Four urgent investment keys for Europe not to miss the train of the economy before 2040

The European economy faces a stage of large investments that can become an opportunity for growth or widen the gap with the United States and China if the States are not able to adapt.

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Europe is going through an economic paradox. While consumption remains weak, the construction residential is at historically low levels and industrial sectors such as automobile and chemicals are facing difficulties, a new wave of investment is transforming the European economy.

The picture presented by Caroline Gauthier, co-head of equities at Edmond de Rothschild Asset Management, points precisely in that direction. In an analysis of the major investment cycles taking shape in Europe -shared with DEMÓCRATA-, Gauthier identifies four megacycles capable of sustaining corporate profits despite the weakness of economic growth: artificial intelligence, electrification, infrastructure, and defense.

European business investment could thus become one of the main engines of the economy in the coming years. According to Gauthier's analysis, corporate profits could increase by 17% this year, while the capital expenditure of European industrial companies could grow at an annual rate of 4.5% until 2029, compared to the 0.5% historical trend.

But to take advantage of this opportunity, Europe will have to resolve four challenges. It is not enough to invest: it is also necessary to allow investments to be made, have sufficient energy, modernize networks, and create the conditions for companies to want to establish themselves in European territory.

1. Artificial intelligence: Europe needs data centers

The first major cycle is that of artificial intelligence. The growth of investments from large U.S. technology companies is already benefiting European suppliers that occupy strategic positions in the value chain.

Among them are companies like ASML, specialized in equipment for semiconductor manufacturing; Besi, linked to chip assembly; Prysmian, in cabling, and Schneider Electric, in electrical infrastructure.

But the big question for Europe is now at another point: where the data centers necessary to support the expansion of AI will be installed.

The European Union has set the goal of tripling its data center capacity in the coming years, according to the analysis by Edmond de Rothschild AM. And there appears one of the first risks for European countries.

A data center needs floor space, connectivity, water in certain cooling systems, and, above all, large amounts of stable and competitive electricity.

For this reason, digitalization cannot be analyzed separately from energy.

Europe can aspire to become a hub of artificial intelligence, but countries that hinder the construction of data centers or that cannot guarantee sufficient electricity generation run the risk of being left out of an important part of this new economy.

The opportunity is not only to attract large tech companies. It also affects equipment manufacturers, power grids, cables, semiconductors, cooling systems, construction, and engineering.

AI, ultimately, can become an investment multiplier for the real economy.

2. Energy: without electricity there will be no digital revolution

The second major cycle is that of electrification.

European electricity demand could increase by more than 10% by 2030, about 300 terawatt-hours additional, equivalent to approximately the annual consumption of Italy, according to estimates collected by Gauthier.

Data centers will be part of that increase, but they are not the only factor. The electrification of transport, industry, and heating is already increasing demand.

The European problem, therefore, is not only about producing more electricity. The major pending issue is the networks.

The European Commission estimates that transport and distribution networks will need 1.2 trillion euros of investment by 2040. (EUR-Lex)

The magnitude of the challenge explains why electrification is much more than an energy policy. It is also a matter of industrial competitiveness and economic security.

Networks will need to be larger, but also smarter and more flexible. They will have to integrate a more decentralized and variable generation and connect new production projects with large consumption centers.

And here lies one of the keys for member states: it is not enough to bet on a certain generation technology if there is no network capacity to deliver that electricity where it is needed.

Europe needs to generate, transport, and store energy competitively.

The country that manages to offer abundant, reliable electricity at a competitive price will have a growing advantage in attracting industry and data centers.

Those that do not succeed may lose investments.

3. Infrastructures: decades of pending investment

The third megacycle is that of infrastructures.

Europe has been dragging decades of underfunding in roads, railways, water networks, bridges, tunnels, and other basic infrastructures. To this is now added the need to create new energy corridors and adapt infrastructures to new industrial and geopolitical needs.

The war in Ukraine has also highlighted the strategic importance of energy and transport connections.

Germany offers one of the most important examples: its plan includes 500 billion euros of investment over twelve years.

But the phenomenon is not limited to Germany. The European funds of NextGenerationEU and REPowerEU, along with national programs, are driving projects in different countries, from Italy and the Netherlands to Eastern Europe.

Investment in infrastructures is no longer just a matter of maintenance.

It is a matter of competitiveness.

An economy with bad roads, saturated electrical networks, insufficient railway connections, or administrative procedures that delay an infrastructure for years loses its capacity to attract companies.

That is why one of the four major challenges for Europe will be to convert the available money into real infrastructures.

And here a transversal problem arises: deadlines.

It is not very useful to have funding if an energy, industrial, or digital project takes so many years to receive permits that the investment ends up moving to another country.

4. Defense: a new strategic industry

The fourth major cycle is that of defense.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed European security priorities and forced member states to consider a structural increase in military spending.

According to estimates collected by Gauthier, European spending could reach 3% of GDP, and even reach 5% if dual-use infrastructures, civil and military, are included.

The consequence goes far beyond arms manufacturers.

The increase in defense investment can benefit industrial, technological, electronics, communications, materials, aerospace, and cybersecurity companies for decades.

And there is an element that can make this cycle durable even if the war in Ukraine ends: Europe is rebuilding its defense capacity after years of lower investment.

The issue will be to determine how much of that spending translates into European industry and how much ends up benefiting foreign suppliers.

Here the concept of economic sovereignty reappears.

Energy and data centers can decide who wins

The four megacycles are interconnected.

Artificial intelligence needs data centers. Data centers need electricity. Electricity needs networks and infrastructures. And new infrastructures and industrial chains need security and defense.

That is why Europe cannot tackle each of these challenges in isolation.

In this sense, the European Commission already points out that the modernization of electrical networks will require investments of 1.2 trillion euros by 2040 and that it will also be necessary to mobilize private capital.

Europe needs private capital

There is a fifth condition that runs through the four megacycles: money.

European governments cannot finance such a volume of investments on their own. Hence, Gauthier highlights that European companies in the STOXX 600, excluding the financial sector, accumulate a record figure of 1.5 trillion euros in cash deployed annually and therefore have significant capacity to invest.

The challenge, therefore, is to ensure that this capital is directed towards Europe. And the EU's joint financing mechanisms - argue Edmond de Rothschild Asset Management - can play an important role, just like the future Capital Markets Union.

The European budget already has a financial framework of about 1.2 trillion euros for 2021-2027, complemented by about 800 billion from NextGenerationEU. But the scale of the needs makes it essential to multiply private investment.

The risk of a two-speed Europe

The analysis from Edmond de Rothschild AM leaves a warning in the background. Europe may be entering a new stage of investment after decades of underfunding. But not all countries are equally prepared to take advantage of it.

States that are able to offer competitive energy, modern networks, industrial land, data centers, efficient infrastructures, and fast administrative procedures - this consultancy emphasizes - will be able to attract a growing share of investment.

Those who delay these projects may lose positions. So, the question is no longer just how much money Europe invests. It is where data centers are built, where electricity is generated, where components are manufactured, and where the new industry is installed.

The energy transition, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, and defense can thus become the four major investment engines of the European economy. But they can also be a test of competitiveness among its own states, as -subscribes Edmond de Rothschild-Europe has capital, leading companies, and a huge need for modernization and, the challenge -concludes- is to ensure that this opportunity does not become another lost decade due to lack of energy, networks, infrastructure, or capacity to execute investments.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current status of Germany's infrastructure investment plan and what parliamentary procedures remain for its execution?

Germany's major infrastructure investment plan under Chancellor Friedrich Merz has been politically and legally approved since March 2025: the constitutional reform to partially break the “debt brake” and create a special fund of 500 billion euros for infrastructure and environment, plus about 400 billion for defense, was validated by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. As of August 2026, the “umbrella plan” no longer has major pending parliamentary procedures: what remains is its annual deployment through budget laws, sectoral packages (transport, digitization, energy), and parliamentary oversight. The details of which specific projects are financed, year by year, depend on subsequent decisions by the federal government and the majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat. It is worth adding that I do not have access to a real-time German parliamentary database, so I can only rely on the information available from the open sources consulted.

1. Basic content of the investment plan

According to economic media such as Cinco Días, the core of the plan is:

  • 500 billion euros over 10–12 years for transport infrastructure, energy networks, and social infrastructure, through a special fund.
  • In parallel, about 400 billion additional for rearmament and modernization of the Armed Forces.

Editorials such as “The historical responsibility of Friedrich Merz” emphasize that this represents a historic shift from the German dogma of fiscal austerity and the Schuldenbremse (constitutional debt limit), while other analyses, like this one on public debt, highlight the strong impact on bond markets.

2. Parliamentary procedures already completed

The key process was the constitutional reform to allow this extraordinary borrowing and the creation of the special fund:

  • The plan was presented and debated in the Bundestag in early March 2025. Reports such as El País’s and eldiario.es describe the last-minute negotiations with the SPD and the Greens to achieve the two-thirds majority.
  • On March 18–19, 2025, the Bundestag voted on the reform with 513 votes in favor and 207 against, as reported by El Mundo and also mentioned in later interviews.
  • On March 21, 2025, the Bundesrat definitively approved the borrowing plan and the special fund with 53 votes in favor, no opposition, and 15 abstentions, according to this report.

That is, the constitutional and legal basis of the large infrastructure and defense fund was closed already in March 2025. From Brussels, Vice President Dombrovskis positively assessed the “Germany infrastructure plan and the debt brake reform,” seeing spillover effects for the entire EU, in his remarks before the Eurogroup.

Subsequently, CDU and SPD closed a coalition agreement, described in eldiario.es and El País, in which the execution of the multi-billion investment plan in defense, infrastructure, and environment is one of the central pieces.

3. Sectoral packages already underway

In parallel with the large fund, Germany has been deploying specific instruments, many coordinated with the EU:

  • Digitization and networks: the European Commission approved in 2024 the expansion of the German aid plan for gigabit networks, raising it to 38 billion until 2028, co-financed by the federal budget and the Länder, according to the press release on gigabit networks [link].
  • Energy transition and green infrastructure: the modified recovery and resilience plan, validated by the Commission and the Council in 2024 (Commission and Council), mobilizes 30.3 billion in grants for 17 reforms and 28 investments, with 49.5% of funds allocated to climate objectives and 47.5% to digital measures.
  • The Commission has also authorized state aid for the deployment of energy and gas infrastructures (floating LNG terminals, hydrogen, etc.), covered in various press releases such as those related to hydrogen and LNG (hydrogen network, FSRU), which are integrated into the German energy infrastructure strategy.

4. Remaining parliamentary procedures

In view of the above, the “infrastructure investment plan” has transformed into a multi-year borrowing and spending framework already approved. What remains pending in parliamentary terms (broadly) is:

  • Annual approval of the Federal Budgets that specify, year by year, which part of the fund is executed in transport, energy, digitization, housing, etc.
  • Processing of sectoral laws and acceleration packages (planning procedures, environmental permits, procurement rules) that allow the money to translate into real projects; these laws must pass through the Bundestag and, in many cases, the Bundesrat.
  • Parliamentary control and monitoring of execution: government appearances, status reports, and possible adjustments to the fund’s design if economic conditions or political priorities change.

More detailed information is not available, in the sources consulted, about which specific sectoral laws were still in process in August 2026 or their exact schedule in the Bundestag and Bundesrat. For fine tracking, one would have to consult the official documentation of both German chambers, which I do not handle with the same depth as the Spanish ones.

What portion of the 500 billion special fund is specifically planned to be allocated to transport infrastructure versus energy and housing? What political and social criticisms is this shift toward massive borrowing for infrastructure and defense receiving in Germany? How is the German infrastructure plan coordinated with European recovery funds and with gigabit network and renewable energy programs?

What are the European Commission's competences in regulating energy transport and distribution networks?

The European Commission has broad competences but mainly in the framework and supervision of energy transport and distribution networks: it proposes legislation that harmonizes electricity and gas markets, approves technical standards (network codes), ensures competition and compliance with internal market rules, and coordinates cross-border infrastructure planning. Member States retain ownership, direct management, and decisions on the energy mix and specific network deployment. In all matters related to interconnections and the functioning of the internal market, the Commission plays a decisive role. Although I specialize in the Spanish context, these are the general lines of competence distribution at the EU level.

Legal basis and general scope

The Commission's competences in energy networks are mainly based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (articles on energy, internal market, competition, and trans-European networks). Under this framework, the Commission:

  • Initiates and proposes legislation (regulations and directives) on the functioning of electricity and gas markets, which directly affect the organization and regulation of transmission system operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs).
  • Monitors correct application of that legislation by Member States and can initiate infringement procedures.
  • Adopts implementing acts and technical guidelines, especially in cooperation with the European regulator ACER and network operator organizations (ENTSO-E, ENTSOG).

Internal energy market and network rules

Regarding the internal electricity and gas market, the European Commission has competences to:

  • Define the market model: rules for dispatch, price formation, third-party access to networks, unbundling between generation, supply, and networks, etc.
  • Promote and approve network codes and guidelines that establish common technical and commercial rules for transmission network operation, cross-border energy exchange, and congestion management.
  • Ensure non-discrimination in network access, supervising that tariffs and access conditions set by national regulators comply with EU law.

These competences mainly affect the transmission network due to its cross-border dimension, but also influence distribution network regulation by requiring principles of neutrality, transparency, and consumer protection throughout the chain.

Competition, state aid, and economic regulation

The Commission is the competent authority for competition defense and state aid in the energy sector. In transmission and distribution networks, this translates into:

  • Control of mergers and acquisitions affecting network operators or large integrated operators to prevent dominant positions.
  • Evaluation and authorization of public aid to network infrastructure (new interconnections, reinforcements, digitization, hydrogen projects, etc.), requiring that they do not unjustifiably distort competition.
  • Supervision of possible abuse of dominant position or anti-competitive practices related to network access and use.

Although network access tariffs are set by national regulators, the Commission can act if methodologies violate EU law principles or constitute disguised aid.

Cross-border infrastructure and planning

In large-scale transmission networks, the Commission has a key role in trans-European energy networks and interconnections:

  • Proposes and updates the framework of trans-European energy networks (TEN-E) and projects of common interest (PCI), which include major electrical and gas interconnections or hydrogen networks.
  • Coordinates, together with ACER and ENTSOs, the preparation of ten-year network development plans at the European level, which guide national planning.
  • Can grant European funding (e.g., through the Connecting Europe Facility) to strategic network projects, conditioning their design and schedule.

This competence mainly applies to high-voltage infrastructure and main gas pipelines; distribution networks remain primarily national responsibility, although influenced by internal market and climate-energy regulations.

Security of supply, energy transition, and coordination

The Commission also intervenes in functional and strategic aspects of networks:

  • Coordinates the application of European security of supply standards, which involve obligations on network capacity, crisis management, and solidarity mechanisms among States.
  • Integrates network needs into decarbonization frameworks (renewable targets, electrification, hydrogen), promoting that States adapt their networks to facilitate the energy transition.
  • Acts as a coordination forum among national regulators, network operators, and governments, especially in situations of tension in energy markets.

In summary, the Commission does not operate or run the networks but defines much of the rules of the game, ensures their application, and directs the integration of infrastructures into a more interconnected and decarbonized European energy market.

How do the European Commission and national regulators specifically coordinate in the regulation of electricity networks? What role do ACER and the ENTSOs play in the development of European network codes? How does EU state aid regulation affect the financing of new energy interconnections?

What legal requirements must EU countries meet to authorize the construction of new data centers?

EU countries do not have a single, specific regime for “data centers,” but to authorize their construction and commissioning, a set of common regulatory blocks applies: urban planning and permits, environmental assessment, energy and efficiency, and cybersecurity/digital infrastructure protection. Each Member State develops these requirements with its own legislation; in Spain's case, they are articulated through the Environmental Assessment Law, Land Law, building energy efficiency regulations, and critical infrastructure protection and network security rules. Below is a summary of the requirements at the EU level and an example of how they are implemented in Spain, where a more detailed framework exists in the available sources.

1. Urban planning and building permits

At the EU level, there is no general urban planning directive: land use planning is a national/local competence. Therefore, each country must integrate data centers into its own planning (land classification, permitted uses, easements, etc.) and require urban and major building permits.

In Spain, the basic conditions of land and building regulation are set by Royal Legislative Decree 7/2015, of October 30, which approves the consolidated text of the Land and Urban Rehabilitation Law (Land Law). This law requires respecting urban uses, meeting basic functionality, safety, and habitability requirements of buildings, and submitting any new construction (such as a data center) to the urban duties and permit requirements established by each autonomous community and municipality.

2. Environmental impact assessment and environmental authorizations

At the European level, Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects and Directive 2001/42/EC on strategic environmental assessment require environmental assessment for projects with significant impacts. Depending on the project design (size, resource consumption, emissions, impact on Natura 2000 network, etc.), a data center may be subject to ordinary or simplified assessment.

In Spain, these obligations are specified in Law 21/2013, of December 9, on environmental assessment (Law 21/2013), amended by Law 9/2018 (Law 9/2018). This law:

  • Unifies strategic environmental assessment of plans and programs and environmental impact assessment of projects.
  • Establishes basic annexes of projects subject to assessment nationwide.
  • Seeks to harmonize criteria among autonomous communities and strengthen legal certainty for promoters.

Besides environmental assessment, Member States usually require internal sectoral authorizations (emissions to air, discharges, noise, waste management, etc.), which in Spain rely on regional environmental quality legislation.

3. Energy efficiency and renewable energy requirements

At the EU scale, Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency and Directive 2010/31/EU on building energy performance (amended by Directive (EU) 2018/844) require Member States to set minimum efficiency requirements and energy certification systems. They also promote energy audits in large companies and encourage self-consumption and cogeneration.

In Spain, these principles are specified in three basic pieces:

  • Royal Decree 390/2021, of June 1, which approves the basic procedure for energy efficiency certification of buildings (RD 390/2021). It transposes Directive (EU) 2018/844 and requires energy efficiency certificates for new buildings, applicable to data centers as tertiary buildings.
  • Royal Decree 56/2016, of February 12, which transposes Directive 2012/27/EU on energy audits, supplier accreditation, and supply efficiency promotion (RD 56/2016). It obliges non-SME companies to carry out periodic energy audits, very relevant for large data centers.
  • Law 24/2013, of December 26, on the Electric Sector (Law 24/2013), and Royal Decree 244/2019, of April 5, on self-consumption of electric energy (RD 244/2019), which regulate grid access and connection and the administrative and technical conditions of self-consumption, key if the data center integrates its own renewable generation.

4. Information security, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructures

In the EU, the reference regulations are Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS) and its revision (NIS 2), which require Member States to impose security measures and incident notification on essential service operators and digital service providers, a category where many data centers may fit.

In Spain, digital infrastructure protection relies on several rules:

  • Law 8/2011, of April 28, establishing measures for the protection of critical infrastructures (Law 8/2011), developed by Royal Decree 704/2011, of May 20, approving the Regulation on critical infrastructure protection (RD 704/2011). If a data center is considered critical infrastructure, it must have operator security and specific protection plans.
  • Royal Decree-Law 12/2018, of September 7, on network and information system security (RDL 12/2018), which transposes the NIS Directive and sets security and notification obligations for essential operators and digital service providers.
  • Royal Decree 311/2022, of May 3, regulating the National Security Scheme (RD 311/2022), applicable to public sector systems and, by contractual extension, to many data center service providers to the Administration.

5. Other sectoral requirements

Additionally, Member States usually apply:

  • Industrial safety, electrical and thermal installation standards (in Spain, some are integrated through the Technical Building Code and sectoral regulations).
  • Data protection and confidentiality rules when the data center processes personal data (in the EU, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 –GDPR– and its national developments).
  • Labor requirements, occupational risk prevention, and, where applicable, incentives or conditions associated with public aid to digital infrastructures.

In summary, the EU sets the basic framework (environmental assessment, energy efficiency, cybersecurity), and each country – like Spain – develops it with its own sectoral legislation. Any new data center project must analyze, case by case, how these regulatory blocks intersect in the specific location where it is intended to be implemented.

How is Law 21/2013 on environmental assessment practically applied to a specific data center project in Spain? In which cases can a data center be considered critical infrastructure under Law 8/2011 and what additional obligations does this imply? What specific energy efficiency requirements would a data center building have under Royal Decree 390/2021 and self-consumption regulations?

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