council of Ministers.
    • Filing constitutional appeals and creating, modifying, and suppressing ministerial departments and State Secretariats.
    • Proposing to the King the appointment and dismissal of vice presidents and ministers.

These functions are supplemented by those related to the Government’s legislative initiative and the exercise of regulatory power (draft bills, royal decree-laws, development regulations), which Law 50/1997 attributes to the Government as a whole, under the Prime Minister’s direction.

Concrete projection on migration policy

Combining these texts, the Prime Minister’s powers in migration matters can be summarized as follows:

  • Setting the Executive’s political line on migration, foreigners, and asylum: by establishing the Government’s political program and the guidelines of interior and exterior policy, the Prime Minister defines general orientations in border management, labor migratory flows, integration, fight against irregular immigration, asylum, and international protection.
  • Directing and coordinating the competent ministries: in practice, migration policy is mainly executed through the ministries of Interior, Inclusion/Social Security/Migrations, and Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister coordinates their actions, resolves conflicts of attributions between ministries, and can create or restructure departments and State Secretariats linked to migrations.
  • Promoting and presiding over the adoption of norms and decisions: as President of the Council of Ministers, he sets the agenda and directs meetings in which the following are approved:
    • Draft bills on foreigners, asylum, or integration (amendments to LO 4/2000, the Asylum Law, etc.).
    • Royal decrees approving regulations on entries, permits, reception, internment centers, or international protection systems.
    • Programs, plans, and binding guidelines on immigration and integration, within the framework of the principles of LO 4/2000.
  • Direction of the external and European dimension of migration: by directing foreign policy (art. 97 CE and Law 2/2014), the Prime Minister guides Spain’s positions in the EU on asylum, external borders, and migration pacts, as well as negotiating agreements with third States on readmission, visas, or migration cooperation.
  • Defense of the State’s competential framework in immigration: being empowered to file constitutional appeals, the Prime Minister can activate the Government against autonomous laws considered invasive of the State’s competence on immigration (art. 149.1.2.ª CE), as reflected in various resolutions cited in the BOE.

In summary, Spanish legislation places the material competence on immigration, foreigners, and asylum in the Government as a whole (especially LO 4/2000), but grants the Prime Minister, through the Constitution and Law 50/1997, a position of political direction, coordination, and leadership that makes migration policy, in practice, one of the central areas under his drive and responsibility.

What results did the PSOE obtain in the last general elections in Ceuta?

No specific and verified numerical data on the exact votes and percentage obtained by the PSOE in the last general elections in the autonomous city of Ceuta has been found in the consulted sources in a direct and exploitable way. Since it is not possible to guarantee a precise figure without referring to the official scrutiny disaggregated by constituency, it would not be rigorous to offer you concrete numbers constructed by approximation or memory; the most prudent is to refer you to the official sources that publish that detail municipality by municipality and constituency by constituency.

In Spain, the results of general elections are published at several levels of detail:

  • By provincial constituency or autonomous city (in this case, Ceuta).
  • By polling station and electoral section, for official scrutiny purposes.
  • By candidacy/party, including total number of votes and percentage over the census and/or over the valid votes cast.

The data that exactly answer your question —votes and percentage of PSOE in Ceuta in the last general elections— are considered part of that official scrutiny, whose canonical reference is the publication by the Electoral Administration (Electoral Boards and Ministry of the Interior).

How to find the exact data

Although I cannot reproduce a closed and verified figure here, I can precisely guide you on where and how to locate it yourself:

  • Official results website of the Ministry of the Interior: after each general election, the Ministry enables a results portal, such as that of the July 23, 2023 elections, which usually has a similar structure to:
    • Selection of the type of election (Congress of Deputies).
    • Selection of the constituency (Ceuta).
    There, tables show:
    • Number of votes for PSOE in the constituency.
    • Percentage of votes for PSOE over the total cast or valid votes.
  • Ministry of the Interior headquarters and Electoral Data Portal: besides the “friendly” results portal, Interior maintains a more technical and stable consultation system over time (Electoral Data Portal or historical results), where you can filter by election, year, constituency, and candidacy. There you can also download data in table or file format.
  • Official State Gazette (BOE): the Central Electoral Board publishes in the BOE the official result of general elections. These agreements detail votes and percentages by constituency. To locate it:
    • Access BOE.
    • Search for terms like “Results elections deputies Congress [year] Ceuta Central Electoral Board”.
    The agreement usually contains annexes with tables showing votes for each candidacy, including PSOE, in the Ceuta constituency.
  • Statistical portal of the Congress of Deputies: although more oriented to the composition of the Chamber, it sometimes links to official results and Electoral Administration documentation.

Some useful clarifications

When consulting the results, it is important to consider:

  • When we talk about “last general elections”, we refer, as of today, to the most recent general elections held in Spain (at the time of writing, those of July 23, 2023, unless there has been a later call).
  • In the Ceuta constituency, only one deputy is elected to Congress, but the results portal will still show all parties that obtained votes, with their figures and percentages.
  • Percentages may refer to:
    • Percentage over the total valid votes.
    • Percentage over the total votes cast (including blank votes, but not necessarily null votes).
    It is advisable to check the table header to know exactly what the data refers to.

In summary, although I cannot offer you a concrete number of votes or an exact percentage here without lacking rigor, I can confirm that this data is publicly and disaggregatedly available on the official results portals of the Ministry of the Interior and in the agreements of the Central Electoral Board published in the BOE. By consulting these sources, you can precisely know how many votes and what share of support the PSOE obtained in the autonomous city of Ceuta in the last general elections.

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What percentage of Spaniards consider that Morocco had some degree of responsibility in the mass entry of migrants into Ceuta, according to the Sigma Dos survey?

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Which measure is the most supported among respondents to prevent a new border crisis in Ceuta?

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What proportion of Spaniards support King Felipe VI visiting Ceuta according to the survey?

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