Two positions of Podemos fed 'Crónica Libre', according to an investigation by the UCO.

The so-called Leire Díez case is currently (August 2026) in the midst of the investigation phase at the National Court, under the direction of Judge Santiago Pedraz. The case is no longer a minor piece but a broad procedure, with several separate parts (maneuvers to interfere in judicial cases and rigging in SEPI) and numerous suspects, including senior officials of the Civil Guard and public companies. The secrecy of the case file has been partially lifted, allowing intense activity of proceedings (statements, searches, communication analyses). The investigation has not yet been closed nor has the oral trial been opened, and key statements and analyses of technological and documentary evidence remain to be carried out.

Current procedural situation

The origin of the case lies in the Court of Instruction No. 9 of Madrid, where Judge Arturo Zamarriego opened proceedings against Leire Díez for alleged crimes of influence peddling and bribery, in a “coordinated action” with businessman Javier Pérez Dolset and journalist Pere Rusiñol to obtain information from UCO commanders and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, as detailed by Demócrata in this key analysis and in the piece about the start of the process with statements from prosecutors Ignacio Stampa and José Grinda on November 5 and from Díez herself on November 11 ([link]).

In 2026, the National Court requested to accumulate and assume those proceedings as they fit into the case investigating an alleged plot led by former socialist leader Santos Cerdán to interfere in procedures affecting the PSOE and the Government, as explained by Demócrata in this information. Since then, the case has been investigated in the Central Court of Instruction No. 5, with various lines: maneuvers before judges and prosecutors, pressures on the UCO, and a piece on SEPI contracts.

Main charges and lines of investigation

According to several reports from Demócrata, Judge Pedraz has significantly expanded the number of suspects:

• Leire Díez remains the central figure of the case, identified as the alleged coordinator of a network to influence judicial and administrative cases affecting the PSOE, the Government, or their environment ([link], [link]).
• In the SEPI piece, Pedraz charges the president of SEPI, Belén Gualda, and 24 others for alleged irregularities in public company awards, with a network that would have collected 700,000 euros in illegal commissions, as detailed by Demócrata in this news and in the full order published at [link].
• The judge charges the Director General of the Civil Guard, Mercedes González, and the DAO Manuel Llamas for alleged crimes of malfeasance and obstruction of justice, summoning them as suspects on July 16 ([link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link]).
• On September 10, the former Director General of the Civil Guard Leonardo Marcos is summoned to declare as a suspect, along with the chief prosecutor of Badajoz José Luis Alonso, according to this piece.
• The former president of Correos Juan Manuel Serrano, former chief of staff of Pedro Sánchez, has also been charged, and more than 10,800 messages allegedly exchanged with Díez are being analyzed, as detailed by Demócrata in [link] and in the profile on Serrano [link].

Actions by the parties and defense appeals

Leire Díez's defense has launched a procedural offensive to try to weaken the case. They have requested the nullity of the procedure for considering her detention “unjustified” and “illegitimate,” and have challenged the seizure and access to her phones, computers, and personal documents ([link], [link]). They have also appealed the massive tracking of her calls and messages, which they consider an excessive intrusion ([link]), and have requested to limit the use of material obtained in searches, which led Pedraz to order a purge of the seized information ([link], [link]).

However, the judge has rejected at least one of the nullity incidents for being filed late and contradicting procedural good faith, keeping the case alive ([link]). Meanwhile, the PP's popular accusation pushes for new requests for charges – for example, for an alleged “tailor-made position” at Correos and precautionary measures against Civil Guard commanders – as the party itself states in this statement and in other parliamentary offensives ([link], [link], [link]).

Pending proceedings and next steps

According to the schedule reflected in the latest Demócrata reports, the following remain pending in the coming months:

• The statement of Leonardo Marcos and the chief prosecutor of Badajoz José Luis Alonso on September 10, and Pedraz's analysis of the complete file of the initial complaint and the internal communications ordered to the State Prosecutor's Office ([link]).
• The possible decision on whether to summon the former Attorney General Álvaro García Ortiz as a witness, once the testimonies of former prosecutors Diego Villafañe and Beatriz López Pesquera, whose appearance was set for July 15, have been evaluated ([link], [link], [link], [link]).
• Resolving pending appeals regarding the scope of the analysis of communications and devices of both Leire Díez and other implicated parties (including the discussion about devices of PSOE personnel), and completing technological and documentary expert reports ([link], [link], [link]).

Only when the judge considers the investigation exhausted will he decide whether to issue an order transforming the procedure into an abbreviated trial to bring the suspects to trial, or whether to archive all or part of the pieces. Until then, the case remains open, with possible new charges (such as those periodically requested by the PP) and with a very intense political projection over the Government and the PSOE, as reflected in multiple parliamentary debates and investigative commissions (for example, around the ‘Koldo case’, collected in [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link]).

The third vice-presidency of the Congress does not have a block of “own” functions different from the other vice-presidencies. The Congress Regulations establish a common regime for the four vice-presidencies: all substitute the Presidency “in their order” and assume the functions delegated to them by the Presidency or the Board. The specificity of the third vice-presidency therefore derives from its position in that internal order (it comes after the first and second and before the fourth) and from its participation in the bodies where the Regulations require the presence of “one of the Vice-Presidencies.”

General framework: Board and Presidency

The Congress Regulations, published in the BOE by Resolution of February 24, 1982, and successively amended (the text can be consulted in the Congress Regulations and the July 31, 2025 reform), first define the structure of the Board:

• Board as governing body: it is “the governing body of the Chamber” and holds the collegiate representation of it in the acts it attends.
• Composition: the Board “shall be composed of the Presidency of the Congress, four Vice-Presidencies, and four Secretariats.”
• Internal political direction: the Presidency “directs and coordinates the action of the Board.”

Additionally, the Regulations detail a broad catalog of functions of the Board (organization of work, internal regime, budget, expenditure management, qualification and processing of parliamentary writings, etc.). All of these are exercised collegially, so the third vice-presidency participates in these decisions with the same status and vote as the other vice-presidencies.

In parallel, the provision on the Presidency of the Congress sets its competencies: representing the Chamber, ensuring the smooth running of work, directing debates, maintaining order, ordering payments, and “complying with and enforcing the Regulations, interpreting them in cases of doubt and supplementing them in cases of omission.” These functions are key because when a vice-presidency substitutes the Presidency, it assumes them entirely.

Specific provision on the Vice-Presidencies

The Regulations contain a specific article dedicated to the Vice-Presidencies, whose relevant literal text (already in its consolidated version after the 2025 reform) is as follows:

• Substitution by order: “The Vice-Presidencies, in their order, substitute the Presidency, exercising its functions in case of vacancy, absence, or impossibility of the latter.”
• Delegated functions: “They also perform any other functions entrusted to them by the Presidency or the Board.”

From this provision derive the two main functions of the third vice-presidency:

• Substitution function: the third vice-presidency substitutes the Presidency of the Congress only when the first and second vice-presidencies are also absent due to vacancy, absence, or impossibility. In that scenario, it presides over the plenary session, the Board, or the Permanent Deputation and exercises all the powers of the Presidency described in the Regulations.
• Additional entrusted functions: it may receive specific assignments (presiding over certain sessions, institutional acts, meetings of the Board or other internal bodies) when so ordered by the Presidency or agreed by the Board itself.

Therefore, there is no own catalog of “competencies of the third vice-presidency”; its statute is common to the four vice-presidencies and differs only in the place it occupies in that substitution order.

Internal order and presence in other bodies

The internal order among the four vice-presidencies is determined in the article related to the election of the Board: the Vice-Presidencies “will be elected simultaneously,” writing only one name on the ballot, and the four persons who obtain the highest number of votes are elected “in successive order.” The classification as first, second, third, or fourth depends, therefore, on the result of that vote.

That order is relevant on several levels:

• In the Plenary and the Board: in the absence of the Presidency, the first vice-presidency substitutes; if it is also absent, the second; then the third; and finally the fourth.
• In the Spokespersons' Board: the Regulations provide that “at least one of the Vice-Presidencies” of the Chamber must attend its meetings. Any of the four can fulfill this requirement, and the third vice-presidency usually does so when the Board organizes it internally that way.
• In the Permanent Deputation: in this body, Vice-Presidencies are also elected, with a scheme analogous to that of the Congress Board; parliamentary experience shows that those holding the Vice-Presidencies of the Chamber may or may not be designated for those positions, but in any case the logic of substitution and internal hierarchy is reproduced.

Limitations and regime in debate

The Regulations include a common rule for the Presidency, Vice-Presidencies, and Secretariats of the Chamber or Commissions: when those holding these positions wish to intervene in a debate, “they shall leave their place on the Board and shall not return to it until the discussion of the matter in question has concluded.” This also applies to the third vice-presidency when presiding over a session or forming part of the Board.

In summary, the third vice-presidency fully shares the legal status of the other Vice-Presidencies: it is part of the Board (governing body), participates with voice and vote in its decisions, can preside over sessions when it corresponds by substitution, and assumes any functions assigned by the Presidency or the Board itself, always within the framework of the Congress Regulations.

The financing of advertising campaigns linked to electoral processes in Spain is mainly governed by the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), the Organic Law on the financing of political parties (amended by Organic Law 3/2015), and various instructions from the Central Electoral Board. These rules establish who can finance electoral advertising, what limits and controls exist, how accounts must be rendered, and what special restrictions apply to institutional advertising and polls during the electoral period. Below is a summary of the essential requirements that parties, public administrations, and entities contracting or funding advertising related to elections must consider.

1. Basic regulatory framework

• LOREG: Organic Law 5/1985, of June 19, on the General Electoral Regime, available in the BOE in this legal text.
• Party financing: Organic Law 8/2007, of July 4, on the financing of political parties, partially amended by Organic Law 3/2015, of March 30, which can be consulted in this financing law and its control and transparency reform in this control law.
• Instructions from the Central Electoral Board (JEC) relevant for advertising and polls:
  • Instruction 2/2011 on institutional campaigns and inauguration acts (art. 50 LOREG), accessible in this instruction.
  • Instruction 1/2024 on voting intention polls conducted by public bodies during the electoral period, in this recent instruction.

2. Permitted and prohibited sources of financing

According to Organic Law 8/2007, party resources are divided into public and private. Among the public resources are subsidies for electoral expenses provided in the LOREG, annual subsidies for operation, and subsidies for referendum campaigns, among others, as stated in the initial article of the party financing law (financing law).

Among the permitted private resources are membership fees, proceeds from own activities, income from assets, profits from promotional activities and services, donations in money or in kind, loans, and inheritances or legacies. Donations must respect the limits and conditions set in that law and its reforms, and Organic Law 3/2015 classifies as a very serious infraction the acceptance of donations that violate those limits, with a specific sanctioning regime (art. 17 bis et seq., as derived from the 2015 reform in this control law).

3. Spending limits in campaigns and concept of electoral expenditure

LOREG establishes that electoral advertising and propaganda (including ad insertions, posters, postal mailings, digital media, etc.) is considered electoral expenditure, subject to the maximum spending limits that LOREG itself sets for each type of election and constituency. Practically, any advertising campaign specifically aimed at soliciting votes or spreading slogans or candidacies during the legal campaign period must be financed through electoral administrators and counted within those limits, charged to resources obtained according to Organic Law 8/2007.

There are no concrete figures of those limits in the consulted fragments of LOREG, but it is established that the Court of Auditors may detect “violations of the restrictions established in terms of electoral income and expenditure” and propose the reduction or non-allocation of public subsidies (article on electoral auditing in the legal text).

4. Control, auditing, and transparency

Organic Law 8/2007, amended by Organic Law 3/2015, strengthens internal and external control of party financing. Among other obligations (articles 14 and 14 bis, according to the consolidated wording visible in this control law):

• Parties must have a responsible for economic-financial management, with accredited knowledge and honorability, responsible for accounting regularity.
• They must maintain an internal control system and submit their accounts to audit, including electoral activity.
• They must submit consolidated annual accounts to the Court of Auditors before June 30 of the following year, detailing income and expenses, and publish on their website the balance sheet, income statement, amount of credits, and main donations (above 25,000 euros) within one month of submission, as well as publish audit reports within a maximum of 15 days from issuance, as stated in the 2015 reform in this control law.

For electoral accounting, LOREG assigns the Court of Auditors the auditing of expenses and the possibility of initiating specific sanctioning procedures, and proposing to reduce or withdraw subsidies when irregularities are detected (article on auditing electoral accounts in the LOREG text).

5. Institutional advertising during the electoral period

A key element is the separation between party electoral advertising and institutional advertising by public authorities. Article 50 LOREG, interpreted by Instruction 2/2011 of the JEC (instruction on institutional campaigns), establishes that from the call of elections until their celebration:

• Public authorities cannot finance institutional campaigns that contain references to achievements or accomplishments, nor use images, jingles, or expressions similar to those of party campaigns.
• Inauguration acts of public works or services with propagandistic content are prohibited.
• Only strictly informative campaigns about the electoral process itself (register, date, voting procedure, and postal voting) and those essential for public interest are allowed, always without electoral connotation.

This implies that institutional advertising funded with public funds cannot be used, directly or indirectly, to favor a candidacy during the electoral period.

6. Polls and surveys during the electoral period

Article 69 LOREG, developed by Instruction 1/2024 of the JEC (instruction on public polls), sets specific conditions for polls financed by public bodies during the campaign, which also constitute a form of political communication:

• The publication and dissemination of electoral polls is prohibited in the five days prior to voting.
• If a body dependent on an Administration decides to conduct voting intention polls during the electoral period, it must notify the JEC in advance, providing their technical characteristics and schedule.
• Results must be made available to political forces under conditions of equality and transparency, to avoid privileged uses of information financed with public funds.

Overall, Spanish regulations seek that the financing of electoral advertising be traceable, limited, controlled by the Court of Auditors, and clearly separated from institutional advertising, guaranteeing equality among actors and transparency before the electorate.