Germany is considering the illegalization of the far-right AfD with the Government divided

In Germany, the banning of a political party is an exclusive competence of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), mainly regulated by Article 21.2 and 21.4 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and by the Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG). Neither the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, nor the Federal Government can directly “ban” a party: they can only initiate the procedure by submitting a formal request to the Court.

1. Who can request the ban

The active legitimacy to request the declaration of unconstitutionality of a party is strictly limited by Art. 21.4 GG:

• The Bundestag (lower house of the federal Parliament).
• The Bundesrat (house of the Länder).
• The Federal Government (Bundesregierung).

Other actors — rival parties, Länder governments, associations, individuals — cannot directly submit a request to ban a party (this is different from bans on associations, which follow a different legal regime).

2. Substantive requirements: when can a ban be requested

Article 21.2 GG establishes the substantive criteria. A party can be declared unconstitutional if:

• It pursues to undermine or eliminate the free and democratic basic order (freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung), or
• It endangers the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Constitutional Court’s case law (SRP, KPD, NPD cases) has clarified that:

• It is not enough that the party holds anti-democratic ideologies; it must develop a “combative, aggressive and active” activity against the free and democratic order.
• There must be a certain real potential to affect that order, assessed according to its structure, mobilization capacity, social insertion, etc., although immediate imminence is not required.
• Both the program and statutes and the practical conduct are analyzed: speeches, campaigns, acts, internal organization, possible links to violence, etc.

3. Internal decision in Bundestag, Bundesrat or Federal Government

Before submitting the request to the Constitutional Court, each body must adopt a formal internal decision:

• Bundestag: the matter is processed as a parliamentary motion or resolution; it requires a majority agreement set in its rules (usually a simple majority of members present, unless a higher political threshold is established).
• Bundesrat: the Länder, through their delegations, vote on a resolution; generally, a majority of votes is needed according to the Basic Law and the Bundesrat’s Rules of Procedure.
• Federal Government: the decision is adopted within the Cabinet; the Ministry of the Interior usually leads the preparation of the file, supported by reports from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz).

These intelligence and security analysis reports are not an explicit constitutional requirement, but in practice they constitute the evidentiary basis that politically justifies the decision to file the request.

4. Content and submission of the request to the Constitutional Court

Once the internal decision is adopted, the legitimized body submits a party ban action before the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court. The request must:

• Precisely identify the affected party (and, if applicable, sub-organizations).
• Set out in detail the facts and legal grounds that prove the requirements of Art. 21.2 GG are met.
• Provide evidence: programs, statutes, internal resolutions, publications, public statements, propaganda material, organizational structure, relations with violent groups, etc.

The BVerfGG establishes formal requirements (legal representation, signature, language, annexes) and the Court initially controls the admissibility of the request.

5. Processing before the Constitutional Court

The procedure essentially follows these phases:

• Written phase: exchange of pleadings between the requesting body, the affected party, and, if applicable, other participants.
• Evidence gathering: the Court may request documents, hear witnesses and experts, and gather information from authorities (police, intelligence services). After the NPD case experience, the use of information from infiltrated informants in the party’s leadership bodies is limited.
• Oral hearing: public hearing where facts and legal arguments are discussed.
• Judgment: if the claim is upheld, the Court declares the party unconstitutional, orders its dissolution, prohibits the creation of substitute organizations, and may order the confiscation of assets. The judgment is final and not subject to appeal.

In summary, the Bundestag, Bundesrat, and Federal Government do not “ban” parties themselves, but act as procedural gatekeepers: only they can trigger the exceptional party ban mechanism before the Constitutional Court, which ultimately decides under very strict standards protecting the democratic order.

The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) is one of the most influential models of constitutional justice in Europe. Its powers and functions have distinctive features compared to other European constitutional courts, although it shares with them the basic mission of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution.

General features of the German Federal Constitutional Court

The BVerfG is a specialized court, separate from the ordinary judicial organization, based in Karlsruhe. It is not part of the apex of the ordinary court system (which lies with the Federal Court of Justice and other specialized supreme courts), but is an autonomous body responsible for:

• Controlling the conformity of laws and public acts with the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
• Protecting fundamental rights recognized in the Constitution.
• Arbitrating conflicts between federal bodies and between Federation and Länder.

Most characteristic competences of the BVerfG

Among its competences, some stand out that differentiate it both in scope and practical use compared to other European constitutional courts:

• Individual constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde): Any person (natural or legal) can directly appeal to the BVerfG if they consider that a public authority has violated their fundamental rights. This route is widely used: the Court receives thousands of complaints annually, although only a minority are admitted.
  In comparison, other countries also have similar mechanisms (for example, the amparo appeal in Spain or the reformed Austrian “Verfassungsbeschwerde”), but the German model is one of the broadest and most consolidated, and has served as a reference in Europe.
• Abstract review of norms: A parliamentary minority, the Federal Government, Länder governments, or other legitimized bodies can challenge a law without the need for a concrete case. This instrument is used with some frequency in Germany and plays a central role in political-constitutional controversies.
• Concrete review of norms: Ordinary courts that doubt the constitutionality of a law applicable in a concrete proceeding must refer a question to the BVerfG. This technique also exists in many countries (e.g., the question of constitutionality in Italy or Spain), but in Germany it has become a very relevant channel of dialogue between jurisdictions.
• Conflicts of competences and bodies: The BVerfG resolves disputes between federal bodies (Bundestag, Bundesrat, Federal Government, President) and between Federation and Länder. This arbitral function is common to other federal or regional models (Italy, Belgium), but in Germany it has special weight due to the federal structure and the relevance of the Bundesrat.
• Control of political parties and electoral processes: The Court can declare a political party unconstitutional if it pursues the elimination of the free democratic order, something formally foreseen also in other systems but rarely used. Likewise, it controls the regularity of federal elections and resolves related challenges.

Comparison with other European constitutional courts

In other European countries with specialized constitutional courts (Italy, Spain, Austria, Portugal, etc.) there is a common basis:

• Abstract and concrete review of the constitutionality of laws.
• Resolution of conflicts between constitutional bodies.
• Participation in the control of electoral processes and, in some cases, parties.

However, there are relevant differences:

• Individual access: While the German individual complaint is broad and central, some countries lack such an open mechanism (for example, in France the priority question of constitutionality is channeled through ordinary courts, not directly by citizens before the Conseil constitutionnel), or condition it more strictly.
• Institutional position: As in Germany, many European constitutional courts are separate from ordinary jurisdiction. However, in other systems (such as the UK, which lacks a separate constitutional court) the control of compatibility with the Constitution or equivalent instruments falls to the higher ordinary courts.
• Material scope of control: The BVerfG has developed a very intense doctrine on fundamental rights, which influences all levels of the legal system. In systems with less rigid constitutions or without a strong catalogue of rights (such as the previous British model without a codified constitution) the control is usually less structuring.
• Political weight and social legitimacy: In Germany, the Constitutional Court is perceived as a true “guardian of the Constitution” and enjoys notable social and political authority. Other European constitutional courts may have comparable influence (such as the Italian or Spanish), but the prestige and centrality of the BVerfG in the design of the German State are especially marked.

Conclusion

In summary, the German Federal Constitutional Court shares with other European constitutional courts its function as the ultimate guarantor of the Constitution, but stands out for the breadth and intensive use of the individual complaint, its strong role in the federal balance, and the great doctrinal authority it has acquired. These elements explain why, in the European comparison, the German model is considered one of the most influential and paradigmatic of constitutional justice.

In the German federal elections of February 23, 2025, Alternative for Germany (AfD) consolidated itself as the second national force, with around one fifth of the votes (around 20.8%) and 152 deputies out of the 630 in the new Bundestag, almost double the previous legislature, in which it had 83 seats, according to El País. At the regional and territorial level, the consulted sources show very intense growth, especially in the eastern Länder, where AfD exceeds 30% of the votes and ranks as the first force in several regions. Overall, the evolution since its creation in 2013 has been that of a party moving from an emerging actor to the main parliamentary opposition, although still blocked by the cordon sanitaire that keeps the rest of the parties away from agreements with the ultra formation.

Results in the last federal elections (Bundestag 2025)

Different press analyses agree that the early elections of February 23, 2025 marked a qualitative leap in AfD’s federal presence:

• The conservative CDU/CSU bloc won the elections with a 28.5% of the votes, while AfD came in second place with approximately 20.8% support, ahead of a sinking SPD, around 16%, according to articles from El País and elDiario.es.
• In the new Bundestag, described in detail by El País, AfD goes from 83 to 152 deputies. The chamber is reduced from 733 to 630 seats, but AfD increases both in absolute and relative terms, up to occupying “a quarter of the seats” and becoming the main opposition group.
• The “grand coalition” agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD — analyzed by elDiario.es — is justified precisely by AfD’s advance, which “was the second force with more than 20%” and is perceived as a systemic threat if the cordon sanitaire is broken.

From a strictly parliamentary point of view, AfD’s recent federal evolution can be summarized as follows: in the previous legislature it had 83 seats; after the 2025 elections it stands at 152 and becomes the second group in the Bundestag, with no other party willing to cooperate with it in government formation.

Most recent results at regional and territorial level

The available sources do not offer an exhaustive “Land by Land” picture, but do allow identification of several significant milestones in the most recent electoral cycle:

• In the eastern state of Brandenburg, in the elections held “last Sunday” prior to the federal investiture, AfD achieved a 32.5% of the votes, compared to an SPD that had dominated the region years ago. The analysis by elDiario.es highlights that this is the best federal result for the far right since World War II and consolidates AfD as the first force in much of the East.
• A report by El País summarizes the map: “in the German-Eastern regions, AfD won clearly a week ago, with 34% of votes, far ahead of the CDU; in the former West Germany, AfD achieved 18% and was far behind the CDU.” That is, the party has become hegemonic in many Eastern Länder and an intermediate force in the West.
• In the March 2026 regional elections in Baden-Württemberg, the state statistical office — cited by Demócrata and other media collected in the research — attributes AfD 18.8% of the votes, third position after Greens (30.2%) and CDU (29.7%), and “the best result in its history in a state election in western Germany.”
• In North Rhine-Westphalia, another press article collected in the research trace indicates that AfD hovers around 15% of the votes in local elections, tripling its support in five years and even worrying the regional CDU, which despite winning warns that the far-right advance “does not allow for peaceful sleep.”

In sociological terms, sociologist Klaus Dörre, interviewed by elDiario.es, highlights that AfD was the most voted option by manual workers in the recent federal elections, and that in regional elections in Thuringia and Saxony it reached 49% and 46% of the vote among this labor stratum, respectively. Although these figures refer to a social segment and not the total electorate, they illustrate the depth of its implantation in certain territories.

Evolution of parliamentary representation since its appearance

An analysis by El País recalls that AfD is a formation founded in 2013 that “has not stopped growing while radicalizing its discourse against immigration” and that in just over a decade it has become the second group in the Bundestag. The recent federal evolution, documented by El País, shows a leap from 83 to 152 seats between the previous and current legislature.

At the regional level, the consulted articles describe a similar process: first breakthroughs in Länder parliaments after its creation, consolidation as the first force in numerous eastern states, and sustained advance in the West, where it already stands around 15–20% in industrialized states such as North Rhine-Westphalia or Baden-Württemberg. Despite this growth, a cordon sanitaire is maintained both federally and regionally, whereby CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, Liberals, and The Left formally refuse any coalition with AfD, which for now limits its ability to translate its parliamentary representation into effective executive power.