Italy extends for another 15 days the controls on travelers coming from Spain due to the Ceuta crisis

Italy, like any State in the Schengen area, can only extend controls at its internal borders when it demonstrates that a serious threat to public order or internal security persists and that the measure remains necessary, proportionate, and temporary. The procedure and limits are set by the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EU) 2016/399), which requires motivated decisions, prior notification to the EU, and a maximum duration control, with intervention by the European Commission when controls are prolonged over time.

1. Material basis: when Italy can extend controls

The Schengen Borders Code allows the reintroduction—and then extension—of controls at internal borders only in exceptional cases. Italy must prove that:

• There is a serious threat to public order or internal security, for example linked to terrorism, migration crises, or major events requiring enhanced security.
• The extension of controls is a necessary and proportionate measure against that threat, taking into account its impact on free movement.
• Less restrictive alternative measures (enhanced police cooperation, mobile controls, information exchange, etc.) have been considered and are insufficient to address the risk.

The European Commission emphasizes that controls at internal borders are an exception and that States must work to gradually lift them, resorting to these alternative instruments whenever possible, as reflected in its communication on temporary controls in several States, including Italy (Commission press release, 06/02/2026).

2. Formal steps Italy must follow to extend controls

When Italy decides to prolong already reintroduced controls, the basic procedure is:

• Motivated internal decision: the Italian Government adopts a new decision (usually at the proposal of the Ministry of the Interior) that:
  • Describes the serious threat that persists.
  • Explains why the extension is necessary and proportionate.
  • Specifies which borders will be affected (e.g., air and sea connections with certain countries) and the specific period of the extension.
• Notification to the EU: pursuant to Articles 25 and following of Regulation (EU) 2016/399, Italy must communicate the extension to:
  • The European Commission.
  • Other Member States and Schengen-associated States.
  • The European Parliament, through the established mechanisms.

  This notification details the threat, justification, territorial scope, duration, and proportionality assessment. If the situation is foreseeable, the communication must be made with sufficient advance notice before the extension takes effect.

• Ongoing evaluation: the Government must commit to reviewing the situation before the expiry of each period and make clear that any new extension will require a “new motivated decision” based on an updated assessment of necessity and proportionality, in line with what is also applied in other States when extending temporary controls.

3. Duration limits and role of the European Commission

The Schengen Borders Code establishes strict limits on the total duration of internal controls:

• Generally, for serious threats linked to foreseeable situations, controls are authorized for limited periods, which can be extended, but with an ordinary maximum of two years of continuous control.
• When controls are prolonged for more than 12 months for the same reason, the Commission must issue an opinion assessing whether the extension is necessary and proportionate and what alternative measures have been used to minimize the impact on free movement (opinions on temporary controls, 06/02/2026).
• In exceptional and persistent situations of serious threat, the Code foresees the possibility of an additional extension beyond the ordinary limit, but always under very strict scrutiny and maintaining the logic of a temporary last-resort measure.

In practice, this means that Italy cannot chain indefinite extensions: each extension must be justified anew, respect temporal ceilings, and be subject to political and legal control by the Commission and other Member States.

4. Safeguards and political control

The Commission and other States monitor that Italian extensions:

• Do not become a “tolerated structural barrier”, but remain exceptionally temporary.
• Are coordinated with neighboring countries to avoid distortions in the functioning of Schengen.
• Respect fundamental rights and do not lead to undue discrimination, especially in migration crisis contexts.

In summary, to extend internal controls Italy must combine a motivated national decision with European notification and supervision, keep the measure within well-defined temporal limits, and demonstrate at all times that the restriction on free movement is justified by a serious threat, is proportionate, and will be maintained only as long as that threat persists.

Matteo Piantedosi is the Interior Minister of Italy in Giorgia Meloni's Government. From this position, he leads the Italian Ministry of the Interior (Ministero dell’Interno), responsible for the State's internal security, public order, and much of the management of migration and border control. In the consulted sources, he is simply presented as Interior Minister, without explicitly specifying his formal membership in a particular political party, beyond his belonging to the Executive headed by Meloni.

Piantedosi's competencies can be quite clearly deduced from the actions recorded in the sources. Firstly, he exercises political leadership over the Italian security forces and bodies. In a parliamentary debate about the presence of agents from the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Milan Winter Olympics, Piantedosi himself emphasized that “security and public order are guaranteed exclusively by our police forces,” making clear that maintaining internal order and protecting citizen security within the national territory fall under his ministry and its dependent bodies (Demócrata).

Secondly, the Interior Minister assumes a central role in migration policy and border control. During the migration crisis linked to the massive arrival of people in Ceuta and the subsequent Italian response, it was Piantedosi who chaired the Committee on Immigration and Border Security Analysis at the Ministry of the Interior and ordered the suspension of the Schengen area with Spain and the closure of maritime and air borders with our country, as well as the coordinated reinforcement of controls with France at the land border (Demócrata). This same capacity is reflected in subsequent decisions to extend or adjust those controls depending on the evolution of the migration crisis, which he himself communicated to his Spanish counterpart Fernando Grande-Marlaska and to European institutions.

Thirdly, Piantedosi promotes and executes internal security policy in legislative and technological terms. A notable example is the approval, by the Council of Ministers, of two legislative decrees to regulate the use of artificial intelligence by security forces. As he explained in a press conference, the objective of these regulations is to frame the use of AI in areas such as biometric controls and video surveillance systems, providing the police with advanced tools without reaching a model of “mass surveillance” or a generalized “Big Brother,” always maintaining human supervision and the requirement of judicial coverage for its use (Demócrata).

From these actions, it follows that among his functions are included:

• The general direction of public order and internal security policy.
• The coordination of national police forces and the definition of their operational framework.
• The adoption of exceptional measures regarding borders, migration controls, and temporary suspension or reintroduction of Schengen, in coordination with other ministries and EU partners.
• The promotion of regulations and decrees governing security tools and technologies, such as artificial intelligence applied to police work.
• The chairing of committees and analysis bodies on immigration and border security, which serve as a technical basis for government decisions.
• The supervision of international cooperation in internal security matters, both with other EU Member States and third countries, including operational police and migration control agreements.

On a strictly personal or partisan level, the chronicles covering Matteo Piantedosi's activity focus on his institutional role as Interior Minister within Giorgia Meloni's Executive and on the decisions he makes regarding security, immigration, and public order. However, the consulted texts do not explicitly specify an organic affiliation to a particular party; he is portrayed as the holder of the Interior portfolio of the current Italian Government, without further detail on his formal party membership.

In summary, Piantedosi concentrates the classic attributions of an Interior Minister in a European parliamentary system: guarantor of public order, coordinator of police forces, political responsible for decisions on borders and migration, and promoter of regulation framing the State's security tools. His relevance has been especially evident in episodes such as the migration crisis linked to Ceuta, the controversy over the presence of foreign agents during the Winter Games, or the regulation of police use of artificial intelligence, where his portfolio has played a decisive role.

The consulted sources do not provide a detailed numerical breakdown of votes and seats from the 2022 Italian general elections, nor an exhaustive and updated list of all ministers in Giorgia Meloni's Government with their portfolios. However, they do allow a fairly clear picture of the resulting political map and the political composition of the Executive, which is probably the most relevant to understand the current Italian situation.

Political results of the 2022 general elections

The last general elections in Italy were held on September 25, 2022, and led to the Government headed by Giorgia Meloni. Although the located documentation does not show concrete figures of vote percentages or seats per party, it confirms a central fact: these elections consolidated the rise of Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), Meloni's party, making it the leading force of the Italian right.

In several subsequent analyses on the European panorama, FdI is described as the party that, from a marginal position years ago, now leads the Italian Government and plays a prominent role in the European conservative space. Other cited journalistic pieces highlight that:

• Fratelli d’Italia is at the center of a right-wing bloc that includes Lega (League) and Forza Italia.
• The electoral victory of this bloc allows a stable radical-conservative right-wing Government, which will subsequently translate into a relevant presence of Meloni's environment in European institutions.
• The contrast is often established with the situation of the right in other countries, using the “Meloni example” as a success case for like-minded forces in Europe.

In parallel, traditional center-left and anti-system parties – the Democratic Party (PD) and the Five Star Movement – move to the opposition. The available information does not detail their exact numbers but makes clear that they fall behind the right-wing bloc led by Meloni, and that this balance of forces explains the parliamentary majority of the new governing coalition.

Political composition of Giorgia Meloni's Government

Regarding the Executive's composition, the news and analyses consulted agree that Meloni's Government is a right-wing coalition Government structured around three parties:

• Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), led by Giorgia Meloni, who holds the presidency of the Council of Ministers and controls the main political positions in the cabinet.
• Lega, headed by Matteo Salvini. In information about Italian domestic politics, Salvini is referred to as Deputy Prime Minister, confirming the League's weight as a central coalition partner.
• Forza Italia, the party heir to Silvio Berlusconi's space. In a European People's Party analysis, it is made explicit that “the populars govern with Meloni through Forza Italia,” clearly indicating Forza Italia as the third pillar of the governmental majority.

Beyond these three main actors, journalistic pieces also highlight the role of certain figures linked to Meloni in the European sphere, such as Raffaele Fitto, identified as one of her strong men and later appointed to a vice-presidency in the European Commission. This underscores how Meloni's Government has projected its influence beyond Italy, inserting itself into the dynamics of the European right.

In summary, Meloni's Government is characterized by:

• Being presided over by Giorgia Meloni, leader of Fratelli d’Italia.
• Relying on a right-wing parliamentary majority arising from the 2022 general elections.
• Formally integrating as coalition partners Fratelli d’Italia, Lega, and Forza Italia, with leaders of these parties in key ministries and deputy prime ministerships.
• Positioning itself, at the European level, within the space of conservatives and radical right, with direct connections to political families such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the European People's Party through Forza Italia's role.

Therefore, although a complete numerical table of votes and seats is not available here, it can be stated with certainty that the 2022 Italian general elections resulted in a clear victory for the right-wing bloc led by Fratelli d’Italia, and that the current Government of Giorgia Meloni is a coalition of three parties – FdI, Lega, and Forza Italia – around the figure of the Prime Minister, with their leaders occupying the main positions of power in the cabinet.