Thus the elections of 29N would look with a PSOE–Frente Amplio pact: more seats for the left, but a right-wing majority that resists.

The average of Democrat places the PP and Vox at 50.3% of the vote. A provincial simulation allows exploring what would happen with agreements in small provinces, a national alliance, or a candidacy that also included Podemos.

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Elecciones 29N · Encuestas

La media de las encuestas

Media a 21 de octubre de 2026 · 15 institutos

  • PP31,6 %
  • PSOE26,9 %
  • Vox18,7 %
  • Sumar6,3 %
  • Podemos3,1 %
  • ERC2,2 %
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Media del último estudio de cada instituto en 30 días y su evolución semanal desde el 23J. Partidos con al menos un 2 %.

Todas las encuestas

Elecciones generales del 29 de noviembre · Demócrata

133 deputies for the PP, with 31.6% of the vote; 111 for the PSOE, with 26.9%; 64 for Vox, with 18.7%; eight for the Sumar space, with 6.3%; two for Podemos, with 3.1%; and eight for ERC, with 2.2%. The remaining candidacies would gather 24 representatives. This is the starting point of an exploratory simulation built from the average of polls from Demócrata on October 21.

By blocs, PP and Vox would sum 197 deputies and 50.3% of the vote. PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos would jointly reach 121 seats and 36.3%. ERC and the other candidacies would complete the Congress with 32 representatives and the remaining 13.4%.

There is an essential distinction: the percentages come from the average of Demócrata, prepared with the latest studies from 15 institutes over 30 days. The seats have been calculated for this exercise by transferring those supports to the provinces according to the territorial distribution of 2023 and applying the distribution of deputies from 2026.

The model simplifies the candidacies and does not incorporate the current territorial agreements between the different organizations. It allows examining the mechanical effect of adding ballots, but its absolute figures may change when the final map of lists is introduced.

The PP would remain first in seats despite the PSOE–Frente Amplio pact in small provinces

The PP would continue to be the leading force in deputies if PSOE and Frente Amplio shared candidacy in the 33 provinces that elect between two and six representatives. In this simulation, the popular party would obtain 131 seats and 31.6% of the national vote, compared to the 124 deputies that PSOE and Frente Amplio would gather between their own and joint lists. Both spaces would sum more votes than the PP —33.2%, a lead of 1.6 points— but would achieve seven seats less. That percentage corresponds to the sum of the two forces, not to PSOE separately.

Vox would achieve 64 deputies and 18.7% of the votes. Its sum with the PP would reach 195 representatives and 50.3%, maintaining the absolute majority. For its part, Podemos would obtain two deputies and 3.1%, raising the PSOE–Frente Amplio–Podemos total to 126 seats and 36.3%. ERC and the other candidacies would gather the remaining 29 representatives.

Within the PSOE–Frente Amplio space, the shared candidacies would achieve 52 deputies; the PSOE's own lists outside the agreement, 64; and those of Frente Amplio, eight. The deputies from the common lists cannot be individually attributed to each party without knowing their candidates and positions.

These figures are conditioned results of a simplified model based on the average of Demócrata and the territorial distribution of the vote in 2023. They assume the complete preservation of support and do not incorporate the current territorial agreements: they do not constitute a validated electoral forecast.

ELECTIONS 29N · SIMULATION
The PP would remain first in seats: 131 against the 124 of PSOE and Frente Amplio

Hypothesis of an agreement in the 33 provinces that elect between two and six deputies, fully preserving support.

National vote and resulting seats from the simplified model
Candidacy Vote Seats
PP 31.60% 131
PSOE: own lists outside the agreement 18.24% 64
Vox 18.70% 64
Joint lists PSOE–Frente Amplio 10.08% 52
Frente Amplio: own lists outside the agreement 4.88% 8
Podemos 3.10% 2
ERC and other candidacies 13.40% 29
Total of Congress 100% 350
SUMMARIES · NOT ADDED TO THE TOTAL
PP + Vox 50.30% 195
PSOE + Frente Amplio, own and joint lists 33.20% 124
PSOE + Frente Amplio + Podemos 36.30% 126

Absolute majority: 176 deputies. The 52 representatives of the common candidacies are not individually attributed to PSOE or Frente Amplio. The total of 126 does not include the territorial lefts nor does it equate to an investiture majority.

Exploratory simulation based on the average of Demócrata from October 21, 2026, the territorial distribution of the vote in 2023, and the provincial distribution of deputies in 2026. It uses Sumar as an approximation to Frente Amplio and does not incorporate the current territorial agreements. It is not a projection of seats published by the average nor a validated forecast.

The starting point: party by party

To explore the possible agreement with PSOE, this exercise uses that 6.3% as an approximation to the space of Frente Amplio. It is a working hypothesis: it does not mean that both brands have exactly the same territorial composition.

Starting point: Democrat vote and simulated seats
Party or space Vote Simulated seats
PP 31.6% 133
PSOE 26.9% 111
Vox 18.7% 64
Sumar / approximation to Frente Amplio 6.3% 8
Podemos 3.1% 2
ERC 2.2% 8
Rest of candidacies 11.2% 24
Total 100% 350


The percentages correspond to the average of Democrat from October 21, 2026. The seats are an independent exploratory calculation, not an estimate published by the average. Absolute majority: 176 deputies.

In the territorial distribution used as a reference, those 24 remaining seats would correspond to EH Bildu -seven-, Junts -seven-, PNV -six-, BNG -two-, Coalición Canaria -one- and UPN -one-. For these formations, the electoral weight of 2023 is preserved: the image of the average does not offer updated individual percentages.

What would change with the agreement

El Confidencial reports this Thursday on contacts between PSOE and Frente Amplio to present common lists in constituencies that distribute fewer than seven deputies. The information points to territories such as Cantabria, Almería, Badajoz, and Toledo.

No agreement has been announced. The information contrasts with the public denials of both organizations and with the insistence of Frente Amplio that its pact with the socialists is limited to the Senate.

To explore that possibility, the simulation gathers the votes of PSOE and the space of Sumar in 24 provinces that elect between two and six deputies, excluding Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Navarra, and the Comunitat Valenciana. It also does not include Ceuta and Melilla. It is an analytical delimitation, not a list of territories where negotiations are accredited.

And a national candidacy? It could surpass PP without preventing its majority with Vox

If PSOE and Frente Amplio shared a candidacy throughout Spain and fully retained their support, they would total 33.2% of the vote: 1.6 points more than PP.

In that case, the joint candidacy would obtain 130 deputies, compared to the 128 popular ones. Vox would achieve 63 and Podemos would maintain two. The progressive coalition would be the first candidacy in votes and seats within the model, but PP and Vox would gather 191 representatives.

If Podemos also joined, the joint support would reach 36.3% and the list would obtain 138 deputies. PP would achieve 123 and Vox, 62: together they would retain 185.

The difference between being the first candidacy and having a parliamentary majority is decisive. Unity can improve the conversion of votes into deputies, but it does not eliminate the 14 points that separate the 50.3% of PP and Vox from the 36.3% of PSOE, Sumar, and Podemos.

How Congress changes under each assumption
Scenario PP Vox PP + Vox PSOE + FA + Podemos, own and common ERC and others
Without additional pact 133 64 197 121 32
Pact in the four provinces mentioned 132 64 196 122 32
Pact in 24 provinces: retention of 60% 132 64 196 122 32
Pact in 24 provinces: retention of 80% 132 64 196 122 32
Pact in 24 provinces: retention of 100% 131 64 195 123 32
National alliance PSOE–FA, without leaks 128 63 191 132 27
National alliance PSOE–FA–Podemos, without leaks 123 62 185 138 27

All scenarios total 350 deputies. In the cases of partial retention, the vote of FA that does not accompany the joint candidacy is transferred to Podemos; that of PSOE is preserved. No probabilities are assigned to these scenarios.

With full retention of the vote, the result would be 131 deputies for PP and 64 for Vox: 195 in total, compared to the 197 of the initial scenario.

On the other side, the shared lists would achieve 35 representatives. PSOE would obtain another 78 where it ran separately; Frente Amplio, eight outside the agreement; and Podemos would maintain two. The sum of these spaces would go from 121 to 123 deputies.

The 35 representatives of the common candidacies cannot be exclusively attributed to PSOE or Frente Amplio: their belonging would depend on the order and composition of the lists.

The before and after: vote and deputies of each candidacy

If PSOE and Frente Amplio shared a candidacy throughout Spain and fully retained their support, they would total 33.2% of the vote: 1.6 points more than PP. In that case, the joint candidacy would obtain 130 deputies, compared to the 128 popular ones. Vox would achieve 63 and Podemos would maintain two. The progressive coalition would be the first candidacy in votes and seats within the model, but PP and Vox would gather 191 representatives.

In this execution of the model, the two changes occur in Almería and Cáceres, where the sum of PSOE and Frente Amplio displaces one deputy from PP. It does not mean that they are the only competitive provinces: small variations in votes or a different territorial distribution can modify which seats change hands.

Six scenarios: from a limited pact to a national alliance

The exercise allows distinguishing the territorial scope of the agreement and the response of voters.

A pact limited to the four provinces expressly mentioned -Cantabria, Almería, Badajoz, and Toledo- would add one deputy to the PSOE–Frente Amplio total in this simulation. Extending it to the 24 selected provinces would raise the gain to two.

If only 80% of Frente Amplio voters in those provinces supported the joint list and the remaining 20% opted for Podemos, the gain would be reduced to one seat. With a retention of 60%, the result would still be one additional deputy. These percentages are sensitivity assumptions, not measurements of electoral behavior.

The last two scenarios expand the hypothesis much further: a national PSOE–Frente Amplio candidacy and another that also included Podemos. They do not describe the scope of the published conversations nor presume that those alliances are politically or legally viable at this moment.

Not all additional deputies would come from PP and Vox

The national expansion of the agreement leaves another relevant result: some of the seats that the common candidacy would gain would come from territorial parties.

In the scenario of a national PSOE–Frente Amplio alliance, their deputies would go from 119 separately to 130 together. The gain would be eleven, but PP and Vox would lose six. The other five would come from territorial formations.

Therefore, gaining representatives for a candidacy does not always equate to expanding a possible investiture majority by the same amount. If the lost deputy belongs to a party willing to support the same presidential candidate, it can change the balance between partners without changing the majority they sum.

The main unknown: how many voters would accompany the agreement

The full sum of support is a demanding hypothesis. Not all voters of Frente Amplio have to accept a shared candidacy with PSOE; nor can it be taken for granted that all socialist voters would support it.

Some might choose Podemos, abstain, or change options. The agreement could also mobilize new voters, but that effect needs specific data: it cannot be deduced from an average of polls that ask about separate candidacies.

In this exercise, alliances improve the distribution of seats for the left under the examined assumptions, but none eliminate the majority of PP and Vox. To do so would require a different territorial distribution, a change in support, or a combination of both factors.

How the simulation was conducted

The visible percentages of the Democrat average and the provincial votes published by the Central Electoral Board for the general elections of 2023 have been used. Each of the six spaces of the average retains its historical territorial distribution; Sumar and Podemos are distributed, for simplification, with the same geography of the Sumar vote from 2023.

For Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, Coalición Canaria, and UPN, the supports from 2023 are maintained. The remaining percentage is treated as dispersed vote without representation: new candidacies are not modeled individually nor changes in those forces. Current territorial agreements are also not incorporated. These are relevant limitations, especially for interpreting national totals.

The distribution is calculated by constituency using D'Hondt, with the legal threshold of 3% and the number of deputies from the 2026 call. In Ceuta and Melilla, the seat is attributed to the most voted candidacy. The reference calculation reproduces the distribution of 350 deputies from 2023 by introducing the votes and seats from that election.

Check the average of Democrat polls here and the tools of the electoral special of 29N⁠

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

At what parliamentary stage is the electoral law reform that could affect the distribution of seats in future general elections?

As of October 22, 2026, the consulted sources have not identified an open parliamentary reform that changes the general distribution of seats in the Congress. The recent electoral reform that does affect territorial representation is that of Formentera in the Senate: its processing has already ended and it became law. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between a modification of the system for distributing deputies and this specific reform of senatorial representation.

The identified reform is already approved

The initiative is the Organic Law Proposal for the modification of Organic Law 5/1985, of June 19, on the General Electoral Regime, aimed at adapting electoral legislation to the reform of article 69.3 of the Constitution. It ended up becoming Organic Law 2/2026, of June 30, published in the BOE on July 2, 2026. Therefore, it is not pending amendments, committee reports, or approval by any chamber. Its progress can be consulted in the Congress file.

Parliamentary stages it passed
  • May 19, 2026: the Congress took it into consideration, that is, accepted to start processing it. Afterwards, it was sent to the Constitutional Commission and the amendment period was opened. This is recorded in the official communication from Congress.
  • May 28: the Plenary agreed to process it directly and in a single reading, a procedure that allows debating the text directly in the Plenary without completing the ordinary course of committee and commission. This agreement is recorded in the note on single reading.
  • June 18: the Congress approved the text and sent it to the Senate. The approval reached the absolute majority required due to its organic nature, according to the approval communication.
  • June and July: the Senate completed the approval without modifications; subsequently, the law was published. The documentation from the Upper Chamber is available in the Senate parliamentary bulletin.
What changes for the next elections

The reform modifies articles 161.2 and 165.2 of the LOREG to expressly recognize Formentera as its own electoral district and regulate the election of its senator. The change means that Ibiza and Formentera go from sharing one representative to each electing one. Its electoral effectiveness is linked to the call for the first Senate elections after the reform.

This change affects one of the two chambers elected in general elections, but does not modify the distribution of deputies in the Congress. It does not alter the D’Hondt formula, the provincial distribution of deputies, nor the electoral threshold of the Congress. Therefore, describing it as a general reform of seat distribution could be misleading.

Another different electoral reform

There is also a government draft bill on electoral debates in public media and transparency of polls. The information published by Demócrata in June 2025 placed it then in public consultation, a phase prior to Parliament. That reference does not confirm its current status and its described content also does not change the distribution of seats.

In conclusion: the identified territorial reform is already approved; for a general modification of the distribution of seats in the Congress, no open initiative is recorded in the consulted sources.

What are the competencies and functions of the president of the Partido Popular according to the party's statutes?

The national president of the Partido Popular exercises the political and legal representation of the party, presides over its main national governing bodies, and coordinates its political action. Their competencies are mainly set out in article 44 of the National Statutes approved at the XXI National Congress, in July 2025. The key to understanding their scope is to distinguish between decisions they adopt directly and appointments they propose to a collegiate body.

Representation and political leadership

The presidency represents the PP before institutions, organizations, and third parties. This function has a political dimension, as an expression of the party's position, and a legal one, as representation of the organization. It is therefore not limited to being its main spokesperson: it also occupies the representative position that the statutes assign to the office.

Additionally, they are responsible for coordinating the general political action. This competence allows articulating a common orientation for the party's activity and ensuring coherence of its positions. In this same area, they must authorize statements made on behalf of the Partido Popular or that may politically commit the organization. It is important to distinguish this authorization from personal opinions: the described function refers to statements presented as the party's position or that commit it.

Presidency of national bodies

The president heads both the National Board of Directors and the National Executive Committee. Therefore, their role combines individual leadership with participation in collegiate bodies: the competencies corresponding to these bodies do not automatically become exclusive decisions of the presidency.

In both, they have a casting vote in case of a tie. This faculty allows resolving a tied vote but does not equate to replacing the deliberation and voting procedure of the corresponding body.

Compliance with agreements

Another central function consists of adopting the necessary measures to comply with and develop the agreements of the National Congress and the decisions of governing bodies with superior statutory competence. The presidency does not act solely as a political driving force: it must also translate the organization's agreements into effective functioning.

This obligation introduces a relevant limit to their authority: presidential leadership must be exercised within the statutory framework and respecting decisions that correspond to other bodies.

Appointment proposals

The presidency plays a decisive role in shaping the leadership through proposals to the National Executive Committee. Among the positions included in this faculty are:

  • The secretary general, deputy secretaries general, coordinators, and secretaries.
  • The person responsible for economic and financial functions, called director general of Finance and Organization in the most recent wording, as opposed to the treasurer title used in earlier versions.
  • The president and members of the Electoral Committee.
  • The president of the Committee of Rights and Guarantees and the corresponding members.

The important distinction is that proposing does not mean unilaterally appointing: the presidential proposal is directed to the Executive Committee, which is responsible for intervening in those appointments according to the statutory distribution of competencies.

Scope and sources

Overall, the presidency combines representative authority, political coordination capacity, executive responsibility, and relevant initiative over the composition of the leadership. However, these attributions do not constitute unlimited power: they must be understood alongside the competencies of collegiate bodies and the agreements of the National Congress.

The main reference is the 2025 Statutes. As complementary documentation, the party published an earlier list of bodies and functions, useful for identifying these attributions but which must be read considering subsequent modifications.

What legal requirements must parties meet to present joint candidacies in provincial constituencies in Spain?

Parties can present joint candidacies through an electoral coalition, without needing to merge. They must formalize and communicate the agreement within the legal deadline and then submit the corresponding candidacies for each constituency. The general framework is in the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), especially in articles 43 to 48.

1. Constitution and communication of the coalition

Article 44 allows parties and federations registered in the corresponding registry and coalitions constituted according to the law to present candidacies. Therefore, a political agreement between organizations does not replace electoral formalization.

Parties and federations that agree to run jointly must communicate it to the competent Electoral Board within ten days following the call. The communication must include:

  • The name of the coalition.
  • The rules governing it.
  • The persons holding its governing or coordinating bodies.

It is important to distinguish this procedure from the submission of lists: communicating the coalition does not equate to submitting its candidacies. LOREG also refers to Instruction 1/2010 of the Central Electoral Board to interpret the constitution of coalitions.

2. Only one candidacy per constituency

Article 44.3 prohibits presenting more than one list in the same constituency for the same election. Additionally, coalition parties cannot present their own candidacies in a constituency where their coalition runs for that same election.

The prohibition refers to the specific combination of constituency and election: a candidacy for the Congress should not be confused with another for the Senate. Candidacies that continue or effectively succeed the activity of a party judicially illegalized and dissolved, or suspended, cannot be presented either.

3. Representation and submission of lists

According to article 43, representatives must be designated before the Electoral Administration. General representatives act for the coalition; those of the candidacies represent the persons included in them and receive notifications.

Article 45 establishes, as a general rule, that candidacies are submitted between the fifteenth and twentieth days after the call, signed by their representatives. Special provisions of the corresponding electoral process must also be respected.

The submission document must state the name, initials, and symbol of the coalition and the full names of its candidates. It must be accompanied by the acceptance of the candidacy and documents proving eligibility conditions.

4. Composition, identity, and parity
  • List integrity: when lists must be presented, they must include as many candidates as positions to be elected; substitutes cannot exceed ten and their order must be indicated, without prejudice to special applicable rules.
  • Electoral identity: names, initials, and symbols cannot cause confusion with other legally constituted parties. They cannot reproduce the flag or coat of arms of Spain nor refer to the Crown.
  • Individual candidacies: no one can run in more than one constituency nor be part of more than one candidacy. The party affiliation of each candidate or their independent status may be indicated.
  • Parity: article 44 bis requires gender-balanced lists of women and men, ordered alternately, considering both main and substitute candidates together. The rule applies to the Congress and, when grouped in lists, to Senate candidacies.
5. Review and proclamation

The Electoral Board reviews candidacies and communicates irregularities; article 47 grants 48 hours to correct them. Proclamation occurs on the twenty-seventh day after the call and does not proceed if legal requirements are not met. For regional elections with provincial constituencies, the particularities of their electoral legislation must also be checked.

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How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

How many deputies would the PP obtain in the simulation of a pact between PSOE and Frente Amplio in the small provinces?

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What percentage of votes would PSOE and Frente Amplio jointly sum up in the alliance scenario in small provinces?

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Which political party, according to the simulation, would maintain the absolute majority alongside Vox?

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