A person is injured after being run over by a train in Llamaquique, in Oviedo

In the current state regulations, crossing railway tracks by users at Spanish stations is based on two central ideas: it can only be done at specifically authorized points and the infrastructure manager must design, signpost, and maintain those crossings in safe and accessible conditions. Crossing "on the track" outside those points is considered contrary to general safety rules.

Basic applicable legal framework

• Law 38/2015, of September 29, on the railway sector (text in BOE): regulates safety in railway traffic, defines the responsibilities of all agents, and requires protecting the interests of users, in connection with Regulation (EC) 1371/2007 on the rights and obligations of railway passengers.
• Royal Decree 664/2015, of July 17, Railway Traffic Regulations (RCF) (text in BOE): orders the circulation of trains, their entry, exit, and passage through stations, signaling, and operating conditions of the General Interest Railway Network.
• Royal Decree 1544/2007, of November 23, on basic conditions of accessibility and non-discrimination in modes of transport (text in BOE): its annex I sets accessibility requirements in railway stations, including passage routes between platforms.
• Order FOM/2015/2016, of December 30, Official Catalogue of Railway Traffic Signals (text in BOE): defines shape, color, design, location, and visibility of signals, including those for protected and unprotected level crossings and signal schemes in stations.
• Royal Decree 780/2001, of July 6, on level crossings (text in BOE): modifies the Regulation of the Land Transport Organization Law and establishes specific rules on level crossings between roads/paths and railway lines.

Requirements for crossing by travelers

• Crossing only at authorized places: Royal Decree 780/2001 states that crossings with railway lines must occur “at places determined for this purpose and with the limitations or conditions established regarding their use.” At stations, this translates into the use of:
  • Underpasses (pedestrian tunnels).
  • Overpasses or footbridges.
  • Defined accessible routes (ramps, elevators, etc.).
  • Where applicable, expressly signposted pedestrian level crossings.
  Crossing by stepping on the track outside these devices deviates from safety regulations.
• Strict respect for signage: the Official Catalogue of Signals and the RCF require attention to fixed and luminous signals, as well as barriers, half-barriers, and acoustic signals at level crossings. If a crossing is closed or in warning phase (flashing lights, bells, moving barriers), the traveler cannot start or continue crossing.
• Observance of instructions from railway personnel: Law 38/2015 and safety regulations recognize that infrastructure managers and railway companies have the authority to issue operational instructions. Orders from station or train staff (for example, preventing crossing until a maneuver is completed) are part of safe use requirements.
• Use of accessible routes: Royal Decree 1544/2007 requires that public use areas of stations and rolling stock be accessible; stations of certain size must adapt to its annex I within set deadlines. For people with disabilities or reduced mobility, the practical “requirement” is to use the planned accessible routes (elevators, ramps, platforms), which replace direct crossing on the track.

Obligations of the infrastructure manager

• Design grade-separated crossings as a general rule: Royal Decree 780/2001 establishes that new crossings between roads or other communication routes and railway lines must be made “in all cases” at different levels, allowing level crossings only as exceptional and provisional, equipped with adequate protection. This encourages that pedestrian crossings near stations be resolved by underpasses or overpasses.
• Eliminate or reorganize existing level crossings: the same regulation requires, when necessary or convenient (and in any case at certain traffic intensities or railway speeds), to remove level crossings or replace them with grade-separated crossings, and to reorganize accesses to concentrate essential crossings.
• Provide adequate safety and signaling systems: level crossings still in service must have “adequate safety and signaling systems to guarantee their safety,” defined by rules from the competent Ministry, considering visibility, traffic characteristics, etc. The Signal Catalogue specifies how “protected/unprotected level crossing” signals and other warnings related to crossings must be.
• Maintain infrastructure and signaling in safe conditions: the RCF and its amendments, together with Law 38/2015, require infrastructure managers and the State Railway Safety Agency to maintain and, if necessary, adapt signaling and control and protection systems, including those related to train entry, exit, and passage through stations.
• Ensure progressive accessibility: Royal Decree 1544/2007 imposes adaptation schedules for stations according to their passenger volume, so that crossings between platforms are made via accessible routes and not by unsafe or discriminatory solutions.

In summary, Spanish regulations combine the material prohibition of crossing the track outside authorized crossings with a strong obligation for the infrastructure manager to offer segregated, signposted, and accessible crossings, and to progressively eliminate residual level crossings wherever possible.

Adif, as the infrastructure manager of the General Interest Network, plays a central role in the prevention, management, and recovery from railway incidents and emergencies. Its competencies are based on its Statute (Royal Decree 2395/2004) and recent internal agreements published in the BOE, as well as on state and regional civil protection and railway safety regulations.

Adif's internal regulatory framework

• Contingency plan: Adif's Board of Directors has delegated to its Presidency the authority to approve “a contingency plan that includes the necessary measures to restore normality in case of accident, technical failure, or any other incident that disrupts railway traffic” (art. 1.7 of the agreement published in the BOE on 06/17/2025, BOE-A-2025-12297).
• Internal accident investigation: the Presidency also approves “the guidelines regulating the procedure to carry out internal investigations of railway accidents that correspond to it” and the annual report of incidents and accidents caused by the provision of railway transport service (arts. 1.5 and 1.6 of the same agreement).
• All this configures a proprietary safety management system coordinated with obligations derived from the Railway Sector Law and EU railway safety regulations.

Self-protection plans and first response

In the field of self-protection, Adif is responsible for the self-protection plans of stations, tunnels, and other facilities. A high-speed derailment drill at Figueres‑Vilafant station shows how these competencies are applied in practice:

• Adif activated the station's self-protection plan and the associated tunnel's plan, regarding detection, alerts, and mobilization of its internal emergency teams (note from the Generalitat of Catalonia).
• Its control centers (Traffic Regulation Center and 24h Protection and Security Centers) are the initial communication nodes when the driver or onboard staff detect an incident.
• From the alarm, Adif teams collaborate with firefighters, health services, security forces, and Civil Protection in evacuation, infrastructure access, and logistical support.

Moreover, recent emergency experience has reinforced that, in accident situations, the first mandatory alert must be directed to Adif's control center, to ensure immediate network overview and the ability to stop or modify traffic as needed (see information on protocol changes in this Demócrata article).

Coordination with Civil Protection and other administrations

When the emergency exceeds the company's internal scope and affects public safety, operational command passes to civil protection plans (state or regional):

• In Catalonia, for example, PROCICAT and its FERROCAT subplan activate in widespread Rodalies incidents due to Adif facility failures; in these cases, Civil Protection leads and Adif provides technical information and means to review and repair infrastructure (FERROCAT alert due to Adif facility incident).
• In complex emergencies, state or regional civil protection plans determine the coordination center (CECOP/CECAT) and command chain. Adif then acts as infrastructure manager: interrupting traffic, enabling access, providing energy or communications, and assisting in evacuation and passenger care logistics.

Relationship with Renfe, CIAF, and the new investigation authority

• With Renfe and other operators, Adif must coordinate traffic regulation, incident management, and passenger information. Press releases on drills and strikes emphasize the need for joint emergency protocols and direct communication between Adif‑Renfe‑Ministry of Transport.
• Regarding technical accident investigation, primary responsibility lies with independent bodies: the Railway Accident Investigation Commission (CIAF) and progressively, the new Independent Administrative Authority for Technical Investigation of Transport Accidents and Incidents. The Senate has emphasized their independence and that Adif appears before commissions to inform but does not lead those investigations (Senate note).
• However, Adif retains the obligation to internally investigate accidents affecting it, according to guidelines approved by its Presidency, and to provide external investigative bodies with all necessary technical information.

Summary

In summary, Adif is responsible for:

• Preventing incidents through maintenance, inspections, and contingency plans.
• Receiving and channeling initial emergency alerts from trains and stations.
• Applying self-protection plans in its facilities and activating its internal teams.
• Coordinating with operators, Civil Protection, and emergency services when an external plan is activated.
• Restoring normal traffic and annually reporting incidents and accidents.
• Collaborating with CIAF and the future independent authority in technical investigation, while maintaining its own internal investigation circuit.

With the information found in the sources consulted in this session, it is not possible to precisely reconstruct the vote and councilor distribution by party in the latest municipal elections in Oviedo. It can be stated, based on Demócrata news, that in the 2023 municipal elections the People's Party (PP) obtained an absolute majority in the Oviedo City Council and since then has governed the municipality alone, with Alfredo Canteli as mayor.

One of the articles consulted about the internal life of the Oviedo PP explicitly refers to the party's goal of “maintaining the absolute majority achieved in 2023” in the next municipal elections. This reference allows two relevant conclusions for your question:

• In the latest municipal elections held in Oviedo — those of 2023 — the PP was the clearly winning force and achieved an absolute majority in the municipal plenary by itself.
• As a consequence of that absolute majority, the local government is formed exclusively by the PP, without the need for stable coalition agreements with other parties to reach a majority.

Regarding the numerical detail you asked — percentage of votes and number of councilors obtained by each candidacy — the search conducted in press databases and institutional sources indexed in this tool has not returned, in this session, a document that records the municipal scrutiny broken down specifically for Oviedo (capital of Asturias). That is, no official table or proclamation act of elected officials has been found in the consulted results that allows answering precisely:

• How many votes and what percentage each list obtained in the city of Oviedo.
• How many councilors corresponded exactly to each party.

In the absence of that specific document in the recovered materials, and following the criterion of not inventing electoral data, it is not possible to offer you here a closed table with vote and seat figures by party. However, the resulting political landscape can be summarized as reflected in the sources:

• The PP of Alfredo Canteli holds a majority of councilors, enough to surpass the absolute majority threshold and control both the mayoralty and the Local Government Board.
• The rest of the parties with representation (which, generally in Asturias, usually include the PSOE and forces to the left of PSOE and to the right of PP) are in opposition in the Oviedo City Council. However, the sources consulted in this session do not provide a reliable breakdown of how many councilors each has in the Oviedo corporation.
• In the materials found, there is also no coalition agreement involving other formations in the municipal government, which is consistent with the data of the popular absolute majority: the PP governs Oviedo alone.

If you need the exact data of votes and councilors by party, the most direct way is to consult the official electoral sources that publish detailed scrutiny by municipality:

• The electoral results search engine of the Ministry of the Interior and the Central Electoral Board, which offers for each process (including municipal) the result by municipality, polling stations, and candidacies.
• The institutional portal of the Oviedo City Council, where results of the latest municipal elections and the current composition of the plenary (with councilors by group) are often linked or reproduced.
• In some cases, the Official Bulletin of the Principality of Asturias or the corresponding official bulletin may publish the proclamation of elected officials at the local level, also with details of lists and numbers of councilors.

In summary, with the information available in this research, I can assure you that in the latest municipal elections in Oviedo the PP achieved an absolute majority and that the local government is formed solely by this party, with Alfredo Canteli as mayor. However, without accessing the specific official result lists, it is not possible here to provide a complete and exact distribution of votes and councilors by party, so for that specific part I refer you to the official resources mentioned.